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Changes in ratio between force and non-force methods of influence of the European Union and Russia in modern realities

Introduction

Changes in the modern world and growing confrontation between Russia and the West put questions on the agenda concerning alterations of the correlation of force and non-force methods of influence in international relations. Today, it can be said almost with confidence that the risk of war between the leading world states has reached its highest level since early 1980s. As in the days of the former USSR and the Cold War, the threat from Russia is of systemic nature.

The study illustrates differences in perception and use of soft and hard power instruments in the EU and Russia, reflects theoretical and practical evolution of soft power and explains general trends. Experts and politicians are increasingly discussing the threat of war between world powers[1].

The Ukrainian crisis, mutual sanctions and the results of the US elections give reasons to suggest that modern states have returned to a policy from the position of strength. The ruling elite of the Russian Federation, having violated with the West and the international community not so much for geopolitical reasons as for preserving its power and domination in the post-Soviet space. Russia has actually entered the path of self-isolation and power confrontation with other states in the form of a „hybrid war”. The point is a combination of traditional hard power methods of waging foreign policy with soft latent ones: engaging internal pressure groups, using information warfare arsenal[2].

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[1] Д. Шерр, *Нові ризики війни*, https://dt.ua/article/print/internal/novi-riziki-viyni-279542_.html (18 IX 2018); V. Ivanchenko, D. Khromakov, A. Margoev, K. Sukhoverkhov, *Power in International Politics: Does the World Go Hard?*, http://www.sant.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/university-consortium/files/report_on_hard_and_soft_power_hse-mgimo_updated.pdf (19 IX 2018).

[2] *„Гібридна” війна Росії – виклик і загроза для Європи*, http://old.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/upload/GIBRID-WAR-FINAL-1-1.pdf (19 X 2018).

Soft power concept

A powerful political, economic, and cultural foundation is needed to pursue a soft power policy. An attractive image of the country is formed not only through information campaigns, but also at the level of basic goal-setting. As a prerequisite, a strategic development project is needed, which offers its reciprocal variants to pressing socio-economic and political challenges. The key concept here is the category of leadership. A state that is not ready to play the role of a leader is not capable of creating mechanisms for generating soft power. The founder of the soft power concept, Joseph Nye, notes in this regard: „A country can achieve the desired results in world politics because other countries – admiring its values, imitating its example, striving for its level of prosperity and openness – want to follow it[3]".

At its core, the technology of „soft power" involves the use of intangible resources, cultural achievements, methods of persuasion and political ideals to provide the necessary influence on the population of foreign countries without the use of traditional methods of power, including military pressure. „Soft power" „is forcing others to want the results that you would like to get". „Soft power" is more than just a persuasion, agreement or the ability to propel you to do something with the help of arguments, although all of this are important elements of this power. „Soft power" is also the ability to attract, and attraction often leads to mutual understanding. In other words, „soft power" is the ability to get what you want through attraction[4].

„Soft power" according to J. Nye, is characterized by three main elements: 1) culture (in the wide sense of meaning); 2) political ideology (political values); 3) foreign policy (diplomacy). The counterbalance to soft power is „hard power", which is usually associated with a combination of military power, economic and political potentials.

In contrast to „soft power", which applies instruments of consensus, foreign policy activities, cooperation, „hard power" is based on the methods of imposing and compulsion. The classic instruments of political influence – hard and soft forces – are trying to adapt to a new political reality, to a new environment that is not friendly and pliable either for purely „soft" or purely „hard" technologies. While arranging them and combining them with „hard" methods, „smart power" appears[5].

The author of „soft power" concept argues that in the information age, the real struggle on the world stage will unfold not between armies, but between ideas

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[3] J. S. Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, Cambridge 2004, p. 191.
[4] *Ibidem*, p. 5.
[5] J. Nye, Jr., *A Smarter Superpower*, „Foreign Policy" 2007, no. 18 (april).

and systems of values. J. Nye considered an important part of the „soft power" strategy to be its ideological content – narrative. In order to be influential on the world stage, an international actor must have its own history, within which all its foreign policy activities take place[6].

The former Soviet Union had a significant resource for the implementation of soft power policies based on a universalist global project. After giving it up in 1991, Russia practically lost the corresponding potential. The collapse of the Soviet statehood led to a fundamental shift in the Russian elite's view of the world and its place in it.

