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The Issue of Faithful Translation According to Roman Ingarden

Abstract: In this article I reflect on the concept of fidelity, which I believe is of fundamental importance in any discourse on translation. According to Roman Ingarden in his essay “On Translation,” this concept may appear in a variety of different contexts – ethical, epistemological and aesthetic – allowing us to better understand the essential components of a faithful translation. When attempting to reconstruct Ingarden’s own concept of what constitutes a faithful literary translation, I refer not only to the above text, but also to his research within the fields of ethics, epistemology and the philosophy of literature. I also consider his role as an author and editor of translations of Immanuel Kant’s works, published in the series *Library of Philosophical Classics*. To conclude, I try to place the results of this reconstruction within the context of the various theories to be found in contemporary translation studies.

Keywords: Roman Ingarden, philosophy, translation theory, the concept of fidelity

Abstrakt: W prezentowanym artykule rozwijam refleksję wokół pojęcia wierności, któremu przypisuję fundamentalne znaczenie w kształtującym się od wieków dyskursie przekładoznawczym. W myśli Romana Ingardena pojęcie to pojawia się w różnych kontekstach: aksjologicznym, etycznym, epistemologicznym i estetycznym. Z wypowiedzi Ingardena na temat znaczenia wierności w wymienionych dziedzinach dociekań filozoficznych wyłania się wieloaspektowy obraz tego pojęcia, pozwalający lepiej zrozumieć istotę kwestii wiernego przekładu, której filozof poświęcił swą uwagę w szkicu *O tłumaczeniach*. Podejmując próbę zrekonstruowania Ingardenowskiego rozumienia wiernego przekładu literatury, odwołuję się nie tylko do tego tekstu, ale także do świadectw działalności polskiego fenomenologa jako autora i redaktora tłumaczeń wydawanych w serii „Biblioteka Klasyków Filozofii”. Wyniki rekonstrukcji odnoszę do wybranych nurtów myśli przekładoznawczej, zwracając uwagę na translatoologiczną relewancję Ingardenowskiego ujęcia problemu wierności.

Słowa kluczowe: Roman Ingarden, filozofia, teoria przekładu, pojęcie wierności

1. Introduction: What Constitutes a Faithful Translation Within the Context of Roman Ingarden's Theories and his Reflections on Translation Studies

In this article I shall discuss the notion of fidelity, which is of fundamental significance within any translation studies discourse. Roman Ingarden, the author of the scholarly essay "On Translations" (1955), which has had a significant impact on the development of Polish translation theory, also contributed to the millennia-long debate on the essence of a faithful translation. However, when attempting to reconstruct Ingarden's understanding of a faithful translation and relate it to contemporary translation studies, one cannot limit oneself to the aforementioned text alone. It is also essential to consider Ingarden's inquiries into the structure and understanding of a literary work, as well as his work on aesthetics, his lectures on ethics, and his studies in epistemology. In addition, Ingarden's work as an author and editor of translations published in the *Biblioteka Klasyków Filozofii* [*Library of Philosophy Classics*] series needs to be considered, as well as the overarching issue of fidelity, understood as a value that requires a faithful, conscientious reproduction of an original text. It is clear, therefore, that there is much to be considered, including issues related to axiology and cognition, although this is hardly surprising. If any reflection on translation studies is to be taken seriously, acknowledging its interdisciplinary nature beyond the domains of linguistics and literary studies is essential. When faced with the problem of fidelity of representation, philosophical reflections are unavoidable.

Since the very beginning of the concept of translation studies, the relevance of the issue of faithful translation has extended far beyond discussions on optimal interlingual translation techniques, touching on fundamental issues related to religion and philosophy.¹ In 395 AD, St. Jerome, citing the authority of the evangelists, argued that fidelity primarily concerns the "sense, not the words" (Jerome 2005, 28). Had it been otherwise, inspired translators of the Septuagint could, contends the author of the Vulgate, essentially be considered forgers of the Holy Scriptures (Jerome 2005, 28). Over a thousand years later, Martin Luther, in his treatise on translation, theologically justified his unfaithful – as far as the words were concerned – translation of a passage from St. Paul's Letter to the Romans (3:28), establishing a higher, spiritual order of fidelity, which nevertheless respects the "requirements [...] of the German language," and at the same time is "not to detract from faith or lose Christ" (Luther 1990, 156).² This connection between the spirit of the national language and the spirit of Christianity, making them the ultimate norm for a faithful biblical translation, had far-reaching consequences on many levels, including the ethical domain. According to Luther,

¹ In this context though the evolution of the idea of fidelity took place, a fusion took place between the lay perspective (underlining interpersonal relations) and the religious one (see Gloyna 1999, 64–72).

