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Unique solutions of the French Republic in the fight against terrorism and radicalisation

Abstract

Experience and solutions of the French Republic, where anti-terrorist structures are constantly developed, should be a signpost for other countries. Creation of unique deradicalization programs and conducting a policy of responding to cases of extremism are actions that can be implemented in Poland. In addition, the use of social media to combat terrorist content and to provide information about threats shows the innovative use of the Internet. It is also worth noting the involvement of French municipal guards and medical services in the process of responding to terrorism, as well as highlighting the role of NGOs working to support victims. Decades of France's struggle with different types of terrorism have meant that methods that would be effective in countering radicalisation and threats have been improved and reviewed over the years. In the author's opinion, it would be advisable to take advantage of the French experience and implement at least some of the solutions in Poland.

Keywords:

anti-terrorism,
France,
Poland,
radicalization,
deradicalization

Terrorist threats, including growing radicalisation, are on the rise in Europe, posing a threat to all countries on the continent. In addition to international action, such as involvement in the global fight against terrorism, there is a need to respond to internal threats. The reasons for this can be traced to changes in religious, political and social beliefs. In some countries, groups are forming which undertake anti-state terrorist activity in order to achieve their goals. In addition, they seek to build a message by involving others, including young people, reinforcing in them the need to support extreme ideological views.

Citizens who become aggressive and uncompromising in their views and modes of action may undertake to organise attacks or develop extremist cells. This is why so much attention needs to be paid to domestic or home-grown terrorism¹. Often, but not always, people who have been brought up in the culture of European countries, but who are orthodox Muslims or who only identify with Islam when preparing an attack, as in France², become terrorists. They are strongly radicalised (adopting opinions, views and ideas that lead to extremism) and as a result may attempt to carry out attacks on the territory of the State of which they have had citizenship by birth, obtained it or in which they have been granted the right to reside. This type of terrorism is also described as a sociological curiosity, since religion dominates the republican values promoted in the country of residence.

In the French Republic, it is stated that radicalisation is the type of any ideology or religion that induces an individual to choose violence in the name of beliefs, while not recognising compromise and choosing to terrorise society. Radicalisation is a process of gradual commitment to and rejection of the rules of society. It occurs during socialisation and relationship building and affects the psyche. It is a phenomenon strongly linked to the reinforcement of identity conflicts and weaknesses

¹ K. Rekawek et al., *Who are the European jihadis? Project Midterm Report*, Bratislava 2018.

² In France, the authorities have long pursued assimilation as a model of social integration, believing that minimising cultural and religious differences will maintain France as both secular and multicultural. In reality, many people in the country feel alienated and excluded from French society. This problem has been evident for more than two decades. See: K. Thachuk, M. Bowman, C. Richardson, *Homegrown Terrorism. The Threat Within*, Washington 2008, pp. 5, 15-16.

by ideology or religion (problems at work or school, family or personal)³. Although radicalisation is not exclusive to jihadist terrorists, it is mainly such people who pose a threat in France today.

Terrorism is a phenomenon that constantly occurs in the international environment. France is constantly facing terrorist threats and is the most frequently attacked country in the European Union in the 21st century. Since the 1950s it has experienced virtually all types of terrorism: from right-wing, to left-wing, to separatist and now jihadist terrorism. So far, Poland has not been a target of terrorist attacks and is not a country where terrorists are constantly and actively operating, although they do transit the country. Moreover, there are indications which make us reflect on the potential threat in Central and Eastern Europe and the growing radicalisation among the citizens of this part of the continent.

The use of solutions applied in France creates an opportunity not only to improve anti-terrorist systems and methods of operation of counter-terrorist units in Poland and other states, but also to educate and make the society aware of emerging threats and challenges. Constant cooperation and supervision of all entities that may be susceptible to terrorist threats are necessary for the proper development of security structures in the state. The use of France's experience also seems extremely important in the context of building anti-terrorist potential in all EU and NATO member states. The most effective way to fight terrorism is to prevent it, so member states should use proven methods that have been developed for decades in France⁴, thanks to which they can now be described as unique⁵.

The aim of the article is to systematize knowledge and to direct the activities of entities obliged to fight against terrorism in Poland and other countries, using the anti-terrorism prevention used in the French Republic. In the author's opinion, some of the elements of French

³ Secrétariat général du Comité interministériel de prévention de la délinquance et de la radicalisation, *Une politique publique volontariste et évolutive*, <https://www.cipdr.gouv.fr/prevenir-la-radicalisation>, [accessed: 4 XI 2021].

⁴ Already in 2005, French counter-terrorism activities carried out since the 1980s were recognised as the most effective in Europe. See: L. Block, *Evaluating the Effectiveness of French Counter-Terrorism*, "Terrorism Monitor Volume" 2005, vol. 3, no. 17.

⁵ A. Olech, *Walka z terroryzmem. Polskie rozwiązania a francuskie doświadczenia* (Eng. Fight against terrorism. Polish solutions versus French experience), Warszawa 2021.

solutions, above all concerning deradicalization, should also be applied on a European scale. Moreover, on the basis of the conducted research, it will be possible to develop a concept of organisation of the system for combating terrorist threats not only in France and Poland, but also in other member states of the European Union and NATO.

Undertaking research focused on the system of combating terrorist threats requires proper organisation, planning and verification. Elementary in these activities is the methodology of research. The conducted search was based on research questions, hypotheses and the objective, which were formulated on the basis of an in-depth analysis of the research problem. The aim of the research was to improve scientific cognition and confront hypothesis with facts⁶. The research questions took the following form:

1. How to use the expertise of the French Republic in the fight against terrorism in order not to make the same mistakes in the counter-terrorism process?
2. Which of the methods and actions of France in the implementation of counter-terrorism tasks should be used in Poland and other democratic countries in Europe?
3. How can the anti-terrorism prevention in the French Republic, including the implementation of projects to combat radicalisation in prisons, on the Internet and within civil society, minimise the risk of a terrorist attack in the country?
4. Are the solutions applied in France valuable for the development of Polish anti-terrorist and deradicalisation structures?
5. In what direction should organizational, functional and normative changes for maintaining national security of the Republic of Poland go in the face of contemporary threats?

Scientific hypotheses have been set on the basis of research conducted so far and are related to the state of knowledge on terrorism⁷. In order to organize the considerations, to achieve the goal presented above and to clarify the research problem, the following research hypotheses have been adopted:

⁶ Kuc B., Ściborek Z., *Podstawy metodologiczne nauk o bezpieczeństwie* (Eng. Methodological foundations of security sciences), Warszawa 2013.

⁷ Johnson J.B., Reynolds H.T., Mycoff J.D., *Metody badawcze w naukach politycznych* (Eng. Research methods in political science), translation A. Kloskowska-Dudzińska, Warszawa 2010.

1. Analysis of at least some of the solutions applied in France and an attempt to implement them in Poland will enable to adjust the Polish anti-terrorist system to contemporary international threats
2. Using the methods applied in France may significantly increase the ability and effectiveness of anti-terrorist and counter-terrorist activities in Poland, especially in the context of introduction of deradicalisation programs in prisons and the use of social media.
3. Conducting activities for combating terrorist threats still at the level of their spread, especially among young people, as well as strengthening national anti-terrorist policy among the society will significantly raise the level of awareness of the threats.
4. The unique solutions introduced in France have significantly affected the number of people radicalised, with fewer terrorist attacks recorded between 2017 and 2021, which means that similar methods could be effective in Poland.
5. If, in accordance with the terrorist experience and solutions of the French Republic, the current and future conditions of international security, appropriate legal, organisational and functional changes in the anti-terrorist activity of the Republic of Poland are made, it will be possible to efficiently carry out defence activities and raise the level of national security.

The solutions presented in this article are less popular than activities carried out by special services and counterterrorist units. However, their importance is equally important in building the state's security potential. In the French Republic, threat response capabilities are being developed most rapidly and are constantly adapted to new challenges, both internal and external. In addition to the enactment of the Law on Strengthening Internal Security and the Fight against Terrorism⁸ and the transformations carried out in the counter-terrorism services, a number of side measures are also relevant. These are undertaken to reduce the impact of terrorism on the functioning

⁸ Loi n° 2017-1510 du 30 octobre 2017 *renforçant la securite interieure et la lutte contre le terrorisme*, JORF n°0255 du 31 octobre 2017 texte n° 1.

of the state. They are the responsibility of the municipal police (municipal guards), the prison administration, the health service or NGOs, among others. It must be emphasised that all activities bearing the hallmarks of counter-terrorism are fundamental to maintaining the security of citizens and consist of both actions aimed at eliminating the attacker and deradicalisation programmes for people fascinated by jihadist ideology.

The intentions under the provisions of the law set out the main tasks to be accomplished by the end of 2022. These are:

- intensification of activities aimed at preventing radicalisation,
- greater cooperation between security services in the fight against terrorism,
- countering radicalisation in prisons,
- providing educational support to radicalised youth as well as minors returning from the Middle East,
- improving the functioning of the justice system in the context of suppressing acts of terrorism and punishing terrorists,
- simplifying and improving procedural issues for victims of acts of terrorism.