Soft power of the European Union

The EU is essentially a long-term project whose goal is: through political and economic integration, based on understanding of the common values and interests of EU member states, to prevent possible conflicts and wars on the European continent. The strategic imperative of the Europe project was overcoming centuries-old contradictions in relations between the states of the region and replacing armed conflicts with competition[7].

Along with its economic power, an important factor of the impact of the European Union on international processes is its cultural and cultural-political influence. Both the EU and its member states have branched institutional system of soft power. Any academic, think-tank, civil society, state-promoted institutions (British Council, Goethe Institute, La Francophonie etc.) can be regarded as soft power (more precisely – public diplomacy) agents. Soft power institutions as well may be party-financed foundations, as, for instance, they are in Germany (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Friedrich Naumann Stiftung, and others). EU soft power works in accordance with EU rules and laws: if a state or a company wants to work with the EU, it must comply with its legislation. Cultural attractiveness of Europe and Europeans, the idea of reliability and economic stability of the EU, soft influence of political values, orientation of European politicians toward cooperation while solving international problems involving multilateral institutions, emphasis on non-military means of resolving conflicts, significantly distinguish characteristics of the EU „soft power" in the international community, as J. Nye emphasizes[8].

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[6] *Ibidem.*

[7] N. Popesku, A. Wilson, *The Limits of Enlargement-lite: European and Russian Power in the Troubled Neighbourhood: Policy Report*, European Council on Foreign Policies, London 2009.

[8] Д. Най, *„Мягкая" сила и американо-европейские отношения*, „Свободная мысль-XXI" 2004, no. 10, p. 12-29.

The concept of „European values" includes various different integral parts – observance of human civil and political rights and freedoms; ethno-religious tolerance; resolving conflicts by negotiations; maintenance of economic and political stability basing on social solidarity; safeguarding of security. These values are shared by all united states and have an impact on the global society. European values largely predetermined the formation of new political thinking that contributed to the transition of mankind from the confrontation of the Cold War period to detente and overcoming international tensions. The most important instrument of cultural and intellectual influence of the European Union on countries and regions is its experience of interstate economic and partly political integration.

The phenomenon of supranationality in the EU is a unique phenomenon in world practice connected with the transformation of the political systems of European countries as a result of their participation in the process of regional integration. Supranationality as the quality of the EU political system is realized in the activities of its institutions due to the principle of subsidiarity, which lies at the heart of the powers and competences between actors at different levels of the power pyramid[9].

Russia's geostrategic project and its failure

The question of what the Russian development project is, at least in its projection onto the post-Soviet space, remained unresolved, despite the ongoing process of Eurasian integration. It was sustained in the old logic: to unite around Russia is necessary first of all because it is beneficial from the economic point of view. The main difficulty was that, arguing in this dimension, to show greater attractiveness of the Russian project comparing to the West, is extremely problematic. Especially in the case of Ukraine having close economic ties with Europe and mainly pro-Western elite. The Eurasian project did not possess any other value content that would allow Russian soft power to act in other spheres. This circumstance in the Ukrainian case was disarming Moscow. The Kremlin was sharply criticized inside the country for being passive in the Ukrainian direction, but Russia could not offer anything fundamentally new, different from the old formula „economy + contacts between elites".

The idea of cultural penetration in the post-Soviet space, particularly within countries, has been in the air since 2007-2008, when, according to presidential

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9   В. Копійка, Т. Шинкаренко, *Європейський Союз: заснування і етапи становлення*, Київ 2001.

decrees, the Russian World Foundation and the Federal Agency for Compatriots Living Abroad (Rossotrudnichestvo) were created[10].

At the same time, a similar vision began to take shape in the Russian Orthodox Church, which, after electing Metropolitan Kirill to the patriarchal throne, began to actively raise the theme of „triune Orthodox Russia".

At the official level, this discourse was legitimized during 2011-12 electoral campaign of Vladimir Putin and in his first public speeches as President, in which Russia was comprehended as a separate civilization[11]. The topic of closeness of Ukrainian and Russian peoples, about which Russian leaders have repeatedly spoken of as a single people, has been rising more and more often[12].