² In fact, Luther translates *fides* from Jerome's Vulgate as "trew und glaub", that is "fidelity and faith" (Gloyna 1999, 77). Unless otherwise indicated translations are mine.

translation was not an art for everyone: “it takes a faithful, patient, God-fearing person, filled with a Christian faith and heart,” and therefore “no false Christian [...] is able to translate faithfully” (Luther 1990, 153).

Another significant source of discourse on fidelity in translation is the humanistic tradition of translating Greek philosophers, which flourished in the Renaissance. In this context, the work of Leonardo Bruni, a translator of Aristotle, and Marsilio Ficino, renowned as the author of *Platonis Opera latina*, are significant. The humanists of the time sought to overcome the medieval translation tradition by elevating naturalness and stylistic coherence above literalness – provided, of course, that a literal translation would contradict these stylistic features. Bruni and other humanistic translators aimed to free “medieval translations from that fearful fidelity to syntactic and phraseological structures, borrowed in general from the Greeks, and more specifically from Aristotle” (Domański 2006, 83). They acted in the name of a higher kind of fidelity, that of precision of meaning, together with clarity and naturalness of linguistic expression.

Marsilio Ficino, who was younger than Bruni, had somewhat different priorities in this regard. He was more concerned with fidelity to Plato’s philosophical thought (especially to the accurate rendition of his terminology), rather than stylistic elegance, especially since the latter appeared to him as mysterious and untranslatable (Olszaniec 2008, 48). Indeed, the humanists paved the way for the notion of philosophical translation, which is still followed by translators today.

Several hundred years later, Friedrich Schleiermacher, who translated Plato’s work into German, was faced with the puzzling quality of his style. He tried to remain loyal to both Plato’s style of thinking and writing as well as to the language and intellectual horizons of his contemporary German readers. Based on his experiences with Plato’s texts on both hermeneutic and translation levels, Schleiermacher formulated his famous remarks on the “different methods of translation,” which initiated modern scholarly reflections on translation studies (see Schleiermacher 2005, 43–63). He also highlighted the web of tensions generated by the multidirectional character of the postulate of fidelity which, incidentally, involved Roman Ingarden as a translator and translation theorist. In Schleiermacher’s reflections on translation, the postulate of fidelity is shaped by polarizing factors such as difference and similarity, foreignness and familiarity, the author of the original text and the translation recipient, and hermeneutics and dialectics. In this multi-dimensional web, the translator acts as a mediator, adopting the role of dialogist. An analysis of Schleiermacher’s textual world of translations from Plato reveals that this dialogist space and mediation between polarized perspectives appears as a field for negotiation (De Bończa Bukowski 2021, 23), where, on each occasion, one can define the meaning of such fundamental concepts as equivalence, adequacy, or fidelity (Eco 2006, 17).

Friedrich Schleiermacher’s practice of a faithful philosophical translation can be explained by referring to the concept of fidelity in translation as formulated by another eminent theorist of interpretation – Umberto Eco, who wrote:

La fedeltà è piuttosto la tendenza a credere che la traduzione sia sempre possibile se il testo fonte è stato interpretato con appassionata complicità, è l’impegno a identificare quello che

per noi è il senso profondo del testo, e la capacità di negoziare a ogni istante la soluzione che ci pare più giusta.

Se consultate qualsiasi dizionario vedrete che tra i sinonimi di fedeltà non c'è la parola esattezza. Ci sono piuttosto lealtà, onestà; rispetto; pietà (Eco 2006, 34).

This concept of fidelity has an affirmative overtone, aiming to build a bridge between tradition and the modern, “relativizing” any theory of interpretation. However, not all trends in contemporary translation studies affirm the age-old practice of employing the concept of fidelity in translation. For instance, in a pivotal text for feminist translation theory, “Gender and the Metaphorics of Translation” by Lori Chamberlain, we read, among other things, that the term *les belles infidèles* is perhaps the best-known manifestation of the sexualization of translation. The endurance of this 17th-century phrase stems not only from “phonetic similarity” but also from the authority of a “cultural complicity between the issues of fidelity in translation and in marriage” (Chamberlain 2005, 307). Here, the female is associated with the translation, while the male is associated with the original text.

However, this does not mean that proponents of feminist translation studies reject the concept of fidelity in translation. Indeed, they do not dismiss it from their discourse but rather reinterpret it in a new spirit. “For feminist translation,” explains Sherry Simon, “fidelity is to be directed toward neither the author nor the reader, but toward the writing project – a project in which both writer and translator participate” (Simon 1996, 2). Paradoxically, such a project extends back to the traditional, combining elements that constitute the historical shape of the concept of “fidelity”: the ethics of democratic loyalty and justice, as well as the ethos of “fidelis” as a representation of a pattern or original that conforms to the true state of affairs (see Gloyna 1999, 80).