Counter-terrorism system in the French Republic

The anti-terrorism system, which in the French Republic is referred to as the counter-terrorism system (*système français de lutte contre le terrorisme*), includes campaigns against not only terrorism (*le plan d'action contre le terrorisme, PACT*) but also radicalisation (*le plan national de prévention de la radicalisation, PNPR*). The General Secretariat of Defence and National Security (*Secrétariat général de la Défense et de la Sécurité nationale, SGDSN*) in 2018 was mandated by the Prime Minister to develop, in collaboration with the national coordinator of intelligence and counter-terrorism (*Coordination nationale du renseignement et de la lutte contre le terrorisme, CNRLT*), the priorities in the counter-terrorism system. No specific bodies or institutions have been singled out for specific actions, but all services and ministries that are involved in any way in maintaining security

have been brought to the forefront of the SGDSN's work⁹. International cooperation is also highlighted as a cornerstone in the campaign against acts of aggression¹⁰. As a whole, the anti-terrorist system is supposed to achieve the following objectives:

- to know: to better identify and understand the terrorist threat and its development;
- to obstruct: to prevent acts of violence by keeping watch on dangerous persons, stopping the financing of terrorism and resolving conflicts which give rise to terrorist threats;
- to protect: adapt the tasks of protection of persons and property in the light of the threats identified (this requires in particular the development of technological capacities and greater involvement of public and private operators);
- to deter: punish perpetrators of terrorist crimes and bring jihadists to justice;
- to increase cooperation between European countries and promote France's initiatives to combat terrorism more effectively within the European Union¹¹.

In analysing countries' anti-terrorism systems, in addition to identifying centres, coordinators or inter-ministerial bodies, it is always necessary to recognise the level at which decisions are taken and courses of action set. The President and the Prime Minister are formally involved in the French anti-terrorist security structure. However, the actual steps are taken at the level of ministers responsible for security or the functioning of individual areas of the economy. An extremely important role in this system is played precisely by the Minister of the Interior, who oversees the work of the Directorate-General for Internal Security (Direction générale de la sécurité intérieure, DGSI). The service was created in April 2014 following the transformation of the Central Directorate of Internal Intelligence (Direction centrale du renseignement intérieur, DCRI) created on 1 July 2008¹². It is a counterintelligence service whose main task is to detect

⁹ *Plan d'action contre le terrorisme*, Paris 2018, pp. 15–16.

¹⁰ *Rapport: Conférence sur la lutte contre le terrorisme et la prévention de la radicalisation violente*, Paris 2016, pp. 35–36.

¹¹ *Plan d'action...*

¹² Décret n° 2014-474 du 12 mai de l'article 6 nonies de l'ordonnance n° 58-1100 du 17 novembre 1958 relative au fonctionnement 2014 *pris pour l'application des assemblées parlementaires et portant désignation des services spécialisés de renseignement*. Article 1.

threats within the state and neutralise threats from foreign entities¹³. Its specific mission is to participate in the surveillance of radicalised individuals and groups who may resort to violence and threaten the security of the state. In addition, the primary role of the special service is to cooperate with the Anti-Terrorism Subdirectorate (Sous-direction anti-terroriste (SDAT))¹⁴ and the Anti-terrorism Section (Section anti-terroriste (SAT))¹⁵ in combating terrorist threats. The specificity of the DGSI¹⁶ is its dual judicial¹⁷ and intelligence competence¹⁸.

It can be assumed that the counterpart of the Polish anti-terrorist system (which would have to be re-enacted, i.e. for the period 2022-2026) is the Vigipirate plan¹⁹. Its genesis dates back to 1978, when France and Europe faced the first waves of terrorist attacks carried out

¹³ In Poland, the Internal Security Agency has similar tasks.

¹⁴ SDAT is based in the same building as the DGSI special service. It is also part of the new counter-terrorism plan presented in January 2020, under which the counter-terrorism service works directly with the intelligence service.

¹⁵ It is the equivalent of SDAT in the Paris police prefecture.

¹⁶ The DGSI is systematically informed of all cases related to terrorism in France. It also coordinates investigations into acts committed abroad against French interests (embassies, French victims abroad, etc.). It cooperates on a permanent basis with the National Anti-Terrorism Prosecutor's Office (PNAT).

¹⁷ DGSI is the only secret service in the French Republic to work directly with judicial institutions (*institution judiciaire*), including the Judicial Police (Police Judiciaire). The aim is to protect intelligence that has been collected by the service and cannot appear in court proceedings because of the secrecy clause. The essence is to protect sources, to keep secret the cooperation of third parties with the service, as well as the way in which information is acquired. Those involved in cooperation with the DGSI are assured that they will not be recognised in court. It is customary for the Judicial Police to be responsible for cooperation with the service and with the courts, acting as an intermediary. In this specificity, the DGSI has dual competences: in the intelligence and judicial spheres. In the intelligence sphere, it has to undertake activities for the benefit of the national interest in all areas of security, and in the judicial sphere - for the purposes of counterintelligence, maintaining the secrecy of national defence and cooperating with the Judicial Police (including the SDAT and SAT branches) in combating terrorist threats. DGSI also interacts with specialist police and gendarmerie services in combating cybercrime.

¹⁸ *Les services judiciaires anti-terroristes*, <https://www.dgsi.interieur.gouv.fr/la-dgsi-encclair/decouvrir-la-dgsi/nos-missions/police-judiciaire-specialisee/services-judiciaires> [accessed: 24 XI 2021].

¹⁹ "Vigipirate" is an acronym for: *vigilance et protection des installations contre les risques d'attentats terroristes à l'explosif* (Eng. vigilance and protection of installations against the risk of terrorist attacks).

by extremist organisations and separatists. The government's Vigipirate plan was officially implemented in 1995. In its current form, it has been in operation since December 2016. It addresses the three stages of threat analysis, namely vigilance, prevention and protection²⁰. Vigipirate, which is overseen by the Prime Minister, is the main tool of the French anti-terrorism system as it brings together all national actors (state, local, public authorities, private economic operators and citizens). They report to the Prime Minister and all ministers. The Ministry of the Interior plays a dominant role in the implementation of the programme²¹.

The programme envisages two phases of action: the ordinary phase and the emergency phase. The basic premise of the plan is to prevent terrorist attacks, as well as to inform the public about the degree of threat and ways to protect themselves against a possible attack. It also indicates specific protective instructions to the police and security services. The latest version of the plan is based on three pillars of operation²². These are:

1. The development of a culture of individual and collective security, involving the entire civil society.
2. The creation of three levels of threat and their representation on a logo visible in public spaces:
 - a) The vigilance level (le niveau de "vigilance") - corresponds to maintaining security and implementing precautionary measures through surveillance of certain means of transport and public places. This level may apply in a specific region.
 - b) Enhanced level, tightening of security measures²³ - there is a risk of attack (le niveau "sécurité renforcée - risque

²⁰ Importantly, it can be extended to include other government plans to combat terrorist threats, e.g. the Pirate NRBC plan (nuclear, radiological, biological or chemical attack), the Piranet plan (IT, cyber attack), and the Piratair-Intrusair, Pirate Mer, Metropirate plans (terrorist attack in airspace, on water or in the metro).

²¹ *Comprendre le plan Vigipirate*, <https://www.gouvernement.fr/risques/comprendre-le-plan-vigipirate> [accessed: 4 XI 2021].

²² A. Olech, *Counterterrorism Strategies in Poland and France*, <https://warsawinstitute.org/counterterrorism-strategies-poland-france> [accessed: 15 XI 2021].

²³ In France, a second level is introduced during: major international events (such as sporting events, e.g. Euro 2016, United Nations Climate Change Conference [COP]), etc., major national events such as the start of the school year and holiday celebrations, after an attack on French territory or abroad, in order to urgently adapt the national protection system.

attentat”) - when it is declared, the possible response of the State must be adapted to the high or even very high terrorist threat. In addition to the protection of particularly sensitive points (airports, railway stations, places of worship, etc.), additional places requiring enhanced control may be identified. This level may apply throughout the national territory and specifically involves patrolling the streets, as well as taking counter-terrorist measures such as searching homes and arresting suspects. There is no time limit.

c) Alert level - imminent threat of attack (le troisième niveau, intitulé “urgence attentat”) - may be established immediately after an attack or when a terrorist group is identified and the need to locate the threat arises. This level is established for a specific period of time: during the attack. It allows the mobilisation of all services, the closure of public places, and the dissemination of information via websites, television and radio that can protect citizens in this specific crisis situation²⁴.

3. Implementing new measures to strengthen government action in the fight against terrorism²⁵. This means implementing new measures, which may be implemented over a period of months, six months or even several years, in order to verify their effectiveness (e.g. the introduction of a higher threat level on national territory, the organisation of protection zones, and the evaluation of the application of a new law - i.e. the anti-terrorism law - in order to determine whether it should continue to be applied²⁶)²⁷.

²⁴ Between 2003 and 2013, four levels were in place: yellow (jaune), orange (orange), red (rouge) and scarlet (écarlate), and from 2014-2016, two: the vigilance level (le niveau de vigilance) and the attack alert level (le niveau d’alerte attentat).

²⁵ L. Wicky, *Le plan Vigipirate et ses trois niveaux d’alerte*, https://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2016/12/20/en-france-le-plan-vigipirate-et-ses-trois-niveaux-d-alerte_5052094_4355770.html [accessed: 4 XI 2021].

