Edward Dąbrowa

THE HASMONEANS AND THEIR STATE

A Study in History, Ideology, and the Institutions

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Table of Contents

Introduction

The restoration of Jewish statehood in the late 2nd century BCE was an event of great historical significance. The Jewish state had ceased to exist over 400 years previously due to expansion into Palestine by the Babylonian king Nebuchadnezzar II, who first subjugated the kingdom of Judah, the last remnant of David and Solomon's monarchy, and captured and destroyed Jerusalem (587/586). The credit for restoring Jewish statehood is due to the Hasmoneans, who led an armed revolt they had started against a Hellenistic religious reform in Judea during the reign of Antiochus IV Epiphanes. Not only did they win broad support for their actions among their people, but they also displayed great political skill in dealing with the Seleucids. They shrewdly took advantage of all favorable circumstances, domestic and international alike, first to carve out considerable autonomy within the Seleucid state, and then in the late 2nd century BCE, during John Hyrcanus' reign, to win full independence from Syrian kings.

The history of the Hasmoneans has long caused disputes among scholars, who are far from agreement about the chronology of events, their importance, and the identities of all their actors. There are no indications that such doubts will be resolved anytime soon. The aim of this study, therefore, is not to present a new reconstruction of Hasmonean history, but to describe the institutions of the state they created. This issue usually remains on the fringe of scholarly dispute and has not been closely investigated so far. Nor has an attempt been made at a synthetic presentation of how the Hasmonean state functioned in all its aspects. For this reason, it could not be explored to the full extent possible.

For the sake of clarity, it is necessary to specify the present work's time span and to define the name "Hasmoneans." Our principal focus is on the period from John Hyrcanus' rise to power (135 BCE), as his actions were fundamental to securing Judean independence from the Seleucids, to the country's loss of political sovereignty following Roman interference in its internal affairs (63 BCE). Although our discussion also covers a slightly earlier period, it is only to ensure its clarity. The name "Hasmoneans" is used throughout to refer to all generations of the family. This is because the genealogical criterion is deemed more historically correct than the traditional division of the family's history into the period of the Maccabees (this designation is used for heroes of the anti-Seleucid rebellion, Mattathias and his sons) and the Hasmoneans (the name is applied to Judean rulers from John Hyrcanus on).[1] Another argument worth consider-

[1] Sievers 1990: ix. The genealogy of the Hasmoneans is known from 1 Macc (2:1; 14:29) and Josephus' account (*BJ* 1.36 (cf. 1.19); *AJ* 12.265–6 (cf. 11.111); see also *Vita* 2. 4). Scholars disagree about the origin of the name: Sievers 1990: 28–29.

ing is that it is not possible to understand the history and structure of the Hasmonean state without referring to events and facts: both preceding Judean independence, early in the struggle against Syrian domination (167 BCE), and following, after 63 BCE, until Herod ascended to the Judean throne (37 BCE). For this reason, this entire time span is subsequently referred to as the Hasmonean period.

The first part of the present study aims to show the Hasmoneans' actions in a broad historical context. Without knowledge of this context, it would be difficult to understand how an obscure Modein family could successfully oppose the powerful machinery of the Seleucid Empire, effect the creation of a nation state, and govern it effectively. Part two analyzes and interprets accounts and information concerning institutions of the Hasmonean state. The notion of "state institutions" is understood here as applying to all social, political, and administrative structures which helped define the state and influenced its functioning. In the third part much attention is devoted to relations between the Hasmoneans and the various social groups, including especially certain religious circles opposed to them.[2] To avoid excessive repetition of references to publications and sources frequently cited in the first part, in part two they are limited to a minimum, with references given primarily to the subject being discussed.[3]

The making of this book became possible owing to the assistance of many institutions and individuals. Scholarships from The Andrew Mellon Foundation at Albright Institute of Archaeological Research (Jerusalem 2001), The Royal Dutch Academy of Sciences at The Netherlands Institute for Advanced Studies (NIAS) (Wassenaar, 2006/2007), and The de Brzezie Lanckoroński Foundation (London) made it possible for me to access and use publications unavailable in Polish libraries yet without a knowledge of which the present book would never have achieved its final form. I am particularly thankful to NIAS administrators and library staff. Their kindness, efficiency, and commitment to creating excellent conditions for scholarly work enabled me to write the first draft within their walls. I am grateful to Pieter van der Horst and Judith Newman, my colleagues and neighbors at NIAS, for their patience and readiness to engage in discussions.

Prof. Henry I. MacAdam gave me invaluable help in the final redaction of the volume, and his comments and suggestions enabled me to avoid many lapses, for which I am greatly beholden to him.

I owe my gratitude to Prof. Andrzej Banach, Dean of the Faculty of History at the Jagiellonian University, for funding the translation of this work. Mr. Tadeusz Stanek I wish to thank for doing the translation.

It must be stated that none of the persons and institutions mentioned can be held responsible for the opinions voiced here. Such responsibility is solely the author's.

[2] In discussing this matter, the author used a large segment of his own article concerning the *Statutes of the King*, cf. Dąbrowa 2008: 8–12. I am very grateful to the Jagiellonian University Press for consenting to such use of it.

[3] When this book was ready for publication a new commentary on 2 Maccabees written by D.R. Schwartz (*2 Maccabees, (Commentaries on Early Jewish Literature)*, Berlin–New York 2008) fell into my hands. It was too late to include in my account his observations or to discuss his individual suggestions and conclusions.

Abbreviations

AASOR – *Annual of the American Schools of Oriental Research*
AJN – *American Journal of Numismatics*
BAIAS – *Bulletin of the Anglo-Israel Archaeological Society*
CBQ – *Catholic Biblical Quarterly*
DJD – *Discoveries in the Judean Desert*
DSD – *Dead Sea Discoveries*
FGH – F. Jacoby, *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker*, Leiden 1950–
HTR – *Harvard Theological Review*
HUCA – *Hebrew Union College Annual*
IEJ – *Israel Exploration Journal*
INJ – *Israel Numismatic Journal*
INR – *Israel Numismatic Research*
JBL – *Journal of Biblical Literature*
JJS – *Journal of Jewish Studies*
JQR – *Jewish Quarterly Review*
JSJ – *Journal for the Study of Judaism*
JSJSup – *Supplements to the Journal for the Study of Judaism*
JSOT – *Journal for the Study of the Old Testament*
JSOTSup – *Supplements to the Journal for the Study of the Old Testament*
JSP – *Journal for the Study of Pseduepigrapha*
JSPSup – *Supplements to the Journal for the Study of Pseudepigrapha*
LA – *Liber Annuus*
NC – *Numismatic Chronicle*
NEAEHL – *E. Stern (ed.), New Encyclopedia of Archaeological Excavations in the Holy Land*, vol. 1–5, Jerusalem 1993–2008.
NRSV – *New Revised Standard Version*
NT – *Novum Testamentum*
PEQ – *Palestine Exploration Quarterly*
RB – *Revue Biblique*

RdQ – *Revue de Qumran*
RE – *Paulys Realencyklopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft,* Stuttgart 1893–1980.
REJ – *Revue des Etudes Juives*
RN – *Revue Numismatique*
SCI – *Scripta Classica Israelica*
SJC – *Scripta Judaica Cracoviensia*
SJLA – *Studies in Judaism in Late Antiquity*
SNG – *Sylloge Nummorum Graecorum*
SNR – *Schweizerische Numismatische Rundschau*
SPB – *Studia Post-Biblica*
STDJ – *Studies on the Texts of the Desert of Judah*
TSAJ – *Texte und Studien zum antiken Judentum*
VT – *Vetus Testamentum*
VTSup – *Supplements to Vetus Testamentum*
ZAW – *Zeitschrift für die altstestamentliche Wissenschaft*
ZDPV – *Zeitschrift des Deutschen Palästina-Vereins*
ZPE – *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik*

Part I:
Judea under the Hasmoneans (167–63 BCE)*

* Unless otherwise indicated, all dates are BCE.

1. Mattathias and Judah: In Defense of the Ancestors' Religion

In the Hellenistic period, independence of peoples inhabiting multiethnic empires was not the subject of any recognized regulations, the very concept of independence (as understood today) being unknown. Following the death of Alexander of Macedon, the political order in the eastern Mediterranean was based on states that rose out of his collapsed empire, headed by the deceased king's generals. Even though the monarchies thus created exhibited many similarities in political structure and organization, in each of them social relations followed a slightly different path, with different economies and cultural traditions. In the Seleucid Empire, a major factor determining state organization was the Achaemenid heritage. Its impact made itself felt especially in Mesopotamia and in the eastern provinces. The use of Persian administrative patterns allowed the Seleucids to manage fairly efficiently, for a while, the vast multiethnic and multicultural territory. Yet, several decades into their reign, they had to face strong separatist tendencies. Those led to the creation within their empire of a number of separate political entities whose leaders made it their aim to win full independence from Syrian kings.

Seleucid attitudes toward their subjects seeking independence from their rule are an important problem in studying Syrian kings' philosophy of government which determined their internal policy. Sources are of little help in pinpointing how the Seleucids went on to lose control over respective lands in their empire and how new states came to arise therein. Exceptional in this respect is the case of Judea, as we have sources available that permit us to follow the struggles that resulted in its independence from Syrian kings as well as to study the changing relations between both sides of the conflict. We owe this insight chiefly to the First Book of Maccabees (henceforth referred to as 1 Macc) and the works of Josephus Flavius. Some valuable hints about the early stage in the process are offered by the Second Book of Maccabees (henceforth 2 Macc), which contains a fairly detailed account of events preceding the Judean uprising and much other information omitted by 1 Macc.[1] Other then these sources, we have some few mentions preserved in fragments by other ancient authors, even if their value in reconstructing events in the Hasmonean-led Jewish armed struggle against Seleucid rule is more than limited.[2] Jewish sources, whether composed in the Hasmonean period or later, contribute little to our knowledge, with few exceptions.

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[1] Cf. Sievers 1990: 4 ff.; Troiani 2008: 365 ff.

[2] Works by these authors frequently contained comprehensive discussions of events contemporary to the developments in Judea, but they have only been preserved in fragments, typically as quotations or paraphrases in later works; some of them we owe to Josephus.

The religious atmosphere in Judea at the time preceding the outbreak of hostilities is pictured only in the Book of Daniel. Strikingly, Qumran texts contain no reference whatever to the conflict between Jews and Greeks.[3] Considered useful, even if they evade clear judgment of their value as historical evidence, are texts of apocryphal or pseudoepigraphic literature.[4] The chief difficulty in attempts to use them is in their problematic dating. Peculiar in character, most such texts have invited a wide range of often contradictory dating suggestions, hypotheses, and arguments. Attempts to use historical information related in rabbinical literature have not yielded satisfactory results, nor are they likely to supply many more clues in the near future. This is because of the didactic and religious nature of most such works. The historical episodes quoted there served the rabbis chiefly as an illustration for their comments on Halakha laws. In the course of multiple reinterpretations, whereby Talmudic authors repeatedly adapted case descriptions to realities of their own days, the original historical events referred to have been lost or greatly distorted.[5]

Without a doubt, the author of 1 Macc intended to show the exceptional contributions of the first generation of the Hasmoneans in fighting against the kings of Syria. Such feats were meant to bolster the political position of Hasmonean successors as legitimate leaders of an independent Judea.[6] To ensure that his account caused proper resonance, the same author resorted to passing over certain events or presenting them in a way that served the Hasmonean cause.[7] Some scholars go so far as to suggest that the author may have deliberately falsified certain developments early in the uprising in order to better highlight the role of his protagonists.[8]

The picture of events where the Hasmoneans played the leading roles as painted by Josephus in his *Bellum Judaicum* is in stark contrast to that in the *Antiquitates Judaicae*. The earlier work offers a greatly abbreviated account of those developments (*BJ* 1.31–164) being part of a lecture on the history of Judea from Antiochus IV (i.e., from ca. 170) to the outbreak of the great Jewish revolt against Rome in 66 CE. Regrettably, Josephus leaves us in the dark about his sources.[9] In his *Antiquitates*, the passage on the Hasmonean period is many times as broad. Moreover, we know some of the sources he

[3] Maier 2000: 55 ff.

[4] Cf. Mendels 1987.

[5] See Efron 1987: 287 ff.; Avery-Peck 2004: 269 ff. This is confirmed by studies on references preserved in rabbinical literature concerning Pharisees and Sadducees before 70 CE. Studies clearly imply that any such references to both groups are devoid of any meaningful historical value, therefore trying to construct on such grounds any hypotheses or historical interpretations leads to erroneous, unfounded conclusions, see Ravenna 1962: 384 ff.; Neusner 1971: 320–368; Alexander 1999: 111 ff.; Saldarini 2001: 199–237, esp. 235 ff. For this reason, V. Aptowitzer's historical analysis (1927) based on rabbinical tradition did not win much approval in the eyes of his critics, see Efron 1987: 55 n. 49, 164–165 n. 98; Sievers 1990: 14.

[6] Literature on 1 Macc is very rich. For guidance in principal problems involved with this book, recommended reading may include, apart from comprehensive and detailed commentaries, at least a selection of works from the past twenty years: Abel 1949; Abel/ Starcky 1961; Nickelsburg 1971; Nickelsburg 1981: 114–117; Attridge 1984: 171–176; Bar-Kochva 1989: 151–170; Delcor 1989: 456–463; Sievers 1990: 1–4; Schwartz 1991: 21–38; Fischer 1992: 440-2; Harrington 1999: 122–136; Mittmann-Reichert 2000: 20–39; Rappaport 2001: 711–734.

[7] Cf. Sievers 1990: 9.

[8] Cf. Mittag 2006: 261, 268.

[9] Sievers 1990: 11.

used in his account. Basic for his description of events from ca. 168 to 142 is 1 Macc.[10] For later developments in the Hasmonean period, he used the works of Polybius, Poseidonius, Strabo, and others. Still, it is difficult to be certain whether he had full versions at hand or drew from citations or summaries.[11] There is no doubt that his primary source in the relevant part of his lecture was the historical work by Nicolaus of Damascus.[12] For a study of the uprising and acts of the first Hasmoneans, Josephus' account is of limited value as it largely iterates information known from 1 Macc. Supplemented by many additions, comments, and interpretations, it offers a more complex treatment of events, which nonetheless contains items of dubious credibility.[13] Despite discernible deficiencies, some of which no doubt result from Josephus' writing technique and his use of sources,[14] his story has the obvious, unquestionable virtue of being the only extant treatment of the entire Hasmonean period.

Another important source offering details of the period is the *Megillat Taanit*.[15] This little volume contains a list of 36 days connected with historical events from the second temple period that had great importance for Jews, who may not have officially celebrated such anniversaries but considered them semi-festival days. The original of *Megillat Taanit* was in Aramaic and was probably composed somewhere between the 2nd century BCE and 1st century CE.[16] Of the days listed, more than a dozen involve events during the insurgency led by Judah Maccabee, Jonathan, and Simon against the Seleucids, and with developments under John Hyrcanus.[17] Although identification of some of those events is the subject of scholarly dispute, their placement in the calendar combined with their known yearly dates provides an accurate chronology.

Finally, one more work deserves mention: the *Chronography* by Synkellos. It is a universal history written in the early 9th century CE by a Byzantine author, covering world history from Adam to Diocletian. His narrative on the Hasmoneans is based primarily on 1 Macc, 2 Macc, and the works of Josephus. Contrary to former beliefs, it

[10] It is a matter of long-standing dispute whether Josephus knew 1 Macc in the shape we presently know it. See Ettelson 1925: 255 ff. and *passim*; Martola 1984: 10 ff.; Gafni 1989: 116 ff.; Feldman 1994: 41 ff.; Williams 1999: 108 ff.

[11] Cf. Kasher 1990: 11; Sievers 1990: 11 ff.; Sievers 1994: 201.

[12] For more on Josephus' account of the Hasmoneans, see Sievers 1990: 10–14. See also Gafni 1989; Wacholder 1989; Fuks 1990; Feldman 1994: 41–68; Schwartz 1994: 210 ff.; Eshel 2008: 7–8. Much help in comparing relationships and differences between these sources is offered by Sievers 2001.

[13] The story of the first Hasmoneans included in the *Antiquitates* is almost a third longer than in 1 Macc (Feldman 1994: 41 ff.) and supplies information on events otherwise unknown (cf. Gafni 1989: 116 ff., 127; Feldman 1994: 42 n. 4). L.H. Feldman (1994: 43–68) points out that the principal cause of the differences between the original source and its paraphrase by Josephus is in his different views in viewing the Hasmoneans' struggles. In trying to show the Hasmoneans primarily as heroic leaders in a struggle for Judean freedom (yet freedom understood in political, not religious terms as in 1 and 2 Macc), he resorted to consciously distorting the picture of events: Feldman 1994: 43–68; cf. Gafni 1989: 119 ff.

[14] Van Unnik 1978: 26 ff.

[15] Cf. Zeitlin 1922: 1 ff.; Lichtenstein 1931/32: 257 ff.; Ravenna 1962: 384 ff.; Schürer 1985: 163–164; Stemberger 1992: 44–45.

[16] Lichtenstein 1931/32: 264. According to G. Stemberger (1992: 44), it was written in 1st–2nd century CE. The present version of the *Megillat Taanit* differs from the original. In addition to the Aramaic part, it includes a much later commentary ("Scholion") in Hebrew: Zeitlin 1922: 1–5; Lichtenstein 1931/32: 258 ff., 265f.; Stemberger, *loc. cit.*

[17] Zeitlin 1992: 77–86; Lichtenstein 1931/32: 273–290.

is now clear that in his work he used not only the *Church History* of Eusebius, another well-known Christian historian, but also some unknown records. Thanks to them, his account of the period in question provides information different in content from what we know from other extant sources.[18]

The official history of the Hasmonean family begins in 167 and remains in close connection with developments that came to pass in Jerusalem and Judea in the period ca. 175–167.[19] Those developments resulted from the attempted introduction in Judea of a social and religious model along Greek lines, pursued in the name of Antiochus IV Epiphanes, king of Syria (cf. 1 Macc 1:12). Notwithstanding the tradition preserved in Jewish sources, he was not, however, the real author or proponent of such changes.[20] There are many indications that the driving force behind the initiative came from an influential group of Judean inhabitants conventionally described as Hellenists.[21] Composed of members of various social circles, including religious ones, it strove to tighten the political and cultural bonds between the Judeans and the Seleucids.[22] As a means to that end, the Hellenists used bribery to secure the position of the high priest at the

[18] In the past decade or so, Synkellos' work has become the subject of many analyses and critical studies; cf. Adler/Tuffin 2002: lxxx ff. It has also been republished in a new critical edition, based on which an English translation has been made: Adler/Tuffin 2002. For the originality of Synkellos' work relative to earlier Christian authors, notably Eusebius, and the sources he used, see Schwartz 1990: 1 ff.; Adler/Tuffin 2002: lx ff.

[19] Use of this name is justified by the fact that the history and role of members of this family in struggles against the Seleucids are only known from 1 Macc. The few references, or mere allusions, to some members of that family, especially to Judah Maccabee, can also be found in other sources (2 Macc and 1 Enoch). Exceptional among them is 2 Macc, in which Judah Maccabee (2 Macc 5:27; 8:1) and his brothers (2 Macc 2:19; 8:22–23; 10:19. 22; 14:17) are repeatedly mentioned as heroes of battles against the Seleucids. However, none of those references provides information on their family. As we are unable to verify all the facts given in 1 Macc, its picture of the first Hasmoneans' achievements must be treated as one they inspired to be widely distributed.

[20] See Sievers 1990: 20 n. 74. The argument to confirm Antiochus IV's involvement in Judea's religious reform was supposed to be his intense propagation of the cult of Zeus, for whom he personally had particular reverence. Critical analysis of historical sources does not bear out this hypothesis: Mittag 2006: 139 ff. E. Bickermann (1937) was the first to propose that the reform originated with members of Jewish communities who favored Hellenization of Judea. He claimed that at that time the Jerusalem temple saw replacement of monotheist worship with a Hellenized cult of the god Baal. Researchers now tend to agree that it was Zeus worship (2 Macc 6:2), cf. Breytenbach 1997: 371 ff.; Mittag 2006: 260, 264. A convincing analysis of accounts concerning the Hellenistic religious reform in Judea and the historical context or religious persecution during that king's reign was presented by Mittag 2006: 256 ff., 267–268. Cf. Maier 2000: 54 ff. In general opinion of scholars the problem of origins of the Maccabean movement is much more complex, and cannot be confined only to question of the Hellenistic religious reform. There are many interpretations whose authors lay stress also on political, social, economic, and cultural factors which had a great impact on situation in Judea on the eve of the uprising, see p. ex. Millar 1978: 1–28 (= Millar 2006: 67–90); Bringmann 1983; Tcherikover 1999 [1st edition 1959]; Hengel 2001 [1st German edition 1969; 1st English edition 1974]; Barag 2000/2002: 59–76; Mittag 2006: 225–281.

[21] This term, although convenient and in general use, does not render the complexities involved in the group. For its definitions, cf. Sievers 1990: 21–22; Pastor 1997: 197 n. 31.

[22] Cf. 1 Macc 1:11. Our attention is focused here mainly on the events related to the Hasmonean period. For this reason, other than some necessary background information, we leave aside presentation of the entire political and social situation in Judea under Seleucid rule, and we do not discuss hypotheses and disputes about chronology of events in the period 175–168 BCE. There is available very large literature offering more insight into these questions, see Bickermann 1937; Schürer 1985, I: 192 ff.; Sievers 1990: 15 ff.; Tcherikover 1999; Hengel 2001; Brutti 2006: 175 ff.; Mittag 2006: 225 ff.

Jerusalem temple. The move enabled them gradually to introduce Greek practices and customs in mainstream social life. Their reform culminated in a removal of monotheistic worship from the Temple (1 Macc 1:54. 59; 2:7–13) and its replacement with polytheistic Greek cults (1 Macc 1:43–49. 54–55; cf. 2 Macc 6:4–6). The change was accompanied by a series of decrees, known as Antiochus IV's religious edicts, which curbed existing religious freedoms of Judea's inhabitants guaranteed to them by Antiochus III soon after he conquered the land in 198.[23] The Hellenists' action was welcomed only by a segment of the population (cf. 1 Macc 1:12–15. 43). A staunchly hostile response came from orthodox religious circles in Judea's rural populations which were strongly attached to Judaism and its related customs. Opposition took various forms.[24] At first not considered a serious threat to the new rules (cf. 1 Macc 1:53. 62; 2:29–37), it later swelled to organized armed resistance. To restore order, Syrian authorities decided to deploy a stronger military contingent in Judea.[25]

According to 1 Macc (1:51; 2:15–25), one method of coercing the population to convert to the new religion, apart from compulsory attendance at Greek religious services, was an obligation for all inhabitants to offer a sacrifice after the Greek fashion in front of the king's officials.[26] As part of enforcement efforts, a troop of Syrian soldiers arrived at the village of Modein more than a dozen kilometers north-east of Jerusalem (1 Macc 2:15),[27] the home of generations of the Hasmonean family (1 Macc 2:1).[28] At that time, the head of the clan was Mattathias,[29] the father of five sons,[30] who enjoyed great respect and authority among the local population to the point of being its unquestioned leader (1 Macc 2:17–18). He owed this status not just to his age, his large and notable family, but also to his personal piety and past priestly service at the Jerusalem temple.[31]

[23] A detailed list of such limitations and penalties for disobedience is given by Daniel (11:31. 38), 1 Macc (1:41-62; 2:9–12), 2 Macc (5:25–26; 6:7–11. 18 ff.), and Josephus (*BJ* 1.34–35; *AJ* 12.253–254). However, interpretations are made difficult by some substantial differences between those accounts, seriously limiting our chances to determine the real state of affairs, cf. Mittag 2006, 256 ff. For more on Antiochus III's privileges (Jos. *AJ* 12.138–144), see Bickerman 1980: 44–85.

[24] Cf. Sievers 1990: 21 ff.

[25] The Syrian administration supporting the religious reform did not intervene until a direct threat appeared to the interests of the Seleucid state, cf. Mittag 2006: 268 ff.

[26] 1 Macc 1:51; 2:15. 23. Since 1 Macc is the only source to mention this development, scholars suppose that its author invented it to create an appropriate context and background against which to start the story of the Hasmonean role in the fight against Syrians and Hellenists. Yet the hypothesis seems contradicted by memory of the event preserved in tradition independent of 1 Macc (Jos. *BJ* 1.36): Sievers 1990: 29.

[27] Abel 1967, II: 391. It is uncertain whether Modein was at that time in Judea or in Samaria: Sievers 1990: 27 n. 1.

[28] According to Josephus (*AJ* 12.265) Mattathias, the family's senior, came from Jerusalem (cf. Sievers 1990: 27; Mittag 2006: 268–269). But 1 Macc (2:70; 13:25) implies that the family had for some generations lived in Modein for it was there that the Hasmoneans' ancestral graves were, next to which were subsequently buried Mattathias and his sons (1 Macc. 9:19; 13:25-30), cf. Schwartz 1993: 307.

[29] Sometimes questioned, the historicity of that figure (Niese 1900: 44 ff.) is not supported by sufficiently plausible arguments (Adinolfi 1964/1965: 75 ff.; Sievers 1990: 29 and n. 10).

[30] According to 1 Macc (2:2–5), their names were John, Simon, Judah, Eleazar, and Jonathan. The list tallies with that given in 2 Macc (2:22–23) with one exception: the latter speaks of Joseph instead of John (also cf. 2 Macc 10:19).