It is worth emphasizing that Schleiermacher himself distinguishes between fidelity as a characteristic of statements that reflect the state of affairs, and fidelity of commitments made by people (mutual obligations), correctly observing that the latter also has a linguistic foundation (Gloya 1999, 79). I am inclined to argue that this approach – clearly echoing the ancient understanding of the terms *fides/fidelis* – in a way defines the framework of Ingarden’s understanding of fidelity in translation.

The historical context of the discourse of fidelity in translation that has been outlined above allows us to discern more clearly the specificity of the phenomenological approach to the problem of faithful translation, as defined in Roman Ingarden’s writings. In what follows, I will try to delve deeper into this perspective, taking into account its fundamental philosophical sources and contexts.

2. Ethical Aspects

The concept of fidelity (*pistos, to piston*), rooted in ancient Greek culture, has a primarily ethical dimension, since it originally relates to the reliability and trustworthiness of interpersonal relationships, especially when a bond or covenant is

formed between two parties (Gloyna 1999, 66–67). Therefore, the first aspect of Ingarden’s argument which I will turn to will be ethics.

In his lectures on ethics delivered in Kraków in the academic year 1961/1962, the philosopher spoke, among other things, about the values or “valuable properties” of a human being (Ingarden 1989, 244),³ while analyzing words that denote personal values, moral assets, perhaps even “virtues” (Ingarden 1989, 245). Among them there is also “fidelity,” which Ingarden describes, listing instances in which this virtue is attributed to individuals. Indeed, a person is faithful primarily in relation to others – when they keep promises, their word, especially in challenging life situations (Ingarden 1989, 248). We can also speak of “fidelity to oneself in conduct” when someone “does not betray oneself;” “does not deviate under the influence of difficulties [...] from their [...] ideals” (Ingarden 1989, 248). The consequence of fidelity is being “trustworthy,” that is, someone who remains faithful, even under challenging circumstances, someone who does not betray. This is certainly a moral stance, especially noticeable when difficulties and unfavorable circumstances arise (Ingarden 1989, 249).

It is evident that fidelity is a value to which Ingarden attributes great importance, and is closely related to other essential values, such as “honesty” or “integrity” (Ingarden 1989, 247–278). It defines a special relationship towards others and to oneself, thanks to which the subject acting in the world gains credibility. To make this axiological space more complete, the value related to fidelity is called “loyalty,” which – it is worth noting – just like fidelity plays a key role in any reflection on the ethics of translation (see Nord 2009, 184–186).

The history of the concept of “fidelity” reveals how it was not always associated with ethics. At times, it merely denoted a certain technical proficiency in imitation – what might be termed as “accuracy” (see Gloyna 1999, 80). However, in all of Ingarden’s contextualizations of this concept, undertaken within various fields of reflection, the ethical dimension of “fidelity” sketched here is clearly present. Thus, we can see that a faithful representation is also trustworthy, does not betray its subject (to which it has obligations), and does not fail those who rely on it. Thus, the demand for fidelity in Ingarden’s thought *primarily* has the character of an ethical demand.

3. Fidelity in the Context of Epistemology

Thus, the fundamental and broadest framework encompassing the issue of fidelity appears to be the axiological framework sketched by Ingarden in his *Lectures on Ethics*. In a narrower, yet still quite broad sense, fidelity can be considered in connection with the theory of knowledge as a value obtained during the process of cognition. In this context, Ingarden is interested in the question of the value of cog-

³ Because of the need for terminological consistency when quoting Ingarden’s various works (translated into English long ago and contemporaneously, once and twice, and sometimes not translated at all), I have chosen to use my own translation. In the references, however, I also locate quotations in existing English translations.

nitive outcomes, described using concepts such as “consistency,” “truthfulness,” “objectivity,” “certainty,” or “adequacy” (Ogrodnik 2000, 86). In his *Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge*, the completion of which was interrupted by the philosopher’s death, he considers the idea of a cognitive outcome, the evaluation of which in terms of worth requires distinguishing between abstract cognitive categories (Ogrodnik 2000, 90), among them being the “adequacy” versus “inadequacy” of cognition. Adequate cognition is complete in itself (Ingarden 1995, 47). Inadequacy, consisting of the insufficient differentiation of content elements, is simply the “unfaithfulness” of forms attributed to the object in relation to the forms in which they occur in the object (Ingarden 1995, 48). Thus, as Ingarden puts it, a kind of “mismatch” of the cognitive outcome manifests itself. Unfaithfulness occurs, for example, when the features distinguished in the cognitive outcome merge or are over-differentiated (exaggerated) (Ingarden 1995, 48). Therefore, when speaking of the fidelity of a certain cognitive outcome, and matching the form the object possesses, we should specify what kind of fidelity it is to be. “Adequate in terms of its scope” does not necessarily mean “faithful” (Ingarden 1995, 48). There are many possible combinations here, allowing for potential, nuanced criticism of the obtained cognitive outcome.