In fact, it was about Moscow's first attempt in all the post-Soviet years to work out some kind of the own leadership project in the territory that the Soviet Union once occupied. Its tactical advantage was that it did not claim globality and in this sense did not enter into an unpromising struggle with the western project[13].

However, it was openly positioned as an alternative within the territory culturally close to Russia. This model began to be projected onto Ukraine from 2008, when the celebrations on occasion of the 1020-th anniversary of the Baptism of Rus turned into an inter-church conflict. At that time, it was about the possibility of granting official status to the Kiev Patriarchate and the subsequent formation of a single local Orthodox church independent of Moscow.

For Ukraine, the country's movement to the West was inseparably linked with the creation of the national Ukrainian state, which seemed „unfinished" without creating a single local Ukrainian church. In contrast to it, Russian secular and church authorities for the first time put forward the idea of an inseparable cultural space, of which Ukraine was a crucial part[14].

The main conductor of this course from Moscow was the Russian Orthodox Church. Patriarch Kirill set the strengthening of religious and cultural ties with

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[10]   *Фонд „Русский мир" создан во исполнение Указа Президента РФ от 21 июня 2007 года*, http://www.russkiymir.ru/fund/thedecree-of-the-president-of-the-russian-federation-on-creation-of-fund-russianworld.php#1 (10 VIII 2018); *Федеральное агентство по делам соотечественников, проживающих за рубежом (Россотрудничество) было создано Указом Президента РФ от 6 сентября 2008 года*, http://kremlin.ru/acts/bank/28020 (10 VIII 2018).

[11]   *Президент Путин полагает, что российскую безопасность укрепляют ядерное оружие и православие*, http://www.pravoslavie.ru/news/20667.htm (19 X 2018).

[12]   Н. А. Комлева, *Украинский кризис как элемент „тактики анаконды"*, http://www.space-time.ru/assets/files/2-16.2014/2226-7271provr-st2-16.2014.13-komleva.pdf (19 X 2018).

[13]   А. В. Будаев, А. В. Манойло, И. А. Чихарев, А. В. Демидов, О. В. Столетов, *„Мягкая сила" в мировой политической динамике*, http://kandidat2.webdevelopers.su/urok/myagkaya-sila-v-mirovoy-politicheskoy-dinamike#_ftn33 (2 IX 2018).

[14]   В. В. Карякин, *Военно-политические стратегии США и угрозы России*, [в:] *Аналитические обзоры РИСИ*, ред. И. А. Романов, Москва 2014; Н. А. Комлева, *op.cit.*

Ukraine as one of his main goals. Regular patriarchal visits to Kiev (Kirill's predecessor visited Ukraine only three times in 18 years), Kirill's statements about his desire to learn Ukrainian, persistent rumors about the possibility of transferring the patriarchal throne to Kiev – all this was aimed at avoidance of Ukraine's church separation and preserve it as a sphere of Russia's cultural influence.

Russia strongly used the confessional-ecclesiastical factor in its own policy towards the Ukrainian people, – from misappropriation of national historical past of Ukrainians to disturbance of public sentiment and destabilization of political situation in our country.

It should also be mentioned that representatives of the Ukrainian (MP) and the Russian Orthodox Church (UOC-MP) and the Russian Orthodox Church regularly conducted information-manipulative campaigns to discredit the Ukrainian state. The emphasis was on the alleged failure of the incumbent authorities to ensure that religious freedom is respected on the territory under their control.

The key diversely presented message that is being spread today by the ideologists of Moscow Patriarchate is as follows: „There is *the only true canonical church* in the Ukrainian Orthodoxy, it is the UOC (MP) which is suffering from *persecution for the part of the schismatics*, on whom the responsibility should be entrusted for *the production of conflicts in inter-church relations, violation of rights and freedoms of the believers*[15]".

Taking into account the fact that both the Ukrainian and Russian Orthodox churches are much more than ordinary public organizations that are formally independent of the state, then it becomes clear that it concerns formation of a new mechanism for Moscow to realize its soft power. This project faced objective difficulties, since the church in the modern world is a special institution with its own, sometimes very different from secular interests. It also had to be carried out in a situation where a lot was already lost.