[31] 1 Macc 2:1; 14:29; Jos. *AJ* 12.265, 268; cf. Pastor 1997: 51. The credibility of this tradition has long been the subject of dispute among scholars. Its critics included M. Smith (1996: 320 ff.), who concluded that the Hasmoneans needed this tradition as an important factor in justifying their claim to high priest-

Emphasized in 1 Macc, Mattathias' great devotion and fidelity to forefathers' tradition clearly carries an ideological message to serve the propaganda functions of the book. This is discernible in a reference to Phinehas (cf. Num 25:6–8; Sir 45:23–26), the biblical forerunner of the Hasmoneans, whose determination in defense of Moses' religious rules was used to validate the actions of not just Mattathias himself, but also the later Hasmoneans.[32]

When the Modein villagers had assembled, the commanding officer insisted that Mattathias, an esteemed personality,[33] must offer a required sacrifice and thus give an example for others to follow. The Syrian's demand was in vain (1 Macc 2:17–22; Jos. *AJ* 12. 269). Still, Mattathias' steadfast refusal did not cause any negative consequences for him or his family. That changed when a man in the assembly volunteered to offer the sacrifice in compliance. Suddenly enraged by the man's declaration, Mattathias killed both the apostate and the supervising official (1 Macc 2:23–25; Jos. *AJ* 12.270). Fearing Syrian retribution, Mattathias and his closest relatives, including all his sons, fled Modein and took refuge in a remote region of Judea (cf. 1 Macc 2:28; Jos. *BJ* 1.36; *AJ* 12.271). As he was leaving, he urged all the faithful of Modein to join him in common struggle in defense of their religion (1 Macc 2:27–28; Jos. *AJ* 12.271). The resistance movement thus inspired quickly solidified under Mattathias' command.[34] The insur-

hood and for this reason they even resorted to falsifying the biblical genealogy of priestly families (1 Chr 24:7): Smith 1996: 323–324. His position is hardly new; many scholars before him spoke in a similar vein (cf. Aptovitzer 1927: 4-12; Arenhoevel 1967: 45) (still, not all accept it: Ackroyd 1953: 126–127; Stern 1976: 589–590; Williamson 1979: 266–267). M. Smith, although he questions the value of 1 Macc account, nonetheless admits it possible that the Hasmoneans could have justified rights to believe themselves a priestly family at a time when Zadok's descendants had died out, and descent from Aaron was perfectly sufficient to perform priestly offices. Careful analysis of evidence on the families of Joarib and the Hasmoneans shows that accusations addressed to the Hasmoneans of their conscious distorting of their genealogical lineage has no basis in facts. The Hasmoneans' Zadokian descent was never questioned even by their critics. It is questioned mainly by contemporary researchers in the context of the disputed meaning of the term "sons of Zadok" found in the Dead Sea Scrolls, see Liver 1967/1968: 25–29; Dequerker 1986: 103; Werman 2000: 623 ff.; VanderKam 2004: 270 n. 90; Schofield/VanderKam 2005: 74 ff.

[32] 1 Macc 2:26. 54; cf. 3:8. The reference to Phinehas carries one more important message since for his act he received from Yahweh a promise of eternal priesthood for his descendants: Num 25:11–13. For more tradition involving Phinehas in the Hasmonean period, see Liver 1967/1968: 26; Hayward 1978: 22, 29-34; Sievers 1990: 30-1, 36; van Henten 1996: 204 ff.; Himmelfarb 1999: 20–21; Egger-Wenzel 2006: 143 ff., 146. A religious motivation for Mattathias' rising and further activity is cited repeatedly in 1 Macc: 2:6–14.19–22. 24–27. 44–48.

[33] The author of 1 Macc did his best to highlight the Hasmoneans' elevated status even before the anti-Syrian rebellion broke out, as is shown e.g. in the account how an officer offered Mattathias generous gifts and inclusion of himself and his sons among "friends of the king" (1 Macc 2:17–18). Now the honors promised were so exalted as to rule out any likelihood of the officer being authorized to make offer them. Privileges of such magnitude were the king's exclusive prerogative. Nor does the context of the proposal imply what other accomplishments by Mattathias, apart from his status in the local community, prompted the Syrian authorities to lavish high honors on him (cf. Sievers 1990: 30).

[34] Jos. *BJ* 1.36. The author of 2 Macc (5:27; 8:1) attributes the origin of the resistance movement to Judah Maccabee and his nine unnamed companions. This is not to say that the version presented in this source is a decisive argument in questioning the role of Mattathias, as is believed by Schunck (1954: 59; cf. Sievers 1990: 31 n. 21), especially as his leadership was also recognized by other religious Jewish groups including the *Hasidim* (συναγωγὴ Ασιδαίων) (1 Macc 2:42–44); cf. Jos. *AJ* 12.274-8. The many hypotheses about who the *Hasidim* were, what social and religious groups they represented, and how they might have affected the ideology of the Qumran community (cf. Lim 2005: 204 ff.; Puech 2005: 301–302 *contra* Grabbe 2005: 281) are mostly speculative, see Morgenstern 1967: 59 ff., esp. 73; Davies 1977: 127 ff., esp.139–

gents adopted guerrilla tactics in operations conducted against their enemies. An account concerning this stage of hostilities suggests that the rebels' energies and actions were not targeted at Syrian forces which, with their inferior weapons and no training, they could not hope to better (cf. 1 Macc 2:44–48). Nor are we led to believe that the rebels succeeded in gaining lasting control over any part of Judea. They set up camps in unpopulated, inaccessible regions of deserts or mountains from where they launched their raids. Their actions were aimed chiefly against those of their countrymen who had taken the side of the Hellenists. Their homes were attacked, pagan altars were destroyed. Many of the victims appealed to the authorities for protection, while those captured by the guerrillas were forcibly circumcised. Just how effective those actions were is difficult to estimate with any confidence. While 1 Macc stresses success (1 Macc 2:44–48; cf. Jos. *AJ* 12.278), the modest number of the insurgent force would suggest that at that point they did not have significant impact on the situation in Judea.[35]

Sources paint a picture of developments that betrays an unmistakably religious character of the Jewish resistance. Its foremost aim was to defend the Judaic religion with all it stood for and a ruthless struggle against renegades as perpetrators of the evils they brought upon faithful Jews.[36] An important part of rebels' operations were systematic attacks against the Hellenists. While the latter were the weakest link in the hostile coalition, selecting them as targets permitted insurgents to score successes which could not have been attainable against Syrian troops and which sent a powerful propaganda message much needed at that stage in the revolt. Exposed to attack, the Hellenists were made to feel vulnerable and constantly threatened, an experience that put to the test their faith in the power and protection of the Syrian king. For the insurgents, their successes served as an integrating force and an incentive to redouble their efforts, at the same time winning them the society's support needed to survive the trying time of organization-building. One weakness in the early stage of the uprising was the advanced age of its leader which naturally limited the dynamics of operations, although on the other hand it could be an asset in gaining popular support. The privations of camp life may have hastened Mattathias' death. According to tradition on his deathbed, he entrusted the leadership to his eldest son Simon (1 Macc 2:65; Jos. *AJ* 12.283–284), bidding him to preserve the movement's religious focus.[37]

Yet it was not for Simon to give the revolt a radical boost: this was accomplished by his younger brother Judah Maccabee (1 Macc 3:1; cf. Jos. *BJ* 1.37; *AJ* 12.285), after

140; Schürer 1985: 214 n. 46; Kampen 1988: 65 ff.; Sievers 1990: 34, 37 ff.; Winninge 1995: 142–146, esp. 144ff.; Schams 1998: 117–121; Hengel 2001: 361–372; Saldarini 2001: 25 ff.; van der Kooij 2001: 235–236, 238; Garcia Martinez 2007: 59–60. All we know about the *Hasidim* at the time of the rebellion against the Hellenistic reform is limited to three brief references: 1 Macc 2:42; 7:13–16; 2 Macc 14:6. Giving to Mattathias the entire credit for creating an organized resistance movement, as is done by 1 Macc, is not fully confirmed by facts as before him there had already appeared groups opposing the Syrian action in many ways (Dan 11:32–34; 1 Enoch 90:9): Davies 1977: 140; Sievers 1990: 24 ff; Schwartz 1993: 307 ff.).

[35] According to legendary tradition, Mattathias succeeded in defeating a great Syrian force, freeing Judea from Antiochus' army and rising to power over the country: Jos. *BJ* 1.36–37.

[36] Nowhere in 1 Macc or 2 Macc are they ever named, and instead referred to by such unfavorable terms as: the godless (ἀσεβοί, cf. 2 Macc 4:13; 8:2), sinners (ἔθνος ἁμαρταλόν, 1 Macc 1:34; 2:44. 48), renegades (ἄνδρας ἀνόμους, 1 Macc 2:44; 3:5. 6; υἱοὶ παράνομοι, 1 Macc 1:11. 34) or apostates (ἄνομοί, 1 Macc 2:44; 3:5. 6); cf. Sievers 1990: 34.

[37] 1 Macc 2:50–61; Sievers 1990: 36–37.

whom it came to be known as the Maccabean revolt. No source explains when and why the change in leadership occurred. Perhaps, as many scholars suggest, Simon's part is a later interpolation meant to highlight his role retroactively, but the most probable explanations seem to be that he resigned of his own accord. In this, he may have been acting on the belief that Judah's temperament and warrior's fame he had already won (cf. 1 Macc 2:66) would give the revolt the new momentum it needed. Simon was probably aware of the movement's still limited extent as well as of his own weaknesses. This hypothesis seems substantiated by Mattathias' opinion that Simon was better suited for political rather than military leadership (1 Macc 2:65). It must be admitted that in the common struggle Simon always stood by his brother, a fact of major importance to their joint successes. If Simon was indeed guided by such inspiration, he was displaying great shrewdness, for under Judah's command the revolt indeed quickly rose in strength and gained momentum.

In the 1 Macc version, Judah appears as the victorious commander of a powerful insurgency, to combat which the Syrian authorities had to dispatch considerable forces. A poetic vision of his earlier feats (1 Macc 3:3–9) is not very specific about facts. Richly symbolic, it paints a picture of his successes against the Hellenists which helped affirm his fame and leadership (1 Macc 3:8–9). With such assets, Judah faced no difficulty with recruitment and could proceed to organize and train a regular insurgent army which shortly attained considerable potential. Some more details on Judah's activity at the time preceding his skirmishes with Syrian troops are offered by 2 Macc, an important complement to the story of 1 Macc. Both accounts agree that before Judah rose to the command, the revolt was purely local in size. As is suggested by 2 Macc (8:1–4), before he embarked on combating Syrian forces, Judah with his followers continued fighting the Hellenists while admitting volunteers to his army. His recruitment efforts helped him gather ca. 6,000 men under his command (2 Macc 8:1). This enabled him to widen greatly his front of operations against religious opponents. He also incorporated new elements toward a change in his strategy, for he successfully attempted to capture selected strategic locations (2 Macc 8:6) to secure more lasting control over chosen areas of Judea. Such control afforded a better chance to prepare further military operations, soldier training, and provision of better conditions for rest and recreation to his men. Still, we need not exaggerate the impact of such successes as some of them were probably ephemeral and never posed a serious threat to the Syrian administration. Judah's combat effectiveness still relied on his time-tested guerrilla tactics which included harassing the enemy in night attacks (2 Macc 8:6–7). The ideological foundation of all such actions was still defense of ancestral religion. In the absence of any mentions about it, it is difficult to determine if and to what extent Judah employed Mattathias' methods against his adversaries. We know of one method of inflicting severe blows which was systematic destruction of their property (cf. 2 Macc 8:6) or its confiscation.[38]

The growing might of the force under Judah's command and its expanding field of operation could not be indefinitely dismissed or ignored by the Syrian authorities. Complaints from the Hellenists affected by the insurgents' actions called for a firm

[38] Cf. Pastor 1997: 51–52, 53–54.

response. A corps under Apollonius was dispatched to Judea[39] with orders to quell Judah's revolt.[40] a clash between Apollonius and the insurgents ended in his death and defeat of his troops. The event was important in more than its military dimension. Thus far, the revolt had only been a grassroots opposition movement centered on religion, created to defend the threatened continuity of ancient belief and tradition. Once Judah scored a spectacular military victory, he was recognized by the Seleucid administration as a distinctive enemy in the military as well as political aspect.[41] This placed him in a much more dire position as from now on he had to face successive assaults by Syrian corps, a challenge which necessitated heightened military effort by the rebels.[42] Nor was the situation changed by an amnesty declared by Antiochus IV in the first half of 164 for all those Judeans who would give up fighting (cf. 2 Macc 11:30–31). Soon afterward, Judah's victory at Beth-zur over another Syrian corps under Lysias[43] opened to him the road to Jerusalem, which he proceeded to occupy complete with the Temple (one exception being a citadel still held by a Syrian garrison) in the latter half of 164. Appointed by Antiochus IV and holding the office since 172, the high priest Menelaus was then forced to seek refuge with his Syrian protectors. With the city captured, the Temple could be cleansed and rededicated to Jewish worship,[44] but that in no way meant cessation of hostilities. Judah's attitude at that time implies that not for a moment did he contemplate laying down arms, and instead continued his struggle while he redefined its objectives. Immediately after occupying Jerusalem, he embarked on a fortification program in the city (1 Macc 4:60; 6:7. 26). This was necessary to assure control over the area and defend against attacks by the king's troops either from Acra (the Syrian stronghold erected in Jerusalem by Antiochus IV following unrest in the city in 168, caused by allegations that the king had been killed in his expedition in Egypt)[45] or from outside. That Judah

[39] 1 Macc 3:10–12; Jos. *AJ* 12.287. According to 2 Macc 8:9–11, the first expedition against Judah was led by Seleucus, son of Patroclus, one of the "friends of the king." This is not the only instance that accounts given in 1 Macc and 2 Macc on battles fought by Judah Maccabee differ not only in detail but in chronology of events described, cf. Sievers 1990: 42–43; Mittag 2006: 269.

[40] Apart from regular troops under Apollonius, there were also units composed of inhabitants of Samaria (1 Macc 3:10). These need not have been actual Samaritans. No relation concerning the conflict between Jews and Samaritans mentions the latter as actively supporting Syrians during their campaigns against the Hasmoneans. All we know is that during Antiochus IV's repressions, they renounced any links with Jews: Jos. *AJ* 12.257–264. That such local militias accompanied regular forces is also confirmed by descriptions of other Syrian campaigns in Judea: 1 Macc 3:15. 41. Cf. Kasher 1990: 58 ff.

[41] Cf. 1 Macc 3:26. From then on, Judah's operations became a challenge to the king's administrators responsible for maintaining order in their territory. Nor can we quite dismiss what Jewish sources called their hope for the easy laurels of victory against rebels (cf. 1 Macc 3:13–15).

[42] 1 Macc 3:13–25; 3:38; 4:25. 28–35; 2 Macc 8:30–35; Jos. *AJ* 12.298–312. Given large discrepancies between sources, the exact chronology of the conflict is difficult to determine, as are the names of Syrian commanders Judah had to face.

[43] 1 Macc 4:26–35; 2 Macc 11:5–12; Jos. *AJ* 12.313–314; Sievers 1990: 42 ff., 270–271, and n. 168. For more on the strategic importance of Beth-zur, see Abel 1967, II: 283; Keel/Küchler 1982: 718–19; Shatzman 1991: 39–40, 53–54.

[44] 1 Macc 4:36–58; 2 Macc 10:1–8; Jos. *AJ* 12.317–322; cf. Zeitlin 1922: 77 ff.; Lichtenstein 1931/1932: 273 ff., 298. The purification also involved much renovation and restoration works. The date of the rededication and restoration of Jewish worship in the Jerusalem temple was deliberately selected to coincide with an anniversary of installation of an altar to Zeus in it.

[45] For the circumstance of its building, see 1 Macc 1:33–36; 2 Macc 5:5–6. Judah failed in his attempts to capture it, cf. 1 Macc 4:41; 6:18–20; Jos. *AJ* 12.318.

meant to continue fighting is also confirmed by the fact that his troops captured another strategic location which was Beth-zur on the border with Idumea.[46]

A word of explanation is due on the question of Antiochus IV's amnesty mentioned above. Without knowledge of its conditions and circumstances, Judah's dismissal of it may seem incomprehensible. The king's amnesty decree is known only from a letter preserved in 2 Macc, addressed to the council of Jewish elders (*gerusia*) and Jewish subjects. It suggests that, hearing of the failed missions of his commanders in 165, the king decided in the spring of 164 to acquiesce to high priest Menelaus' pleas[47] and restore the rights abrogated under the persecution scheme to those who rose against the religious reform.[48] The amnesty was to apply to all who would cease their armed resistance and return to their homes by a specified deadline. The decree also announced that Menelaus would be sent to Jerusalem to persuade (πέπομφα δὲ καὶ τὸν Μενέλαον παρακαλέσοντα ὑμᾶς) those hesitating to accept the king's proposals.[49] Contrary to the king's expectations, his concessions failed to become a turning point in the conflict, as the letter only confirmed his unwavering support for and trust in Menelaus. Antiochus' position ruled out any accord with Judah and orthodox believers. To them, Menelaus was no more than a usurper, unlawfully claiming the highest religious office as he did not descend from the house of Zadok, the proper lineage of high priests, instead owing his position to bribery and appointment by a foreign power.[50] Since his appointment was one of the reasons why the revolt had erupted in the first place, faithful Jews felt that the king's declaration was a mere gesture of little consequence other than as a propaganda ploy. Their response is sufficient evidence that the religious fervor that had sparked the fight with the Hellenists had not lost its hold.

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[46] 1 Macc 4:61; cf. 6:7. 26. Archaeological excavations at Beth-zur realized in 1931 and 1957 revealed fortifications from various historical periods. At the time the revolt broke out, all there was there was a rudimentary bulwark built probably in the Ptolemaic period. A large expansion of the defenses, alongside civilian settlement in the area, did not come about until the Judean rebellion itself. Archaeologists, however, did not come up with sufficiently certain evidence to prove that the radical buildup of the fortification had been linked to Judah's activity. It seems that at the time when Beth-zur was in the insurrectionists' hands, repairs were made to damaged portions of earlier walls and some construction work was done. The Beth-zur stronghold was considerably extended and settlers arrived in the area only after it was occupied by Bacchides (162/161). For more dating problems with respective phases in the fortress' development, see Funk 1968: 9–17; Keel/Küchler 1982: 720 ff.; Funk 1993: 261; Berlin 1997: 21–22.

[47] 2 Macc 11:29. It was no accident that Antiochus IV emphasized the role of Menelaus in promulgating the amnesty (Gera 1998: 244, 247, 248). By highlighting the high priest's concern about his countrymen and sending him to Judea, the king sought to ingratiate Menelaus with the population to secure the success of the king's plans. The unfavorable description of the priest (cf. 2 Macc 13:3–4) offers no hint as to the likelihood that he might of his own accord have submitted any measures to resolve the conflict.

[48] 2 Macc 11:30–32. The letter is one of four cited in chapter 11 of 2 Macc (11:16–38). Because of their addressees and, even more, the dates they contained, those documents have long fueled scholarly dispute (for a bibliography on the subject, see Gera 1998: 239 n. 56). The central issue to such dispute was whether they were genuine (the major hypotheses and interpretations are given by Chr. Habicht (1976: 7–17 = Habicht 2006: 112–123). Most problems with those documents have eventually been solved by Habicht (*loc. cit.*), who not only proved their authenticity but also determined their actual chronology, a fact of some consequence for a better understanding of developments in Judea. Despite isolated criticisms, his conclusions have won general approval, cf. Gera 1998: 239, 245 ff.; Roberto 2003: 796 n. 3.

[49] 2 Macc 11:27–33; Sievers 1990: 43–44 and n. 6-9; Mittag 2006: 272ff.

[50] Cf. Mittag 2006: 275–276.

The determination displayed by the insurgents and the Hasmoneans in denouncing Menelaus as high priest stemmed from their religious zeal and devotion to tradition. In all expressions of social and religious life, tradition reserved an important role for religious ritual, and that inescapably involved the office of high priest. A lack of support from the Jerusalem temple was all too obvious, forcing Mattathias and Judah to seek alternative solutions or set precedence in matters in the high priest's responsibility or competence.[51] Prompted by necessity, such solutions nevertheless contained in them the germs of future conflicts and crises. Although justified, or sometimes necessitated by the existing state of affairs, any such steps paved the way for high priest's rights and duties to be assumed in future by individuals outside the tradition-sanctioned circle. We learn from 1 Macc that, while a combatant, Judah was scrupulous about religious observance. As a military leader, he stayed back during the purification and rededication ceremonies of the Jerusalem temple, instead appointing to perform the necessary offices a carefully selected group of priests untainted by involvement in the religious reform.[52] He also did not seize the opportunity to obtain for himself any religious capacity, nor did he attempt to remove Menelaus from the high priest's office and replace him with someone more worthy.

While Judah declined the amnesty offered by Antiochus IV, this did not mean rejection of any contacts with the Syrians. Those were initiated by Lysias after his defeat in the 164 battle of Beth-zur. Realizing how powerful the rebels were, he approached them to propose negotiations to find a solution to the conflict that would satisfy both sides. During the talks, Lysias not only committed himself to present the rebels' demands to Antiochus IV, but also to persuade the king to accept them. The proposal apparently gave Judah hopes for a political solution of the situation in Judea, so he considered it in earnest and stated his conditions in a letter delivered by his envoys to Lysias (2 Macc 11:13–15. 17). A letter by Lysias to Judeans some time later, but still before the death of Antiochus IV,[53] suggests that the king was willing to make certain concessions to those demands, if the insurgents likewise showed readiness to cooperate with the Syrian authorities (2 Macc 11:18–19). Not knowing Judah's terms, we cannot gather from Lysias' letter which of them the king contemplated granting. At any rate, the Syrian readiness to continue talks suggests that Antiochus IV, although absorbed by the campaign in the eastern provinces, was inclined to seek settlement with the rebels (2 Macc 11:20). It may be surmised from 2 Macc that mutual contacts indeed resulted in a compromise or a cease-fire between the warring parties,[54] though we know nothing of its clauses

[51] One such instance was the decision that even on a Sabbath it was necessary to fight in defense of one's life, a decision taken on Mattathias' initiative at the beginning of the insurrection: 1 Macc 2:39–41.

[52] 1 Macc 4:42–43; Sievers 1990: 47. The recovery and rededication of the Temple is commemorated as the feast of Chanukah (1 Macc 4:59; 2 Macc 10:8; cf. Zeitlin 1922: 79; Lichtenstein 1931/32: 275–276). It was the first festival without biblical roots to be introduced in the Jewish religious calendar. For more on this, see Sievers 1990: 46–47.

[53] 2 Macc 11:16–21; Habicht 1976: 9–10, 15 = Habicht 2006: 114–115, 119; Gera 1997: 240, 242; Roberto 2003: 797–798.

[54] 2 Macc 12:1; cf. Gera 1998: 252–253. Neither 1 Macc nor its echo in the Josephus' *Antiquitates* makes the slightest mention of those talks and the resulting cease-fire. P. Mittag (2006: 277 n. 188) believes the truce to be identical with that made during Antiochus V's expedition to Judea in 162 (cf. 1 Macc 6:55–63; Jos. *AJ* 12.379–382). In fact the hypothesis is contradicted by chronological details and their context as given in 1 Macc and 2 Macc.

or signatories.[55] However worded, the accord was further helped by another amnesty declared by Antiochus V Eupator, the son of Antiochus IV, soon after he ascended the throne.[56] Like the previous agreement, it was the effect of Lysias' political efforts. Although in some respects it resembled the amnesty promulgated by Antiochus IV, it was not its mere duplication. In addition to guaranteeing to Judeans a freedom of religious practice and life according to their own religious precepts, the king was returning the Jerusalem temple to Jews, while leaving open the question of the office of high priest (2 Macc 11:22–26); the letter makes no reference to it whatever. It hardly seems likely to have been his oversight instead of a deliberate political gesture.

Having concluded an agreement with Syria and effectively taken over power in Judea, Judah felt confident enough to launch, probably in 163, military operations in neighboring lands[57] inhabited by Jewish communities whose security had, since the outbreak of the revolt, been threatened by surging anti-Jewish sentiments and attitudes among neighbors (cf. 1 Macc 5:1–2. 9–13.14–15. 26–27. 30–31). The interventions were meant to pacify and intimidate non-Jewish populations and to extend help and care to Jewish communities, including resettling small isolated groups of Jews in Judea.[58] Such was the scope of the campaigns that they were conducted simultaneously by two corps commanded by Judah and Simon respectively.[59] Not that their troops were above attacking and pillaging small towns at the slightest provocation (1 Macc 5:3. 22. 28. 35. 51. 68; 6:6; 2 Macc 8:30–31). In this way they obtained subsistence, means to continue fighting and to extend material support to persecuted Jewish groups (2 Macc 8:30), and, last but not least, it provided them with good weapons they captured (1 Macc 6:6; 2 Macc 8:31;

[55] Based on narratives in both books of Maccabees covering the period from 164 to ca. 162, we may only speculate that the talks might have concerned Menelaus and Acra. All that time, Menelaus was probably in Syria, without the least impact on the course of developments in Judea (cf. 2 Macc 13:3). Concerning Acra, Judah might have agreed to refrain from attacking it. The guess seems probable in that rebel raids outside Judea and clashes with local representatives of Syrian administration there did not seriously strain mutual relations. What did was Judah's attempt to capture Acra (cf. 1 Macc 6:18–28).