In this context, Ingarden observes that the fidelity or adequacy of a cognitive outcome can be influenced by the properties of language, i.e. that we formulate a cognitive outcome in a given language (hence indirectly). We are, in a way, translating, which includes breaking down this outcome into sentences, which can lead to “unfaithfulness concerning the established points and formal relations related to the construction of the object under consideration” (Ingarden 1995, 49). According to Ingarden, this issue was of fundamental importance for Henri Bergson, to whom he attributed an important role in the history of contemporary philosophy. However, the same issue was also significant for phenomenologists (Ingarden 1995, 49). Bergson claimed that the perspective view of the cognized thing expressed via a language of symbols, i.e., “translated” into that language, would always remain unfaithful, and therefore be an imperfect translation (Bergson 1912, 5). On the other hand, phenomenologists, who recognized the problem of fidelity of the cognitive outcome to the object of the “original” (see Bergson 1912, 3), were much less skeptical about the possibility of insight and its communicability.⁴

It is worth noting here that for Ingarden, the issue of fidelity in describing the results of cognition was not only, as Marek Rosiak emphasizes, a “matter of practical proficiency”, but also a matter of ethics. Ingarden understood this fidelity as an expression of “the thinker’s integrity towards the object of his research and towards his listeners or readers” (Rosiak 2011, 44). This understanding corresponds to the concept of a translator’s loyalty defined in the context of functionalism by Christine Nord (2009, 184–185). It assumes the translator’s rectitude towards the original text (and its author) and the target audience, requiring, among

⁴ On the problem of the communicability (being able to be translated into a discourse) of a phenomenological insight, see Kofakowski 1990, 45–47.

other things, a proper understanding of the subject of translational action and the determination of an adequate degree of translation differentiation (see Kußmaul 1994, 215).

4. Faithful Concretization and Reconstruction of Literary Works: Between Aesthetics and Epistemology

In the realm of aesthetics, Ingarden considers the issue of fidelity primarily in three contexts: (i) the faithful concretization of the work of art, especially literary, (ii) the faithful reconstruction of the literary work, and (iii) fidelity within the context of truthfulness related to objects presented in any given work of art. I would like to focus here on the issue of the faithful concretization and reconstruction of literary works, as presented by Ingarden in his monograph *On the Cognition of the Literary Work* (1st edition 1937).

According to Ingarden, such fidelity is a demanding task, because to “faithfully capture the artistic work in its proper form”, one must “delve into” its “microcosm,” encompassing all its layers (Ingarden 1976, 160; see Ingarden 1973b, 163). Subsequently, it is necessary to “reconstruct” it, utilizing “all its artistic faculties for the establishment of a faithful aesthetic concretization” (Ingarden 1976, 160; see Ingarden 1973b, 163).⁵ At the same time, it is much more challenging to “faithfully capture the world presented in the work and all the other moments of its multilayered (stratified) and multi-phased whole than to accurately understand the statement of a scientific work” (Ingarden 1976, 160–161; see Ingarden 1973b, 164). However, this does not mean that the latter does not pose difficulties during the process of understanding, partly because a fully unambiguous text is a rare commodity (Ingarden 1976, 154; see Ingarden 1973b, 157).

The concretization of a work may conform to the artistic intentions of the creator or may in fact be removed from them. It may emulate the style of the work or be in a style incompatible with it. In this context, Ingarden speaks of the “accuracy and fidelity” of concretization and links this issue with the adequacy of perceiving a literary work and the accuracy of its assessment (Ingarden 1976, 58; see Ingarden 1973b, 55). However, even faithful aesthetic concretizations can differ from each other, revealing different “aesthetically valuable qualities” and consequently “different aesthetic qualities” (Ingarden 1976, 64–65; see Ingarden 1973b, 62). A person can actualize and concretize appearances in many different ways, which often leads not only to divergent assessments of a literary work (Ingarden 1976, 64–65; see Ingarden 1973b, 62–63) but also to translations that differ from each other. In this perspective, the question of the fidelity of translation refers to the scope of “fidelity” achieved by the translator when concretizing the original work.

However, the level of freedom is not unlimited here. Just as the original demands a type of faithful translation, the literary work also “requires” faithful con-

⁵ Bartoszyński (1995, 234) sees this concretization as a “translation” that further refines original meanings.

cretization, i.e., rendering “justice” to, for instance, the multilayered character of the work (Ingarden 1976, 91; see Ingarden 1973b, 90). In this regard, lack of fidelity can distort the reconstruction of the polyphonic harmony of aesthetically significant qualities.