²⁶ Ministère de l’Intérieur, Premier bilan de l’application de la loi renforçant la sécurité intérieure et la lutte contre le terrorisme, Communiqué de Presse 12 II 2019.

²⁷ J. Sulzer, *Loi Renforçant La Sécurité Intérieure Et La Lutte Contre Le Terrorisme, Analyse juridique critique – Mise en œuvre – Suivi du contentieux constitutionnel, 30 octobre 2017 – 29 octobre 2018*, H. Decoeur (ed.), Paris 2018.

Under the Vigipirate plan, intelligence services assess the terrorist threat and their analyses allow the General Secretariat of Defence and National Security to adopt a certain level of danger. The Vigipirate plan applies on French territory, at sea and even abroad. Some of the plan's measures can be activated outside the borders if a threat to French citizens or French interests is proven and if they are compatible with the sovereignty of the countries concerned. These measures include, for example, strengthening security around French diplomatic representations²⁸.

Importantly, since 12 January 2015, the protective tasks of the Vigipirate plan have been entrusted to soldiers as part of the "Opération Sentinelle" mission, which aims to secure particularly sensitive points in the country. Operations are being carried out with all security services. Initially, 10,412 soldiers and 4,700 police and gendarmes were mobilised to protect 830 locations in France most vulnerable to attacks, including: places of worship, schools, diplomatic and consular representations, press offices (they are monitored 24 hours a day). It is not insignificant that since the "Opération Sentinelle" was launched, there have been regular attacks (also of a terrorist nature) on soldiers who are in vulnerable places²⁹. According to the then Minister of the Armed Forces, Jean-Yves Le Drian, the cost of maintaining the operation is one million euros a day³⁰. Currently, between 7 thousand and 10 thousand soldiers are deployed in the vicinity of the most important points in the country (including the protection of critical infrastructure³¹). It is worth noting that similar systems of operations have been introduced by, among others:

²⁸ *Plan Vigipirate. Foire aux Questions*, Paris 2016, p. 3.

²⁹ *Comprendre...*

³⁰ *Attentats: „L'opération Sentinelle coûte 1 million d'euros par jour”*, <http://www.leparisien.fr/faits-divers/le-drian-l-operation-sentinelle-coute-1-million-d-euros-par-jour-08-02-2015-4515903.php> [accessed: 4 XI 2021].

³¹ Critical infrastructures in France are facilities, centres or installations that provide services and goods essential to the life of citizens. In 2006, in order to protect critical infrastructure in France, 12 sectors of activity of the highest importance (*secteurs d'activités d'importance vitale*, SAIV) were defined, divided into four pillars: human, state, economic and technological. Key operators (*opérateurs d'importance vitale*, OIV), considered fundamental to the functioning of the economy and society, and points of critical importance (*points d'importance vitale*, PIV) have been identified. Critical infrastructure protection in France is defined as: a set of activities, essential and not replaceable, contributing

- Belgium - after the attacks of January 2015, the operation “Vigilant Guardian” was launched there on the model of the French “Opération Sentinelle”³²,
- Italy - 4800 soldiers were deployed on the streets in February 2015 to protect important public places, including the Vatican, from possible terrorist attacks³³,
- Israel - the country has deployed officers in vulnerable areas, i.e. city centres, critical infrastructure and temples, since 2015³⁴,
- United Kingdom - after the Manchester bombing in May 2017, it was decided to launch Operation Temperer, which placed 5100 soldiers on city streets³⁵.

The army’s commitment to protecting the population and territory of the country is meant to be a wake-up call to terrorists. In the face of a sustained terrorist threat, it is justified. Soldiers carry out observation and monitoring tasks³⁶.

The French Republic carries out many anti-terrorist missions outside the country (in addition to maintaining permanent military bases³⁷), mainly in North Africa in cooperation with the G5 Sahel group³⁸.

to the exercise of state authority, the functioning of the economy, the preservation of the defence potential and the security of the nation, in order to maintain the production and distribution of essential goods or services for the functioning of the state.

³² *Deux ans après: l’image de la Défense améliorée par la présence des militaires en rue*, https://www.rtb.be/info/dossier/explosions-a-brussels-airport/detail_deux-ans-apres-l-image-de-la-defense-amelioree-par-la-presence-des-militaires-en-rue?id=9505164 [accessed: 13 XI 2021].

³³ *Rome déploie 4 800 soldats autour de sites sensibles*, <https://www.ouest-france.fr/europe/italie/antiterrorisme-rome-deploie-4-800-soldats-autour-de-sites-sensibles-3195080> [accessed: 13 XI 2021].

³⁴ M. Bachner, *Hundreds of thousands more Israelis okayed to carry guns under new rules*, <https://www.timesofisrael.com/hundreds-of-thousands-more-israelis-okayed-to-carry-guns-under-new-rules> [accessed: 13 XI 2021].

³⁵ L. Lagneau, *Terrorisme: Engagée dans l’opération „Temperer”, la British Army devra faire face à de nouveaux défis*, <http://www.opex360.com/2017/05/24/terrorisme-engagee-dans-loperation-temperer-la-british-army-devra-faire-face-un-defi-nouveau> [accessed: 13 XI 2021].

³⁶ *Plan Vigipirate. Foire...*, p. 3.

³⁷ A. Olech, *International Military Involvement of the French Republic*, Warsaw 2021.

³⁸ Chad, Niger, Burkina Faso, Mali and Mauritania have established a formal framework of cooperation to improve security and develop counter-terrorism efforts in the region due to the proliferation of terrorist organisations.

Counter-terrorism measures are already being taken outside French territory, as the government in Paris is aware of the threat posed by migrating terrorists. The idea is to strengthen the security capabilities of the countries in the region and also to prevent terrorists from entering Europe. French soldiers are using the latest weaponry, using the same methods as in the current armed conflict³⁹. It is debatable, however, whether opting for a so-called global war on terror - far beyond a country's borders - is really effective in stopping terrorists, and whether it is not sometimes a case of maintaining a conflict by force and then quickly withdrawing all troops, as in the case of France in the Barkhane mission or the Americans in Afghanistan.

Public policies in the fight against radicalisation

An important body to be distinguished in the French system is the Interministerial Committee for the Prevention of Crime and Radicalisation (Comité interministériel de prévention de la délinquance et de la radicalisation), which, together with the Secretary General (constituting the SG-CIPDR - Secrétariat général du Comité interministériel de prévention de la délinquance et de la radicalisation), deals with prevention and the fight against radicalisation and sets guidelines for government policy within the scope of the Committee's name. It supports the work of ministries and the use of budgets to stop radicalisation, separatism⁴⁰ and sectarianism⁴¹. It also assists in the preparation of information campaigns and conducts field activities.

The SG-CIPDR plays a key role in supporting civil society by promoting good practices and providing training to state services, local authorities, associations and citizens. Visible results of this are the organisation of training courses and workshops on, inter alia,

³⁹ J.-D. Merchet, *Mali: une „cinquantaine de terroristes neutralisés” par l'armée française*, „L'Opinion” 3 XI 2020.

⁴⁰ Code de la sécurité intérieure, Version en vigueur au 23 novembre 2021. Section 1: Comité interministériel de prévention de la délinquance et de la radicalisation (art. D132-1 à D132-4).

⁴¹ Décret n° 2020-867 du 15 juillet 2020 modifiant le décret n° 2002-1392 du 28 novembre 2002 instituant une mission interministérielle de vigilance et de lutte contre les dérives sectaires, NOR : INTX2004492D, JORF n°0173 du 16 juillet 2020.

the prevention of radicalisation⁴², the provision of online materials for those interested in this issue⁴³, the development of strategies for the state in informing and educating the public about the radicalisation process and the use of social media to reinforce government policies to combat crime and terrorism.

The public response to crime prevention and radicalisation aims to involve as many partners as possible to ensure an interdisciplinary approach to emerging challenges. In this way, the SG-CIPDR coordinates a network of actors working in cooperation with civil society to promote solidarity in countering organised crime and radicalisation. In addition, the institution operates within a European cooperation network and participates in the exchange of good practices. It represents France in the working group on radicalisation at the European Commission and at the EU Internet Forum at the European Commission.

Identifying people who have been radicalised or are in the process of doing so is essential to provide them with the support they need and to prevent terrorist attacks. However, the identification of the radicalised must be detailed enough to focus on the right people and not to include those who pose no threat. It is therefore necessary to rely on a structured and professionalised system of action at departmental level. The CIPDR is responsible for building a preventive response of a social - public nature, offering detailed information on possible radicalisation in the public space, presenting a kind of radicalisation indicators developed by experts.

As the phenomenon of radicalisation is starting to become more prevalent among young people, the government is reaching

⁴² An open training session on the prevention of radicalisation was organised on 4-5 November 2021, with topics such as: the public response to preventing and combating radicalisation, key concepts of Islam, the geopolitics of the jihadist movement, the process of radicalisation: knowledge, controversies and research methods, support for deradicalisation, combating and preventing radicalisation in prisons, countering radicalisation in sport, psychiatry and radicalisation. The aim of the public events is to create a network of actors at national level, so that all potentially radicalised people can be detected in order to observe them and then provide the necessary care.