It is worth to note that by this time the Western soft power has taken deep roots in Ukraine. Positive image of prosperous in all respects West, ready to integrate Ukraine into its composition and thereby realize its post-Soviet dream, was still very high for Ukrainians. At least one generation managed to grow up in conditions of information and cultural domination of the West.

It was impossible to indoctrinate it in new directions for several years. Political and business elites, including the eastern ones, the most influential of them, despite cultural and psychological closeness to Russia, often reinforced by personal and business contacts, were oriented mostly towards the West. Thus, Russia underestimated the potential of Ukraine's movement in the opposite direction

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[15] *Україна заважає патріарху Кирилу підготуватися до Всеправославного собору*, http://risu.org.ua/ua/index/all_news/ukraine_and_world/international_relations/59901/ (28 IX 2018).

and overestimated the reliability of cultural and historical ties between the two nations.

Russia, having lost the idea of its leadership in the post-Soviet space and having no its own development project, in fact, could not master the mechanisms of soft power in Ukraine. The problem was not that Moscow did not allocate enough funds to maximize its influence on Ukrainian public opinion and introduced fewer NGOs in Ukraine than the United States. The point is that these channels had nothing to be filled with. At the pre-crisis stage, the appeal to the historical and cultural common character of the two peoples could not essentially change the situation. The course to the West was taken, and even in the traditionally pro-Russian regions it was supported by more than a quarter of the population. In the mass consciousness of the Ukrainians there was no clear correlation between belonging to the single Russian cultural field and the political loyalty to Russia as its core[16].

On the other hand, an objective obstacle to implementation of Russian soft power in Ukraine was the fact that this activity would have to be carried out in the situation of the presence in Ukraine of a national project of state construction, which was largely based on the rejection of Russian cultural influence. For modern Ukraine, Russia is in many ways a hostile and aggressive state, correlating itself with which the young state is determining its own identity. Therefore, any latent Russian influence was considered a priori in Kiev as a threat. In this situation, the cultural expansion of Russia in Ukraine, the idea of the need for which Moscow had come to by early 2010s, appeared to be seriously hampered.

Another objective circumstance is: in principle, it is difficult for Russia to operate with categories of soft power policy. For its successful implementation, it is necessary to some extent to be aware of the own exclusiveness, the exponential national example of historical development. Basing on this potential, the West and China are developing their soft power. The Soviet Union had a great resource in its time. Russia, which gave up the model of global and regional leadership in 1991, is facing difficulties on this path.

The policy of the Russian Federation was based on this starting-point, which absolutely ignored the soft power factor of the West. The EU and the USA have invested huge resources in promotion of a positive image of „the West" through multiple foundations, NGOs, cultural and educational exchanges. There was simply no consolidated power within the Ukrainian society that would support pro-Russian or pro-Eurasian direction during the demonstrations that took place after suspension of the negotiations on the EU's Association Agreement. Having used a great number of means, the West managed to create an attractive image that, due to the emotional impact on public opinion, nullified all the pragmatic

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[16] А. А. Вершинин, *Украинская политика России: между мягкой и жесткой силами*, https://www.ogt-journal.com/jour/article/view/246 (24 X 2018).

arguments of the Russian side[17]. Although public polls showed an approximate parity between the supporters of integration with the EU and the Customs Union, it was the first ones that set the information background, and therefore, had the opportunity to exert influence on state policy[18].

By 2013, it had become absolutely clear that interests of Russia and the West in Ukraine differed. Moscow increasingly evidently refused to accept the rules of the game finally established with the end of Cold War, and questioned the global leadership of the West. As a result, the Russian Federation used classical hard power against the western soft power, having a number of important advantages while realizing it[19].

Russian „soft power" had no success in Ukraine because it failed to convince Ukrainians of the attractiveness of Russian culture, language, traditional values and economic prospects. Russia was unable to put forward its project, which would not necessarily be global, as once was the Soviet one, but would allow to formulate a new development agenda for the post-Soviet space, which is confronted in many ways with similar challenges[20]. The point is that the soft power of Russia is associated with the discourses of the common past, and the soft power of Europe is grounded on the idea of future prosperity and success.

Problems of European integration: difficult stage of development

However, today there are many serious crises which the West has to fight against, and not always successfully. First of all, it concerns a clear tendency of returning to the model of „secluded national states" and attempts to confront the processes of globalization that are gaining strength in the US and Europe, as well as in other regions of the world. In the light of these trends, the issue of the direction of European integration is relevant.