However, according to Ingarden, the problem of fidelity is best understood within the context of an interaction with a literary work of art that is oriented towards its “research-based understanding.” Here, we are dealing with “a certain, already complete, given (encountered) object” (Ingarden 1976, 317; see Ingarden 1973b, 329), which serves as a reference point for the reconstruction under way. The aim of the cognitive effort is to “do justice to the valuable harmony” of the literary work of art in an “adequate” manner (Ingarden 1976, 318; see Ingarden 1973b, 330). Therefore, one can speak here of the adequacy of perceiving the work on an epistemological level, rather than an aesthetic one (see Ingarden 1970, 135; Szczepańska 1989, 166–167).

A faithful reconstruction, writes Ingarden, “is similar to the work in every respect,” revealing that work in all its details (Ingarden 1976, 324; see Ingarden 1973b, 324). What is crucial here is a faithful reconstruction of the linguistic sound and semantic layer (i.e. the stratum of sound formations and the stratum of meaning units) because it determines the “fidelity of other layers and all their connections into one whole” (Ingarden 1976, 325; see Ingarden 1973b, 337–338). In this context Ingarden writes of “unfaithfulness,” which leads to deviations that “distort the original” in those layers that are dependent on language, resulting in the transformation of the work during the act of cognition (Ingarden 1976, 328; see Ingarden 1973b, 340). Arriving at a faithful knowledge of the work “necessitates confronting the properties of the work itself with various concretizations, and determining whether these concretizations fit within the variability permitted by the work” (Szczepańska 1989, 168). This means that the overall assessment of the fidelity of a particular concretization requires a faithful reconstruction of that work and a thorough analysis of that concretization within the context of its adequacy. Note that a similar procedure is used by contemporary translation criticism (see, e.g., Koller 1979).

When posing a question about the criterion of fidelity in reconstructing a given work, Ingarden admits that he assumes the necessity of a specific return to the original, to the very text of the work (Ingarden 1976, 330; see Ingarden 1973b, 342–343). But can we really access it? Is a faithful reconstruction possible in which “the work adequately reveals itself in its own form”? (Ingarden 1976, 335; see Ingarden 1973b, 348). Ingarden answers in the affirmative. There must be an “original,” an “original form of the work itself,” otherwise a consensus on understanding its meaning would be virtually impossible (Ingarden 1976, 335; see Ingarden 1973b, 348).⁶ It can be reached through a rather painstaking objectification of the results of the research-based text cognition – through its subsequent readings or via a comparison of its different reconstructions.

⁶ Compare Ingarden’s explanation of the essence of “the faithful adherence to the text!” (in its schematic shape), which can be found in the monograph *O dziele literackim* (Ingarden 1988, 416, note; see Ingarden 1973a, 343).

Concretizations of a work arise from the aesthetic experience, which should be “regulated by a specific mode of cognizing the work of art” from this experience (Ingarden 1976, 365; see Ingarden 1973b, 378). The concept of adequacy plays a significant role in this context – the aesthetic experience is adequate when it leads to a concretization that – as Ingarden writes – is a precise embodiment of its “idea” – a specific project of concretization (Ingarden 1976, 381; see Ingarden 1973b, 394). Such an idea should have a “basis in a faithful reconstruction of the work” (Ingarden 1976, 382; see Ingarden 1973b, 395) and be guided by the postulate of closeness and justice towards the work.

5. Fidelity in Literary Translation

Ingarden addressed the issue of translation, especially literary translation, in his works on multiple occasions (see de Bończa Bukowski 2017, 437–438). He devoted considerable attention to it in his monograph, *Das literarische Kunstwerk*, not only in the context of analyzing the ontological structure of a literary work but also in a broader dimension. It is worth noting that the introduction to the Polish edition of this work takes us directly into the heart of translation studies, as Ingarden problematizes three important issues: a faithful reconstruction of the original as a work in itself, a faithful translation of specific linguistic constructions, and a faithful rendition of the author’s thoughts (Ingarden 1988, 13, Preface to the Polish Edition).

Almost all aspects of Ingarden’s reflection on the problem of interlingual translation are illuminated in a very comprehensive article, *O tłumaczeniach* (*On Translations*), which resulted not only from the philosopher’s theoretical considerations but also from his own practical endeavors as a translator and editor of works by classical philosophers. This text was first published in the 1955 collective volume, *O sztuce tłumaczenia* (*On the Art of Translation*), edited by Michał Rusinek. The book, a result of the Translation Study run by the Pen Club, presented lectures by eminent Polish scholars and writers and played a significant role in shaping Polish translation theory (see Bukowski, Heydel 2013, 11–13).

The issue of “faithful” translation (Ingarden often mentions this term in quotation marks), appears in the very first paragraph of the article *O tłumaczeniach*, where the philosopher first establishes the concept of translating a literary work, using his own theory of the latter as a reference point. So, what is fidelity in translation? If we assume that translation is the replacement of the sounds of words in a work written in the source language with the sounds from the target language, then we can speak of fidelity when “no meaning in the semantic layer of the work (the stratum of meaning units) undergoes a change during this process” (Ingarden 1972, 120; see Ingarden 1991, 131). A key assumption in this approach is the arbitrariness of the sound-meaning relationship. This is the theoretical basis for the belief in the possibility of translation, or the translatability of texts in different languages (see Hanuszewicz 2001, 230). Such a perspective also reveals a characteristic of the linguistic definitions of translation, focusing on the lexical level of transfer. Can this approach be considered persuasive?