⁴³ Videos made available on YouTube entitled: *E-learning „Znaj, wykrywaj i zgłaszaj zjawiska radykalizacji”* (Eng. Know, detect and report radicalisation phenomena), <https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PL2VXuAZDO9kb6gI8u4GT0v-J8nrXitELO> [accessed: 22 XI 2021].

out to them, using the same channels as terrorist group recruits, i.e. through the Internet and social networks. One example of this was the launch of the #ToujoursLeChoix campaign⁴⁴. Increasingly, young people are becoming radicalised, regardless of their background, social role and place of residence. This is being exploited by online campaigns showing that radicalisation can happen to anyone and that we need to support each other to prevent it from happening. Another approach to building confidence among citizens is the launch of e-learning courses on emerging terrorist threats and how to respond to them⁴⁵. In addition, the DGSi describes in detail on its website how to recognise signs of radicalisation (e.g. change in dress, eating habits, gradual fading of relationships, new online interests in religions and cults)⁴⁶. In young people, they can be the result of failing to achieve success and experiencing injustice and discrimination⁴⁷.

The involvement of a governmental actor in dialogue with society, who offers training and aims to prevent radicalisation, is an innovative solution. The use of the Internet (91% of French people have access to the Internet and 75.1% of French people have access to the Internet) is innovative. The use of the Internet (91% of French people have access to the Internet and 75.9% have an account on a social networking site⁴⁸), the preparation of government plans and strategies on de-radicalisation⁴⁹, as well as the organisation of lectures and events, are important elements in the process of strengthening anti-terrorism measures in the country. This rather new approach to the challenges is important for building links with society and lays the foundations

⁴⁴ Eng. there is always a choice.

⁴⁵ *Faire Face Ensemble*, <https://vigipirate.gouv.fr> [accessed: 22 XI 2021].

⁴⁶ *Reconnaître les signes de la radicalisation violente*, <https://www.dgsi.interieur.gouv.fr/la-dgsi-a-vos-cotes/lutte-contre-terrorisme/sinformer/reconnaître-signes-de-la-radicalisation> [accessed: 22 XI 2021].

⁴⁷ Since 2017, there is a specific platform for teachers to help understand the phenomenon of radicalisation: CANOPÉ - <https://www.reseau-canope.fr/prevenir-la-radicalisation/ressorts-et-etapes.html> [accessed: 22 XI 2021].

⁴⁸ A. Patard, *Chiffres clés d'Internet et des réseaux sociaux en France en 2021*, <https://www.blogdumoderateur.com/chiffres-internet-reseaux-sociaux-france-2021> [accessed: 22 XI 2021].

⁴⁹ Comité interministériel de prévention de la délinquance et de la radicalisation, «Prévenir Pour Protéger» Plan national de prévention de la radicalisation, Communiqué du Premier ministre, vendredi 23 février 2018.

for jointly creating an environment in which terrorist threats will not have the opportunity to grow in strength. Other countries should consider launching similar initiatives that allow citizens to understand the causes of not only radicalisation, separatism and sectarianism, but also nationalism, for example. At the same time, public policy on this topic must be conducted with respect for values and with a focus on social dialogue involving theorists and practitioners.

Responding to radicalisation at departmental and national level

Since 2014, there have been two instruments at departmental level to counter radicalisation. The first - with a security profile - is the special evaluation group on Islamist radicalisation (groupe d'évaluation départementale de la radicalisation islamiste, GED)⁵⁰, created by the prefect⁵¹ in each department to maintain the exchange of information between departmental and national authorities. The groups are above all considered to be the first operational body. They are responsible for ensuring that any person who is reported as radicalised is properly assessed and monitored. The GED cooperates with the units of the Ministry of the Interior (DGSI, police⁵², Gendarmerie and judicial police) and, as necessary, with other institutions (prison intelligence, customs, border police⁵³, etc.). The second entity - with a social profile - is the unit for the prevention of radicalisation and family support (Cellule de prévention de la radicalisation et d'accompagnement des familles, CPRAF)⁵⁴. Its main task is to provide social, educational, medical and psychological and even psychiatric support if it concerns radicalisation. CPRAF representatives, at departmental level, provide clarification

⁵⁰ Its powers are limited to the control of communes and departments and the management of state services operating in the department. More: M. Ofiarska, *Francja*, "Annales Universitatis Paedagogicae Cracoviensis. Studia Politologica" 2010, no. 4, pp. 88-111.

⁵¹ It is composed of representatives of the department, the Ministry of the Interior, the police and the gendarmerie.

⁵² Mainly with the Service central du renseignement territorial.

⁵³ Central Directorate of Border Police (Direction Centrale de la Police Aux Frontières).

⁵⁴ It is composed of, among others, representatives of: the police, the Ministry of Education, the judiciary (Directorate for the Judicial Protection of Young People - Direction de la protection judiciaire de la jeunesse), social services, youth welfare associations, but it may also include representatives of the GED.

to citizens in their understanding of religion, complement the legal protection of young people and the social assistance activities for children or the probation service. The unit's activities are also family-oriented, to work with the relatives of the radicalised person. The observations carried out by CPRAF are based on the indications provided by the GED⁵⁵.

In addition, a National Centre for Assistance and Prevention of Radicalisation (Centre national d'assistance et de prévention de la radicalisation, CNAPR) has been set up at departmental level and can be contacted by people⁵⁶ who believe that someone is being radicalised. In the first two years, since its opening in 2014, the hotline of the institution was called more than 5 thousand times⁵⁷. The information obtained by the centre is transmitted to the DGSI, more precisely to the Coordination Unit for the Fight Against Terrorism (Unité de coordination de la lutte antiterroriste, UCLAT). Once CNAPR confirms that a person is being radicalised, the information is forwarded to the department of residence so that psychological and educational support can be applied or monitoring by intelligence units can be implemented. All departmental security services obtain information on the suspect and send it to UCLAT.




Fig. 1. Actors involved in activities implemented at national and departmental level to counter radicalisation.

Source: Own elaboration based on <https://www.cipdr.gouv.fr/le-cipdr/>.

⁵⁵ *Le dispositif territorial de prévention de la radicalisation violente*, <https://www.cipdr.gouv.fr/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Dispositif-territorial-de-pr%C3%A9vention-de-la-radicalisation-violente-1.pdf> [accessed: 22 XI 2021].

⁵⁶ By phone or online form.

⁵⁷ *Country Reports on Terrorism 2016*, Washington 2017, p. 120.

In French legislation, the possibility of investigating radicalisation against public officials should be singled out. Article 11 of the anti-terrorism law changes the way in which action is taken to ensure internal security. The fight against radicalisation, which does not exist in the state of emergency, is a novelty in the law. An official (officer) carrying out his or her mission or profession related to security and defence can be transferred or even removed if an administrative investigation reveals tendencies towards radicalisation. The procedure also applies to military and prison officers. The new law allows action to be taken on mere suspicion and not, as was previously the case, in an already open investigation. It also involves the withdrawal of certain authorisations from the suspect. Any contradictions are resolved by a specially appointed commission (whose composition and functioning is determined by a decree of the Council of State)⁵⁸.

Moreover, in French law, the legislator has defined a new sanction - penalties for parents who incite their children to commit acts of terrorism or travel abroad for this purpose. Defining a new offence and imposing sanctions in the form of: 15 years imprisonment, a fine of 225,000 euros for parents and the possibility of losing parental rights⁵⁹ - is a precedent on a European scale⁶⁰.

The National Anti-Terrorist Prosecutor's Office

A novelty of sorts is the establishment of a procedural body that has a dominant influence on the functioning of the counter-terrorism system in France. The National Antiterrorist Prosecutor's Office (Parquet national antiterroriste, PNAT) was created on 1 July 2019. (the project emerged at the end of 2017) and its competences, although national,

⁵⁸ LOI n° 2017-1510... Art. 11.

⁵⁹ Where an act is committed by a person exercising parental authority over a minor, the court of first instance shall decide on the total or partial withdrawal of parental authority pursuant to Articles 378 and 379-1 of the Civil Code. It may also rule on the withdrawal of parental authority with respect to other minor children of that person.

⁶⁰ R. De Massol De Rebetz, M. van der Woude, *Marianne's liberty in jeopardy? A French analysis on recent counterterrorism legal developments*, „Critical Studies on Terrorism” 2020, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 1-23.

also relate to international cooperation in the fight against terrorism⁶¹. The PNAT has jurisdiction over such matters as crimes against humanity, war crimes, specific crimes, terrorism, distribution of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, torture and kidnapping. The Public Prosecutor's Office has specific competence for the most serious crimes⁶², taking over such cases from local prosecutors' offices⁶³. In addition, information is provided to the institution on actions taken by other authorised entities (in accordance with the provisions of the Law on Combating Terrorism)⁶⁴. The PNAT is staffed by judges specialised in the investigation of terrorism and extremism.