In 2004-2007, the European Union experienced a massive wave of expansion. The success of the model, ideology and process of unification of Europe was evident – many states of Central and Eastern Europe, representatives of the post-socialist camp, expressed their desire to join the EU or its programs with the willingness to adopt its values and rules. The EU has become the center of attraction[21].

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[17]   V. Ivanchenko *et al.*, *op.cit.*

[18]   *За вступление Украины в ЕС выступают 41% граждан, за Таможенный союз – 35%* [10 X 2013], http://zn.ua/POLITICS/zavstuplenie-ukrainy-v-es-vystupayut-41-grazhdan-za-tamoz-hennyy-soyuz-35-130295_ (17 X 2018).

[19]   А. В. Будаев *et al.*, *op.cit.*

[20]   А. А. Вершинин, *op.cit.*

[21]   В. Копійка, Т. Шинкаренко, *op.cit.*

Today, the world is witnessing lots of crises that are shaking the European Union from inside and outside, attempts to overcome internal instability and mistrust of citizens. Problems of coordination and solidarity in the European Union are obvious. There are fierce debates concerning principles of Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU, not only at the national level, but also at the European supranational level[22]. The main problem is that an attempt to formulate a European supranational policy is realized in the absence of an integral European civil society. The emergence of misunderstandings results from different national identities of the EU member states, and weak „federal" cohesion.

In the process of decision-making not only national interests, but also national stereotypes often work. National governments that have a significant impact on the common foreign policy of the EU are sometimes not interested in its full realization and in limiting their own authorities and spheres of competence. The source of contradictions is often the problem of harmonizing relations between various institutions of the European Union, in particular, the European Parliament and the European Commission[23].

The overcoming of existing problems is first of all on the agenda, and only then new projects should be considered. In this case, new projects can be hardly called ambitious, such as the Single Internal Market or the Economic and Monetary Union. The problem of lack of large-scale projects in the EU is due to many reasons.

Thus, today's ultimate goal of European integration is not clear or apprehended by the elites and the population. Previously, everything was clear enough. It was striving for peace, preventing a new war, then increasing economic efficiency and affirming the effectiveness of the EU in a globalizing world. But in today's realities, the goal of integration is blurred – only general statements from officials can be heard and lack of their understanding and support by the EU citizens can be observed. Also, today there are no „pan-European" leaders and inspirers as Jean Monet and Jacques Delors, supported by national and supranational elite and the population. Official representatives of EU institutions are more perceived as officials and technocrats, but not as ideologists and leaders.

The proposal for the integration of the political and military sphere is ambiguously perceived by the national states[24]. It is also unlikely that integration is

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[22] V. Vdovychenko, *Que vadis, dear EU? (The evolution of European security strategies approaches in the changing European Union)*, „Європейські історичні студії" 2018, no. 9, p. 6-20.

[23] А. Мартинов, *Спільна зовнішня і безпекова політика Європейського Союзу: основні етапи розвитку*, http://eustudies.history.knu.ua/andrij-martynov-spilna-zovnishnya-i-bezpekova-polityka-yevropejskogo-soyuzu-osnovni-etapy-rozvytku/ (20 IX 2018).

[24] Г. Мінгазутдінова, *Трансформація військової політики та політики безпеки в Європі на тлі „української кризи" 2014 р.*, http://eustudies.history.knu.ua/galyna-mingazutdinova-transformatsiya-vijskovoyi-polityky-ta-polityky-bezpeky-v-yevropi-na-tli-ukrayinskoyi-kryzy-2014-r/ (16 IX 2018).

widespread – the big issue is the adoption of new members in the EU and even the emergence of new candidates, especially against the background of Brexit and the resulting uncertainty[25].

As a result, the EU has to solve current problems in already integrated areas – in the sphere of single internal market (for example, on the agenda is creating a single digital market), in the field of health care, infrastructure, energy, etc[26].

But will it be enough to increase the potential of influence of the European Union? Moreover, the modern generation, which did not see the Second World War of 1939-45, is more demanding on the EU and does not perceive, does not realize the original argument of the unification of Europe for the sake of peace. The European Union is looking for a way out of existential crises, while Europe itself is gradually ceasing to be perceived as the center of world political processes by the Europeans themselves. The surging wave of nationalism and the popularity of right-wing parties in the EU states show that lots of values and results of European integration are being questioned by the EU citizens, who have recently been increasingly inclined to sympathize with right-wing parties.