Ingarden examines this issue thoroughly and arrives at a negative conclusion: “literary translation is not a simple exchange of verbal sounds from one language into the sounds of another language” (Ingarden 1972, 132; see Ingarden 2019, 85). This would imply that other layers of the work could remain intact during this procedure. However, extracting one component from the “complex organism” of the work and replacing it with another from a different language entails changes in other components, in their harmony, and consequently in the entirety of the work, so that often a completely new work is created (Ingarden 1972, 132; see Ingarden 2019, 85). Therefore, the initial concept of translation, especially the “fidelity” of translation, should be revised. According to Ingarden, this fidelity must be constructed separately for a scholarly work as well as for a literary artistic work (Ingarden 1972, 132; see Ingarden 2019, 85), since the difference in their “tasks and functions” is tied to their distinct structures within the “multilayered (stratified) and multi-phase structure of a literary work in general” (Ingarden 1972, 123; see Ingarden 1991, 133).⁷

Translating a literary work according to Ingarden, “always necessitates a certain reconstruction,” involving at least the exchange of verbal sounds from the original into the sounds of the target language, because changes usually also occur in the other layers of the work. A fundamental question arises here as to whether, despite these changes, “the individual identity of the work” still persists, or is it compromised, resulting in “an entirely new work, qualitatively distinct from the original”? (Ingarden 1972, 132; see Ingarden 2019, 85) This issue is challenging, because it is difficult to establish any general boundaries in a work’s identity. From Ingarden’s perspective, the constructional role of the semantic layer (the stratum of meaning units) is crucial as it determines the construction of the entire work and its identity (Ingarden 1972, 132–133; see Ingarden 2019, 85). Meanwhile, the “perceptual-aesthetic” role remains secondary in this context, although its importance varies depending on the nature of the work (scholarly or artistic).

Thus, when speaking of the faithful reconstruction of a scholarly work, one must consider whether the exchange of verbal sounds “does not violate the meaning of the original sentences” as well as “their order” (Ingarden 1972, 136; see Ingarden 2019, 87). Here, “literary merits” are not essential – if they “do not affect the cognitive efficiency of the work,” they are irrelevant in the context of the “fidelity” of translation (Ingarden 1972, 136; see Ingarden 2019, 87). The goal is for the translation to “lead the reader towards the same objectives as the original work” and allow them to understand it (Ingarden 1972, 136; see Ingarden 2019, 85). This effect concerns a layer which, following Schleiermacher I refer to dialectics.⁸

The case of an artistic work, however, is different because the sound layer (the stratum of sound formations) is of primary importance. In this case, a translational reconstruction can be considered faithful when the new verbal sounds “do not

⁷ See a broad definition of a literary work as formulated by Ingarden (1972, 121; 1991, 132) that encompasses discursive (scholarly) works and artistic (literary) ones.

⁸ On Schleiermacher’s understanding of dialectics and the role of translation in this context, see de Bończa Bukowski 2020, 247–277

violate the polyphonic harmony of the qualities that have aesthetic value”, while maintaining, if possible, the semantic layer (the stratum of meaning units) of the work (Ingarden 1972, 136; see Ingarden 2019, 85).⁹

A conventionalist theory of language that assumes translatability is, according to Ingarden, fundamentally correct but not “entirely true,” since in that case a “completely faithful” translation would always be possible, and even relatively easy to achieve (Ingarden 1972, 139; see Ingarden 2019, 90). However, this is not the case. The philosopher provides examples of “concrete”, “lively” and “juicy” words prevalent in everyday language which play a significant role in literature, partly due to their sound qualities (Ingarden 1972, 140; see Ingarden 2019, 91). Literary style studies teach us, however, that the relationship between the sound of a word and its various functions is not always loose. After all, the function of “imaginary representation” is associated with certain sound properties of words (Ingarden 1972, 142; see Ingarden 2019, 92). Additionally, the “tone” of any given statement, its register, etc., should be considered. Therefore, the relation between the sound of a word and its function can vary in different languages, and such a phenomenon “limits the degree of fidelity that can be achieved in translation” (Ingarden 1972, 144; see Ingarden 2019, 94). Sometimes this degree is high, other times low, so fidelity can be seen as a relative, gradable value. It depends on various factors, among which Ingarden specifically discusses linguistic ones.¹⁰ Today, this is referred to as the problem of untranslatability due to linguistic differences (see, e.g., Hejwowski 2004, 105–123).