The creation of the PNAT is part of Emmanuel Macron's strategy to centralise the fight against terrorism by ensuring that the services are properly coordinated by an anti-terrorist prosecutor, to enable them to act more quickly and effectively in the event of a threat⁶⁵. The functioning of the public prosecutor's office is a legal response to terrorist threats. Under French law, the National Anti-Terrorist Prosecutor's Office is now an autonomous, specialised structure dedicated to the fight against terrorism. Its creation was intended to consolidate the actions of the judiciary, particularly in view of the series of trials of the terrorists who carried out the attacks in 2015 and 2016 and are currently on trial. In 2019 alone, there were 87 trials related to acts of terrorism conducted by the National Anti-Terrorist Prosecutor's Office⁶⁶. It is important to stress that not all acts of terrorism

⁶¹ Décret n° 2019-628 du 24 juin 2019 portant entrée en vigueur des dispositions relatives au parquet antiterroriste, JORF n°0145 du 25 juin 2019 texte n° 4, NOR: JUSD1917754D.

⁶² *Zoom sur le nouveau Parquet national antiterroriste*, <http://www.justice.gouv.fr/justice-penale-11330/zoom-sur-le-nouveau-parquet-national-antiterroriste-32661.html> [accessed: 10 XI 2021].

⁶³ In practice, local prosecutors, when notified that a potentially terrorist act has been committed in their area, contact the National Anti-Terrorism Prosecution Service so that the latter can assess whether it intends to use its powers in this regard in cooperation with the local authority.

⁶⁴ Code de procédure pénale: art. 628-1, art. 706-17, art. 706-169. Code de la sécurité intérieure: art. L228-2. Code de l'organisation judiciaire: art. L217-1, art. L217-5.

⁶⁵ J. Jacquin, *Vers la création d'un parquet national antiterroriste*, „Le Monde” 18 XII 2017.

⁶⁶ *Le parquet national antiterroriste, une force de frappe judiciaire*, <https://france3-regions.francetvinfo.fr/paris-ile-de-france/le-parquet-national-antiterroriste-une-force-de-frappe-judiciaire-1881258.html> [accessed: 22 XI 2021].

can be processed by the PNAT if there is no factual indication that it was a terrorist event⁶⁷.

Individualised de-radicalisation programme

In the process of combating radicalisation, an individualised programme of acceptance and social readmission (le programme d'accueil individualisé et de réaffiliation sociale, PAIRS) should be distinguished. Initially, a programme of research and intervention against extremism (Programme Recherches et Intervention sur les violences extrémistes, RIVE) was run, in operation since 2016, but in 2018, after a positive evaluation of its activities, its activities were extended and renamed⁶⁸. Organised in prisons, PAIRS offers, under the supervision of the judiciary, a support system for inmates accused or convicted of acts of terrorism and identified as radicalised. This means that the project is carried out not only in prisons, but also in the homes of inmates or at points chosen by the court. The main objective is to create conditions in which the inmate rejects violence and the desire to integrate with terrorists by participating in individualised behavioural monitoring, with the involvement of a social support group (social workers, psychologists, psychiatrists, educators, as well as researchers and religious scholars) and, in exceptional cases, family and relatives. Each participant undergoes a personalised course that addresses issues such as social, professional and cultural integration, with the main objective being for the inmate to achieve intellectual autonomy rather than a total rejection of religion. The whole is based on three pillars: social, psychological and ideological. Each person participating in the deradicalisation process is evaluated every three months, and the programme can last up to a year.

⁶⁷ A man with a knife attacked four police officers, but the regional prosecutor's office concluded early in the investigation (computer check and psychiatric examination) that there were no grounds to involve PNAT. The man was charged with attempted murder. See: K. Blondelle, *Attaque de policiers à Cannes: pas de saisie du parquet national antiterroriste*, francebleu.fr/infos/faits-divers-justice/cannes-pas-de-saisie-du-parquet-national-antiterroriste-apres-l-agression-de-policiers-au-couteau-1636728441 [accessed: 23 XI 2021].

⁶⁸ M. Hecker, *Djihadistes un jour, Djihadistes toujours? Un programme de déradicalisation vu de l'intérieur*, Paris 2021, pp. 9–15.

Currently, PAIRS covers not only those who have been accused and radicalised, but also those who may undergo this process in the future. The average time spent working with clients is six hours a week, and the therapy provided can last between three and 20 hours a week. There are currently four de-radicalisation centres in the country, managed by the prison administration (Administration pénitentiaire en France⁶⁹), which are located in Paris, Lyon, Marseille and Lille. A maximum of 50 people can be accommodated in the capital, and a total of 125 radicalised people can be accommodated by the programme nationwide. In 2019, 70 inmates took part in PAIRS, 90 in 2020 and over 110 in 2021⁷⁰.

What stands out in the deradicalisation efforts is the involvement of health services. People who suffer from mental disorders will be recorded in reports and their data will be passed on to the security services without the patients' knowledge. Cooperation will be local and information will be verified at departmental level. Data of people with mental disorders are stored in the HOPSYWEB register⁷¹.

PAIRS was also in operation during the full closure when the COVID-19 crisis occurred, with staff connecting with those on the programme via video calls and remaining in contact by telephone. Those in care admitted that the support of professionals was very important to them when they were alone during the nationwide quarantine⁷².

Currently, the biggest challenge in the functioning of the programme is to determine whether the radicalised are practising *Takijja*⁷³.

⁶⁹ Subordinate to the Ministry of Justice, responsible for the enforcement of court decisions in criminal matters and promoting the social reintegration of detainees.

⁷⁰ According to the Institut français des relations internationales, no person in the programme committed a terrorist act after completing it (as of February 2021). However, it must be stressed that the most radicalised people, even those who have committed or attempted murder, did not take part.

⁷¹ Décret n° 2018-383 du 23 mai 2018 autorisant les traitements de données à caractère personnel relatifs au suivi des personnes en soins psychiatriques sans consentement, NOR: SSAP1811219D, JORF n°0117 du 24 mai 2018.

⁷² M. Hecker, *Djihadistes...*, p. 54.

⁷³ The permission in Islam to hide one's true beliefs in the event of religious persecution (or personal danger). *Taqiyyah* means hiding one's religion or belief because of fear, but deep down the person must adhere to the religion he or she is hiding. In other words, it is a form of self-defence which includes defending one's life, property, respect and beliefs. According to Shariah, if one is threatened from two sides, and one of the dangers is greater, a danger of lesser consequence (e.g. lying about abandoning one's faith compared to long imprisonment) may be accepted to protect oneself.

At the same time, during several months of observation, the PAIRS support group and specialists from the special services observe the inmate, which, according to experts, should allow them to catch signs of extremism⁷⁴.

In view of the development of PAIRS, amendments to the Penal Code have been recommended to authorise the judge in charge of sentencing to extend monitoring to the prisoner after release. The main idea is to verify the radicalisation of former prisoners⁷⁵.

In prisons there are also so-called prison intelligence units (*renseignement pénitentiaire*), which are part of the National Service of Prison Intelligence (*Service national du renseignement pénitentiaire*⁷⁶), one of whose tasks is to obtain information on persons convicted, *inter alia*, of offences of a terrorist nature, and to take action for the security of prisons. There are currently around 100 officers operating in the field, but this number is expected to increase by another 50 by the end of 2022.

It should be noted that French prisons were running out of places to hold people convicted of terrorism. Therefore, since 2018, the number of cells in penitentiaries for terrorists, including particularly dangerous ones, has been steadily expanded. Special single cells will be set up in 80 prisons by the end of 2022, with a target of 1,500⁷⁷.

Taqiyyah can be defined as protecting life, property and honour from the enemy. See: Shia Pen, Chapter One: Definition of Taqiyyah, www.shiapen.com/comprehensive/taqiyyah/definition-of-taqiyyah.html [accessed: 2 XI 2021].

⁷⁴ *Programme de suivi des individus radicalisés: „On n'a absolument pas à rougir de ce qu'on fait en France par rapport à ce qui est fait à l'étranger”*, www.ifri.org/fr/espace-media/lifri-medias/programme-de-suivi-individus-radicalises-na-absolument-rougir-de-quoi [accessed: 2 XI 2021].

⁷⁵ Rapport d'information fait au nom de la commission des lois constitutionnelles, de législation, du suffrage universel, du Règlement et d'administration générale (1) sur le contrôle et le suivi de la loi n° 2017-1510 du 30 octobre 2017 renforçant la sécurité intérieure et la lutte contre le terrorisme. Rapport d'information n° 348 (2019-2020) de M. Marc-Philippe Daubresse, fait au nom de la commission des lois, déposé le 26 février 2020, s. 49.

⁷⁶ Arrêté du 29 mai 2019 portant création et organisation d'un service à compétence nationale dénommé « Service national du renseignement pénitentiaire » NOR: JUST1911857A, JORF n°0125 du 30 mai 2019.

⁷⁷ LOI n° 2019-222 du 23 mars 2019 de programmation 2018-2022 et de réforme pour la justice, NOR: JUST1806695L, JORF n°0071 du 24 mars 2019.

Previously, there were programmes for the assessment and observation of prisoners convicted of terrorism and radicalised, which were implemented in selected prisons in separate and adapted parts. The first, conducted in selected pavilions, concerns the assessment of radicalisation (quartier d'évaluation de la radicalisation, QER), the second covers terrorist recidivists and those most radicalised (détenus radicalisés les plus prosélytes, QPR). Importantly, initially, women convicted of terrorism were not included in any radicalisation assessment programme⁷⁸, but now, thanks to PAIRS, there has been an increase in such measures in France.