[56] 2 Macc 11:22–26. Calling Antiochus V's rule "independent" is more figurative than factual, for as a youth, throughout his reign he was under the towering influence of Lysias (Obst 1927: 2532–2533, no. 9; Grainger 1997: 102; Savalli-Lestrade 1998: 57 ff., no. 56, 64, no. 63), whom Antiochus IV appointed his son's guardian just before setting out for the East (Gruen 1976: 79–80; Habicht 1989: 353–354 = Habicht 2006: 205–206; Muccioli 2000: 261–265; Mittag 2006: 328 ff.). The picture of political developments in Syria painted by 1 Macc and 2 Macc is lacking in clarity and not wholly true in detail. As a child several years old, Antiochus V was made (ca. 166) co-ruler by his father (cf. App. *Syr.* 46. 66; Wellman 1894: 2476; Volkmann 1925: 379). Following Antiochus IV's death, he ascended to the throne, even though formally the succession should rather have gone to Demetrius, the son of Seleucus IV, long held hostage in Rome (Polyb. 31.2.1–7; Diodorus 31.18.1; Jos. *AJ* 12.389; App. *Syr.* 47; Iust. 34.3.6; cf. Volkmann 1925: 375 ff.). In both books, the interpretation of events in Syria after 164 (cf. 1 Macc 6:14–17. 55–56. 63; 2 Macc 9:29; 10:10–13) mainly concerns the rivalry between Lysias and Philip to secure influence on the juvenile king: Mittag 2006: 328 ff. Antiochus V's letter to Lysias announcing the amnesty is undated. References in it to a recent passing of Antiochus IV suggest that it was written in the first weeks or months of this son's reign: Habicht 1976: 10, 15 ff. = Habicht 2006: 115–116, 120 ff.; Roberto 2003: 798–799.

[57] Cf. 1 Macc 5:1–68; 2 Macc 12:10–45. Such dating is suggested by the historical context of those actions where a clear dividing line is drawn at the death of Antiochus IV and the rededication of the Jerusalem temple.

[58] Cf. 1 Macc 5:23. 45. See also Kasher 1999: 71, 83.

[59] Reportedly, Judah then commanded 8,000 men, while Simon 3,000 (1 Macc 5:20).

12:27). It was also an opportunity to demolish pagan sanctuaries and objects of worship.[60]

Sources differ among themselves considerably in detailing the number and chronology of those expeditions, their course and purpose, leaving scholars to debate these issues.[61] What we know is that Judah's and Simon's operations also targeted Syrian troops and garrisons whose activity and looming presence constantly threatened Jewish populations and insurgent troops operating across the river Jordan.[62] Destroying many small fortified towns and settlements located along communication routes could seriously hamper Syrian deployment based on local help to attack Judea from different directions.[63] Therefore local Syrian officials attempted to prevent Judah from expanding his area of operation. Still, they could not effectively contain his forces since they are known to have been operating in Judea's neighboring lands probably as late as spring 162.[64] Successes won in raids beyond Judea inspired Judah to make another attempt to seize Acra: its destruction could at last give him the longed-for full control over Jerusalem, rid of not only a Syrian garrison, but also, perhaps more importantly, of the Hellenists. Their continued presence at Acra must have posed a challenge to him, for even though he controlled the city and the temple, the perpetrators and sympathizers of the religious reform could still feel safe within the city, never renouncing their hostile actions against the rebels (1 Macc 6:18–27). It was a fateful decision to attack Acra as it meant resumption of armed conflict. Finally, pressured by the Hellenists, Antiochus V personally moved into Judea at the head of his army (1 Macc 6:28–31; 2 Macc 13:1–2).

His expedition may be treated as both a reaffirmation of the Syrian king's supremacy over Judea and a display designed to boost his authority among those subjects who had supported the Seleucid rule and now expected relief from their king. This explains why Judea saw an incursion of a large force which included, for the first time, battle

[60] 1 Macc 5:43–44. 68; 2 Macc 12:26 (cf. 40); Jos. *AJ* 12.344; Kasher 1990: 78–79.

[61] The issue is of secondary importance to our discussion, so we will forgo a closer examination. According to B. Bar-Kochva (1989: 51–52, 342), the expeditions were intended to resettle populations to improve Judea's demographic potential and thus ensure greater recruitment to the rebel army.

[62] The accounts of 1 Macc and 2 Macc suggest that particularly threatening were the military operations of Timothy, who led a sizeable force: 1 Macc 5:6–7. 9-11. 34. 37–43; 2 Macc 10:24–37; 12:2. 10–11. 18–25. He is shown in 1 Macc as a local leader hostile to Jews. According to 2 Macc 12:2, he was a local Syrian *strategos*, cf. Grainger 1997: 121. The same book (10:24–37) also mentions another Timothy whose role and position are not clearly stated. A parallel passage in 1 Macc seems to indicate that both are the same person (scholars are disputing the identities of both Timothies: Sievers 1990: 53 n. 36). Since all the passages quoted refer to Judah's activities in the same year, we are led to suppose that those in 2 Macc are now positioned in a different chronological context due to its elaboration by the epitomist. Cf. Sievers 1990: 51 ff.

[63] To attribute to Judah a desire to liberate those territories from Syrian rule, as A. Kasher does (1990: 74), is entirely groundless. It seems dubious that such was his motive at the time since the success of the Judean rebellion still hung in the balance and maintaining lasting control over any area across the border was unrealistic. Disbelief in any of Judah's territorial gains outside Judea is voiced by Sievers 1990: 57–58.

[64] Such dating is supported by chronological hints found in parallel passages in 1 and 2 Macc (cf. Sievers 1990: 49 ff.) concerning Judah's expedition to Scythopolis (Beth-Shean). They suggest that Judah returned from it to Jerusalem just before the feast of *Shavuot* (2 Macc 12:31), and after celebrating Pentecost he set out for Idumea (2 Macc 12:32). The account of preceding rebel actions rules out their dating at spring 163. Therefore, they would instead occur in spring 162, before Judah decided to try and capture Acra (1 Macc. 6:19–20), thus provoking renewed combat in Judea.

elephants.[65] We know that the very appearance of that army temporarily caused panic among the insurgents (cf. 2 Macc 13:9; see also 1 Macc 6:41. 47), but eventually, even in the face of an imposing display of the opponent's strength, they refused to give up their struggle. A picture of events which took place in Judea following the Syrian incursion is not fully clear. According to 1 Macc, Judah and his men tried to stop the enemy advancing from Idumea at Beth-zur, but found themselves unable to hold the position, chiefly because a shortage of food (1 Macc 6:49–50; Jos. *AJ* 12.375–376). Nor did Judah succeed in stopping Antiochus V in the battle of Beth-Zechariah. Despite the losses they sustained, the Syrians reached Jerusalem and proceeded to lay siege to the city.[66] As had been the case at Beth-zur, also now the rebels' resistance quickly waned for the same reason: what food reserves there were in the city had been consumed by the resettled groups (1 Macc 6:53–54; Jos. *AJ* 12.377–378). In both cases, inadequate food supply was due to it being a Sabbath year.[67] An unexpected change was brought by news from Syria about a usurpation attempt by Philip, a former associate of Antiochus IV, now left behind by Antiochus V in the capital as its administrator for the duration of the Judean expedition.[68] On hearing about the development, the king and Lysias showed fresh readiness to make peace with Judah, who assented to their proposal (1 Macc 6:60–61; Jos. *AJ* 12.382). But before the Syrian king began withdrawal of his forces, he found time – in breach of the newly concluded treaty with Judah – to demolish the fortifications erected by the rebels near the temple. He made up his mind to do so upon entering Jerusalem and seeing how extensive the defenses were: he could appreciate how useful to the enemy they could be (1 Macc 6:62; Jos. *AJ* 12.383). Razing them was, next to the accord with Judah, a major success of the expedition[69] as it departed from Jerusalem, leaving the rebels without a stronghold to fend off an external threat, thus making the city and the Temple more vulnerable to Syrian influence.

Antiochus V's expedition to Judea as depicted in 2 Macc shares only few similarities with that presented in 1 Macc. According to 2 Macc, despite the Syrians' overwhelming superiority, the campaign right from the start was an unbroken series of victories for Ju-

[65] Sources have handed down to us many numerical data on the Syrian force deployed in Judea, but certainly they are exaggerated: Bar-Kochva 1989: 40 ff. The author of 1 Macc (6:30) relates that the Syrian army included 100,000 infantry, 20,000 cavalry, and 32 elephants. According to 2 Macc (13:1–2) the king and Lysias commanded separate corps (ἑκαστον ἐχοντα δύναμιν), each numbering 100,000 foot, 15,300 horse, 22 elephants, and 300 chariots. Also Josephus is inconsistent. In the *Bellum* (1.41), he says that the Syrian army consisted of 50,000 infantry, about 5,000 cavalry, and 80 elephants, but in the *Antiquitates* (12.366) he reiterates the information given in 1 Macc.

[66] Josephus cites two different versions of Judah's fate after the battle. In one (*BJ* 1, 45), Judah fled the battlefield, finding refuge with what had remained of his force in Gophna; in the other (*AJ* 12, 375), he withdrew to Jerusalem. For comments on this account, see Feldman 1994: 56.

[67] 1 Macc 6:49. 53; Jos. *AJ* 12.378. According to J. Pastor (1997: 57–58; 2007: 34 ff.), the true cause for insufficient supplies, which also affected the king's troops (cf. 1 Macc 6:57; Jos. *AJ* 12.380), could have been poor crops in the year preceding the Sabbath year.

[68] 1 Macc 6:55–56, cf. Jos. *AJ* 12.379; 2 Macc 13:23. Far more credible about the course of events during the usurpation is 2 Macc. The account in 1 Macc, repeated by Josephus, contains a muddle of past and contemporary facts.

[69] Soon afterward, the Syrians, with Hellenist support, encountered no difficulty in installing Alcimus in Jerusalem, which may suggest that the fortifications had indeed been demolished, preventing Judah and his supporters from offering effective resistance and even maintaining their presence in the city, cf. 1 Macc 7:10. 19. 21–24.

dah and his men, with the fall of Beth-zur being caused by its commander's treason (cf. 2 Macc 13:19–22). The news of usurpation by Philip, had Antiochus V so disconcerted that he offered a truce to his enemies, promising to respect all their rights. Moreover, the king "offered sacrifice, honored the sanctuary and showed generosity to the holy place" (2 Macc 13:23). During the talks, he actually met Judah Maccabee in person (2 Macc 13:24). This apologetic picture obviously distorts the course of events described above, but it allows the author to present the outcome of Antiochus V's expedition as a success of a providentially guided Judah.

Although the two accounts differ widely, both well convey the atmosphere of anxiety that erupted the moment the Syrian army intruded into Judea and the sense of relief when the conflict was resolved. At an early stage, events bared the rebels' weakness, heroic though they proved, in the face of an adversary superior in numbers and materiel. The relief was felt when, suddenly worried by reports from Antioch, the king and his advisors, though at an overwhelming military advantage, proposed a peaceful resolution to the rebels, guaranteeing them a right to live according to their own beliefs. The declaration, not the first of its kind by Antiochus V,[70] was preceded by an event that could not fail to make waves in the rebel camp. As he mounted the Judean campaign, Antiochus V sentenced to death the high priest Menelaus as the cause of the trouble the Syrian administration had to face in the land.[71] Removing him from the political scene at that particular point was a crucial decision as it made it easier for the king and Lysias to make peace with the rebels without a controversial intermediary.[72] That said, there are no suggestions Antiochus V's meant his decision as a conciliatory gesture toward his adversaries at a point when the outcome of the struggle still hung in the balance.

Whatever the circumstances, the expedition concluded with a considerable success for the young Antiochus V. What with his capture of Beth-zur, victory at Beth-Zacharia,[73] occupation of Jerusalem, destruction of rebel fortifications, and peace with Judah, he had achievements in his name that could help boost his image and build his standing with his people.[74] Now that peace prevailed in Judea, he could deploy a larger force to combat Philip. For Judah, the outcome of the invasion seemed unexpected, perhaps

[70] 2 Macc 13:23; cf. 2 Macc 11:25. Commitment to respect Jewish religious laws is not mentioned in 1 Macc as a truce clause but only as the king's declaration in his speech to his soldiers (1 Macc 6:59); cf. Jos. *AJ* 12.383. Such decisions by Antiochus V probably involve what the *Megillat Taanit* recorded as a restored right to study the Torah: Zeitlin 1922: 79; Lichtenstein 1931/1932: 279. The entry on the 28th of Shebat implies that a Syrian king named Antiochus departed from Jerusalem. The reference may be either to Antiochus V or Antiochus VII. According to S. Zeitlin (1922: 80–81), it was about Antiochus V. Judging by the importance of the event, much more plausible arguments speak for Antiochus VII than Antiochus V: Lichtenstein 1931/1932: 287–288.

[71] 2 Macc 13:3–8. In Josephus' version (*AJ* 12.383–385), he did not die until after Antiochus V' expedition to Judea ended. Still, we have no evidence to suggest (cf. Roberto 2003: 804) that Antiochus V appointed Alcimus as a replacement. This is merely an *argumentum ex silentio* (see below).

[72] Speculation about who represented the rebels in negotiations (see Mölleken 1953: 218; Bunge 1975: 267–268, Sievers 1990: 60–61) has little relevance for our discussion; what matters is what impact they had on further developments.

[73] The account of the alleged battle near Modein given in 2 Macc (13:13–17) certainly refers to the engagement at Beth-Zacharia: Sievers 1990: 59 n. 52.

[74] This aspect of the Judean expedition has importance that cannot be missed. It was crucial especially to Lysias, the king's guardian, as any successes of his young royal ward strengthened his own position at his liege's side. The story in 1 Macc suggests that Lysias, convinced of the futility of attempts to quell the

prompting him to conclude, as did the author of 2 Macc, that it was only through an intervention by Providence that his uprising was spared a crushing defeat. His successful policy of *faits accomplis* outside Judea had given him such confidence that he had neglected to prepare his men and Jerusalem's inhabitants to survive the coming the Sabbath year. When the Syrian army first marched onto Judean soil, he had found himself in perhaps the tightest spot since the rising broke out. His attempts to slow down the enemy advance by provoking skirmishes along the way had only a limited effect, the odds being so heavily against him. Even more lethal than the Syrian army was another enemy: hunger. The short supplies demoralized his officers and men, who either surrendered to the Syrians or deserted. In this unfavorable situation, a peace proposal was the last thing Judah could expect. Even the destruction of Jerusalem's fortifications, a severe blow, to be sure, was not too high a price to pay for the truce.[75]

As for the negotiations, some more points deserve attention that helps cast more light on the relations between the two sides. Although he removed Menelaus, the king did not proceed to name a new high priest for the Jerusalem temple, leaving the question open. Moreover, the atmosphere surrounding mutual relations bore some resemblance to the situation before the religious reform, because, the time-honored canon of daily sacrifices then offered at the Temple was probably again made to include those performed on behalf of the Syrian king.[76] The political significance of this fact is not to be overlooked, for it might mean that in return for having Judea's religious autonomy restored and obtaining a share in power over Jerusalem and Judea, Judah Maccabee gave up rising against Syrian supremacy. This situation did not change even after Demetrius I ascended to power in Syria.[77] The precarious balance was not upset until the new monarch used strong-arm policies against Judah Maccabee. This fact seems to reconfirm that the reasons the first Hasmoneans rose against the Seleucids and Hellenists had more to do with religion than politics.[78]

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rebellion by force of arms, whether by Antiochus IV or Antiochus V, favored a political settlement of the Judean conflict, cf. Gera 1998: 248–249, 252–253, 301 ff.; Roberto 2003: 796 ff.; Rappaport 2007: 172 ff.

[75] When analyzing source material on Judah's situation after Antiochus V's expedition, J. Sievers (1990: 62 ff.) concluded that he had lost not only his sway in Jerusalem but also control over much of Judea. He believes that Judah's theater of mostly guerrilla operations was confined to the area of Modein (p. 63).

[76] 1 Macc 7:33; cf. 2 Macc 14:31. It is hardly conceivable that the social and political atmosphere in Jerusalem should have been conducive to renewed offerings for the king at the same time the temple was rededicated. The quoted mention in 1 Macc applies to the reign of Demetrius I, but it suggests that such offerings for the king were nothing new at the time. It therefore seems that the practice was revived in close connection with the peace made with Antiochus V.

[77] 1 Macc 7:1–4; 2 Macc 14:1–2; App. *Syr.* 47; Willrich 1901: 2795 ff., no. 40; Volkmann 1925: 373–405; Grainger 1997: 39 ff. The information in 2 Macc erroneously suggests that three years passed between the Judean campaign of Antiochus V and the ascent to the Syrian throne by Demetrius I; in reality, the space was one year.

[78] Contrary to U. Roberto's argument (2003: 801), Judah's struggle to restore Judeans' religious rights did not extend to include independence from foreign rule. That religious rights could be used as a political tool is well seen in Antiochus III's decisions after conquering Judea when, to secure his new subjects' sympathies and support, he guaranteed to them and to the Jerusalem temple a broad range of religious privileges. Still, those did not translate into political freedoms that would contradict Seleucid interests. Therefore, Judah's struggle to regain lost privileges cannot be seen as a national liberation movement (cf. Schwartz 2002: 73–74; Roberto 2003: 801 ff.). Flavius, in presenting it as fight for freedom (*eleutheria*), sees it in terms proper for his own time, not that of Judah (cf. Feldman 1994: 45 ff., 67).

Demetrius I's ascent to the throne had a dramatic effect on Judea. The Hellenists must have quickly realized that the new ruler was bent on restoring the Seleucid state to its former power,[79] so they used the opportunity to persuade him to change the policy toward Judah and renounce the peace treaty made with him by Antiochus V (cf. 2 Macc 14:5. 11). It came as a convenient pretext for the Hellenists that the rebel leader practiced forced Judaization. Neither of the Maccabean Books makes it clear whether such complaints cited Judah's present or past actions to that effect. Nor did it matter much since the real objective of Judah's enemies was to convince the king of Syria to intervene in Judea. The Hellenists did all they could to prove that the root cause of all the troubles Demetrius' predecessors suffered was the rebellion of Judah and his partisans as it had upset the existing order in Judea, causing a threat to the vested interests of the Seleucid monarchy and its loyal social groups (1 Macc 7:5–7; 2 Macc 14:7–11). The Hellenists found an influential advocate in Alcimus.[80] He came forward as an advocate of Judah's adversaries, hoping that Demetrius I would help him obtain the position of high priest in the Jerusalem temple.[81] Alcimus' ambitions were seen by the Syrian king as an assur-

[79] Demetrius I's political temperament was known well enough in Rome, where he remained for many years as a hostage. Although his claim to the Syrian throne was fully justified, Rome would not support him for fear of trouble that would ensue once he rose to power (App. *Syr.* 47). His eventual ascent to the throne he owed to some Roman friends who concealed from the senate his escape for a few precious days, giving him a head start and preventing effective pursuit (Volkmann 1925: 380 ff.). The Roman senate proved its disapproval of Demetrius I following his enthronement by refusing to recognize formally his rule until 160. Throughout his reign, Roman senators used all means available to upset an independent policy by Demetrius I (Cf. Polyb. 32.2.1–3. 13; Diodorus 31.29–30; App. *Syr.* 47; Willrich 1901: 2796–2797; Volkmann 1925: 390–391; Gruen 1976, 80ff.; Habicht 1989: 355–362 (= Habicht 2006: 207–215). An important change following Demetrius I's rise to kingship was restoring officials who served Antiochus IV and seeking support from those social groups which recognized his right to the throne and supported policies to restore the status of the Syrian state: Roberto 2003: 795 and n. 1, 805–806 and n. 17, 810 ff.

[80] 1 Macc 7:5; 2 Macc 14:3–5. Because of his role in the events in Judea, the figure of Alcimus attracts much interest from scholars. Their investigations concern not only his background (1 Macc 7:14; 2 Macc 14:7), but especially his serving as high priest prior to turmoil in Judea (2 Macc 14:3: Ἄλκιμος δέ τις προγεγονὼς ἀρχιερεύς). Most scholars studying this matter go so far as to propose that his office of high priest he owed to Antiochus V (cf. Jos. *AJ* 12.385). Different manipulations in this respect have been offered as exemplified by studies by W. Mölleken (1953) and J.G. Bunge (1975: 11–27). Both authors were acting on the assumption that any differences in accounts concerning Alcimus between 1 Macc and 2 Macc assuredly indicate distortions by the writer of the earlier book. In their reconstructions of events, both scholars employed arbitrary interpolation and transposition of source passages. Using this technique, they managed to prove their assumed point. Yet their method and consequent arguments met with resolute criticism, cf. Sievers 1990: 60–61, 65; VanderKam 2004: 232 ff., 235 ff. Nor can we accept the remarks of S. Mandell (2003: 88 ff.) on Alcimus. She proposes an interpretation of literary evidence and events which is based on argument of an overwhelming influence of Rome on relations between the eastern Mediterranean states in the 2nd and 1st centuries BCE (cf. Mandell 1989: 89–94; Mandell 2003: 80–96). Her perception of historical facts of this period is very speculative.

[81] 1 Macc 7:5: Ἄλκιμος ἠγεῖτο αὐτῶν βουλόμενος ἱερατεύειν. Considering known events, and, even more so, another possible interpretation of the information on Alcimus' priestly office (Rooke 2000: 255 n. 36, 279; VanderKam 2004: 234 n. 344), it seems quite improbable that he should have been high priest of the Jerusalem temple by appointment of Antiochus V, cf. Sievers 1990: 61 n. 57. We know that the *Hasidim* supported Alcimus only when he arrived in Jerusalem with Demetrius' army, although their main reason behind their support was his lineage which legitimized his claim to the role. From the point of view of the Jewish law, that was the decisive factor and support or no support from Syria was of not much consequence. Had Alcimus been high priest earlier, the *Hasidim* would not have had a hand in deposing him, and yet we know of his role in introducing the religious reform (2 Macc 14:3), and of their involvement in countering

ance of his loyalty. Installing him in Jerusalem would allow Demetrius I to restore full Syrian control over Judea while shifting the responsibility for maintaining order there to a member of the local elite who, relying on Syrian help, would make a convenient tool to implement the king's policies. It was probably such arguments, together with the Hellenists' declared readiness to cooperate, that made him assign to Bacchides,[82] the governor of the province Transeuphratene (whose competences included Judean affairs), the task to do away with Judah and introduce Alcimus to Jerusalem.[83]

Alcimus' appearance in Judea caused an unexpected rift in the rebel camp and its consequent weakening. The *Hasidim*, a major group fighting so far under Judah's command, sided with Alcimus, recognizing his aspiration to become high priest as fully legitimate (1 Macc 7:14). The consequences of this attitude proved disastrous for the *Hasidim* and for Judah with his followers alike.[84] Although they lent their support to Alcimus, he had *Hasidim* leaders treacherously murdered, resulting in the group's being permanently eliminated from the political scene.[85] Once introduced to Jerusalem by Bacchides, Alcimus, now at the head of not only Syrian forces (1 Macc 7:20), but also of a multitude of revenge-minded Hellenists who had been brought to the city and the land by the political change,[86] could proceed to crack down on the rebels. Resist as he might, Judah was forced to withdraw from Jerusalem and conduct his struggle in the city's environs. His tactics was to block the roads leading to Jerusalem. In this way, he could hinder supplies coming in as well as communication with the outside world (1 Macc 7:24). The tactics proved so effective that Alcimus was forced to retreat and Judah not only regained the initiative, but on the surge of renewed support rebuilt his own force (cf. 1 Macc 7:25). Alcimus' defeat did not affect his relations with Demetrius I, who supported another attempt to install him as high priest at the Temple, dispatching him to Judea escorted by Nicanor (1 Macc 7:26; 2 Macc 14:12–13).

The figure of Nicanor himself as well as the course of his expedition as described in the both Books of the Maccabees, appear quite different, in spite of some similarities.

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it. Yet to Alcimus himself, none other than the *Hasidim* were the mainspring of Judean unrest (1 Macc 7:6; 2 Macc 14:6), for he believed them supporters of Judah, and Judah their leader (2 Macc 14:6).

[82] Wilcken 1896: 2788; Grainger 1997: 84–85; Savalli-Lestrade 1998: 66 ff., no. 65. This is the same official who had fought the rebels under Antiochus IV: Gera 1998: 275–276; Roberto 2003: 805 ff. and n. 17.

[83] 1 Macc 7:8. The author of 2 Macc (14:12) relates that Demetrius I assigned this mission not to Bacchides, whose name he never even mentions, but to Nicanor.

[84] The position represented in this issue by J. Efron (1987: 24), who believes that such a rift never happened, is not shared by other scholars, cf. Feldman 1994: 50 n. 10. Josephus shows the event in a completely different light (*AJ* 12.395–396): Feldman 1994: 49–50; Schams 1998: 117.

[85] 1 Macc 7:16. According to Josephus (*AJ* 12.396), the order to murder *Hasidim* leaders was issued by Bacchides. Attempts to explain Alcimus' behavior toward the *Hasidim* and to supporting them scribes (1 Macc 7:12–13) has been given much thought (see Davies 1977: 136 ff.; Sievers 1990: 64 ff.). These two groups became the subject of many interpretations and hypotheses, one of them accepts a possible identity of both groups (see Schams 1998: 117–121). Regardless of any proposed interpretations, Alcimus' attitude should be seen through the lens of his declared enmity toward the *Hasidim* (cf. 2 Macc 14:6). It cannot be ruled out that the killing of *Hasidim* leaders was prompted by lack of trust toward them as Judah's supporters thus far, and also by their orthodoxy which could as some point move them once again to embrace opposition *vis-ŕ-vis* Alcimus.

[86] 1 Macc 7:21–22; cf. 2 Macc 14:14. Another effect was that many of Judah's supporters abandoned him, believing perhaps that he was a lost cause: 1 Macc 7:19. 24. Although he took the side of Alcimus, Bacchides did not trust deserters. For reasons known only to him, he had some of them murdered (1 Macc 7:19).