According to experts of the Economist Intelligence Unit, during 2016-2017, the so called „retreat of democracy" took place in the countries that are trying to maintain a democratic political regime with varying level of success. Its main features were: lower level of citizens' participation in elections and political process, problems with national authorities fulfilling their duties, falling trust in public institutions, widening gap between political elites and voters, collapse of independent mass media, attack on civil rights, mainly on the freedom of speech[27]. In practical terms, the „retreat of democracy" resulted in numerous electoral victories of those political forces and leaders who managed to take advantage of general disappointment of people because of irresponsibility of traditional parties and the alienation of state institutions from public interests[28]. It should be noted that, unlike developed Western states, which are protected by social stability and experience of close partnership within the framework of the EU and NATO, Ukraine has fallen into a situation of „lagging democracy" at a time when the distance between the expected changes and the real state of affairs, even in conditions of relative social and political stabilization and reduction of the threat of war, was

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[25] С. Толстов, *Проблеми та пріоритети України в умовах кризи європейської безпеки*, http://uaforeignaffairs.com/ua/ekspertna-dumka/view/article/problemi-ta-prioriteti-ukrajini-v-umovakh-krizi-jevropei/ (16 IX 2018).

[26] *Кризові явища в єврозоні та їх вплив на політичні трансформації в ЄС: Аналітична записка*, http://www.niss.gov.ua/articles/772/ (19 IX 2018).

[27] *Democracy Index 2017. The Economist Intelligence Unit*, https://www.eiu.com/topic/democracy-index (19 X 2018).

[28] А. Мартинов, *op.cit.*

perceived by the citizens much more critically than during gradual onset of ruling elites to democratic institutions.

In case of crises, some achievements began to play against the EU. Thus the freedom of movement and existing social policy have let aggravate the migration crisis. The EU does not know how to effectively use the migration resource without prejudice of its people. Social benefits and ineffective policies for the integration of refugees and migrants into the European environment cause a lot of problems and challenges in the sphere of freedom, justice, security and European economy.

Another precedent – Brexit – is just gaining momentum; it is not entirely clear how serious the consequences of a possible UK exit from the EU will be for further development of integration. Is it possible at all to face rolling back and gradual disintegration of the Union? Or Brexit, on the contrary, will make the EU more united, since the main Eurosceptic and initiator of flexible integration concept is leaving the European Union?

On the whole, the European Union is more and more inclined to the choice of flexible integration – the way when states will move towards integration goals in accordance with their readiness.

The Eastern partnership offers no perspective of joining the EU, and at some point it just stops working and attracting its recipients. EU grants its financial and consulting assistance to its Eastern partners on reforms instead of accepting the EU „acquis communautaire”. But, as the Ukrainian case showed, expansion of EU norms and europeanization did not imply creating area of stability and peace. Europeanization today does not guarantee peace and prosperity, and it is a serious blow to the European soft power. Hard power instruments i.e. restrictive measures used against Russia, have not reached their goals and did not change the political regime in Russia. The EU does not use coercion tools to make Ukraine more active with reforms or with the Minsk process. And it only demonstrates a very strong disproportion between soft and hard power in the EU and incapability to adopt the smart power approach[29].

Thus, in addition to choosing a path, the challenge for the EU is to preserve achievements, since the accumulated problems can undermine the success of the European Union. And this challenge is one of the most serious in the whole period of development of the European Communities and the Union. These very problems undermine the potential of EU influence in Eastern Europe[30].

The analysis of the EU's leadership potential testifies that the foreign policy instrumentation of „soft power” is more in keeping with the objectives of the EU's foreign policy than the use of a force resource. At the same time, the 2014 events

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[29]   V. Ivanchenko *et al.*, *op.cit.*

[30]   С. Толстов, *op.cit.*

have revealed the need for a consolidated work of the European community in the „hard" security and defense issues. Indeed, even such a „soft power" embodiment as the European Union cannot exist without defense capability.