Critics of the operation of programmes for prisoners stress their non-individualised form. Persons convicted of terrorist offences do not have the right to attend the funeral of a family member or other important moments (e.g. a serious illness in the family, a religious celebration)⁷⁹, despite their inclusion in the Code of Criminal Procedure⁸⁰. This is due to the criminal policy of the PNAT, which maintains that the current terrorist threat requires maintaining a high level of anti-terrorism activity in the state⁸¹.

In mid-2021, the prison administration was responsible for almost 82,000 people in France: 66,591 inmates, including 19,168 defendants who were housed in 187 prisons (occupancy rate as high as 110%) and 14,701 convicts under electronic supervision. At the end of 2021, French prisons held 454 convicted terrorists and 648 radicalised⁸². In 2020, there were 558 terrorists (522 jihadists and 36 Basque separatists) and a total of more than 1,400 inmates suspected of radicalisation were under surveillance in prisons⁸³.

⁷⁸ C. Hache, „Plus prosélytes et violentes”: les détenues radicalisées, un défi pour les prisons, „L'Express” 5 II 2020.

⁷⁹ The equivalent of Article 141a - permission to leave prison of the Act of 6 June 1997. - Executive Penal Code (Journal of Laws of 2021, item 53).

⁸⁰ Code de procédure pénale. Version en vigueur au 16 novembre 2021. Art. 723-6.

⁸¹ C. Cottineau, *Justice antiterroriste post-sentencielle: la tentation de la résignation*, <https://www.dalloz-actualite.fr/node/justice-antiterroriste-post-sentencielle-tentation-de-resignation#.YaPYadDMI2w> [accessed: 18 XI 2021].

⁸² *La France dénombre „648 détenus radicalisés” dans ses prisons, affirme Éric Dupond-Moretti*, <https://www.lci.fr/justice-faits-divers/terrorisme-islamisme-la-france-denombre-648-detenus-radicalises-dans-ses-prisons-affirme-eric-dupond-moretti-2195734.html> [accessed: 18 XI 2021].

⁸³ R. Basra, P.R. Neumann, *Prisons and Terrorism: Extremist Offender Management*

In France, the issue of monitoring Islamist terrorists coming out of prison is also very important. By 2023, 230 of them will have left prisons: in 2020 it was 83 convicts, in 2021, - 70, in 2022 it is expected to be 50 and in 2023. - Importantly, only 29% of prisoners will be subject to individual administrative control and supervision measures⁸⁴ (mesures individuelles de contrôle administratif et de surveillance, MICAS) for a maximum of 12 months⁸⁵. It will therefore be a priority to verify during the course of a sentence that those convicted of terrorism do not re-offend.

The deradicalisation and prisoner control programmes appear to be effective, and France has been developing its anti-terrorist structures very dynamically and wisely since 2017. However, it should be noted that the measures were taken far too late and the programmes should have been in place since 2013-2014. At the same time, the implementation of new solutions must be a signal to other countries in Europe that all kinds of manifested extremes must be countered earlier. Especially when the number of people who need to be controlled is not yet large and they have not engaged in terrorist activities.

Once again in 2020, it was stressed that the penalties for those convicted of terrorist offences who become radicalised again should be increased, by means of a higher sentence, as well as an order to undergo permanent control. In addition, it recommended several measures to be implemented on a permanent basis, in particular: the transmission of information on the surveillance of individuals to the national prosecutor's office and the territorial prosecutor's offices, giving prefects the possibility to close - even several times for the same reason - places of worship, as well as facilities that belong to legal or natural persons, the permanent control and monitoring

in *10 European Countries*, London 2020, p. 7.

⁸⁴ J. Leclerc, *L'inquiétante défaillance du suivi des terroristes sortant de prison*, <https://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/l-inquietante-defaillance-du-suivi-des-terroristes-sortant-de-prison-20201109> [accessed: 28 XI 2021].

⁸⁵ The Constitutional Council ruled on the constitutionality of the various administrative control and supervision measures (MICAS) created by the law of 30 October 2017 on strengthening internal security and combating terrorism. This is the equivalent of house arrest. See: Loi n° 2017-1510...; O. Cahn, J. Leblois-Happe, Loi n° 2017-1510 du 30 octobre 2017 renforçant la sécurité intérieure et la lutte contre le terrorisme: perseverare diabolicum, "Actualité juridique. Pénal" 2017, p. 468; Loi n° 55-385 du 3 avril 1955 relative à l'état d'urgence; Décision n° 2017-624 QPC, 16 mars 2017.

of persons convicted of terrorism in order to verify their possible radicalisation, and facilitating the services' access to suspects' computer data. In the end, the intensification of counter-terrorism and anti-radicalisation measures implemented in the State to date was assessed positively⁸⁶.

Use of municipal guards or equivalent services in other countries

Due to the terrorist threats present on the territory of the French Republic, more and more municipalities are choosing to train officers. This is a new strategy that started to be implemented at the end of 2019⁸⁷. This is due to the fact that municipal police⁸⁸ are usually on the front line when there is danger. The mayor of the municipality of Cannes said that even if responding to terrorism is not part of the municipal police officers' mandate, everyone in the municipality will undergo training by the end of 2020. In November 2019 200 Cannes police officers have been trained to respond in the event of a terrorist attack. Counter-terrorists from RAID (Recherche, Assistance, Intervention et Dissuasion) and BRI (Brigade de recherche et d'intervention) conducted a course based on a potential attack scenario at the Palais des Festivals et des Congrès in Cannes⁸⁹. This is a very important example of actions that involve basically every actor in responding to terrorist threats. It is important to note that actions taken just before or just after an attack are critical to the security situation in the area.

When the attack in Nice in July 2016 occurred, it was, among others, the city guards who were responsible for road safety. Their knowledge of terrorist threats and the rapid transmission of information about

⁸⁶ *Rapport d'information fait...*

⁸⁷ M. Auray, *La place de la police municipale dans la lutte contre le terrorisme*, Lille 2019, pp. 1–2.

⁸⁸ Which, for the purpose of this article, is called the municipal police, and its competences are similar to those of the formations operating in Poland, Stadtpolizei in Germany, Policia Local in Spain, městská policie in the Czech Republic, Handhaving in the Netherlands or Муніципальна поліція in Ukraine.

⁸⁹ P. Renoir, F. Azur, *Cannes forme ses policiers municipaux à intervenir en cas d'attaque terroriste*, <https://www.francebleu.fr/infos/faits-divers-justice/cannes-forme-ses-policiers-a-intervenir-en-cas-d-attaque-terroriste-1574963396> [accessed: 10 XI 2021].

the danger to other services meant that there were far fewer casualties⁹⁰. In addition, they cooperated well during and after the attack with the police and the soldiers acting in Operation Sentinelle. Their appropriate movements were the result of the preparations for the EURO 2016 matches in Nice, as they had undergone five anti-terrorism training courses⁹¹.

Municipal guards were given powers to organise and maintain protection zones in municipalities. The separation of areas (in order to maintain security during sporting, cultural and festive events as well as assemblies and demonstrations) reduces the risk of a terrorist attack by controlling access and the movement of people⁹². This is an example of using a force that is not strictly counter-terrorist in order to strengthen the state's anti-terrorist capacity. As many as 98% of municipalities in France have municipal guards.

The involvement of municipal guards is intended to strengthen the effectiveness of the social response to crises, as they know the situation in each municipality best. The officers could support the police and gendarmerie, as well as being a liaison officer to inform about the need to use counter-terrorist units or special forces, as they are already used during increased threats in the state under the Vigipirate plan⁹³. Importantly, police municipale officers may be authorised to carry arms (until 2016 they did not have them) at the request of the mayor of the municipality⁹⁴. The main purpose of their involvement is to take integrated action in the fight against terrorism, so that all measures used on the national territory are coordinated. This also includes responding

⁹⁰ It is also worth mentioning that, at the time, the officers of this formation did not have weapons at their disposal, as is the case with the police, and thus they did not manage to stop the truck in the first phase of the attack and could only pass on information about the threat to other entities.

⁹¹ Déclaration de M. Manuel Valls, Premier ministre, en réponse à diverses questions portant sur la lutte contre le terrorisme depuis 2012, l'attentat de Nice, la prorogation de l'état d'urgence et les opérations extérieures menées par la France contre Daech, à l'Assemblée nationale le 20 juillet 2016.

⁹² Code de la sécurité intérieure, Version en vigueur au 18 novembre 2021. Art. L226-1.

⁹³ *Lutte contre la radicalisation et le séparatisme islamiste: la ville agit pour votre sécurité!*, <https://www.vernon27.fr/actualites/lutte-contre-la-radicalisation-et-le-separatisme-islamiste-la-ville-agit-pour-votre-securite> [accessed: 19 XI 2021].

⁹⁴ Code de la sécurité intérieure, Version en vigueur au 19 novembre 2021. Paragraphe 1: Armes susceptibles d'être autorisées (art. R511-12 à R511-13).

to other threats in the municipality, such as organised crime. In France, it is recommended that the competencies of the municipal police are further strengthened and that they work more closely with the police⁹⁵.