Ingarden understands that translation encompasses a realm of difference, and that the translator is somewhat condemned to unfaithfulness. As he notes, either the translation is unfaithful to the sound layer (the stratum of sound formations) but faithful to the layer of the units of meaning (the stratum of meaning units), or vice versa – the translator, aiming at preserving the sound, introduces differences at the level of the units of meaning (Ingarden 1972, 156). He emphasizes that only a detailed analysis of specific translations can reveal “in what cases and for what reasons” translations are, for example, faithful in meaning but unfaithful artistically (Ingarden 1972, 156; see Ingarden 2019, 102).¹¹

At this stage of reflection, Ingarden concludes: “General considerations alone cannot give us anything more on this matter” (Ingarden 1972, 157; see Ingarden 2019, 103). He then moves on to discussing difficulties in translating the works of classical philosophers, where the problem of fidelity comes to the fore. Here, he begins his considerations on fidelity and literalness in translating scholarly texts with a definition: “Any translation of a scholarly work, especially a philo-

⁹ Thus, it is possible to say that “the oneness/sameness of the polyphonic harmony of the original and translation” determines the value of translation, though it does not seem right to claim it is a universal “translation dominant” (Mikołajko 2018, 158).

¹⁰ Ingarden discusses such qualities of language as “abstractness”, “discernibility” or “incisiveness” (see also Hanuszewicz 2001, 232).

¹¹ Apparently, Ingarden must have thought about this fidelity in meaning when he commented on his own translation of the poem by Rainer Maria Rilke, “Das Lied des Aussätzigen”, included in the second volume of *Controversy over the Existence of the World*: “I strove for fidelity rather than for poetic form” (Ingarden 1987, 196; see Ingarden 2016, 208).

sophical one, is faithful if it accurately conveys the meaning of all the sentences of the original in the attire of another language” (Ingarden 1972, 159; see Ingarden 1991, 163). Ideally, the philosopher adds, it should also be literal, preserving “the dictionary meaning of all individual words of the original” (Ingarden 1972, 159; see Ingarden 1991, 163). Unfortunately, linguistic differences usually thwart this level of literalness.

The above definition initially comes across as somewhat anachronistic: Ingarden refers to an old rhetorical concept of “linguistic attire” (*ornatus*), with which the meaning of sentences (their intellectual content) is as if dressed. Further on, the author nuances his definition, writing about the “reconstruction of the intellectual content of the original,” which he perceives as the result of cognitive operations by the author of the work (Ingarden 1972, 159; see Ingarden 1991, 163). This reconstruction is faithful when the translator conveys “the same thought (meaning) of the original” in the target language. If literalness is not possible here, the translator may resort to different words and phrases but which express the same sense (Ingarden 1972, 159; see Ingarden 1991, 164). Ingarden, however, cannot precisely explain what this sense is, admitting that “theoretically, the matter is not easy” (Ingarden 1972, 160; see Ingarden 1991, 164). It is difficult to reduce this invariant sense to a “reality which is autonomous and independent of the sentences” (Ingarden 1972, 160; see Ingarden 1991, 164). According to the philosopher’s suggestion, determining such a sense requires the translator to show hermeneutical competence: a knowledge both of the thing itself and the language in which this thing finds its expression. We are thus close to Gadamer’s hermeneutics of translation, albeit in a simplified form.

Nevertheless, the very concept of translating a philosophical work as a meaning-directed reconstruction of the original seems fortunate; in any case, it can be productively used in discussions about translations of structurally-challenging philosophical texts from Anaximander and Plato to Wittgenstein and Derrida. However, clarification is needed in determining precisely which factors constituting the meaning should be taken into account by a faithful translator-reconstructor.¹² Ingarden mentions some of them later in his work, of which the most significant are:

1. *Conceptual approach to reality*. Here fidelity consists of “maintaining the same conceptual approach to objects and states of affairs that the original deals with” (Ingarden 1972, 161; see Ingarden 1991, 165). In this context, one should also place the issue considered by Ingarden using Kant’s thought as an example, concerning the scope of concepts in the original and in its translation, as well as the differentiation of their contents (Ingarden 1972, 168 ff., 171 ff.; see Ingarden 1991, 172 ff., 174 ff.).
2. *Syntactic-logical structure of the original*. Fidelity assumes an awareness that sometimes reorganizing the sentence structure of the original gives it a “different mode of thinking” and changes the “structural face of reality” that the “original tries to faithfully convey” (Ingarden 1972, 163; see In-

¹² On the levels of sense reconstruction, see Pisarska, Tomaszewicz 1996, 91–102.

garden 1991, 167). It means keeping to as faithful a representation (through reconstruction) of a specific mode of representation as possible, produced in the original by the author.