In 1 Macc, Nicanor is shown as a sworn enemy of the Jews (1 Macc 7:26), who, feigning readiness to talk, tried to remove Judah through deceit (1 Macc 7:27–30). Not even a defeat at the hands of the rebels could make him change his mind about his design (1 Macc 7:31–32). In his contacts with priests, he displayed arrogance and cynicism, threatening to burn down the Temple if they refused to help capture Judah and his men (1 Macc 7:33–35). A much more sympathetic picture of Nicanor emerges from 2 Macc. In this account, although given the task of leading Alcimus to Jerusalem, he refused to fight Judah even after his troops had won a clash with the rebels led by Judah's brother Simon (2 Macc 14:16–17). He felt great respect for the leader of the insurrection for his courage and desired to talk with him (2 Macc 14:18–19). When such talks resulted in an agreement with Judah, a disconcerted Alcimus advised Demetrius I of Nicanor's violation of the king's orders regarding person of the high priest (2 Macc 14:20–26). The proof of this disobedience was to be Nicanor's consent for Judah to take the place of Alcimus in Jerusalem.[87] The intervention succeeded: Demetrius ordered Nicanor (allegedly against his own conviction (2 Macc 14:28)) to capture the rebel leader and deliver him to Antioch (2 Macc 14:27). Further events basically follow the scenario outlined in 1 Macc: after another failed attempt to trap Judah, Nicanor demanded that the priests deliver him, threatening to destroy the Temple otherwise (2 Macc 14:29–33). Both accounts yield the same conclusion: whether by conviction or under pressure from Alcimus and the Hellenists, Demetrius I refused to consider any possibility of accord with Judah's rebels. He had learned from past experience that as long as Judah was alive, any attempts to install in Jerusalem a local leader who would be loyal to the Seleucids and willing to commit himself to perpetuating Syrian control over Judea would have no chance of success. He could only be strengthened in this belief by news of the further fortunes of Nicanor's expedition. When the Syrian commander's efforts to capture Judah produced no effect, he decided to confront the opposing force head-on. The rebel army, although modest in number, acquitted itself admirably in the battle of Adasa (161), routing Nicanor's corps. Syrian losses were heavy: Nicanor himself was killed on the battlefield, with probably few of his soldiers left to tell the story. On seeing their leader perish, his troops fell into disarray and fled their ground. The chase was joined by local inhabitants who effectively hunted down any survivors (1 Macc 7:43–50; 2 Macc

[87] 2 Macc 14:26; VanderKam 2004: 242-3. No other source, except Josephus (*AJ* 12. 414, 419, 434) and Synkellos (p. 415–416), clearly attributes to Judah Maccabee the office of the high priest. Since Josephus' account in this matter is full of contradictions and inconsistencies (cf. Jos. *AJ* 20.237), it is usually treated more as the author's own speculation than a reflection of actuality (cf. Rooke 2000, 280 note 40). Yet according to A.S. van der Woude (1982: 353–354; 1996: 380–381) a passage in the *Pesher Habakkuk* (1QpHab, VIII, 8-13) discovered in Qumran suggests that there might have existed a tradition relating that Judah claimed the office of high priest (van der Woude 1982: 354; 1996: 380–381). The view appears likely to García Martínez (1985: 170 ff., 181 = 2007a: 54 ff., 66) and VanderKam (1990: 219 ff.; 2004: 241–244, cf. also 244 n. 6). Even though Judah is not listed among known high priests at the Jerusalem temple, these scholars believe that he could have performed the priestly office on the authority of his soldiers (Jos. *AJ* 12.414; cf. Feldman 1994: 57–58; VanderKam 2004: 243). In that case, his standing as the leader of the insurrection would have become more official (cf. Feldman 1994: 57 n. 17, 67). A later tradition favorable to the Hasmoneans, preferred to ignore that fact as unfavorable to Judah's image. According to S. Mandell (2003: 87) Judah *assumed the functions, but not yet the title, of high priest, even though a legitimately appointed high priest was still alive*, shortly after assuming command over the insurgency; cf. also Mandell 2003: 87 ff.

15:20–37). Nicanor's defeat did not persuade Demetrius I to change his mind about Judea; if anything, it intensified his desire to impose on that land his own concept of order as soon as possible. Toward that end, the king dispatched to Judea another corps, the command of which he entrusted to Bacchides. On the way to Jerusalem, he was accompanied by Alcimus (1 Macc 9:1).

Demetrius I's quick and determined response must have come as a bad surprise to Judah and his followers. Before then, Syrian forces following a lost battle or campaign would not resume action until after much delay. That gave Judah's army time to recuperate and rebuild its strength. Apparently, this time the delay was not long enough and the enemy force too large to oppose effectively. If 1 Macc is to be trusted, at that juncture Judah's army had the same numerical strength as it had had at Adasa.[88] The Syrians advanced rapidly probably because they had chosen a different route than before. This enabled Bacchides to bypass major strongholds, while his troops made short work of smaller pockets of resistance along the way (cf. 1 Macc. 9:2). The Syrian force arrived outside Jerusalem with little opposition. Despite the enemy's numerical superiority, Judah decided to make a desperate stand at Adasa although he could not harbor any delusions about the outcome of an engagement which his aides tried to dissuade him from. Disbelieving a chance of success, most of his soldiers deserted in the face of the enemy. As the battle started, of a 3,000-strong army Judah was left with 800. The epic account of their heroic fight is a homage paid by the author to Judah and his fallen insurrectionists (1 Macc 9:11–18).

Why did Judah accept a challenge against impossible odds (1 Macc 9:7–8)? The author of 1 Macc makes the protagonist answer that a fight to the last, regardless of outcome, is simply a matter of honor (1 Macc 9:10). While attributing such an answer to Judah certainly helped build his image as a noble, unwavering leader, we are still left to conjecture as to his real underlying motives. One might have been fear of losing his authority, which would have equaled forfeiting past achievements. Perhaps Judah felt it a cause worth giving up his life for.

The movement headed by Judah had been losing impetus and attractiveness with each successive Syrian concession restoring to faithful Jews their rights. By the same token, the religious motivations invoked at the outset had largely lost their validity and appeal.[89] Contrary to some opinions, it does not seem that Judah had a clear political program on top of a religious agenda. His raids outside Judea were meant as relief to threatened Jewish groups and a means of obtaining resources necessary to sustain his army and to offer material help to all those supporting the revolt. In such forays he never attempted to install a rebel administration or to man garrisons. The resistance movement led by the first Hasmoneans had originated to defend the religious rights of Jewish inhabitants of Judea. It did not reorient its objective even after Judah Maccabee regained

[88] Cf. 1 Macc 7:39; 9:1. 3–6; Sievers 1990: 67. We can but speculate whether the smallness of Judah's army was caused by the surprising rapidity of the Syrian action which left not enough time to mobilize more men, or his limited recruitment opportunities. That it was surprise is suggested by Judah's inaction in slowing down Bacchides' march and by the rebels' dismay at the sight of the sheer numbers of Syrian troops arriving in Judea (1 Macc. 9:6). Repetitively quoted in 1 Macc, the number of 3,000 of Judah's men suggests that that was how large the core of his rebel army was.

[89] Cf. Sievers 1990: 71.

control over the Jerusalem temple. The recovery of the Temple and its rededication to Yahweh in itself was not a guarantee of its continued safety as a Syrian garrison still remained in nearby Acra, and there still were Hellenists whom it was protecting. After Antiochus V restituted Jewish religious rights, Judah's most challenging task was to safeguard the Sanctuary and restore Jerusalem's sanctity by ridding it completely of foreign presence. This called for great effort in organization and supplies that could not be contained in the city walls. Without access to resources in the environs, any defense of Jerusalem would be doomed to fail. With such consideration in mind, Judah's attempts to subordinate Judea can hardly seem evidence for a clear political program for they did not show signs of mutating into a drive to secure sovereign statehood. Characteristically, no source account contains the least allusion to the subject. Judah's recurrent readiness to make peace with Syria suggests that in no way was he interested in breaking away from the Seleucids. A large obstacle in trying to define his political outlook is the absence of detailed information on the nature of his (or other rebel delegates') talks with Syrian representatives, or on the specific provisions thus agreed. We may still plausibly hypothesize that he was far more in favor of Judean autonomy within the Syrian state with guarantees of Judea's own administration and freedom of religious practice than of full independence. Had it indeed been Judah's aim to win independence, the rebels had only one chance to bring it up in bargaining with Lysias and Antiochus V. Although both sides were in a squeeze, it was the Syrian king who was harder pressed as had more to lose. At that unique juncture, the rebels could have capitalized on the internal strife in the Seleucid state to win far-reaching concessions. Since, however, both sides quickly came to an agreement that satisfied them, and no observable political change in Judea's status followed in its wake, it stands to reason that the question of independence from Syria was not at all brought up in negotiations. Judah did not have sufficient force or means to win political independence and defend it if necessary. The Seleucid state, regardless of its many internal weaknesses, was still powerful enough at the time to prevent effectively any Judean independence. Later, likewise, Judah's chances for any notable military or political success that could make the Syrian king inclined to treat him as a partner were ruined after he lost the support of the *Hasidim* (the fact weakened the rebellion and its social resonance) and the Hellenists regained their former status. This difficult position could in no way be alleviated by Judah's attempted contact with the Republican Rome after the battle of Adasa;[90] that he made the attempt in the first

[90] Cf. 1 Macc 8:17–32; 2 Macc. 4:11; Diodorus 40.2; Jos. *BJ* 1.38; *AJ* 12.414–419; Iust. 36.3.9. The matter of Judah sending envoys to Rome and consequent treaty of friendship (if any) has been the subject of many studies and interpretations which have seen their authors embrace sometimes opposed conclusions, see Täubler 1913: 239–254 (*contra* Timpe 1974: 136–139); Sordi 1952: 509–519; Liebmann-Frankfort 1969: 111 ff.; Piattelli 1971: 236 ff.; Giovannini/Müller 1971: 166–170; Fischer 1974: 92-3; Timpe 1974: 133 ff.; Gauger 1975: 155 ff.; Smith 1975: 1–2; Gruen 1976: 73 ff.; Fischer 1981: 104 ff.; Sievers 1990: 68 ff.; Shatzman 1999: 59 ff. and n. 35; Mandell 2003: 80 ff. (cf. Mandell 1989: 89–94). The credibility of this information is sometimes questioned (Gauger 1975: 243 ff., 327–328). However, now most scholars accept it as genuine: Sievers 1990: 68 ff. An important factor in Judah's attempt to establish relations with Rome was his position at the time: he stood a better chance as the high priest of the Jerusalem temple, and thus the formal head of the Judean society, than as the leader of a faction of the Jewish community rebelling against the ruling Seleucids (cf. Feldman 1994: 57 n. 17, and see note above). Based on 2 Macc (4:11; 11:34–38) it may be thought that Judah's embassy was not the first time direct contact was sought between the Jews and Rome. The first such attempt was probably made as early as 174 (Zollschan 2004: 37–44). Important

place was highly unusual, not just for its political overtones, but also as a break with strict, tradition-imposed limitations on Jewish contacts with the outside world.[91] Even if Judah pinned any hopes and expectations on that initiative,[92] his attempt was made too late to bring about a swift and meaningful change in the situation in Judea.[93] Aware of inevitable defeat, Judah chose a solution that enabled him to escape its bitter and humiliating consequences.

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evidence of Rome's interest in Judean affairs is (if authentic: Liebmann-Frankfort 1969: 103–104; Habicht 1976: 12 (= Habicht 2006: 117); Fischer 1980: 65) a letter from Roman envoys Q. Memmius and T. Manius written in 164 to τω δήμω των Ιουδαίων (2 Macc 11:34–38; Bunge 1971: 392 ff.). Its actual significance and impact in Judea is difficult to ascertain. The contents seem to imply that it had been initiated by Roman senators rather than being a response to any rebel appeals to them, even though some scholars do not share this opinion (Liebmann-Frankfort 1969: 106-11, 118–119; Gruen 1976: 78; Piattelli 1979: 197 ff.; Gera 1998: 249–252; Shatzman 1999: 60 and n. 38; Roberto 2003: 799 n. 8). For the recipient of the letter, see Piattelli 1971: 232–236; Habicht 1976: 10, 12 (= Habicht 2006, 115, 117); Gera 1998: 244–245; Roberto 2003: 797.

[91] Cf. Smith 1978: 2 ff.

[92] Cf. 1 Macc 8:1–2. 17–18. 31–32. Rome's role in undermining Seleucid power following the battle of Magnesia (189) and effective Roman interventions in Syrian affairs during the reign of Antiochus V – all are well understood in 1 Macc, although at the same time the book contains surprisingly many inaccuracies or outright errors about Antiochus III's defeat, which suggests that Judah only received second-hand knowledge about those events. Probably, too, Judea's elites had a rather generalized idea of Rome. Echoes of Rome's actions perhaps reached Judea through those Judeans who visited Antioch or through correspondence. Before the religious reform was introduced, official contacts with the Seleucid capital or representatives of Syrian administration were maintained by high priests of the Jerusalem temple. Later, the Hellenists were in close and frequent touch. It is difficult to imagine that events in the Syrian capital should have been late news to Judah. A long passage in 1 Macc (8:1–16), also called the *Eulogy of the Romans*, is in fact not only a literary portrait of Rome's power and importance (for more on the eulogy, see Piattelli 1971: 252 ff. *contra* Sordi 1952: 512–519), but also a justification Judah Maccabee's initiative, cf. Troiani 2008: 356–359. What is doubtful (as shown above in the incomplete grasp of Roman successes displayed by the author of 1 Macc) is Judah's sufficient knowledge of Roman political procedures, diplomatic ways, and his realization of substantial differences between various forms of political relations with Rome and consequent obligations to both sides (cf. Mandell 1991: 203–204, 207 ff., 212 ff., 219–220). Some scholars think it an argument against the authenticity of the friendship treaty with Rome as cited in 1 Macc (1 Macc 8:23-30; cf. Jos. *AJ* 12.417–418) and its cover letter (1 Macc 8:31–32) as its diplomatic form departs from that of other similar documents (for more on this subject, cf. Fischer 1980: 105–113). In accepting the authenticity of the treaty, it should be noted that its clauses imposed on the Jewish partner obligations whose burden was not offset by any immediate benefits (Timpe 1974: 151; Gruen 1976: 86–87.; Shatzman 1999: 64 ff.). Benefits were there for Rome: the treaty gave her an excuse to interfere with the Seleucid Empire's internal affairs (Liebmann-Frankfort 1969: 114 ff.; Shatzman 1999: 59 ff.). The picture of Roman-Jewish relations repeatedly presented by S. Mandell (1988: 87–89; 1989: 89–94; 1991: 202–220; 2003: 80–96), concerning the period in question and later under the Hasmoneans, is at least controversial (cf. especially Mandell 1988, 1989). It must be called thus because of Mandell's biased interpretation of sources subordinated to proving the correctness of her preconceived hypothesis on Rome's compelling political impact in all areas of the eastern Mediterranean.

[93] It is unlikely that Judah's envoys should have returned before his death (cf. Täubler 1913: 254 n. 1). The information was probably introduced into the narrative for its resonance (cf. Sievers 1990: 70). In favorable weather, a trip from Judea to Rome and back took at least several months, depending on the route (cf. the chronology of Simon's embassy to Rome: 1 Macc 14:24; 15:15). Added to this must be an unpredictable waiting time for envoys to present their case to the senate and for it to answer. For this reason, any hypotheses and interpretations concerning the effects of the treaty based on the assumption that its clauses were known to Judah are purely speculative (cf. Roberto 2003: 807–808) for unless ratified, it remained a dead letter (Täubler 1913: 253–254; Sordi 1952: 510 ff.; Giovannini/Müller 1971: 166–167; Fischer 1980: 113 ff.; Fischer 1981: 141).

Although Judah's death closed with defeat the first stage of Judeans' rising in defense of their religious and cultural identity against imposition of alien cultural patterns, its attainments and the experience gained would prove an invaluable asset whose true worth would be demonstrated in time to come. The spontaneity of the movement proved insufficient to secure success just months into the insurrection. Without a broader social base and a charismatic leader, the movement could not achieve its purpose. For this reason, the rebellion's successes cannot be attributed just to Judah's martial skills on the battlefield. Such successes would never have been possible without the support given him by various groups in Judean society[94] or without the effective organizational and administrative structures he had built as a foundation of the movement. Without such structures, Judah would not have been able to form an army, assure its proper functioning, and manage human and material resources which accrued as the rebellion expanded.

Sources provide little insight into the organization and functioning of those structures. Worse still, the sources are different in nature; information in one is not corroborated by others. Rarely, too, do their accounts complement each other. Therefore, attempted reconstruction of the insurrection's institutions must acknowledge that their picture may contain many hypothetical elements. One of the chief problems facing Judah as he assumed leadership, one crucial for success of the struggle, was to transform the assembly of random, casually armed men who had joined him (1 Macc 3:58; 4:6) into an organized, trained, and well equipped fighting force.[95] In this, it seems, he was fully successful. Building an army must have been supported by victories which could help persuade more volunteers to rally around his banner. With this process in place, his army at its peak may have numbered in excess of ten thousand men. Apart from ideologically motivated volunteers, the ranks also included a number of those who had joined the struggle in hopes for material rewards.[96] Over time, the army greatly fluctuated in number according to the military situation at a given point: successes attracted new recruits, defeats made the disheartened go home.[97] The mainstay of the rebel army

[94] Cf. Sievers 1990: 70–71.

[95] Cf. 2 Macc 8:5. The primary and only formation in his army was infantry. No information is available on rebel cavalry deployed in battle (a different opinion is voiced by Bar-Kochva 1989: 69 ff., 82 ff.). A mention of a mounted rebel fighter is not very strong proof. It refers to a combat episode in Idumea where the protagonist is one Dositheus, who, possessed of exceptional strength and riding a horse, almost took prisoner the Syrian governor Gorgias of Idumea, who commanded the Syrian force (2 Macc 12:35). It can be inferred from the context that Dositheus' mount was probably a trophy.

[96] In the battle with Lysias (1 Macc 4:29) Judah had 10,000 men. By 163, his army had grown much beyond that number. Operating outside Judea, he commanded 8,000, his brother Simon 3,000, and a reserve force remaining back in Judea numbered at least several thousand armed men (1 Macc 5:20); two thousand of them were killed in a failed raid taken against Judah's orders by their captains Joseph and Azariah (1 Macc 5:60). Sievers (1990: 58 n. 46) believes that the number should not be taken too literally since it is an evidently apologetic figure of speech, as is implied by the commentary in the next sentence. Valid though his argument may be, given the sheer vastness of Judah-controlled territory, we cannot wholly dismiss the information on rebel numbers in sources as untrue. Since such information is unverifiable, its credibility remains the subject of more or less plausible speculation, cf. Bar-Kochva 1989: 47–67; Schwartz 1991: 16.

[97] Such changes in the strength of the rebel army are easier to follow in 1 Macc. In 2 Macc, Judah is first mentioned as the insurrection's leader when he is already heading 6,000 men (2 Macc 8:1). The same number was to face Nicanor on battlefield (2 Macc 8:21).

consisted of at least several thousand soldiers commanded personally by Judah.[98] The whole army was divided into units of various sizes.[99] If needed, larger formations were formed *ad hoc* to be led by appointed commanders (2 Macc 8:22), or independent corps were created to which Judah entrusted conduct of special combat tasks (cf. 1 Macc 5:17–20). While the supreme command was exercised by Judah, senior officer roles were served by his brothers (1 Macc 5:17; 2 Macc 8:22). Junior officer ranks were probably awarded to those men who had distinguished themselves in combat or showed leadership qualities.[100]

In trying to assess at least an approximate military potential Judah commanded, attention must be given to the part played in combat by civilian population even if its impact is difficult to determine. We know of instances when, spontaneously joining in skirmishes and battles, civilians could significantly contribute to the outcome (1 Macc 7:46). Military training, too, should be appreciated. As time passed and the rebellion expanded training became increasingly specialized.[101] Accounts of Judah's engagements convey information on the part played by troops skilled at tasks beyond ordinary soldierly routines, such as breaking into fortified settlements, cities, and fortresses (cf. 1 Macc 4:41; 5:5. 8. 28. 35–36. 44. 46–51. 66; 6:19–20. 26; 2 Macc 10:16–17.18. 22–23. 32–36; 12:13–16:27), defense of fortifications (1 Macc 4:60–61; 6:31. 52), and building of fortifications capable of resisting a prolonged siege by the enemy.[102]

Next to number, training, and command skills, an army's value is determined by its equipment and morale. In the case of Judah Maccabee's force, both these items are quite difficult to estimate. Sources make no reference to manufacture of weapons by the rebels. This silence does not preclude such production being in place, but given the complex technological processes involved, the necessary technical base, and need for suitable materials, it may be surmised that, at best, the size and quality of such production must have been quite limited.[103] This being so, one of the chief sources of military materials must have been the enemy troops (cf. 1 Macc 6:6) abandoning their weapons

[98] Most probably they numbered 3,000, men who fought under Judah from the first (1 Macc 4:6) to last battles (1 Macc 7:40; 9:5). Conceivably, they were specially selected soldiers armed differently from the rest of the army (1 Macc 9:5; cf. 2 Macc 13:15; cf. Kasher 1991: 335–336; Shatzman 1991: 23).

[99] Cf. 2 Macc 12:20. 22. The organization of the insurgents army presented in 1 Macc (3:55) resembles rather an imaginary ideal in faithfully copying a biblical model (Exod 18:21; Deut 1:15) than historical reality. Its application in 1 Macc must be thought the author's conscious device to lend his work a literary quality similar to that of biblical books (see more below). The same biblical model of army organization is invoked in the *Temple Scroll* (LVII: 3–5); cf. Schiffman 1988: 302.

[100] Apart from Judah's brothers, we know the names of several other leaders of the rebel army of varying rank: Joseph, the son of Zechariah (1 Macc 5:18. 56. 60), Azariah (1 Macc 5:18. 56. 60), Zaccheus (2 Macc 10:18), Dositheus and Sosipater (2 Macc 12:19. 24), Rhodocus, the commander of the Beth-zur stronghold (2 Macc 13:21), and rather obscure Bacenor (2 Macc 12:35) and Esdris (2 Macc 12:36). The first two enjoyed an elevated rank as is indicated by their title of ἄρχοντες τῆς δυνάμεως (1 Macc 5:56).

[101] One such specialized branch must have been Judah's intelligence service which kept him informed about enemy movements and warned him of any traps in his way: 1 Macc 5:38; cf. 1 Macc 4:3; 7:30.

[102] 1 Macc 4:60–61; 6:62. Little is known about the appearance of fortifications erected by rebels. Archaeological excavations at Beth-zur had not produced sufficiently certain data to match uncovered remains in their various phases with known historical events.

[103] Mentions refer to great difficulties in procuring weapons at an early stage in the conflict: 1 Macc 3:58; 4:6. Their random armament gave the rebels a serious disadvantage *vis-ŕ-vis* regular Syrian troops, cf. 1 Macc 4:6–7.

on the battlefield (2 Macc 8:27, 31). Weapons were also obtained from depots where they were kept (cf. 2 Macc 12:27–28). The employment of this method required good preparation and swift action, but a single raid could brings rewards not only in a sizeable cache of individual soldiers' weapons but perhaps also some heavy military equipment such as that used in siege warfare.[104] Matching the Syrians for armament quality was no small matter as it helped bridge the gap, if only partly, between the two combatants. Probably, too, quality weapons offered much longer service life than could be expected of home-made contraptions.

An assessment of the insurrectionists' morale across several years of their operations may not be free of risk of oversimplification, chiefly because the only available basis on which to form it are accounts of soldiers' behavior in the course of various battles and campaigns. Any attempt at such evaluation must again consider the character of extant sources. Their authors paint a picture of Judah as a charismatic leader whose personal courage and bravery, and especially his deep faith that even in their darkest hours in the struggle for a just cause the rebels had Yahweh on their side, helped soldiers overcome their fear of the superior enemy force and proceed to take effective action (cf. 1 Macc 3:16–22; 4:8–11. 30–33; 7:40–42; 9:8–10; 2 Macc 11:7; 12:36–37; 13:10–12. 14; 15:8–17). Yet it is only natural to suppose that maintaining discipline in the rebel army could not always have been easy. Sources mention only a few instances of insubordination, but in fact there may have been many more. Each such description comes with a scathing moral judgment denouncing offenders for the harmful consequences of their trespasses either for the entire movement or for their comrades in arms (cf. 1 Macc 5:62. 67; 2 Macc 12:42–45). In the cases quoted, such harmful consequences of insubordination by both rank-and-file soldiers and commanding officers arose out of disobeying orders and instructions from Judah himself (cf. 1 Macc 5:18–19. 56–61. 67; 2 Macc 12:39–40). Success in battle did not always build morale among the men as it created opportunities for common plunder. Some, to satisfy their greed, even resorted to treason (2 Macc 10:20). In confrontation with a superior enemy force, Judah's army showed bravery, to be sure, but along with it came instances of collusion with the enemy (2 Macc 13:21) as well as mass desertions (1 Macc 7:19; 9:6; 2 Macc 8:13). While such negative occurrences must not be exaggerated, they should be acknowledged to have affected even as religiously inspired an army as Judah's. One more consideration is worth noting. Over the years of struggle, a large share of Judea's population passed through the rebel camp. In the process, they received more or less systematic military training and won combat experience. This had an enormous impact on the course of further struggles for Judea's freedom.