NGO activities in favour of victims of terrorism

In addition to actions taken against terrorism or responding to an attack, it is equally important to involve people and resources in civic assistance to those affected by attacks. In the French Republic, NGOs are complementary to state institutions. Specially designated entities are tasked with supporting the country's counter-terrorism system and providing support to those in need. Selected institutions supporting victims of attacks or the impact of terrorism include:

- Association française des Victimes du Terrorisme (AfVT, French Association of Victims of Terrorism) - is funded by the European Commission and aims to establish a dialogue between victims of terrorist attacks and the general public (especially young people) in order to prevent radicalisation and promote a sense of citizenship and camaraderie in the face of terrorism. The organisation aims to provide assistance to victims of terrorism and their families. This assistance can be moral, administrative, financial, legal, medical or other. Three types of mission are carried out: psychological, legal or preventive. AfVT supervises and monitors the activities of the International Federation of Associations of Victims of Terrorism (FIAVT). It also provides online diversionary content for search engines such as Google to display to people searching for extremist topics⁹⁶.
- Association IMAD pour la jeunesse et la paix (IMAD Association for Youth and Peace) - was set up to establish inter-religious dialogue, to prevent extremist excesses, and to support secular and republican tradition⁹⁷.

⁹⁵ L'ancrage territorial de la sécurité intérieure – Rapport final, n° 323 (2020-2021), Date de remise: 29 janvier 2021.

⁹⁶ Association française des Victimes du Terrorisme, <https://www.afvt.org/> [accessed: 8 XI 2021].

⁹⁷ Association IMAD pour la jeunesse et la paix, <https://association-imad.fr/en/association-for-youth-and-peace/> [accessed: 8 XI 2021].

- Fédération nationale des victimes d'attentats et d'accidents collectifs (FENVAC, National Federation of Victims of Attacks and Collective Accidents) - was founded in 1994. It brings together more than 70 associations in France and abroad (Barcelona, Bardau, Ouagadougou, Marrakech, etc.). Through its experience, it shares guidance based on members' testimonies and encourages victims to come together. This support can also be individual and cover legal, administrative, psychological, social, etc. problems encountered by victims⁹⁸.
- Association 13 novembre: fraternité et vérité (13onze15, Association of 13 November: Brotherhood and Truth) - supports victims of attacks in courts and institutions. It also contributes to the commemoration of the victims of the attacks⁹⁹.
- Association Montjoye - offers social, legal and psychological support to victims. The Foundation strongly supported the creation of an information zone for the victims of the Nice bombing of 14 July 2016, in which 87 people were killed and 202 injured, in order to provide assistance as soon as possible¹⁰⁰.

State bodies have also been involved in financial support. Under the Law on Planning and Reform of Justice 2018-2022¹⁰¹, victims of terrorism, i.e. French citizens and including public officials and soldiers, will be compensated. Funds may be awarded to victims of acts of terrorism committed both at home and abroad, as well as to the dependents of the victims, regardless of their nationality. Importantly, if a dangerous situation has occurred through the fault of the victim, compensation may be refused or reduced¹⁰². The money will be paid from a specially created guarantee fund (Fonds de Garantie des Victimes des actes de Terrorisme et d'autres Infractions, FGTI¹⁰³).

⁹⁸ Fédération nationale des victimes d'attentats et d'accidents collectifs, <https://www.fenvac.com/> [accessed: 8 XI 2021].

⁹⁹ Association 13 novembre: fraternité et vérité, <http://13onze15.org/> [accessed: 8 XI 2021].

¹⁰⁰ Association Montjoye, <https://montjoye.org/> [accessed: 8 XI 2021].

¹⁰¹ LOI n° 2019-222...

¹⁰² Code des assurances, Version en vigueur au 17 novembre 2021. Art. L126-1.

¹⁰³ *Les statuts du Fonds de Garantie des Victimes des actes de Terrorisme et d'autres Infractions (FGTI)*, <https://www.fondsdegarantie.fr/fgti/statuts/> [accessed: 18 XI 2021].

Currently, the funds allocated by the government to help victims of terrorism amount to 30 million euros.

Financial and psychological assistance is the most important thing to support citizens in the event of a terrorist attack. Therefore, countries that are particularly vulnerable to this type of attack should improve their social support system. In Germany, there is still a problem in providing good living conditions for victims of terrorism, and legislative changes are needed here. Many people are struggling to get sufficient support from the government and insurance money because they do not have the funds for life and rehabilitation¹⁰⁴. The French Republic has therefore taken the right step to help those affected.

Using social media to inform citizens

An example of a measure aimed at convincing the public to alert the authorities of a potential danger is the initiative of the Ministry of the Interior of the French Republic, which calls on people to inform the services that a person in their environment may have been radicalised, intends to carry out an attack or there is a terrorist threat. A special hotline has been set up for this purpose, so that the report can be directed to a specific entity.

Another solution to come to the fore is the use of social media as a form of information to the security services. Such measures are being introduced not only in France, but also in other countries such as Austria. During the terrorist attack in Vienna on 2 November 2020, while the police were in pursuit of the terrorist, bystanders reported on his movements. The Austrian Interior Ministry decided to have people who saw the terrorist share the information via a special form on the website to help the services locate the threat. The Austrian interior ministry asked people not to post the information on social media, which could lead to misinformation, but to pass the data directly to the police, who then distributed the verified information to citizens.

Another important element in strengthening the system for combating terrorist threats using social media is constant communication

¹⁰⁴ H. Rubinich, *Überlebende von Terroranschlägen. Der schwierige Weg aus dem Trauma*, <https://www.deutschlandfunkkultur.de/ueberlebende-von-terroranschlaegen-der-schwierige-weg-aus-100.html> [accessed: 20 XI 2021].

between the services and the public. The use of digital tools to transmit information important to citizens should be the basis for building a sense of security and stopping the growing disinformation, for example from false websites or terrorist groups¹⁰⁵. It is therefore necessary to reach out to platforms that make it possible to notify risks and to pinpoint the location of attacks and zones that are dangerous. The use of the Internet for communication is widespread and the creation of an official profile exclusively for risk reporting would be of great help not only to citizens but also to tourists or migrants who are at a given moment in the region at risk¹⁰⁶. This requires an official profile on these portals (one for the whole country, so that messages are not duplicated or modified on the websites of the police, the crisis management centre or the Ministry of Defence¹⁰⁷), which will always present the most important and official data on risks to citizens. It would be a profile that would report on the danger and give specific guidelines, for example not to use the chosen metro line or not to go to the city centre. Moreover, such a website could be part of the state's security policy and made available through tourist portals and on embassies' websites, so that visitors to the country know that in case of, for example, a terrorist attack, they can check the official message on the Internet. It should be noted, however, that it must be operational 24 hours a day and constantly updated.

Training of medical personnel

Another very important part of the system for fighting terrorist threats is the appropriate response to an attack. In addition to the activity of the security services, the most important thing in the event of an attack

¹⁰⁵ S. Gliwa, A. Olech, *Republika Francuska w obliczu działalności Państwa Islamskiego. Doświadczenia płynące z ataków terrorystycznych i propagandy w mediach społecznościowych w latach 2015–2019* (Eng. *The French Republic in the face of Islamic State activities. Experiences from terrorist attacks and social media propaganda in 2015-2019*), „Wiedza Obronna” 2020, vol. 271, no. 2, pp. 109-130.

¹⁰⁶ During the terrorist attacks in 2020, the interior ministries of Austria and France constantly informed (also in Polish) on their social media profiles about the existing threat.

¹⁰⁷ Ministère de l'Intérieur – Alerte, https://twitter.com/Beauvau_Alerte [accessed: 19 XI 2021].

is the proper and rapid organization of medical services. In the French Republic, there are special emergency teams prepared to provide assistance during a terrorist attack, as well as to help a large number of victims. In response to an attack, special medical and firefighting teams and reserve groups (in case of further attacks) are immediately activated, as well as a crisis regulation team, which is responsible for organising patient admissions and sending mobile units (doctors and nurses). This approach does not result in too large an influx of injured people into a single hospital. In addition, doctors, nurses, police and firefighters regularly undergo joint simulations and training in order to properly undertake life-saving measures in a coordinated rescue operation.

During the Paris attacks in November 2015, the medical services handled the situation despite the brutality of the perpetrators and the horrific number of injured because they were well prepared. Already since January of the same year (after the attacks on the headquarters of “Charlie Hebdo”) there was a danger that another attack could take place in France. Moreover, in 2013, protocols for action were introduced for medical emergency teams (*Service d'aide médicale urgente*, SAMU), police and fire brigades on first aid and the transport of victims in the event of a terrorist attack¹⁰⁸. Proper training of the medical team has the effect of reducing the risk of death of victims, as well as sending patients to the units that will provide them with the necessary assistance (depending on the specialisation of the hospital and the availability of medics and equipment). Of all the patients who arrived at the hospital after the 13 November 2015 attack in Paris (a total of 302 people), four died, representing less than 1% of the injured¹⁰⁹. The execution of a very efficient rescue operation was the result of previous exercises for medical services in the event of a terrorist threat.

Referring to the above actions, it should be stressed that currently in many countries in Europe, including Poland, there is no compulsory

¹⁰⁸ On the day of the attack in France, 13 November 2015, SAMU, the police and the fire service took part in an exercise simulating the organisation of emergency teams in the event of a shooting in Paris. The scenario focused on attacks involving multiple locations. In the evening, when the same medics were confronted with this situation in reality, some of them thought it was another simulation exercise.