3. *Ambiguities of the original*. Here fidelity implies preserving ambiguity as long as it does not result from “careless, even faulty sentence construction” (Ingarden 1972, 167; see Ingarden 1991, 171).
4. *Stylistic properties of the original*. Fidelity assumes maintaining the character of the original language, for example, its stylistic register, so that the “cognitive efficiency” achieved by such means of expression finds its counterpart in translation. This efficiency can, however, be associated with “the visual apprehension of objects of investigation” (Ingarden 1972, 176; Ingarden 1991, 179).

The elements mentioned above that specify the concept of faithful reconstruction of the original can be complemented by detailed conclusions and postulations arising from Ingarden’s remarks on specific translation problems that emerged in connection with his work on other translations, as well as his own translation of Immanuel Kant’s first critique. Unfortunately, due to the limited scope of this article there is no space to analyze (i) Ingarden’s correspondence related to his work with the Editorial Committee of the “Library of Philosophical Classics” and his translation work; (ii) paratexts authored by the philosopher and published in the volumes of the “Library of Philosophical Classics”, especially in the edition of Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* (1957); and (iii) his comments recorded in the protocols of the so-called Lviv Aristotle Seminar (1938), referring to the translation of *Metaphysics* (see Kuliniak, Pandura 2020).

From my preliminary research of Ingarden’s material related to the translation issues of Kant’s works, three highly prefatory conclusions arise at this stage, indicating what the postulate of maintaining fidelity in translation might imply in (translation) practice:

1. The necessity to establish a *dialogue* with the text, within the intellectual tradition in which it is inscribed, with the language of that text (in both a systemic and pragmatic dimension), its interpreters, and ultimately with the author in their biographical-intellectual positioning.¹³
2. The necessity to negotiate, taking into consideration different arguments arising from perspectives that exist within a multi-faceted dialogue (such as that of the author and recipient). Other subjects, such as language experts, can be introduced into this negotiation space.¹⁴
3. The necessity *to formulate* postulates defining directions of loyalty. These postulates will serve as guidelines in translation work.

¹³ On the role of a dialogue at the “cognitive meeting” according to Ingarden, see Póltawski 2011, 150.

¹⁴ Ingarden wrote to Irena Krońska on 13.09.1951: “At the end of the month and later I intend to arrange some discussion sessions with my translators on the Polish terminology, especially concerning Kant’s translation. I wished that two Polish studies specialists (Professor Kleiner, who additionally is philosophically qualified and possibly Professor Klemensiewicz as a professor of the Polish language) had participated in these sessions” (cited after Ingarden 2021, 109).

6. Some Concluding Remarks

In aiming to summarize this discussion, it is worth emphasizing an issue that is exceptionally important for practically-oriented translation criticism. Namely, when asking about the founding of fidelity as a value in a specific translation, we must, according to Ingardenian axiology, examine the “actual properties of the given object” (translation) and “consider all circumstances in which the value appears in a specific case” (Ingarden 1966, 124). This necessitates a *multi-dimensional* analysis of the translation regarding the realization of the value defined as fidelity.¹⁵ Such an analysis places the translation at the center of the discourse, rather than the original. It excludes dogmatism, intuitiveness and impressionability from evaluating the translation.

In this article, I have presented Ingarden’s reflections on fidelity in literary translation, placing them within a broad philosophical context encompassing ethics, epistemology, and aesthetics. At the beginning of my analysis, I noted that from Ingarden’s statements on the significance of fidelity within these philosophical domains, an image of a value emerges that necessitates a diligent, conscientious representation of the thing that is the subject of cognition. However, it turns out that this image is more complex than I imagined. An analysis of Ingarden’s discourse on fidelity leads to the conclusion that the ethical, epistemological, and aesthetic perspectives are in fact closely correlated. Loyalty in interpersonal relations, “the thinker’s integrity towards the object of his study” (Rosiak 2011, 44), efficiency in constructing an adequate representation of the object of cognition, and finally, the proper *fulfillment* and adequate – based on a coherent strategy – *reconstruction* of the schematic, layered construction of a literary work (by both the researcher and translator), are in fact different facets of fidelity.

All these perspectives play an important role in contemporary translation studies. Fidelity is problematized here on many levels: in the context of the ethics of the translator – acting as a loyal mediator (see, e.g., Nord 2009, 184–186), in connection with the epistemological and aesthetic value of the translational reconstruction of the original (see, e.g., Tabakowska 2001), or with the patterns of functionally-optimal and internally-consistent translation strategies (see, e.g., Kussmaul 1995, 149–153).

It is true that Ingarden did not construct a coherent theory of translation (Hanuszewicz 2001, 233); nevertheless, in analyzing his multi-leveled problematization of fidelity as a key concept in translation studies, one can conclude that he laid excellent foundations for a considerable expansion and deepening of reflections on translation.

¹⁵ It can be called a “situational” analysis” (see Depraz 2010, 189).

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