As has been mentioned on several occasions previously, the rebellion generated not only military but also administrative and political structures without which – at the movement's greatest extent – everyday existence would have been impossible for the soldiers as well as for the multitude of civilian participants in those events. The civilians included not only soldiers' families but also local communities which sympathized with the rebels and supported them in a variety of ways. But any attempt to

[104] Cf. 2 Macc 12:27. Sources make it clear that Jewish rebels could make use in combat of captured heavy equipment or similar constructions of their own making: 1 Macc 6:20; Jos. *AJ* 12, 363; Shatzman 1989: 461–462.

reconstruct structures of civilian administration of the uprising run into the same, if not greater, difficulty as the effort to interpret its military organization. Any relevant mentions, scattered across sources, suggest only that such structures did exist. We have no clue as to whether Judah-controlled territories of Judea had any functioning rebel administration, nor can we guess much about any administrative competences of military officials. Similarly, we can only suspect some form of widespread, voluntary material contributions to the rebellion from its sympathizers, a support that could give it the key boost it needed, especially at an early stage. As to mandatory services, they were imposed on opponents. Such services were necessary to sustain the rebel force until its financial standing could improve following its victories and consequent spoils. This aspect of rebel operations is often mentioned in sources, which treat it as a perfectly normal practice,[105] although some Jewish religious groups denounced the rebels' plunder as betrayal of the noble ideals the insurrection was meant to stand for.[106] Some of the spoils so obtained must have fallen to Judah himself and to his men, the rest being used to cover all sorts of military expenditure such as recruitment, training, and fortification, while a share was spent on the needs of the civilian population, as is indicated by references to Judah devoting resources to support poor compatriots (2 Macc 8:28. 30). When Judah regained control over the Jerusalem temple, it, too, and its priests could be recipients of Judah's financial support. Dividing spoils and allocating means was a large task that would have been too taxing to be done by Judah personally. It is therefore plausible to assume that it was attended to by some more or less permanent bodies charged with managing captured resources and their efficient distribution.

At its full swing, the insurrection probably included some other organs whose nature, composition, and function largely remain a conjecture based on the names used to refer to them. We cannot even be sure that they really existed or are merely the product of literary imagination. The problem arises out of differences between the authors of extant sources in their perception and interpretation of events, ranking of their importance, and notions used. This being so, only 1 Macc contains reasonably credible information to be used in an approximate reconstruction of the insurrection's civilian structures. Those mentioned include: *Israel assembly* (4:59: ἡ ἐκκλησία Ισραηλ), *great assembly* (5:16: ἐκκλησία μηγάλη), and the *elders of the people* (7:33: ἀπὸ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων τοῦ λαυοῦ), to whom probably there is also a mention in 2 Macc (13:13: καθ' ἑαυτὸν δὲ σὺν τοῖς πρεσβυτέροις γενόμενος). A community of especial importance was *the people* (ὁ λάος). The Greek term used with this reference, however, only applies to combatant

[105] 1 Macc 3:12 (cf. 4:17–18); 4:23; 5:3. 22. 28. 35. 51. 68; 6:6; 7:47; 2 Macc 8:25. 27. 30–31. The differences between the two sources in the number of references to spoils of war suggest that the author of 1 Macc saw booty-taking as a measure of Judah's military might and success. Much more reserved in describing the practice, the writer of 2 Macc probably preferred instead to emphasize the religious motivation behind rebel action. He, too, however, mentions benefits to the rebels and their supporting populations from property seized in warfare, cf. 2 Macc 8:28. 30.

[106] There can be no doubt that it met with stern disapproval from the Qumran community, cf. 1QpHab, viii, 8–13; van der Woude 1982: 353–354. See also below p. 000

insurrectionists.[107] As distinct from them, the general population is described by other terms.[108]

The contexts in which the *Israel assembly* and the *great assembly* appear imply that both names may refer to a single body. Consisting presumably of all inhabitants, it was the highest decision-making body. It could pass resolutions concerning religious questions (cf. 1 Macc 4:59) as well as military issues (cf. 1 Macc 5:16). The *elders of the people* and the *elders* are probably the same assembly. It was composed of a group of men distinguished for their prestige and social rank. Based on available evidence, we may suppose that it was a body Judah consulted before making important decisions (2 Macc 13:13). Its members were authorized to appear in public as representatives of the insurrection's leadership (1 Macc 7:33).

A reconstruction of the insurrection's leadership structure and governing bodies can hardly ignore the position of Judah and his brothers. His image presented in 2 Macc is that of a charismatic religious leader of his people and a commander almost independent (cf. 2 Macc 13:13) in any important decisions made by others. A different portrait emerges from 1 Macc. Although its author clearly acknowledges Judah's leadership, on many occasions he also stresses the important roles played by his brothers at his side (1 Macc 3:1–2). He shows them together in battle and jointly working in what was a collegial body serving at once as general staff and political committee of the rebel movement (cf. 1 Macc 3:1–2. 25; 3:42–43; 4:36. 59; 5:65; 8:20). It was not before discussing a matter with his brothers that Judah either made suitable decisions, took action, or submitted recommendations to other collective bodies (1 Macc 4:36. 59). Together they received honors (1 Macc 5:63) and were the joint addressee of letters to the rebel leader (1 Macc 5:10; 7:10. 27). Even their enemies saw them as a collective cause of their own failures (1 Macc 7:6). Considering the 1 Macc author's political disposition to create a vision of the Hasmoneans as a providential family in the history of Judea, his emphasis on the contribution of the Maccabee brothers at Judah's side may be thought as

[107] See 1 Macc 4:17. 55. 58. 61; 5:2. 4. 16. 18. 19. 42. 52. 61; 6:19. 24. 44; 7:6. 18. 19. 21. 26. 33. 37. 48. 64; cf. VanderKam 2004: 274 ff. The people of the insurrection would have been a hierarchical community if we are told about *elders of the people* (1 Macc 7:33: ἀπὸ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων τοῦ λαυοῦ) and *scribes of the people* (1 Macc 5:42: γραμματεῖς τοῦ λαοῦ; for an interpretation of this term, cf. Schams 1998: 114 ff., 120–121). Differences in status between soldiers and civilians are best rendered in a passage describing the latter as joining in fighting: 1 Macc 7:46. Decisions of *the people* were of much consequence for the life of the community at large, including its religious aspects (1 Macc 7:48–49). We may therefore suppose that after the Jerusalem temple had been regained and original worship restored, *the people* could conceivably have invested Judah as high priest, cf. above note 87. For the role of *the people* in appointing Simon high priest to replace the deceased Jonathan in 143, see below.

[108] In the quoted letters from Lysias (2 Macc 11:7) and the Romans (1 Macc 8:20), they are referred to as τὸ πλῆθος τῶν Ιουδαίων. Use of this term in official correspondence carries political overtones. (In the political practice of the Greek world from the 5th century BCE, this description was used to denote not only an unorganized multitude of inhabitants, but also a civic majority enjoying the right to make decisions (*quorum*), cf. Ruzé 1984: 252–263.) According to scholars, in both cases the term applies to rebels gathered around Judah Maccabee: Habicht 1976: 10 (= Habicht 2006: 115); Roberto 2003: 797–798 and 797 n. 4. In Roman documents, inhabitants of Judea are also called τὸ ἔθνος τῶν Ιουδαίων (1 Macc 8:23. 25. 27) or ὁ δῆμος τῶν Ιουδαίων (1 Macc 8:29). Use of terms with such denotations seems to suggest that the Romans may have treated the rebels and their supporting Judean inhabitants as a legal entity which might be considered party to a treaty: Piattelli 1971: 249 ff. For this reason, Judah, who held no formal position or authority, was ignored as recipient of official correspondence; cf. Giovannini/Müller 1971: 168 ff.

lending legitimacy to their claim to leadership following his death. Without prejudice to such an intention, it must still be noted that mentions of the brothers' joint involvement are also to be found in 2 Macc. Its author, even considering the book's present form, certainly demonstrates a desire to glorify the Hasmoneans. At the beginning of his introduction the epitomist of the work of Jason of Cyrene states clearly that the original version of the work contained the story of Judah Maccabee and his brothers (2 Macc 2:19). That the information is true is confirmed by the description of a battle during the first Syrian military campaign against the rebels. It relates that in an engagement with the Syrian general Nicanor, the rebel force was divided into four equal formations commanded by Judah and his brothers Simon, Joseph, and Jonathan (2 Macc 8:22). The fifth brother, Eleazar, was awarded the honor of reading out a selected passage from the Torah before the fight and giving the troops the watchword for the battle (2 Macc 8:23). Other than these, two other mentions confirm that Judah's brothers held leadership positions (2 Macc 10:19–20; 14:17). Thus there is no reason to reject as implausible the tradition about joint leadership preserved in 1 Macc, even if we are unable to specify the real nature of the relations among Mattathias' sons.

It will be only too obvious to say that the insurrection movement under Judah, although born out of religious fervor and fighting under religious banners, was inevitably a social movement with a measure of political impact. A restrained assessment of its political dimension is by no means to disparage or belittle his role in history; rather it reflects a possibility to view the movement from the different perspectives of each side of the conflict. According to the authors of 1 Macc and 2 Macc, the Judean rebellion started by Mattathias and successfully continued by Judah Maccabee was an event that shook the Seleucid state, and the failed attempts to pacify it launched by a succession of generals and state officials almost resulted in a complete destruction of its military might. With many successes to his name, Judah became an unquestioned lord of Jerusalem and Judea, capable of launching long-range raids to areas under Syrian rule and easily routing the troops stationed there – all with impunity. Thus outlined, the picture of events can in no way be considered fully credible. For Syrian rulers, developments in Judea seemed neither as weighty nor as disastrous in their consequences as these sources would have us believe. Antiochus IV dismissed the unrest in Judea as a local problem of which there had been many in the history of the Seleucid Empire, something that did not require his immediate attention and presence.[109]

This is why the outbreak of the rebellion did not make him change his plans for an expedition to the East. Antiochus V's aides did see the rebel activity as an obstacle in strengthening his rule, but the Syrian military superiority in the Judean expedition combined with the insurgents' short supplies enabled both sides to find a satisfactory

[109] Local rebellions and usurpations happened quite frequently in the Seleucid Empire. Widespread though some of them might have been, the Syrian kings did not proceed to quell them until years after such outbreaks. Such conflicts did not prevent them from pursuing their own political and military priorities elsewhere. At least a few examples for this are seen during the reign of Antiochus III alone. Similarly, Demetrius I, just after ascending to the throne, had to face not only the Judean rebellion, but also an attempt to seize power by Timarchus, the satrap of Babylonia, who desired to rule Media in addition to his own satrapy: Diodorus 31.27a; App. *Syr.* 45. 47; Iust. *Prol.* 34.13; Volkmann 1925: 392 ff.; Ziegler 1968: 1237–1238, no. 5; Piattelli 1971: 242–243; Gruen 1976: 85; Houghton 1979: 213 ff., 216–217; Habicht 1989: 356–357 (= Habicht 2006: 208–209); Grainger 1997: 68; Roberto 2003: 811–812 and n. 27.

truce quickly. In his turn, Demetrius I did not at all desire or intend to seek peace with Judah and chose instead to support the Hellenist party as being politically more after his heart. A tell-tale indication of this Syrian ruler's attitudes toward Judah himself was the fact that he was routinely ignored in all official contacts with the Jewish side. As its legitimate representatives they considered either Jerusalem temple priests they had appointed, or the Jewish elders, or even the Jewish populace – but never Judah. He was carefully sidelined in any official contacts between Syrian rulers and Jewish subjects, an indication that Judah was not considered a partner important enough to be approached directly. That policy was no doubt designed to undermine, with ostentation, his authority even in the eyes of his followers. Such a blatant display by Syrian rulers of disregard of the revolt and its leader could have stemmed from the limited breadth of the insurrection's scope. Given the religious nature of the movement, Judah, obedient to the biblical tradition, did not go looking for outside help and support. Even if he tried in his military operations outside Judea to secure the favor of some Arab tribes, any resulting declarations of friendship applied mainly to the concrete local context.[110] Judah's decision to seek support in Rome could conceivably be of great impact. In case his plan succeeded, the friendship and support of Rome, an unfriendly power *vis-ŕ-vis* the Seleucids, might have become a weighty factor in persuading the Syrian rulers to modify their stance toward Judah. However, the initiative came too late to have real impact on the course of events. Nor can we be too sure if Judah indeed believed Rome to be ready to engage actively in defending the rebellion.

Summing up Judah's attainments, of particular importance were those that survived him. In the course of several years of his insurrectionist operations, a sizeable share of the population received military training. Skills learned then offered a promise for a more suitable time when they could be put to a use again. Likewise, a group of experienced commanders had been created who, basking in the glory of their successes at Judah's side, had won prestige and material gains. Their loss of status following their leader's death and the humiliation of defeat must have aroused in them a desire for revenge in continued struggle. As for the Hasmoneans themselves, it must have been an important reflection drawn from their experiences that religious aims, although they mattered, in the long run proved insufficient to assure the uprising's success. Therefore Judah's attempt to establish relations with Rome cannot be thought to have been entirely futile. It could have served as a signpost for his brothers to follow in their future dealings with the Seleucids.

[110] During the rebellion, the Jews' only reasonably friendly neighbors were the Nabateans (1 Macc 5:25; cf. 9:35). Others only declared friendship on Judah's demonstrations of power (cf. 2 Macc 12:10–12).

2. Jonathan and Simon: a Strategy for Independence

The death of Judah Maccabee at Elasa (161) put a definite end to that stage of the Judean revolt which strove predominantly to restore religious rights and defend coreligionists. The nature of the struggle initiated by the Hasmoneans won them popularity and broad support. It still proved insufficient in the face of a military defeat that left the vanquished and rebel sympathizers facing a difficult trial of their faithfulness to its ideals and faith in a continued struggle. Bacchides' victory meant an increased influence over Judean affairs of the Hellenists, Judah's ideological and political adversaries (cf. 1 Macc 9:25; Jos. *AJ* 13.2). Now in control of the situation, supported by Bacchides, they proceeded to crack down on the defeated opponents (1 Macc 9:26; Jos. *AJ* 13.4–5). The repressive measures they took were a form of revenge for the wrongs they had suffered and for their lost property, and were meant to remove as many of Judah's associates as possible. A thorough political purge well served the interests of the group now in control over Judea, as it did the Syrian rulers. Elimination of rebel leadership could prevent possible future recurrence of insurgency. As an unexpected windfall, famine that struck Judea at the time helped the Hellenists strengthen their position. Supplied by Syrian authorities, the Hellenists were able to provide grain to all those who sided with them, which, hardly surprisingly, increased their popularity.[1]

Despite their improved position in Judea and the wide-ranging repressions they used, the Hellenists did not succeed in attaining their objectives. Persecution of Judah's sympathizers and associates, although it involved many victims and forced many into hiding from the victorious adversaries (cf. 1 Macc 9:26–27), failed to produce desired outcomes: it neither eliminated them completely, nor did it compel them to renounce the Hasmoneans. It could be said that it produced exactly the opposite effect, for it caused a fairly rapid consolidation of those who survived (1 Macc 9:28). The consolidation was importantly expressed in their choice of Jonathan, Judah's brother, as their political and military leader (1 Macc 9:30: τοῦ εἶναι ... ἡμῖν εἰς ἄρχοντα καὶ ἡγούμενον τοῦ πολεμῆσαι; Jos. *AJ* 13.5–6). Our dating of the event can only be indirect and approximate. It happened probably during the year 160, at least several months before the death of Alcimus in spring (May) 159 (1 Macc 9:54). None of Judah's brothers was a victim of the repressions. The most trying period of the persecution they probably survived, owing to still strong sympathies for the Hasmoneans among the people. Such sympathies must also have been a favorable factor in the building of a political group around the remaining members of the family. To emphasize the distinction between the rebellion led by Judah and the activity of his brothers (Jonathan and Simon), the group they headed will subsequently be referred to as the Hasmonean party. In its activities, religious purposes and motivations clearly gave way to political aims.

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[1] 1 Macc 9:24; Jos. *AJ* 13.3. For more on the famine and its related political and economic issues, see Pastor 1997: 55–62.

News of the Hasmonean party being revived triggered an immediate and determined response from Bacchides. He must have been fully aware of the event's possible social repercussions and its impact on the situation in Judea.[2] When his attempted underhanded elimination of Jonathan failed (1 Macc 9:32–33; Jos. *AJ* 13.7), he decided to wage open warfare against the Hasmoneans and personally stood at the head of his troops. The outcome of his expedition fully bore out his fears (1 Macc 9:43–49; Jos. *AJ* 13.14). Although Hasmonean forces were numerically far inferior to his own, Bacchides was defeated and suffered grievous losses.[3] Drawing from experiences of his predecessors, Bacchides gave up further struggle. Instead, he proceeded to develop Syrian fortresses and cities in strategic locations to provide his troops with bases from which to launch their attacks.[4] All such strongholds were garrisoned and stocked with provisions to allow for defense in case of prolonged siege or for combat capability even if the enemy should cut off supply routes (cf. 1 Macc 9:52). The tactics adopted by Bacchides to combat the Hasmoneans provided for incessant attacks on Judea's territory to prevent at all costs a strengthening of their presence there (1 Macc 9:51). Apart from military actions, an additional safeguard for peace in Judea would to be hostages supplied by families commonly known for their sympathies for the Hasmoneans (1 Macc 9:53; Jos. *AJ* 13.17).

Such energetic steps taken by Bacchides were disturbed in spring 159 by the sudden death of Alcimus (1 Macc 9:54–56; cf. Jos. *AJ* 12.413). The loss of the Hellenists' political and religious leader soon prompted Bacchides to decide to leave Judea (1 Macc 9:57). His decision seems somewhat hasty and not altogether understandable. While among Bacchides' tasks entrusted to him by Demetrius I was support for Alcimus and his followers, he was at the same time a royal official administering Judea, a role that involved multiple responsibilities. The death of the high priest, therefore, should not have greatly affected his behavior; if anything, it posed more challenges for him to meet than ever before. Considering his past activity, at a moment like that he might have been expected to display particular care for the maintenance of law and order of the territory entrusted to his care and to wait patiently for the king to name a new high priest. The only rational explanation for his behavior might be a desire to avoid both entanglement in a new conflict in Judea between the Hellenists and supporters of the Hasmoneans, and a need to conduct regular warfare against the latter.[5] Departing from Judea, Bacchides left behind Syrian garrisons which continued effectively to enforce law and order in the land (cf. 1 Macc 9:57; Jos. *AJ* 13.22).

For Jonathan and the Hasmonean party, both those events proved a very lucky coincidence. The death of Alcimus had a paralyzing effect on the Hellenists, distinctly

[2] Bacchides' fears became manifest in his military action against the Hasmoneans (Jos. *AJ* 13.7) early, when in their weakness they still had to hide in the Tekoa desert (1 Macc 9:33; Jos. *AJ* 13.8).

[3] According to 1 Macc 9:49, the clash cost the lives of about 1,000 of his soldiers, while Josephus (*AJ* 13.14) reports Bacchides' losses at 2,000.

[4] Cf. 1 Macc 9:50–52; Jos. *AJ* 13.15–17; Sievers 1990: 75; Shatzman 1991: 42–43. In the opinion of Pastor (1997: 60–61) such fortresses, apart from purely military functions, with their stores of provisions could also serve as food distribution centers for local populations during famine or crop failure, thus helping win their sympathies for the Syrian administration.

[5] For more on the situation of the Jerusalem temple after Alcimus' death, see Burgmann 1980: 141 ff.; Sievers 1990: 76 ff.

undermining their importance. They still maintained their positions in Jerusalem and wherever else their safety was guaranteed by Syrian garrisons. Whatever his motives in leaving Judea, Bacchides' absence there carried the important implication that none of his garrison commanders left behind tried single-handedly to launch large-scale military action against the Hasmoneans. In spite of such favorable circumstances, the Hasmoneans took much longer to rebuild their positions than could be expected. Their field of operation was restricted to rural areas whose inhabitants, even if sympathetic to their cause, were unable to provide a base strong enough for them to attempt open warfare against the Hellenists, who dominated in the cities. But even with such constraints, the Hasmoneans' freedom of movement was something the Hellenists could not easily stomach. Therefore, in 157, after two years of Bacchides' absence, they made vigorous efforts to bring him back to Judea to rid them of Jonathan once and for all (1 Macc 9:58–59; Jos. *AJ* 13.23). The operation against the Hasmoneans was designed as a joint surprise attack by Syrian forces and Hellenists. The Hellenists' arguments persuaded Bacchides to travel to Judea, but the plan for attack from concealment against the Hasmoneans did not succeed (1 Macc 9:60; Jos. *AJ* 13.25). Still, Bacchides decided to continue the campaign once started. Faced with an overwhelming force he brought with him, the Hasmoneans again had to retreat to remote areas. They chose Bethbasi as their main center of resistance.[6] The fortified place gave them a chance to stand up to the Syrian force (1 Macc 9:63; Jos. *AJ* 13.27), while Jonathan's guerrilla warfare at Bacchides' rear effectively undermined his men's morale. The losses he suffered finally persuaded Bacchides to retreat (1 Macc 9:65–69; Jos. *AJ* 13.28–31). Before he left Judea he punished severely those Hellenist leaders who had instigated action against the Hasmoneans.[7]

This act carried far-reaching consequences for the Hellenists, for it upset their position as a privileged partner of the Syrian authorities. Not only had those among them who had the greatest influence at the royal court been eliminated from the political game, but the fiasco of Bacchides' expedition permanently stripped the Hellenists of Syrian confidence. From that point on, their importance in Judea's political scene declined. By contrast, the Hasmoneans saw new possibilities opening before them when Bacchides decided to withdraw from Judea, for there ensued a truce between him and Jonathan.[8] The clauses of the truce suggest that it was favorable for Jonathan. Bacchides pledged not to take any offensive action against Hasmoneans in the future and released all Jewish prisoners of war captured during his expedition.[9] What may give us a pause is the silence in the sources as to Jonathan's commitments. Considering the circumstances in which the truce was made, it seems unlikely that just one party would have been forced to seek

[6] 1 Macc 9:62; cf. Jos. *AJ* 13.26; Abel 1967, II: 269.

[7] 1 Macc 9:69; Jos. *AJ* 13.31. It was not the only punitive measure against the Hellenists during that expedition. An earlier one (1 Macc 9:61; Jos. *AJ* 13.25) took place soon after Bacchides arrived in Judea, when it transpired that plans for a clandestine attack on the Hasmoneans had failed. Sources paint different pictures of the event. According to 1 Macc, a group of about 50 Hellenists was killed by Jonathan, while Josephus reports they were murdered by order of Bacchides. For more on causes of the difficulty in interpreting such differences, cf. Sievers 1990: 77–78 n. 18.

[8] 1 Macc 9:70; Jos. *AJ* 13.32; Synkellos, p. 416. On the importance of the event, see Roberto 2003: 817–818 n. 41, 824.

[9] 1 Macc 9:71–72; Jos. *AJ* 13.32–33. For Josephus' information on the truce, cf. Feldman 1994: 59.

compromise.[10] Perhaps some of its clauses were for various reasons inconvenient for the dynastic tradition of the Hasmoneans and were obligingly passed over in silence by the authors of our sources. The complete lack of information about Jonathan's pledges forces us to speculate as best we can. It seems that Jonathan might have agreed to pay taxes due to the king[11] and to refrain from open attacks on Syrian troops and strongholds, including Jerusalem and the Acra. Such a hypothesis seems substantiated by a lack of information about any Hasmonean actions against Syrians stationed in Judea in the period 157–152.[12] By contrast, it does not seem that Bacchides tried to obtain from Jonathan any special security guarantees for the Hellenists. A formal recognition by Bacchides of Jonathan as a political partner assured the Hasmoneans not only free rein in the Judean territories they controlled, but also a possibility to crack down on their opponents.

Jonathan made his headquarters at place called Michmash near Jerusalem (1 Macc 9:73; Jos. *AJ* 13.34). Choosing such a location was indispensable for proper execution of his duties as a ruler,[13] but unfortunately, we do not know if he personally exercised that power in all its aspects, or instead used administrative organs he eventually created. The absence of information on his style of government is all the more acute as it applies to his entire reign. It may have been, for various reasons, a conscious policy by the author of 1 Macc.[14] We can't rule out that in Jonathan's activities he found no special or heroic acts that would merit description. Based on data for later in Jonathan's reign, we may assume that at earlier stages he focused on building firm foundations for his position. Such foundations must have included armed forces and a system of defenses to assure the security of the area under his rule and control over it, and also territorial and fiscal administrative structures providing an inflow of necessary finances. It seems justified to believe that in building his military structures he drew not just from his own experience gained with Judah, but he invited veterans of those struggles to cooperate. He must have realized that engagements with Bacchides in 159 and 157 were too short to provide sufficient military practice for an all-new generation of commanders. As to Jonathan's civilian administration, as has been said, we are confined to speculation.

[10] Roberto (2003: 819–822) interprets the truce as an effect of the parties using the *berit* principle accepted in international relations in the ancient Near East. Yet at that time it was no longer in operation and so it does not seem that in that particular situation it would have been a plausible explanation. The argument that it was the basis of the agreement made in 215 between Hannibal and Philip V of Macedon carries no conviction whatever, especially when both events are compared. It should be borne in mind that Bacchides only held the authority of a governor and his decisions applied to events whose scope was local.

[11] There is no evidence to suppose that the agreement with Bacchides exempted Jonathan from their payment. Exemptions from taxes and customs duties were the prerogative of the king himself, not his officials (cf. 1 Macc 11:28–29). What is more, such a privilege was not perpetual and needed confirmation by successive kings (cf. 1 Macc 10:29–35; 11:34–36; 13:34. 37. 39; 15:5. 30–31). In practice, the truce with Bacchides could actually mean for Judea's population a rise in obligatory payments, for apart from sums levied by the king, they probably had to supply revenues for Jonathan's upkeep.

[12] Important findings about relations between inhabitants of Acra and Jerusalem and the nature of relations between Acra and the Hasmoneans were presented by J. Sievers (1994: 195–209, esp. 203 ff.). To confirm Jonathan's conscientious observance of the truce, there are words by Demetrius I in his letter to inhabitants of Judea: 1 Macc 10:26.

[13] 1 Macc 9:73: καὶ ἤρξατο Ιωναθαν κρίνειν τὸν λαὸν; cf. Rooke 2000: 284–285; Egger-Wentzel 2006: 145.

[14] Cf. Sievers 1990: 92–93.