¹⁰⁹ M. Hirsch et al., *The medical response to multisite terrorist attacks in Paris*, „The Lancet” 2015, no. 386 (10012), pp. 1–4.

training for paramedics and doctors, which would prepare them for this type of situation. Moreover, this has not been included in the planned in-service training courses. There are also no legal regulations or financial resources to carry out such exercises. At the same time, there are grassroots initiatives that offer medics to undergo a course to be able to react appropriately in a critical moment¹¹⁰. This is very important, because the behaviour of health professionals may be crucial if there is an attack. It is therefore necessary to regulate this issue legally and to take action at ministerial level to ensure that the majority of paramedics receive such training, or at least those who work in large cities where the terrorist threat is higher. Preparatory courses for paramedics and hospitals have also been introduced in, among others, Spain¹¹¹, the UK¹¹² and Turkey¹¹³, countries that have already experienced terrorist attacks. This does not mean that paramedics have to operate before the threat is contained, but qualified medical staff should have the knowledge and schemes to respond and minimise losses.

¹¹⁰ *Czy polscy ratownicy są przygotowani na udzielenie pomocy po ataku terrorystycznym?* (Eng. Are Polish rescuers prepared to help after a terrorist attack?), <https://www.infosecurity24.pl/czy-polscy-ratownicy-sa-przygotowani-na-udzielenie-pomocy-po-ataku-terrorystycznym?fbclid=IwAR2S8FsK2p2wHhVPrU99lvUJrf9LcLnZf6fmpOhORB1RhV14NT4s3u2eJeU> [accessed: 18 XI 2021].

¹¹¹ *Así funcionan los protocolos sanitarios en caso de atentados en España*, https://www.consalud.es/pacientes/asi-funcionan-los-protocolos-sanitarios-en-caso-de-atentados-en-espana_22428_102.html?fbclid=IwAR0fqXimun7oK2vbK7UCiFddJqSYfGbLRc0BKRHQ2ec_ZRuTF8Uw4LQZ41w [dostęp: 21 XI 2021]; *Simulacro antiterrorista*, https://www.diariodesevilla.es/vivirenvilla/Simulacro-antiterrorista_0_1131787221.html [accessed: 21 XI 2021].

¹¹² E. Skryabina, N. Betts, G. Reedy, P. Riley, R. Amlot, *UK healthcare staff experiences and perceptions of a mass casualty terrorist incident response: a mixed-methods study*, „Emergency Medicine Journal” 2021, vol. 38, no. 10.

¹¹³ G. Tarihi, *Hastanemiz çalışanlarına Adıyaman Emniyet Müdürlüğü Terörle Mücadele Daire Başkanlığı Büro Amirliği tarafından “Terörle Mücadele” eğitimi verildi*, <https://besnidh.saglik.gov.tr/TR,36418/hastanemiz-calisanlarina-adiyaman-emniyet-mudurlugu-terorle-mucadele-daire-baskanligi--buro-amirligi-tarafından-terorle-mucadele-egitimi-verildi.html> [accessed: 21 XI 2021].

Conclusion

In the author's opinion, the process of counteracting threats of a terrorist nature requires cooperation of various entities and groups at many stages. Nowadays it is not enough just to maintain a counterterrorist unit. Combating this type of aggression requires the involvement of entire societies and all the resources possessed by the state. Each of the elements supervised by the public administration has an important role to play in the process of verification and response to threats. Counter-terrorism should nowadays include a response to: the process of progressive radicalisation, the terrorist activities undertaken, and the activity of those convicted of terrorism (or other terrorist offences) who have already served their sentences. In addition, other challenges must be taken into account, such as the radicalisation of young people, the lack of access to rehabilitation programmes for inmates, insufficient support for victims of aggression and terrorism, the untapped potential of the Internet and social media, the ineffectiveness of the different uniformed formations in responding to terrorism, and the unpreparedness of medical teams in the event of an attack. All these measures can be taken in a short space of time, as many European Union countries, including Poland in particular, have the right tools and the capacity to implement them. The determinant factor should be that in France terrorism is a regular occurrence, and in Poland the threat is still low, so it may be considered a good time to prepare for an emergency now. French expertise demonstrates both mistakes and shortcomings that should not be repeated, and unique and proven solutions that should be used.

In the process of deradicalisation¹¹⁴ of convicts and those who may be about to embark on terrorist activities, assistance from many groups of people is important. The 'de-radicalisation team'¹¹⁵ includes: teachers

¹¹⁴ Radicalisation need not necessarily take the form of a terrorist attack. Moreover, this process concerns all ideologies that take violent and aggressive actions with the intention of forcing changes in the state, leading to destabilisation, confusion and unrest. Any religion, any ideology, any political party or movement can be radicalised. This applies equally to jihadism, right-wing terrorism, left-wing terrorism, separatism, nationalism and even actions within specific communities.

¹¹⁵ The author states that a nomenclature is needed for the entire team involved in supporting a person who may be influenced by a harmful ideology, and therefore proposes a name of its own.

(who can inhibit the radicalisation of young people), psychologists, guards (or supervisors) at the place of detention, co-workers, family, friends and clergy (or someone perceived as an expert or guide in the religion or ideology the person professes). These groups, if they cooperate, are in a position to help an individual who is succumbing to harmful influences. The basis of cooperation is conversation and exchange of views between team members. It does not have to have an official framework, but the necessary contact between those surrounding the radicaliser is sufficient. Just as the whole state is important in the system for fighting terrorist threats, here the team is crucial, as it can react early enough so that an attack does not take place. Furthermore, outsiders can point out worrying symptoms, which will be analysed by those surrounding the radical. This is why it is important to pay attention to increasing aggression (based on ideology) whether on the Internet or in the workplace (study). Any person can become a threat whistleblower. This does not mean that the suspect will immediately be held criminally responsible, but their behaviour can be monitored by the security services. In the French Republic, this is how the process works, which makes it much easier to take action if strong radicalisation actually occurs. This is now such a very specific danger that it requires constant vigilance and observation by all citizens.

In the fight against terrorism and in preventing violent radicalisation, governments as well as regional and international organisations face major challenges. However, through transnational cooperation they are able to respond not only to conventional but also to asymmetric threats such as extremism and organised crime. Moreover, with the dividing line between internal and external security increasingly blurred, it is necessary to re-examine the adaptation of security systems to the geopolitical situation in order to make them more effective. Using even some of the solutions applied in France will be very effective on Polish soil. The threat of an attack or radicalisation is just as possible. All that changes is the perpetrator and his motivation.

The lack of a uniform perception of the phenomenon of terrorism in France and Poland does not mean that effective methods and countermeasures cannot be identified that are appropriate for both countries. The actors responsible for counter-terrorism cannot only be called upon when a threat is detected or an attack occurs.

The overriding aim should be prevention and the creation of conditions to stop the radicalisation of particular groups and individuals. At the same time, in the event of an attack and during the reorganisation afterwards, the government should have a set of measures to mitigate the negative impact of the aggression on society. Many of the solutions presented in this paper are intended to draw attention to less popular methods of conducting the state's anti-terrorist policy, but equally important in the process of building security capacity. Additionally, the solutions described in France can be implemented and extended in Poland quite naturally, within the framework of the development of the existing tools¹¹⁶. Currently, the environment in which radicalisation and terrorist attacks take place is changing. Due to technological progress, what is happening is that terrorism is not only an attack with explosives, but also the destructive use of the Internet and social media. Consequently, recognising the methods and means that terrorists may use is extremely important in verifying the threat in order to be able to effectively eliminate it in the first phase of its development.

Strengthening the current structures for combating terrorism in Poland will be very important in the coming years due to the growing phenomenon of radicalisation¹¹⁷. Furthermore, defining already now strategies and methods to respond to challenges that are not yet as common as in France, will allow a proper assessment of the potential and skills of the different actors¹¹⁸. The evaluation carried out will also highlight inadequacies that need to be remedied and will allow the direction of change and improvement of Polish and European counterterrorism to be set.

When analysing future solutions for Poland, it is worth at the outset resuming work on the next edition of the National Anti-Terrorist Programme in order to include in it the area of radicalisation

¹¹⁶ These include the launch of e-learning courses by the ABW Terrorism Prevention Centre (see: <https://learning.tpcoe.gov.pl/> [accessed: 27 November 2021]) and the creation of a special prison cell with the right to surveillance (see: infosecurity24.pl/specjalna-komorka-wieziennictwa-z-prawem-do-inwigilacji [accessed: 27 XI 2021]).

¹¹⁷ Collegium Civitas, *Spoleczny wymiar radykalizacji – czynniki wpływające na proces radykalizacji młodych ludzi. Wnioski z badań w projekcie „DARE”* (Eng. The social dimension of radicalisation - factors influencing the radicalisation process of young people. Conclusions from the research in the „DARE“ project), Warszawa 2021.

¹¹⁸ A. Olech, *Walka z terroryzmem...* (Eng. Fight against terrorism...)

in a manner adequate to the results of the above-mentioned research. Thanks to that, this issue would be comprehensively developed within the existing AT system in the Republic of Poland. This would allow for the creation of a subsystem supporting the identification of terrorist threats, consisting of social initiatives, scientific and research projects and institutional solutions, which would combine the potential of information collected by local administration bodies, the Police, the Internal Security Agency or the Prison Service.

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