The RF aggression has shown how important it is to hold a unified course in European foreign policy in the prevailing conditions. The EU great economic potential is the evidence of the possibility to exert its economic pressure or encouragement, which is an element of „hard power" in EU politics. Thus, the imposition of economic sanctions against Russia became a timely and collegial decision, the format of which has been essentially developed within the EU over the years and which has shown its effectiveness.

The EU strategy for domestic and foreign policy „Common Vision, Common Actions: A Stronger Europe", approved in June 2016, offers a new vision for the EU's global role to ensure peace and security, demonstrating readiness to secure its borders and citizens. The EU recognizes that Russia today represents a major strategic challenge, since it has strengthened its military presence in the region.

The EU Global Strategy for domestic and foreign policy „Common Vision, Common Actions: A Stronger Europe", says that Russia's violation of international law and the destabilization of Ukraine, as the pinnacle of protracted conflicts in the Black Sea region, called into question the European security order at its core[31]. Therefore, the priority objectives of cooperation between the EU and Ukraine in the field of security are the expansion of military-political dialogue, training of military specialists, holding common military exercises and participation in peacekeeping missions[32].

Conclusions

In conditions of global instability and geopolitical shifts in the modern world, the promotion of national interests depends on new ideas, economic innovations and mutually beneficial and equal partnership. Russia has no chance of successful promotion of its soft power because: 1) uses the post-Soviet potential; 2) has inexpressive Russian development model (development priorities, ineffective political and social system); 3) time factor plays against: generations with different cultural and linguistic traditions grew up in post-Soviet countries.

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[31] *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign And Security Policy*, https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/sites/globalstrategy/files/ eugs_review_web.pdf (21 X 2018); J.-C. Juncker, *Ukrainian Lessons*, http://news.postimees. ee/2795554/jean-claude-juncker-ukrainian-lessons (14 VII 2017).

[32] M. Britz, M. Pankovski, L. Ohman, *Developments in Security Policy: European and US Considerations Regarding the War in Ukraine*, Stockholm 2016.

At the same time, Moscow is more experienced using its hard power both in military and economic fields. Russian and European hard forces in the territories of Eastern Europe are not balanced. Russia's actions present a serious challenge to basic principles of contemporary European and world order. RF's aggression and military intervention against Ukraine put on the agenda the issue of preserving territorial integrity of the European state.

European integration of Ukraine remains a key priority of Ukraine's foreign policy. Despite all the complexities and contradictions of the integration process, the European idea is a consolidating factor that unites both political elites and Ukrainian society as a whole. If the EU does not use its hard power (economic power) to ensure sovereignty and Europeanization of Ukraine, it can expect permanent political instability and armed conflicts on its eastern borders in the future.

Abstract

Galyna Piskorska, Natalia Yakovenko

**Changes in ratio between force and non-force methods of influence
of the European Union and Russia in modern realities**

The European Union and Russia represent different approaches to the balance between hard and soft power. The European Union is stronger in its soft power, but lacks hard power instruments. It is connected with the nature of the political entity as there is no EU army. Armies are in the competence of the EU member states. The key power source is the attractiveness of the European Union for the nations, acceptability of European norms and standards. The concept of „European values" includes a number of integral parts – observance of human civil and political rights and freedoms; ethno-religious tolerance; resolving conflicts by negotiations; maintenance of economic and political stability basing on social solidarity; safeguarding of security. These values are shared by all European states and have an impact on the global society.

Russia inherited the USSR military experience, diplomatic schools and schools of negotiations. But ideological work applied in the USSR quickly turned out to be outdated in the modern world. In recent years Russia has tried to adapt soft power concept to its foreign policy and to become more active in public diplomacy track. Nevertheless Russian „soft power" had no success in Ukraine because it failed to convince Ukrainians of the attractiveness of Russian culture, language, traditional values and economic prospects. Moreover, Russia strongly used the confessional-ecclesiastical factor in its own policy towards the Ukrainian people.

Soon it became clear that interests of Russia and the West in Ukraine are absolutely different.

Russia is more experienced using its hard power both in military and economic fields. Russian and European hard forces in the territories of Eastern Europe are not balanced. Russia's actions present a serious challenge to basic principles of contemporary European and world order.

Keywords: hard power, soft power, the EU, European integration, Russia, methods of influence

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