In the ancient world, one outward sign of a ruler's power was a large peacetime army. The army was an instrument with which to exercise power and a guarantee of the state's external and internal security. The size of the force usually depended on the resources available to respective rulers. Since Jonathan became the recognized leader of at least a part of Judea, it became necessary for him to command a regular armed force not only for the prestige but also for practical purposes. Without such a force, it would have been difficult to do any policing. Having trained, well equipped, and loyal soldiers was also a safeguard of Jonathan's personal security. Several previous attempts by opponents of the Hasmoneans on the life of Judah Maccabee and his brothers (including Jonathan) necessitated keeping a personal military guard. Since such a unit certainly required large financial outlay to maintain, it is only natural to inquire about the source of the funding.

No details are known of Jonathan's personal property early in his reign, although he probably controlled at least some part of the booty accumulated by the Hasmoneans in the course of Judah's campaign. Yet they seem unlikely to have been the only source of his funding. Apart from personal fortune, Jonathan must have had other ways of obtaining needed funds. They could have come from the taxes he levied, but because of his obligation to pay a fixed sum to the Syrian king's treasury, any additional tax burden imposed on Judea's population had to be limited lest it cause eruption of social unrest. One more option existed that allowed him to obtain large gains in the short and long run. We know from 1 Macc that after taking office, Jonathan launched military actions against Hellenists which involved regular troops. Eventually, he managed to "destroy the wicked" (1 Macc 9:73: καὶ ἠφάνισεν τοὺς ἀσεβεῖς ἐξ Ισραηλ.). That destruction is not to be taken too literally, for the same source, in describing later events, makes several mentions of their presence within the walls of some Syrian fortresses (cf. 1 Macc 10:14; Jos. *AJ* 13.42), and even speaks of repeated political actions they took against Jonathan (cf. 1 Macc 10:61–63; 11:21. 25; Jos. *AJ* 13.121–122. 133). Now it should be remembered that, according to custom, repressions against opponents involved confiscation of their landed property. It usually then became the property of the king and it seems that estates so obtained may have provided Jonathan with a steady income needed to finance all his endeavors, becoming one of the sources of Hasmonean wealth.[15]

Jonathan strengthened his position during the years he spent at Michmash, as is indicated by events of 152 and later in Syria. Their origin goes back to 159, when a self-proclaimed son of Antiochus IV Epiphanes, the underage Alexander Balas, supported by king Attalus II of Pergamon and Ariarathes, the ruler of Cappadocia, attempted to claim the throne of the Seleucids.[16]

At first, with its marginal support, the usurpation posed no great threat to the then king Demetrius I. Things changed dramatically in 152, when Alexander Balas captured

[15] Cf. Pastor 1997: 62 ff. Although all sources of Jonathan's income are not known to us, we can be sure that he had ample financial means available to him: 1 Macc 10:21; Jos. *AJ* 13.46.

[16] 1 Macc 10:1–2; Diodorus 31.32a; Jos. *AJ* 13.35; Just. 35.1.6–9; Synkellos, p. 416; Wilcken 1893a: 1437–1438, no. 22;Volkmann 1925: 403-12; Grainger 1997: 6–7; cf. Gruen 1976: 91 ff. Only both Jewish sources (and Synkellos, who drew from them) present him as a legitimate son of Antiochus IV. This favorable image of Alexander Balas stemmed from his attitude toward Jonathan. By contrast, Greek and Latin sources show him in a highly unfavorable light, both for his personality and his style of government: Volkmann 1925: 411–412.

Ptolemais in a surprise attack. Embroiled in struggles for Cyprus, Demetrius I feared that his precarious position might make Jonathan side with his rival. Wishing to secure Jonathan's loyalty, the king declared willingness to change the nature of their mutual relations and promised to release Jewish hostages kept at Acra from 159 (1 Macc 10:3–6. 9 (cf. 10:15); Jos. *AJ* 13.37–38). The basis for mutual relations between Demetrius I and Jonathan was now to be an alliance (συμμαχία)[17] under which the Judean received permission to organize and arm Jewish forces to support the cause of the Syrian ruler.[18] As he accepted the Syrian proposal, Jonathan was being handed an opportunity to enter Jerusalem to collect the hostages. Once they were free, Jonathan refused to leave the city and chose it for his new capital. One of his first decisions was to begin a large-scale fortification program around Jerusalem to protect the city from external threats (1 Macc 10:10–11; Jos. *AJ* 13.41), for since its walls were demolished by Antiochus V, it had been an open city. The new walls, like those erected by Judah Maccabee, were to defend the inhabitants from a sudden attack by the Acra garrison in case the political situation suffered any reverse (cf. Jos. *AJ* 13.181–183). This implies that Jonathan was distrustful of Demetrius I and wanted to hold out in Jerusalem at all cost.[19] Contracting an alliance with the Judean leader gave Demetrius I a breathing space: he could withdraw some of his forces from Judea's strongholds and instead use them to combat Alexander Balas.[20] Still, undiminished garrisons remained at Acra and Beth-zur, offering safe haven to Hellenists (1 Macc 10:14; Jos. *AJ* 13.42).

Any hopes that Demetrius I entertained to obtain help from the Hasmonean against his rival at the price of small concessions were frustrated, as the concessions produced effects contrary to expectations. For one thing, they helped improve Jonathan's position, allowing him to become an important figure in the dynastic struggles between pretenders to the Seleucid throne. This is confirmed by steps taken by Alexander Balas, who, on hearing of Jonathan's successes, attempted to win him over as an ally. For this end, he showed skill in recalling the dramatic struggles fought by the Hasmoneans against Demetrius I early in his reign,[21] and offered to Jonathan great honors to confirm his position: the title of a friend of the king and an official court dress appropriate for this status, on top of the position of high priest of the Jerusalem temple.[22]

Jonathan soon became high priest, a visible sign of the political choice he had made. From that point on, he could appear as an official representative of the population of Ju-

[17] 1 Macc 10:6. According to Josephus (*AJ* 13.37) their agreement resulted in συμμαχία και ευνοια. Entry into an alliance gave the Syrian king's partner a number of important political and legal benefits, although the status of an ally in no way diminished the Syrian dominion: Bikerman 1938: 141 ff., 145 ff.

[18] Military aid to the king was inseparably bound with συμμαχία: Bikerman 1938: 144.

[19] No chronological data are available to us to determine either when Jonathan arrived in Jerusalem or when he started the fortification program. The go-ahead was most likely given on hearing news from Syria. As long as Demetrius I's position did not portend his defeat, Jonathan had to act cautiously.

[20] 1 Macc 10:12–13; Jos. *AJ* 13.42. Little faith can be placed in Josephus' information about the flight in panic of Syrian troops after Jonathan seized Jerusalem. Even after Demetrius I's fall, many strongholds built during his reign still remained in Syrian hands: 1 Macc 11:41; 12:45.

[21] 1 Macc 10:15–16; cf. 10:46; Jos. *AJ* 13.43. In the situation that arose in Syria, recalling the wrongs he had suffered from Demetrius I could provide Jonathan with convenient propaganda excuse for backing out of an alliance newly contracted with him.

[22] 1 Macc 10:20; Jos. AJ 13.45; Savalli-Lestrade 1998: 77–78, no. 77. Cf. Rooke 2000: 284–294.

dea.[23] In response to Jonathan's decision, Demetrius I hastened with proposals for new far-reaching concessions and privileges in return for Jonathan remaining one of his allies. The proposals included a wide range of tax reductions, territorial cessions, a privileged status for Jerusalem and the Temple, evacuation of the Acra, bolstering of the status of the high priest, confirmation of freedom of religious practice, release of all prisoners of war, option of service in the king's army for Judeans, and a promise to cover the costs of fortification works around Jerusalem (1 Macc 10:25–45; Jos. *AJ* 13.48–57).[24] In the Jewish camp, this unexpected favor and generosity from the Syrian king for Judea stirred

[23] 1 Macc 10:21; Jos. *AJ* 13.46; cf. Jos. *AJ* 20.238; Rooke 2000: 285 ff. J. Sievers (1981: 309; 1990: 84 ff.) points out that the tradition concerning the circumstances of Jonathan's appointment is extremely laconic and contains certain inconsistencies. Also, the way in which he took office significantly departed from accepted practice. Still, there is little conviction in the arguments of those scholars who suggest that it may have been caused by the fact that Jonathan was displacing another holder of the title who was identified as the Teacher of Righteousness known from Qumran texts. J.G. Bunge (1975: 28–43, 45–46), by manipulating the text of 1 Macc, even tried to show that the date given by that source when Jonathan took office was deliberately falsified in connection with that event: Sievers 1990: 84 n. 42; VanderKam 2004: 247–248, 256–259. Josephus notably thought that Jonathan's elevation to the high priesthood significantly bolstered his status: Feldman 1994: 61–62. According to the newest findings, the criticism of the Hasmoneans contained in the Dead Sea Scrolls is not directly related to Jonathan's rising to the high priesthood or to the foundation of the Qumran community. The main cause of the discord between its members and the Temple with all it stood for was of a theological nature, beginning with what they saw as the questionable purity of the cult celebrated within its walls and consequently by its priesthood, all the way to use of a different calendar. For more on these issues, see Olyan 1987: 276 ff.; García Martínez 1988: 000 (= García Martínez 2007d: 17–24, 27–28); Collins 1995: 53, 84; Eshel 1996: 59 ff.; Schwartz 1996: 75 ff.; Schiffman 1996: 75 ff.; Kugler 1999: 93 ff., 112 ff.; Talmon 1999: 385–395; Abegg 2001: 145 ff.; Collins 2001: 25 ff., 40 ff.; Maier 2001: 91 ff.; Schuller 2001: 125 ff.; Collins 2006a: 213 ff.; García Martínez 2007c: 77 ff.; García Martínez 2007e: 67 ff.

[24] According to 1 Macc (10:25), Demetrius I's letter was intended for the population of Judea (τῷ ἔθνει τῶν Ιουδαίων), but Josephus writes (*AJ* 13.48) that the addressees were both Jonathan and the population at large ('Ιωνάθῃ καὶ τῷ ἔθνει τῶν 'Ιουδαίων) (for the purpose of that contrivance by Josephus, see Feldman 1994: 59-60; Roberto 2003: 815 n. 35). Recognizing the 1 Macc version as primary relative to Josephus', we may suppose that in addressing Judea's inhabitants en masse, Demetrius I was resorting to a practice previously employed by the Seleucids in their relations with inhabitants of Judea (cf. Roberto 2003: 814–815). Yet by circumventing Jonathan, such a step was undermining his position. The letter, as all other documents preserved in sources and relating to the Hasmonean period, is the subject of dispute. Uncertainties concern not just authenticity (cf. Sievers 1990: 93–94). Much more contentious is its dating, because Demetrius I's letter contains references to the position of high priest of the Jerusalem temple and certain stipulations reminiscent of provisions known from the Dead Sea Scrolls (cf. Wise 1990b: 606 ff.). Researchers into the history of the Qumran community (cf. Stegemann 1971: 213–220; Bunge 1975: 27–43; Murphy-O'Connor 1976: 400–420) believe that those are of crucial importance in questioning the historicity of the so-called *intersacerdotium* (the seven-year-long period between the death of Alcimus and the assumption to the high priesthood of Jonathan, when the position was vacant, cf. Jos. *AJ* 20. 237) and in demonstrating that the high priest mentioned in the letter was indeed the Teacher of Righteousness who had been forcefully made to step down in favor of Jonathan (cf. Eshel 2008: 55–57, 182–183). Arguments presented to support the hypothesis are based primarily on the assumption that Demetrius I's letter (1 Macc 10:25–45) is the same document which he sent to Jonathan proposing alliance against Alexander Balas (1 Macc 10:3. 6). No evidence exists to support the hypothesis, because the chief argument to promote its credibility was obtained primarily by manipulation of the text of 1 Macc. For a review of all hypotheses offered in the dispute, complete with their critiques, see VanderKam 2004: 244–259. Despite sharp criticism from H. Burgmann (1980: 137–176), H. Stegemann maintains his position on the issue, using it as one of his chief pillars of interpretation and the dating of some Qumran texts (including 4QMMT); cf. Stegemann 1996: 502 ff. In recent years, scholars began to present arguments that exclude any links between Jonathan and the Teacher of Righteousness, since information in the Dead Sea Scrolls suggest shifting the latter's period of activity to the first half of the 1st century BCE; see below note 30.

justified fears as to the earnestness of his declarations (cf. 1 Macc 10:46). Demetrius' offer was rejected, resulting in Jonathan's tighter alliance with Alexander Balas (1 Macc 10:46), who, after a victorious conclusion of fighting against Demetrius, bestowed on his Jewish supporter more privileges and court honors in 150.[25] Among them was inclusion of Jonathan among the king's friends and appointment to the elevated positions of a general and the provincial governor. The outward attributes of those and earlier honors[26] were publicly presented to Jonathan by Alexander Balas in the presence of Ptolemy VI, the father-in-law and supporter of Syria's king,[27] during their joint meeting at Ptolemais. All such political gains suggest that Jonathan had come down on the right side in the conflict between both pretenders to the Syrian throne. His good relations with Syria's new ruler helped him further strengthen his rule unimpeded.

Left with no data on Jonathan's internal policies, we cannot attempt a closer analysis or assessment. Many scholars believe that the main current of his policies was defined as targeting his domestic opposition that had arisen in Judean religious circles. Its appearance is usually thought to have been caused by Jonathan's rise to the high priesthood.[28] Regrettably, little can be said about the social or religious nature of those groups. From the Dead Sea Scrolls and from post-biblical literature (apocryphal and pseudoepigraphic), we know that their unfavorable or hostile attitudes toward Jonathan,

[25] Alexander Balas won a final victory only in 150: Sachs/Hunger 1996: No. 149 A, 'Rev.' 6'–14'; van der Spek 1997/98: 168–169; cf. Jos. *AJ* 13, 58–61; Synkellos, p. 416.

[26] 1 Macc 10: 65: καὶ ἔγραψεν αὐτὸν τῶν πρώτων φίλων καὶ ἔθετο αὐτὸν στρατηγὸν καὶ μεριδάρχην. Josephus (*AJ* 13.85) only mentions Jonathan as included among friends of Alexander Balas, while Synkellos (p. 418) has Balas offer Jonathan the title of a king. In the opinion of Savalli-Lestrade (1998: 77), there is no contradiction in accounts concerning the honors Jonathan received in 152 (cf. 1 Macc 10:20; Jos. *AJ* 13.45) and those in 150. In a formal perspective, they are complementary.

[27] According to 1 Macc (10:51–54) and Josephus (*AJ* 13.80–82), the initiative to bring both rulers closer came from Alexander Balas. In his point of view, family ties with Ptolemy VI enabled him to acquire a powerful ally who, if need be, could support him in arms and in finance. Undoubtedly, Ptolemy VI, too, stood to benefit in many ways from a union with Alexander Balas. A major advantage was that he could dominate the young king of Syria and regains influence in maritime cities and in areas long contested between the Ptolemies and the Seleucids. Ptolemy VI's intentions are confirmed by numismatic sources, among others, cf. Willrich 1901b: 2798; Otto 1934: 121 n. 2; Volkmann 1959: 1716. No clear evidence exists to show that Ptolemy VI intended to annex the contentious territories at that stage in mutual relations.

[28] See Sievers 1990: 88 ff. Recently this hypothesis is defended by H. Eshel (2008: 30, 42 ff., 52–61). Until the last years, the scholarly consensus was that opposition arose in protest against the office being held by a member of a non-Sadokian family. As mentioned above, this view has no ground in preserved tradition. It became popular mainly in the context of the conflict between the Teacher of Righteousness and the Wicked Priest, known from Dead Sea Scrolls. Contrary to conclusions drawn by some scholars, Jonathan's appointment to the high priesthood had no direct link to the origins of those groups as some of them probably arose prior to that event. The immediate causes for some of them to appear were apocalyptic sentiments and eschatological concepts that appeared and gained popularity within Judaism at the turn of the 2nd century BCE. Notable among such religious movements were the Essenes (those who, in many opinions, founded the Qumran community), see Chazon 1992: 3 ff.; Davies 1992: 116 ff; Stegemann 1992: 156 ff.; Wacholder 1992: 186 ff.; Trebolle Barrera 1995: 52–53, 62 ff.; García Martínez 1995a: 77–78; Collins 2005: 346–347; Hempel 2005: 251 ff.; Kampen 2007: 11 ff.; cf. Mason 2007: 238 ff. (for another hypothesis on the origin of the Qumran community, unrelated to the Essenes, see Boccaccini 1998; Boccaccini 2005a: 303 ff., 325–425.) We may note the opinion of many scholars that the appearance of sentiments opposed to Jonathan is confirmed by a passage in the *Antiquitates* (13.171–173) (in the part of the narrative concerning Jonathan) which Josephus devoted to a characteristic of Pharisees, Sadducees, and Essenes. For more on the message in that passage and its credibility as a historical source, see Mason 1991: 196–212; cf. also Mason 2007: 219–261.

or, in a broader perspective, to Hasmonean rule, was grounded in religion. Such facts as Jonathan's appointment to high priesthood in Jerusalem by Alexander Balas, his active part in conflicts between Syrian pretenders to help his elevation in Judea, and his enrichment by violence and robbery might have been seen by some former supporters of the rebellion against the Hellenistic religious reform as a betrayal of their ideals in the defense of which the Hasmoneans had risen in the first place. An unambiguous expression of displeasure and disappointment with Hasmonean attitudes is found in the Qumran texts.[29] Hypotheses concerning the dating of the Qumran community link its creation with a conflict over the Jerusalem high priesthood between its founder, the Teacher of Righteousness, and the Wicked Priest, often identified with Jonathan. After rejecting as unfounded the supposition that the Teacher of Righteousness was forcefully removed from high priesthood by the Hasmonean, it may be unjustified to attribute to Jonathan any large-scale repressive measures against his religious opposition.[30] To begin with, it

[29] Sievers 1990: 88–92; Xeravits 2007: 211–221; cf. Eshel 2008: 22–27. Particularly vocal testimony to the disappointment and criticism of Hasmonean rule is the *Pesher Habakkuk* (1QpHab); cf. van der Woude 1982: 349-59. Several text fragments found at Qumran mention king Jonathan (4Q448) or simply Jonathan (4Q245, 4Q523). Many contradictory commentaries and interpretations were provoked especially by the one mentioning king Jonathan. The first publishers of the 4Q448 fragment identified him with Alexander Jannaeus (who used the name Jonathan on coins he issued): Eshel/Eshel/Yardeni 1992: 216–219; Eshel/Eshel 2000: 652 ff.). G. Vermes attempted to question this identification by arguing that distinct references in it to Jerusalem, and the conventional nature of the title of king in front of that Jonathan's name point to a brother of Judah Maccabee (1993: 298–300). The identification was seconded by E. Puech (1996: 258–263; 1998: 76; 2005: 302). Yet the hypothesis failed to win approval. By far the majority of scholars who have addressed the issue of that king Jonathan's identity accept with little reservation his identification with Alexander Jannaeus: Lemaire 1997: 70; Main 1998: 113 ff.; VanderKam 1999a: 531; Wise 2003: 69–70; VanderKam 2004: 335; Elgvin 2005: 278; Collins 2006a: 227–228; Vermes 2007: 136; Xeravits 2007: 214 ff. More heated controversy surrounds the character of the text. E. Eshel and H. Eshel see it as a prayer for Alexander Jannaeus (1992: 214 ff.; 2000: 652 ff.; H. Eshel 2008: 103–105), so does Puech (1996: 253, 257). The interpretation is quite uncritically accepted by some scholars who treat it as an expression of fleeting sympathy for Alexander Jannaeus occasioned by his conflict with the Pharisees (Boccaccini 1998: 129–130; cf. Wrigth 2005a: 289). Critics of this position cite philological and historical arguments to demonstrate that the argumentation is erroneous and any resulting hypotheses concerning the history of the Qumran community and its attitude toward contemporary events are quite unsubstantiated (cf. Wright 2005a: 289; Wrigth 2005b: 399–400). In their belief, the 4Q448 fragment contains a prayer aimed explicitly against Alexander Jannaeus, on behalf of the well-being of the Qumran community, the true Israel, see Lemaire 1997: 62, 66–70; Main 1998: 113–135; Xeravits 2007: 213–217; cf. VanderKam 2004: 335–336. In recently published study H. Eshel (2008: 101, 113–115, 184–185) is arguing that the text has non-sectarian nature, which was written by a supporter of the Hasmoneans, and can be, with a great probability, associated with the war of Alexander Jannaeus against Ptolemy IX Lathyrus. Identification of the Jonathan mentioned in 4Q523 does not raise as many doubts (Puech 1996: 263–268; 1998: 76) as its historical conclusion drawn from interpretations of this poorly and partly preserved text. In 4Q245, in addition to the names of several other priests mentioned, there appear the names Jonathan (reconstructed) and Simon. Associations with the two Hasmoneans bearing those names are quite obvious to the editors of the text (as they are to Wise 2003: 68; Vermes 2007: 135). But here, too, the poor preservation of the document is not solid enough evidence to build any generalized conclusions on, although the editors believe that the appearance of those names may be important evidence suggesting that the author of the text considered as legal the high priesthood of both those Hasmoneans (Collins/Flint 1996: 156 ff., cf. 154–155). In the opinion of VanderKam (2004: 264 ff.), the state of preservation of all quoted texts precludes any historical conclusions about Jonathan's activities.

[30] Although the theory about the Wicked Priest being Jonathan has been widely accepted by scholars, independently of his many other proposed identifications (a highly useful, if not quite complete list of them is given by Freedman/Georghegan 2006: 17 n. 1; cf. Collins 2006: 218–227), other hypotheses have been

is difficult to establish what real threat to Jonathan's standing might have been posed by that opposition. Most likely, none of the groups that made it up was of great social consequence, nor did it command any armed force. The only danger that might have threatened Jonathan was criticism in speech or writing expressed publicly by their representatives. It still seems that a high priest who commanded a large armed force and enjoyed wide social support could not have been as vulnerable as to feel compelled to engage in sweeping persecution of his opponents. What cannot be ruled out is that even if he took some action to contain their activity, they deliberately exaggerated it.

In 147, Syria saw another dynastic conflict break out. This time, the participants included Alexander Balas and Demetrius II, the son of Demetrius I.[31] Like the one before it, this struggle, too, was not without effect on Jonathan's situation. Immediately after seizing power over part of Syria, Demetrius II questioned his right to rule over Judea and ordered military action against him to the Alexander Balas-appointed governor of Syria Coele, Apollonius, who had meanwhile switched sides.[32] The threat from Apollonius was serious enough for Jonathan to force him to mobilize a large force.[33] The fighting took place mainly in the maritime area between Joppa and Askalon. Jonathan was successful in capturing Joppa and enjoying a victory in the battle of Azotus (1 Macc 10:75–76), in which he managed to defeat Apollonius and occupy the city itself (1 Macc 10:77–85). Such victories doubtless exerted much propaganda impact, contributing to Jonathan's increased popularity. In addition, they brought Jonathan considerable spoils of war (1 Macc 10:87). Also, Alexander Balas, grateful to Jonathan for helping him retain the throne, awarded him with inclusion among the king's kinsmen (συγγενεῖς τῶν βασιλέων) and with a donation of Ekron with environs as Jonathan's property.[34]

Despite their number and importance, the honors obtained from Alexander Balas did not make Jonathan an independent ruler: they were merely a generous payment to a vassal for faithful service. It was an unquestionable success for the Jewish leader in his relations with the Seleucids between 152 and 147 to have been noticed by rival parties competing for the Seleucid throne for his political and military stature. For his own

put forward, see Geller 2002; Kokkinos 2004; Wise 2003: 53–87; Freedman/Georghegan 2006: 17–24. They differ considerably from past ones especially in dating the life and activity of the Teacher of Righteousness. M. Geller (2002: 14 ff.) and N. Kokkinos (2004: 7 ff., esp. 15) believe that the Teacher of Righteousness should be identified with Simon the Just, high priest of the Jerusalem temple holding the office ca 200. In their turn, Freedman/Georghegan (2006: 19 ff.) presented arguments for equating the Wicked Priest with Onias III. M.O. Wise (2003: 82 ff., esp. 84, 86–87), based on analysis of historical mentions found in the Dead Sea Scrolls, hypothesizes that the Teacher of Righteousness was active in the early 1st century BCE; prone to accept it, among others, are also G.L. Doudna (2001: 753–754) and J.J. Collins (2006: 212 ff., 228–229). That the period was of special importance for the Qumran community is shown by numerous mentions in Qumran texts referring to figures then active in Judea: Wise 2003: 65–81; Atkinson 2007: 126–151; Vermes 2007: 121 ff.

[31] 1 Macc 10:67; Diodorus 32.9c; Jos. *AJ* 13.86; App. *Syr.* 67; Just. 35.2.1–4; cf. Willrich 1901: 2798 ff., no. 41; Volkmann 1925: 407 ff.; Grainger 1997: 42 ff.

[32] 1 Macc 10:67–73; Jos. *AJ* 13.86-90; cf. Grainger 1997: 80 (Apollonios 7).

[33] 1 Macc (10:74) and Josephus (*AJ* 13.91) report that during the campaign, Jonathan commanded 10,000 men.

[34] 1 Macc 10:89; Jos. *AJ* 13.102; Bikerman 1938: 44; Sievers 1990: 94–97. The personal nature of the donation is indicated by its designation as κληροδοσία (1 Macc 10:89): Pastor 1997: 64. See also observations concerning the aulic title συγγενής: Bikerman 1938: 42 ff.; Muccioli 2000: 252 ff., esp. 257, 265–266, 269–273 (on Jonathan's title).

part, the only notable expression of any desire he might have had at the time to increase his political independence may be considered to be his choice of Jerusalem as his capital and the city's fortification program pursued without the king's consent. Most probably, it was those decisions that spurred Demetrius II to send Apollonius against him. The young king, in following his father's political line, correctly understood Jonathan's behavior as driven by an unmistakable desire to loosen his ties of dependence on the Seleucids (cf. 1 Macc 10:70: καὶ διὰ τί σὺ ἐξουσάζῃ ἐφ' ἡμας ἐν τοῖς ὄρεσι).

Jonathan only proceeded to take more energetic and resolute political steps when both pretenders to the Seleucid throne engaged in fighting within Syria itself. Ptolemy VI set out from Egypt at the head of a large army to support Alexander Balas (1 Macc 11:1–3; Jos. *AJ* 13.103), but before they could join forces, the Egyptian changed his mind. Instead of supporting his son-in-law, he decided to take the side of Demetrius II and went so far as to offer him the hand of the same daughter he had given in marriage to Alexander Balas (1 Macc 11: 9–12; Jos. *AJ* 13.109–110. 116). At one point, this step gave Ptolemy VI an opportunity to ascend to the Syrian throne, but fearing an unfavorable response from Rome, he declined the offer for the sake of Demetrius II.[35] Taking advantage of the confusion over fighting in Syria, Jonathan attempted to capture Acra (1 Macc 11:20). He must have been acting on the belief that whoever was the winner in the conflict, his control of Acra could be a precious asset in his relations with any king in Antioch. So great was his determination to achieve his objective that he would not abstain from besieging Acra even when the victorious Demetrius II summoned him to appear at Ptolemais (1 Macc 11:22–23; Jos. *AJ* 13.123). Jonathan's diplomatic skill, of which he had given ample evidence many times before, enabled him to avoid any punishment – hoped for by his enemies – for that disobedience (1 Macc 11:24).[36] Moreover, despite active efforts by representatives of his political opposition, he managed to obtain from Syria's new king an explicit confirmation of his political status (1 Macc 11:25; Jos. *AJ* 13.125). Demetrius II also validated Jonathan's high priesthood and any court honors previously bestowed on the Hasmonean (1 Macc 11:27). Jonathan additionally secured exemption from tax levies on the territory under his control in Judea and Samaria for the price of a single payment of 300 talents to the king's treasury (1 Macc 11:28–29). Demetrius II went on to exempt Judeans permanently from a number of minor but bur-

[35] 1 Macc 11:13; Jos. *AJ* 13.112. 114–115. The beginning of Demetrius II's independent rule is closely connected with the death of Ptolemy VI, caused by injuries he sustained in the last battle with Alexander Balas on the river Oinoparos: 1 Macc 11: 14–18; Strabo 16.2.8 [751]; Liv. *Per.* 52; Diodorus 32.9c; Jos. *AJ* 13.117–119; Sachs/Hunger 1996: No. -144, 'Obv. 35'-37'; van der Spek 1997/1998: 170–171. The role of Ptolemy VI and his aims in the struggles between Alexander Balas and Demetrius II are the subject of dispute. One reason for it are significant differences in source accounts. Some scholars believe that sources suggest that the Egyptian king was trying to capture Syria. Also, much controversy is caused by his attitude toward Alexander Balas and their mutual relations. For more on this subject, see Bouché-Leclercq 1904: 49 ff.; Volkmann 1925: 405–411; Otto 1934: 121–128; Volkmann 1959: 1716–1717; Amantini 1974: 511–529; Gruen 1976: 93; Chauvaeu 1990: 151 ff.; Höbl 2004: 170–171.

[36] News of his siege of Acra reached Demetrius II via Hellenists staying there (1 Macc 11:21: καὶ ἐπορεύθησάν τινες μισοῦντες τὸ ἔθνος αὐτῶν ἄνδρες παράνομοι πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα καὶ ἀπήγγειλαν αὐτῷ ὅτι Ιωναθαν περικάθηται τὴν ἄκραν) [*But certain renegades who hated their nation went to the king and reported him that Jonathan was besieging the citadel.*] (tr. NRSV); cf. Jos. *AJ* 13.122. The political activity of Jonathan's opponents was probably grounded in the hope that Demetrius II, like his father before him, would attempt to regain a firm hold on Judea, and they would play a major role in it: 1 Macc 11:25.

densome taxes (1 Macc 11:30–36; cf. Jos. *AJ* 13.124–128). Thus despite his serious instance of insubordination to the Syrian king in trying to capture Acra, Jonathan was able to retain his previous gains undiminished, even accruing more to boost his position further.[37] That felicitous turn of affairs for him was due to a combination of various circumstances. Among them was Demetrius II's tender age, his inexperience, and the precarious state of his newly won power in Syria.[38] As he summoned Jonathan to Ptolemais, Demetrius II assuredly wanted to reassert his supreme authority over Judea and to discipline its ruler, but at that particular point he found it more pressing to secure the support of a powerful vassal, hence he was willing to forgo any sanctions against him.

Soon afterward, Demetrius II's errors in internal politics presented Jonathan with an opportunity to try to stake out larger freedoms for himself. The opportunity arose out of a conflict between Demetrius II and his own soldiers, who were manifesting their intense resentment at having been dismissed from duty and replaced by mercenaries. The event was used for his own purposes by Tryphon, a military commander from the time of Alexander Balas.[39] He became not only an advocate for the discontented soldiers, but he managed to extend his patronage to Antiochus, the infant son of Alexander Balas, and place him on the throne.[40] Developments in Syria encouraged Jonathan to attempt to win further concessions from Demetrius II. He demanded evacuation of the Syrian garrisons of Acra and other strongholds in Judea on the grounds that they posed a danger to local inhabitants (1 Macc 11: 41; Jos. *AJ* 13.133). The king responded by promising to do so in the future, in return for support in his struggle against the usurper. Jonathan refrained from further action, firmly embracing Demetrius II's side. In a display of far-reaching loyalty to the king, when so requested, he sent his own troops to Antioch to support him against domestic opposition (1 Macc 11:47–51; Jos. *AJ* 13.134). Thanks to that help, Demetrius II succeeded in salvaging his throne and restoring his control over

[37] One privilege that must have offered such a boost were all exemptions from taxes paid by inhabitants of Judea to the Syrian king (1 Macc 11:34–35: ἀντὶ τῶν βασιλικῶν, ὧν ἐλάμβανεν ὁ βασιλεὺς παρ'αὐτῶν τὸ πρότερον κατ'ἐνιαυτὸν ἀπὸ τῶν γενημάτων τῆς γῆς καὶ τῶν ἀκροδρύων. Καὶ τὰ ἄλλα τὰ ἀνήκοντα ἡμῖν ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν τῶν δεκατῶν καὶ τῶν τελῶν τῶν ἀνηκόντων ἡμῖν καὶ τὰς τοῦ ἁλὸς λίμνας καὶ τοὺς ἀνήκοντας ἡμῖν στεφάνους [(…) *we have granted release from the royal taxes that the king formerly received from them each year, from the crops of the land and the fruit trees. And the other payments henceforth due to us of the tithes, and the taxes due to us, and the salt pits and the crown taxes due to us* (…).] (tr. NRSV); cf. Jos. *AJ* 13.128). The decision did not at all mean abolition of the tax. As a privilege, the revenues could from that point be collected by Jonathan.

[38] Recognition of his rights to the throne Demetrius II owed to the intercession of Ptolemy VI with inhabitants of Antioch, who feared revenge from a son of Demetrius I for their disloyalty toward the father: Jos. *AJ* 13.114-5; cf. 135. To his father-in-law he also owed the support of the army (Iust. 35.2.3).

[39] His real name was Diodotus (Diodorus 33.4a; Strabo 16.2.10 [752]; Jos. *AJ* 13. 131), but was better known under his nickname Tryphon. Appian's (*Syr.* 68) information on his social status and circumstances of his adopting the name of Tryphon is untrue. For more about Diodotus-Tryphon, see Hoffmann 1939: 715 ff.; Fischer 1972: 201 ff.; Grainger 1997: 69–70; Houghton/Lorber/Hoover 2008: 335–336.

[40] Cf. 1 Macc. 11:39–40. 54; Jos. *AJ* 13.131; App. *Syr.* 68 (Appian wrongly relates that he bore the name Alexander). The son of Alexander Balas and Cleopatra Thea was the sixth king to bear the name Antiochus. His nicknames were Epiphanes Dionysos: Wilcken 1894a: 2477–2478, no. 29; Fischer 1972: 204 ff.; Grainger 1997: 28–29. An approximate chronology of events in Syria related to the rule of Antiochus VI and Tryphon can only be reconstructed from numismatic sources, see Seyrig 1950: 7 ff.; Fischer 1972: 208 ff., 212–213; Houghton 1986: 277 ff.; Houghton 1992: 136–139; Houghton 1993: 277 ff.; Houghton 1993/1994: 59 ff.; Houghton/Lorber/Hoover 2008: 341–347. Regrettably, such knowledge only goes a little part of the way to link those events with their contemporary developments in Judea.

the capital, but once he felt secure again, he refused to deliver on the promise given to Jonathan.[41] The reason for this sudden change of Demetrius' mind seems obvious enough. He was acting on the conviction that keeping his promise to the Judean and extending any further favors would badly serve his own interests as it would excessively strengthen Jonathan's standing. As a tell-tale sign of his enmity toward his recent Jewish ally and vassal, he had his loyal generals launch military actions against him. And it was not only when he was defending his throne from Tryphon and Antiochus VI (cf. 1 Macc 11:63. 67–74), but also later, when he was ruling only part of Syria (cf. 1 Macc 12:24–30. 33–34).

The hostility toward Jonathan demonstrated by Demetrius II eventually proved an advantage for the Judean. Just as had been the case before, when Alexander Balas fought Demetrius II, so in another stage in Syrian dynastic struggles Jonathan became a coveted ally for one warring faction, which was ready to pay a high price for his support. It came to pass when Tryphon had subjugated for Antiochus VI the maritime Phoenician cities neighboring on Judea. Appreciating Jonathan's strength, Antiochus VI, no doubt prompted by Tryphon, wrote to him a letter in which he confirmed his appointment as high priest as well as dominion over a part of the Samaria's territory incorporated into Judea, and named him a king's friend. In addition, he appointed Simon, Jonathan's brother, governor (στρατηγός) with authority over a stretch of land along the coast, from Tyre even to the Egyptian border (1 Macc 11:57–59; Jos. *AJ* 13.145–146).

Siding with Antiochus VI brought Jonathan many more advantages than just those listed in the king's letter. He was named a commander (Jos. *AJ* 13.148) and entrusted with forming troops in Phoenicia and Coele Syria that would be capable of confronting Demetrius II's forces present there. With the support of inhabitants of many Palestinian cities, he raised a large army under his command, with which to operate on a vast territory. At the head of that army he marched as far as Damascus. Some of his operations were targeted at cities loyal to Demetrius II, others at the king's troops trying to regain control over lost territories (1 Macc 11:60–74; Jos. *AJ* 13.148–154. 158–163. 174–179). Smaller-scale military operations were conducted in parallel by Simon. While Jonathan was standing up for broadly understood interests of the king, Simon's warfare was more geared to the interests of the Hasmoneans themselves: he succeeded in capturing the Beth-zur stronghold and manned it with his own garrison (1 Macc 11:65–66; Jos. *AJ* 13.155–157). Control over that strategically located fortress was important in helping assure the security of Jerusalem. Prolonged combat between Antiochus VI's and Demetrius II's armies and successes won by Simon in Judea gave Jonathan an impulse to embark on a political and military program to safeguard his own interests for the future. Such shrewdness must have been a lesson learned from earlier experiences in dealing with Demetrius II. He must have become aware that the king's promises, given the contradictory interests both parties had, were not the most dependable guarantee for his achievements to last.

[41] 1 Macc 11: 53. Demetrius II still allowed Jonathan's soldiers to keep all spoils they had won in fighting Antioch inhabitants: 1 Macc 11:48. 51; Jos. *AJ* 13.142.

In what is a testimony to Jonathan's political ambitions at the time, he dispatched envoys to Rome[42] and Sparta,[43] while he also successfully conducted, simultaneously with Simon, military operations on territories contiguous to Judea. One of such actions enabled him to capture Joppa and garrison it with his own troops (cf. 1 Macc 12:1–34; Jos. *AJ* 13. 180). Trouble in Syria helped Jonathan carry out other ventures intended to bolster his position: he blockaded Acra, commenced fortification of Jerusalem, and began planning construction of more strongholds in Judea.[44] Jonathan's endeavors were assuredly meant as a step-by-step process of Judean independence-building. Despite that, in his day he was seen by contemporaries as a loyal ally of Antiochus VI. One indication of this is Tryphon's fears about Jonathan's response to Tryphon's planned assassination of Antiochus VI (1 Macc 12:39–40). That Jonathan became involved on the side of Antiochus VI might have been payment of his debt of gratitude he owed to his father, Alexander Balas, while at the same time a payback to Demetrius II for his breach of faith (cf. Jos. *AJ* 13.147). In supporting the cause of Antiochus VI, Jonathan was probably placing complete trust with his protector Tryphon. Absorbed with fighting, he might not have realized the regent's desires to claim sovereign rule (cf. 1 Macc 12:46; Jos. *AJ* 13.191) nor the fact that he was thus standing as a major obstacle in his way (cf. 1 Macc 12:39–40). Although Tryphon, appreciating Jonathan' numbers at arms and his political cunning, carefully avoided any displays of hostility toward him, something must have happened to make the Judean take a large force to meet the regent. Tryphon, outnumbered (1 Macc 12:41–42), resorted to subterfuge. First he invited Jonathan to a conference at Scythopolis (Beth-shean), where he publicly showed him his favor to lull him into a sense of security (1 Macc 12:43; Jos. *AJ* 13.188–190). Then both men made their way to Ptolemais, which Tryphon promised to give Jonathan to rule. There he also promised to meet other requests of the Judean ruler (1 Macc 12:45; Jos. *AJ* 13.190). Extending to Jonathan guarantees of safety, he persuaded him to send

[42] 1 Macc 12:1-23; Jos. *BJ* 1.48; *AJ* 13.163–170. The official purpose of the legation was to renew an earlier treaty contracted by Judah (for a dispute about the nature of the treaty, see above). The context of events surrounding this endeavor seems to indicate that a formal partnership with Rome would be a guarantee of security in Jonathan's relations with Syrian kings. Characteristically, accounts of that mission, compared with e.g. those of his visit to Sparta, are laconic, which may suggest that it failed to produce the political effects Jonathan hoped for (it can hardly be thought a success that the envoys received from the Roman senate letters of safe passage on their way back to Jerusalem: 1 Macc 12:4). Although Josephus contends that the senate ratified its previous resolutions regarding relations with Judea (*AJ* 13. 165: τῆς βουλῆς ἐπικυρωσάσης τὰ πρότερον αὐτῃ περὶ τῆς Ἰουδαίων φιλίας ἐγνωσμένα) we cannot be certain that it is not just his own commentary, see Fischer 1970: 96 ff.; Fischer 1974: 92–93; Timpe 1974: 146, 149–150; Gauger 1977: 179–182; Sievers 1990: 98–99; Mandell 1991: 209 ff. With less than accurate information on the chronology of Jonathan's and Simon's diplomatic missions, some scholars are inclined to attribute some of those initiatives to Simon rather than to his brother, cf. Timpe 1974: 146 ff.; Shatzman 1999: 69 n. 72.

[43] 1 Macc 12:2; 5–23; Jos. *AJ* 13.165–170. The question of those relations (their nature, purpose, and many other more or less important factors and circumstances) has had many analyses, interpretations, and hypotheses devoted to it. Examples include Abel 1949: 231 ff.; Schüller 1956: 257 ff. For an overview of earlier discussions on that question and the various hypotheses offered, highly useful is E. Gruen (1996: 254 ff.). In his opinion (Gruen 1996: 262–264) Jonathan's alleged initiative to establish relations with Sparta based on common descent (συγγένεια) is a purely literary creation with no basis in facts.

[44] 1 Macc 12:35–38; Jos. *AJ* 13.181–183. According to Josephus (*AJ* 13.183), fortresses were developed by Simon. 1 Macc (12:38) mentions that he built the Adida stronghold in Shephelah: Abel 1967, II: 340–341. Events of Tryphon's expedition to Judea (1 Macc 13:13; Jos. *AJ* 13.203) confirm that it indeed had much strategic importance for control over lowlands skirting Jerusalem.

the main Judean force back home, and once they were safely out of the way, Tryphon had Jonathan imprisoned and his personal guard murdered (1 Macc 12:46–48; Jos. *AJ* 13.192; *BJ* 1.49). In Tryphon's plan, that was the first step toward controlling Judea, for he expected that Jonathan's imprisonment would dispirit his people, while leaderless Jewish forces would not be able to offer effective resistance (cf. 1 Macc 12:49–52; 13:2; Jos. *AJ* 13.194–196).

That was not to be, however. News of what had happened at Ptolemais and of Tryphon raising a great army to attack Judea prompted Simon to take the place of his captive brother and to call the dismayed population to arms (1 Macc. 13:1–6; Jos. *AJ* 13.197–202). His call was answered by a large part of the society, attached to the Hasmoneans.[45] When Simon led a large army to meet Tryphon, the latter, preferring to avoid confrontation with so determined an opponent, proposed talks about the release of Jonathan (1 Macc 13:14). He expected such talks would not only help him avoid an engagement in unfavorable circumstances, but also buy him time as his demands of a high ransom for Jonathan and handing over his sons as hostages (1 Macc 13:15–16; Jos. *AJ* 13.204–205) were designed to arouse disputes in the Jewish camp about their acceptance (cf. 1 Macc 13:17–19; Jos. *AJ* 13.205–206). Simon foiled the plan by quickly agreeing. That was probably not what Tryphon was expecting: he reneged on previous promises, refused to free the prisoner, and after some failed attempts to storm Jerusalem, decided to retreat.[46] During the retreat, Tryphon had Jonathan murdered (1 Macc 13:23).

Tryphon's withdrawal from Judea gave Simon a freedom of movement which he used to strengthen his military capabilities. He began to build new fortresses, stocking them with supplies to last through a prolonged siege.[47] He also sent envoys to Demetrius II with gifts and a request to have his taxes for Judea remitted owing to the devastation wrought by Tryphon's operations (1 Macc 13:34). In this way Simon was implying that he still recognized the formal dominion of the Seleucids. Such policy may have been part of his deliberate political game designed to avoid having to fight on two fronts at once against both simultaneous rulers of Syria, Tryphon and Demetrius II. Under the circumstances, it was a shrewd move to side with the latter. Demetrius II, with an eye to his own advantage in establishing good relations with Simon (he was hoping to gain an asset *vis-ŕ-vis* Tryphon), not only declared readiness to make peace, but sustained all decisions concerning Judea made previously, and moreover consented to Simon's

[45] 1 Macc 13:7-9. Identifying the group poses no difficulty. It is consistently referred to in 1 Macc as ὁ λαός (*the people*): VanderKam 2004: 278 ff.

[46] Cf. 1 Macc 13:20–24; Jos. *AJ* 13.207. An important part of Simon's tactics, and a surprise for Tryphon, was the constant presence of Jewish troops at his army's rear (1 Macc 13:20; Jos. *AJ* 13.207). This prevented any clandestine operations, exposed him to repeated attacks, and frustrated the campaign's planning. Tryphon's aim was to recapture Jerusalem (1 Macc 14:31) and strengthen or restore Syrian control over other strategic locations in Judea in cooperation with local groups of supporters. Simon might have known the plan or guessed its aims. This is confirmed by his actions to improve Jerusalem's fortifications, prevent Tryphon's troops from launching dispersed operations, and his dispatching to Joppa a strong garrison while removing from the city its civilian, mainly Greek, population (1 Macc 13:11). For Tryphon, reaching Jerusalem was of great political and military consequence. An effective blockade of Acra ordered by Simon cut off supplies for its Syrian garrison (1 Macc 13:21; Jos. *AJ* 13.208). Without supplies, that bastion of Syrian presence in Jerusalem was doomed. Desperate efforts to reach the city were finally frustrated by heavy snowfall blocking incoming roads (1 Macc 13:22; Jos. *AJ* 13.208).

[47] 1 Macc 13:33. Cf. Bar-Kochva 1996: 123.

continued control over the fortresses he had built, waiver of outstanding taxes, and exemption from all duties collected in Jerusalem for his treasury. In addition he expressed willingness to accept Jewish soldiers in his guards (1 Macc 13:36–40). The Syrian king further acknowledged assumption by Simon of the office of high priest without the king's formal approval (cf. 1 Macc 13:36).

Compared to other concessions made by Syrian kings in the past, those declared by Demetrius II were the most far-reaching. They were almost tantamount to Judea obtaining full independence.[48] Contrary to the opinion of the author of 1 Macc, Demetrius II did not see such concessions as abolishing Judea's dependence on the Seleucids, since a notion of subjects having a right to independence was completely alien to Syrian rulers.[49] And although he was thus only sanctioning the existing state of affairs, the continued presence of Syrian garrisons at Gezer and Acra suggested that Demetrius II did not mean to be too literal about keeping all the promises he had made. As he declared willingness to settle peacefully his relations with the ruler of Judea, he made no reference to Acra, Jerusalem's most hated symbol of Syria's looming presence. He may have consciously left the issue unaddressed as an asset to be used in more favorable future circumstances.

Settling relations with Demetrius II and the latter's engagement with fighting Tryphon gave Simon a free hand to continue building his own position. His great achievements included gaining control over Gezer, an important Syrian stronghold, strategic in controlling a vast maritime area, complete with improving its fortifications,[50] and conquest of Acra. Its final downfall had been caused by a months-long blockade, ordered by Jonathan, which proved so effective that its garrison was faced with death by starvation and was thus forced to surrender.[51] Directly on freeing Jerusalem of Syrian military presence, Simon engaged in a systematic fortification program around the Temple itself, and introduced his own garrison into the captured fortress.[52] Acting in

[48] 1 Macc 13:41; Jos. *AJ* 13.213–214; *BJ* 1.53; cf. Zeitlin 1922: 83–84; Lichtenstein 1931/1932: 286; Sievers 1990: 110 ff. The view is shared by some scholars, cf. Fischer 1975b: 193; Will 1982: 405.

[49] Cf. Dąbrowa 2004: 79 ff.

[50] 1 Macc 13:43–48; Sievers 1990: 112–113. Apparently by mistake Synkellos (p. 417) credits him with the capture of Gaza instead of Gezer.

[51] 1 Macc 13: 49–51. Most probably, the Syrian garrison received permission from Jonathan to evacuate from Jerusalem. This is confirmed by an entry in the *Megillat Taanit* on the 27th of the month Iyyar: Zeitlin 1922: 84; Lichtenstein 1931/1932: 286–287.

[52] 1 Macc 13:52; 14:7. 36–37. A Jewish garrison was introduced to Acra after the place had been ritually purified (1 Macc 13:50–51; 14:7). Contrary to what Josephus claims (*BJ* 1. 50; *AJ* 13.215), the Syrian stronghold was not demolished immediately after its capture but only some time later. Since Simon garrisoned Acra with his own troops and fortified not only the Temple Mount (1 Macc 13:52), but also Jerusalem itself (cf. 1 Macc 14:37: καὶ ὕψωσεν τὰ τείχη τῆς Ιερουσαλημ), he must have been constantly wary of Syrian attack. Despite the obvious military advantages of holding Acra, past memories and its associations with foreign rule over Jerusalem and Judea, its presence in the cityscape must have aroused many negative social emotions. Use by Simon of this hostile symbol for his own needs involved a not unreal danger that such negative associations would be transferred to Acra's new host. This delicate situation probably combined with religious considerations finally persuaded Simon to make the difficult decision to tear down the fortress: Bar-Kochva 1989: 453 ff.; Wightman 1989/1990: 36–38; Sievers 1990: 113 ff.; Sievers 1994: 201–202. Acra was demolished so thoroughly (cf. Jos. *BJ* 1.50; *AJ* 13.215–217) that no material trace was left of it, and since sources are rather vague about its exact location, scholars have long disputed just where in ancient Jerusalem it was placed, see Vincent 1954: 175–192; Shotwell 1964: 10 ff.; Mazar 1975: 216; Tsafrir 1975: 501 ff.; Dequerker 1985: 193 ff.; Decoster 1989: 70 ff.; Bar-Kochva 1989: 445 ff.; Wightman

the same vein, Simon dispatched a legation to Rome to renew mutual relations.[53] When Simon finally managed to free Judea completely of Syrian presence and to strengthen its independence, he faced a need to define his status formally – this time not *vis-ŕ-vis* the current king of Syria, but in relation to his subjects. From the outbreak of the anti-reform rebellion sparked by Mattathias all the way to the capture of Acra, the extent and style of power exercised by successive Hasmoneans were determined chiefly by external factors. When those dwindled in importance, only wide social support in Judea could ensure that Simon maintain his status. Such support mattered to him primarily because, advanced in years, he had to think about assuring succession to his descendants. Without a doubt, all his acts, and especially his ridding Jerusalem of Syrian presence, made him, in general awareness, and certainly in the eyes of Hasmonean party, a great hero deserving of special accolade. Such was bestowed on him by resolution of the "great assembly" of representatives of various Judean social groups: priests, commoners, elders, and local aristocracy.[54] Those assembled recognized in Simon their religious, political, and military leader, investing him with a wide range of powers and the privilege to keep the position of authority in his family. At the same time, severe religious sanctions were

1989/1990: 31 ff.; Geva 1993: 723; Bieberstein/Bloedhorn 1994, II: 388–393; Sievers 1994: 196 ff.; Bahat 1996: 40; Levine 2002: 75 ff.; Mazar 2002: 18 ff.; Cohen 2006: 255 ff. Some believe that the information in 1 Macc on Simon's destruction of Acra should not be taken at face value because such an act would have gone against the grain of his own interests. According to L.-H. Vincent (1954: 190 ff.), instead of demolishing it, he thoroughly rebuilt it, transforming Acra into a national fortress ("en forteresse nationale") which the Hasmoneans later used as their seat.

[53] 1 Macc 14:16-9. 24; Jos. *AJ* 13.227. News of Jonathan's death allegedly caused the Spartans, acting of their own accord, to send an embassy to Jerusalem to renew with Simon the accord made with his brother (1 Macc 14:16–23). Based on the chronology of events as presented in 1 Macc, we may assume that the legation to Rome was sent no later than the end of 141 (cf. Schwartz 1993: 124), with the same envoys whom Jonathan had dispatched there previously. The resolution of the "great assembly" (1 Macc 14: 40) implies that by fall 140 the legation's political success was already known in Jerusalem. But elsewhere, in a narrative concerning events of 138, 1 Macc (15:15–24) mentions only the arrival of the legation from Rome (for more on interpretation of this fragment, see Schwartz 1993: 117–126). Even greater confusion in pinpointing the actual date when Simon's envoys were present in the Roman capital is created by Josephus' quotation (*AJ* 14.145–148) of the Roman senate's resolution which some scholars associate with the said legation because of the names of envoys mentioned in it. Yet the same document contains other mutually exclusive chronological elements. Attempts to solve those problems have so far failed to produce a generally accepted solution; nonetheless, one possible suggested date is 142 (Schwartz 1993: 125; Shatzman 1999: 66). For a discussion around the legation, criticism of sources, and proposed solutions of disputed issues, see Abel 1949: 275–276; Fischer 1970: 96–101; Timpe 1974: 146–147, 148–149, 150; Gauger 1975: 273–282, 285–314; Sievers 1990: 116–119 (there, too, the earlier literature).

[54] 1 Macc 14:28: ἐπὶ συναγωγῆς μεγάλης ἱερέων καὶ λαοῦ καὶ ἀρχόντων ἔθνους καὶ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων τῆς χώρας (...); cf. Sievers 1981: 310; Sievers 1990: 123–124, 125 ff.; Schenker 2000: 165–166; VanderKam 2004: 278 ff. Representatives of *the people* present came in fact from among supporters of the Hasmoneans, and their presence in the "great assembly" was expected to subordinate that body to Simon's political interests. As to the high priesthood, the "great assembly" only formally endorsed an earlier decision taken by the military on acceptance of Simon's leadership after Jonathan's death (cf. 1 Macc 13:36. 42; VanderKam 2004: 272–281). *The people* were bent on strengthening their leader's status, as is visible in their initiative to award him other honors: 1 Macc 13:41–42: Ἔτους ἑβδομηκοστοῦ καὶ ἑκατοστοῦ ἤρθη ὁ ζυγὸς τῶν ἐθνῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ Ισραηλ, καὶ ἤρξατο ὁ λαός γράφειν ἐν ταῖς συγγαφαῖς (…). Common interests between the ruler and his army were probably reflected in Simon's activities for the benefit of *the people* (1 Macc 14:14). Since our source is vague about how this special concern of his was expressed, the information may be understood in various ways, cf. Pastor 1997: 67–68.

stipulated to discourage any possible future changes in the clauses so passed.[55] The importance of the "great assembly's" resolution was not limited to Simon's personal entitlements. It introduced a new model of Judea's political system, no less. Contrary to tradition, it would be based on the empowerment of the head of the state with the highest authority in both politics and religion.

Sources are silent about Demetrius II's response to those developments, although we may suppose that in his judgment they in no way affected existing mutual relations between the Seleucids and Judea. Some time after Simon was chosen leader of Judea, Demetrius officially confirmed his right to the high priesthood, numbered him among the king's friends, and bestowed other honors on him.[56] According to 1 Macc, Demetrius' stance was influenced by news of Simon's recognition by the Romans as a friend and an ally,[57] a dubious claim since Demetrius' behavior shows not the least suggestion of his fears of Simon's powerful political partner. Ever since Jason first received appointment as high priest of the Jerusalem temple, from Antiochus IV Epiphanes, Syrian kings treated the right to name successive high priests as an important political act naturally derived from their dominion over Judea. In this context, Demetrius II confirming the legality of Simon's high priesthood (which he had been given by his assembled subjects), as well as the honors the king granted him, do not seem a sign of weakness or fear. Rather, they were clearly political gestures to remind the Judean that he was still a vassal of the Seleucids.

Another confirmation that, as far as the Seleucids were concerned, Judea's political status had not changed was a letter to Simon by another pretender to the throne, Demetrius II's younger brother Antiochus known as Antiochus VII Sidetes,[58] who was asking for help in his efforts to claim power in Syria.[59] To convince Simon of his sincerity, Antiochus confirmed Simon's status in Judea, his right to keep his fortresses, and previously awarded fiscal and religious privileges. After victory, more favors were promised, if vaguely (1 Macc 15:2–9). The only truly new item in such promises was authorization for Simon to issue his own coins.[60]

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[55] 1 Macc 14:29–47; Jos. *BJ* 1.53; *AJ* 13.213–214; cf. also 1 Macc 15:21. Such regulations made to prevent any changes in accepted provisions are interpreted as obvious testimony to the existence within various social groups in Judea of a strong opposition to Simon's rule: Sievers 1981: 313 ff.; Sievers 1990: 124–127, 133–134; Rappaport 1995: 271–281. For the honors awarded to Simon and way of their approval, cf. Sievers 1981: 310 ff.; Sievers 1990: 119–124; Mendels 1997: 59–60; Schenker 2000: 163 ff.; van Henten 2001; Krentz 2001.

[56] 1 Macc 14:38–39. It is worth noting that the same set of honors had been offered to Jonathan, the high priest of the Jerusalem temple and ruler of Judea, while at the same time a vassal of the kings of Syria.

[57] 1 Macc 14:40. Cf. Fischer 1970: 96–101; Sievers 1990: 116–119.

[58] For more on this subject, see Wilcken 1894b: 2478 ff.; Grainger 1997: 29 ff.

[59] According to Josephus (*AJ* 13.223), Antiochus sent this letter only after capturing Seleucia. The chronology of events presented in 1 Macc (15:1) is more reliable.

[60] 1 Macc 15:6. Contrary to various opinions voiced on the subject, the promise should not be taken literally (Ehling 1998b: 230–231). Like Antiochus VII's other concessions, it was meant from the start as a chip in a political game to persuade Simon to take his side, and not a privilege to bolster the Judean leader's position. In the course of further developments, Simon was unable to organize production of his own coin from the moment the concession was granted until it was revoked. The effort would have involved creating a mint from scratch and finding skilled minters, which was not easy in Judea. A Jerusalem-based Syrian mint had stopped operation already under Antiochus IV Epiphanes, see Kanael 1950/1951: 170 ff.; Kanael 1963: 43; Wirgin 1972: 104 ff.; Ben-David 1972: 93 ff.; Meshorer 2001: 23–24.

The clearly conciliatory tone of the letter reflected the sender's precarious situation: as he prepared ground for his political thrust in Syria, he wanted an assurance of neutrality from Judea's leader, for the latter's interference in Syrian affairs could severely frustrate the pretender's intentions. That such interpretation of Antiochus' letter is correct is confirmed by later developments. As soon as he rose to power in 138, his attitude toward Simon changed abruptly.[61] Instead of previously declared friendship, he displayed hostility and aggression. It became obvious in how he offended Simon by rejecting his offer of material and military assistance,[62] refusing to accept gifts sent by Simon, and canceling all previous commitments and decisions favorable to Simon (1 Macc 15:26–27). At the same time, Antiochus VII demanded that Simon return the cities and areas won from the Seleucids and pay the taxes owed on profits obtained form illegally holding such property (1 Macc 15:28–31). On meeting with a refusal (1 Macc 15:32–35), Antiochus VII proceeded to launch armed operations in Judea, command over which he entrusted to a close aide, Cendebeus (1 Macc 15:38). The campaign ended in the Syrian's failure, his army crushed by Jewish forces under Simon's sons (1 Macc 15:38–16:10; Jos. *AJ* 13.225–227; *BJ* 1.51). For Judea, the victory secured several years of peace, only interrupted by the assassination of Simon and his sons by his son-in-law Ptolemy in 135 (1 Macc 16:11–17. 21; Jos. *AJ* 13.228–229).

Judea's internal affairs under Simon, much as they had been under Jonathan, stayed in the shadows of his struggle to strengthen the country's security from the Syrian threat. For this reason, it is difficult either to describe or to assess his internal policies. Some of Simon's achievements in this respect are inferred from the context of his other political endeavors. Especially notable is his embarking on the colonization of Gezer, the first Jewish colonization effort of such scale known to us. It involved complete removal of the city's previous population and transfer of their lands to Jewish settlers.[63] As a result of this policy, the city saw a thorough change in its ethnic character. Apart from its social and economic aspects, the settlement program also was clearly politically minded. With its location, Gezer was crucially important for Judea's security. No Jewish garrison, regardless of strength, could have held it if an enemy attack from outside had received support from the city's population. Lacking much more detailed information, we cannot be certain whether Gezer was the only colonizing effort ordered by Simon. Equally important for the security of Judea was Joppa, and it cannot be completely ruled out that there, too, he applied the same solution.[64] Apart from the nation's security, colo-

[61] 1 Macc 15:10; Ehling 1998b, 228 ff.

[62] Josephus (*AJ* 13.224) tells an altogether different version of events. In his story, the gifts offered by Simon in friendship were received by the Syrian king with great joy, allowing him to deliver necessary supplies to his troops besieging Tryphon at Dor.

[63] 1 Macc 13:47–48. The presence of Jewish inhabitants at Gezer is confirmed by archaeological remains (Seger 1977: 389 ff.; Reich 1981: 48 ff.; Shatzman 1991: 40–41 and n. 21, 53 and n. 73; Dever 1993: 506; Berlin 1997: 29; Weitzman 1999: 48–49) and epigraphic evidence: more than a dozen stone markers that staked out the area occupied by Jewish colonists, cf. Reich 1985: 71*; Rosenfeld 1988: 235-6; Reich 1990: 44 ff.; Reich/Greenhut 2002: 58–63. It is yet not certain that the stones come from Simon's time, although their dating to the Hasmonean period is much more likely that to Herod's time (Rosenfeld 1988: 236 ff. *contra* Reich 1990: 45–46; Schwartz 1990: 47 ff.). The resettlement done by Simon is invoked in a Greek graffiti discovered at Gezer: Seger 1977: 390.

[64] Like Gezer, Joppa did not have a Jewish population and for this reason the Jewish garrison removed inhabitants outside city walls when the fate of Tryphon's expedition against Jerusalem hung in the balance

nization had other advantages for the ruler: it helped him exercise more efficient rule over newly acquired territories and draw profits from their exploitation.[65] Other than politics and the economy, Simon's colonizing efforts also had an ideological dimension stemming from his inherent aversion to "others," i.e., non-Jewish inhabitants of Judea, whom he saw as a threat to native religion and custom. That dislike would repeatedly come to the fore later when the Hasmoneans took control over Judea. Simon's extremely hostile behavior toward "others" was continued by his successors.[66]

The first unquestionable pieces of evidence of a Hasmonean local administration at work come no later than the rule by Simon. One such center was the above-mentioned Gezer, where one of Simon's sons, John, permanently resided (1 Macc 13:53; 16:1.19.21). Another was Jericho, the administrative center of the surrounding area and a place where part of the Judean ruler's treasury was in safekeeping (1 Macc 16:11). The governor of the Jericho oasis was Simon's son-in-law, Ptolemy, the son of Abubus (1 Macc 16:11). Authority in both cities was exercised by members of Simon's family because they were his personal property. Apart from those two, there were other local administrative centers which allowed Simon to exercise effective control over the state's entire territory. That Judea under Simon possessed extensive state administration, both civilian and military, is proved by the "great assembly's" resolution. It granted him an exclusive right to appoint civilian and military officials (cf. 1 Macc 14:42). We also know that he exercised direct control over such officials as he traveled the country for inspection (cf. 1 Macc 16:14). The right to mete out justice both Hasmoneans, Jonathan and Simon, had enjoyed from the moment they took political leadership; that was in tune with Jewish tradition which considered it the ruler's privilege and obligation.[67]

Assuring the security of his state required of Simon many exertions and resources to expand his armed forces and develop a military infrastructure. The army Jonathan built in the few years of his rule may have numbered as many as several tens of thousands.[68] In the early years, he probably recruited his soldiers from among veterans of Judah's struggles. Later, having been formally recognized in 152 in his political position as high priest, he was able to expand his forces on a more systematic basis. Their final extent was determined not only be defensive needs, but also Jonathan's financial means which consisted of income from his own estates, revenues from Judea's population, and tax rebates obtained from successive Syrian kings or savings on overdue taxes. Another source of income was spoils captured in expeditions outside Judea, although it seems

(1 Macc 13:11). Retaining Joppa for its strategic (1 Macc 14: 34), but also economic, importance as Judea's port (1 Macc 14:5) was a priority for Simon (cf. 1 Macc 15:35). With that in mind, we may suppose that in order to reinforce Jewish presence in that city he may have sent there not just a garrison but also settlers (1 Macc 14: 34), cf. Berlin 1997: 23, 29.

[65] See Pastor 1997: 207 n. 89.

[66] Cf. Schwartz 1991: 16 ff.; Schwartz 1998: 30 ff.

[67] Cf. 1 Macc 9:73; Jos. *AJ* 13.34 (Jonathan); 1 Macc 14:14 (Simon).

[68] When Jonathan was setting out to face Tryphon, he commanded 40,000 soldiers (1 Macc 12:41). This is the highest number of his personnel known to us. In much earlier fighting against Apollonius, Demetrius I's general, he led a 10,000-strong corps (1 Macc 10: 74). The reliability of numbers quoted by our sources regarding the Hasmonean army is questioned by many scholars, but considering the human and material potential Jonathan then had at his disposal, there is no reason to believe such information is worthless. In this particular case, the numbers of Jewish troops could be substantiated by the state of current relations between Jonathan and Tryphon and by fears of an unexpected attack from Syria.

that that way of enriching the treasury lost its importance when Jonathan was forced to concentrate on defending his own territory.[69] Simon, too, faced a need to maintain a sizable army, what with ensuring the security of Judea itself and exercising control over captured territories. It therefore seems that Simon perhaps did not reduce the numerical strength of the army he had inherited from Jonathan. This is suggested by that fact that his development program of a system of strongholds and fortifications required great numbers of soldiers to man them. Moreover, Simon had to have at his disposal an army large enough to operate in the field. We do not know how that army was organized. Practical and economic considerations suggest that only a part was a standing army, the rest being militia called up when needed. Such an organizational structure is indicated by a mention that John, the son of Simon, when threatened by Cendebeus attacking, moved out to meet him with an army of 20,000 conscripts (1 Macc 16:4: καὶ ἐπέλεξεν ἐκ τῆς χώρας εἴκοσι χιλιάδας ἀνδρῶν πολεμιστν καὶ ἱππεῖς). We also know that in Simon's day the army included cavalry units, although beyond a mention of it being used in combat, nothing can be said about the formation (1 Macc 16:4. 7). The Jewish soldiers must have been skilled and the army well provided with engineering equipment to have been able to breach enemy fortifications with various siege engines.[70]

Regular service was provided by thousands-strong select units which most probably constituted Jonathan's and Simon's guards as they accompanied them in travels (1 Macc 12: 47; Jos. *AJ* 13.191) or were used for special tasks (1 Macc 11:44; 15:26; Jos. *AJ* 13.134). Under Jonathan, they numbered 3,000 men (1 Macc 11:44; 12:47). Their number corresponds to the size of a similar formation also kept by Judah Maccabee. If indeed Jonathan's guards were modeled after it, it would have meant the brothers continuing an institution begun during the rebellion. Following Jonathan's death, such units probably remained in service at Simon's side.[71]

Several mentions have been made above about the close link between the size of the army and Jonathan's and Simon's available resources, so their finances deserve a closer look. While possible sources of such revenue have already been listed, it is sill interesting to consider the question through the lens of various mentions made in that reference. Jonathan's and Simon's numerous political contacts with various partners were kept either through correspondence or in face-to-face meetings. Whichever the form, it was customary to present the partner with gifts. Generous gifts accompanied Simon's letter to Demetrius II (1 Macc 13: 37: τὸν στέφανον τὸν χρυσοῦν καὶ τῆν βαΐνην) as they did his legation to the Roman senate (1 Macc 14:24: ἀπέστειλεν Σιμων τὸν Νουμήνιον εἰς Ῥώμην ἔχοντα ἀσπίδα χρυσῆν μεγάλην ὁλκὴν μνῶν χιλίων...). Personal meetings involved even greater generosity in giving. This was required by the diplomatic protocol, the circumstances of a meeting, and desires to attain the respective participant's

[69] This supposition is based mainly on the number of mentions of spoils taken by his troops and does not mean that Jonathan himself or his men did not seize opportunities thus to enrich themselves, cf. 1 Macc 10:84. 87; 11:48. 51. 61; 12:31.

[70] In his attempt to capture Acra, Jonathan used ... μηχανὰς πολλάς (1 Macc 11:20), and in siege warfare at Gezer an ... ἐλεόπολιν (1 Macc 13:43). Cf. Shatzman 1989: 464–465.

[71] Cf. 1 Macc 15:26. Although the reference here is to only 2,000 soldiers, we must suppose that the rest remained at his side at the time. That the soldiers represented exceptional combat qualities is suggested by their description as ἄνδρες ... ἐκλεκτοί (1 Macc 9:5), or ἁνδρας ... δυνατοὺς (1 Macc 11:44), cf. Jos. *AJ* 13.134; Kasher 1991: 339–340. See also above chap. I, notes 88 and 98.

purpose. Donations were designed to make a good impression on the host, win his favor, and bear witness to the giver's affluence. They were an element of self-presentation and propaganda targeted at the host's court elite or, depending on place and circumstances, a wider local auditorium. We know that during his reign Jonathan met with Alexander Balas and Ptolemy VI (1 Macc 10:59–66), Demetrius II (1 Macc 11:24), and Tryphon (1 Macc 12:41–43). Accounts of the first two meetings include information about how Jonathan spared no gold or silver or other gifts to win the favor of the rulers he was visiting as well as their entourages. None of such mentions offers an estimate of the gifts' worth, but we can be certain it was considerable. No exact value is known of the gift sent to Antiochus VII when he was engaged in heavy combat with Tryphon, but if it included a troop of soldiers, a large amount of military materiel, gold, and silver (1 Macc 15:26: καὶ ἀπέστειλεν αὐτῷ Σιμων δισχιλίους ἄνδρας ἐκλεκτοὺς συμμαχῆσαι αὐτῷ καὶ ἀργύριον καὶ χρυσίον καὶ σκεύη ἱκανά), it must have amounted to a truly royal gift. Although the offer was rejected, the very fact that the Judean was able to dispatch it of his own accord, without noticeable detriment to his resources, speaks for itself. We may add that the event came to pass some time after Simon paid 100 talents to Tryphon as ransom for his brother (1 Macc 13:19), and on top of past and current military expenditure whose value remains unknown to us (cf. 1 Macc 14:31). Before that, Jonathan had incurred the high cost of creating and equipping an army – from his personal wealth (1 Macc 10:21). Simon, too, had ample treasury as is suggested by his readiness to pay 100 talents to Antiochus VII as compensation for lost income from Gezer and Joppa (1 Macc 15:35). As another indication of Simon's great wealth, an envoy of Antiochus VII to Jerusalem was surprised to see the furnishings of his residence there (1 Macc 15:32: καὶ εἶδεν τὴν δόζαν Σιμωνος καὶ κυλικεῖον μετὰ χρυσωμάτων καὶ ἀργυρωμάτων καὶ παράστασιν ἱκανὴν καὶ ἐξίστατο...; cf. 36). The sheer maintenance of such riches required a suitably protected place. Its existence is confirmed for Simon's rule. We know that there existed in Jerusalem a treasury which also housed copies of important documents.[72]

In Hasmonean history of the period in question, one of the crucial events – apart from Jonathan's appointment as high priest in the Jerusalem temple – was no doubt the resolution of the "great assembly" which defined the extent of Simon's personal rule, its implementation, and his succession. The momentous event has already been mentioned and will be the subject of a separate discussion further on. Another privilege the resolution granted to Simon also deserves note: he was given the right to use special attributes of his rank in society, i.e., to wear purple cloth and gold adornment.[73] The origins of those symbols in Jewish context had a short but fairly peculiar history. They had no doubt been borrowed from the Hellenistic world. There they stood for royalty, shared by kings with their closest associates and loyal vassals as a sign of the highest grace. In the first instance, a purple robe and a gold crown were used by Alexander Balas to honor Jonathan. This excep-

[72] Cf. 1 Macc 14:49. In the context of Simon's finances, we may as well note a mention of the great fortune of Ptolemy, the governor of Jericho. His possession of it resulted from his being Simon's son-in-law (1 Macc 16:11). It therefore stands to reason that the wealth had come to Ptolemy in his wife's dowry. It could be another suggestion to confirm that Simon possessed a great personal fortune.

[73] 1 Macc 14:43: καὶ ὅπως περιβάλληται πορφύραν καὶ χρυσοφορῇ (cf. 1 Macc 14: 44). We can guess that in regard to gold, the law applied to the wearing of all kinds of gold items of official dress: agraffes, pins, etc. (cf. 1 Macc 10:89; 14:44).

tional gift from a Syrian king came with Jonathan's appointment to the high priesthood of the Jerusalem temple (1 Macc 10:18). Again Jonathan received it from the same king in a public ceremony in the presence of king Ptolemy VI of Egypt during their meeting in Ptolemais (1 Macc 10:62). The same gifts were probably offered to him by Demetrius II.[74] By contrast, Simon never received a similar present from any Seleucid. The act of the "great assembly" granting him a right to use such symbols may therefore seem difficult to understand. Not only were they of alien origin, but in effect they, in some sense, pointed to Judea's dependence on the Seleucids. Simon's acceptance clearly indicates that such politically-inspired mental associations meant no major obstacle to him.

An explanation for Simon's attitude must be sought in the situation in which he had found himself. For the first time in Israel's history, the highest religious function and the supreme secular power had converged in a single person. High priesthood was symbolized by ceremonial liturgical vestments donned on occasions prescribed by the religious calendar. In a secular role, Simon could not use them, and since he frequently had to perform his duties in public, he needed recognizable attributes proper for secular authority to emphasize his position in the state. It was only natural for him to borrow symbolism from Hellenistic monarchies. Any possible undesirable associations involved in the use of such symbols could be cleverly dismissed with the argument that the symbols that had been presented to Jonathan were tantamount to recognition of his status in Judea.[75] Such an interpretation is acceptable because the act which recognized Jonathan's high standing in relations with Syrian kings was accompanied by various concessions and tax exemptions extended by Syria to inhabitants of Judea. Seen in this light, the purple cloak and the gold adornment need not have aroused unwanted associations in Jewish society. Still, Hasmonean practice differed from its Hellenistic source in one point. In Hellenistic monarchies, the wearing of purple vestments with gold trimmings was not codified. The natural limitation in availability of such articles was the sheer cost of the dyed fabric. For this reason, purple robes indicated the wearer's high social status, often also testimony to his membership in the political elite, in the king's intimate circle.[76] By contrast, in Judea, the privilege to wear purple and gold was legally restricted to Simon and his successors.[77]

[74] Cf. 1 Macc 11:26–27. Although the quoted passage lists in a bundle all honors Jonathan received, at the same time it mentions that he was given the same distinctions he had received from Alexander Balas. This implies that those included purple cloth and a gold crown.

[75] The practice of wearing purple vestments goes back to the second millennium BCE, although at first such raiment was a symbol of luxury rather than of power. Their particular significance and symbolic meaning did not come about until the Neo-Assyrian empire, and later at the time of the Achaemenid empire, when the wearing of purple vestments by Persian kings made purple a symbol of royalty. Purple was also known in the Greek world, but it did not become a royal symbol until, and from, the time of Alexander of Macedon, who was following Achaemenid court practices in this respect. After Alexander's death, the custom of wearing purple was taken up by rulers of his empire's splinter states. For more on the subject, see Reinhold 1970: 7 ff., esp. 29–36 (also there a bibliography).

[76] Cf. Reinhold 1970: 34 ff.

[77] 1 Macc 14:43. In no event can we accept the position taken by M. Reinhold (1970: 35–36), who would have Demetrius I issue the privilege: "Likewise, King Demetrius when he confirmed Simon as high priest of the Jews, granted similar insignia [i.e. A purple cloak and gold crown]. In this last instance we are also informed that Demetrius confirmed to Simon that 'no other should be clothed in purple or wear a golden clasp' (I Macc 14:44–45). If this was indeed the actual royal decree of Demetrius, it would appear to be the first recorded restrictive measure banning the use of purple by all but the ruling authority; (…)]."

The above remarks on Jonathan's and Simon's rule suggest that their political purposes and methods of achieving them differed radically from those of Mattathias and Judah Maccabee. Religious inspirations and a fighting ethos had been replaced by political pragmatism in painstaking, persistent pursuit to strengthen and sanction their leadership both at home and in relations with Syrian kings. Such pragmatism was not equally welcomed or understood by all groups in Judea's society. Ambivalent attitudes existed toward such policies by both Hasmoneans, one indication of which was the appearance of religious groups which not only contested their leadership, but also unflaggingly demonstrated their opposition to their methods of government. The roots of such opposition are the result of a deep disappointment with the Hasmoneans' stance in circles expecting from them absolute faithfulness to the ideas that guided the Jews, when they rose against the Hellenistic religious reform. The disappointment is understandable in the context of the eschatological expectations voiced by such groups, and apocalyptic moods prevailing in at least some of them. Yet such attitudes did not meet with wider understanding; on the contrary, they could be greeted with hostile reactions. In response, some of these communities renounced interest in temporal matters, the future of the Jerusalem temple and of Judea at large, instead choosing self-imposed social and religious isolation, rejection and denial of traditional Judaism's primary institutions and symbols as compromised and belonging to a world they contrasted with their own new world.[78] This situation caused a deep rift between the part of society that held religious values as paramount and those who supported a political pursuit of independence, guided by their own self-interest since their support of Hasmonean efforts afforded them a share in their economic and political successes.

When Judah Maccabee died, the situation in Judea was completely different from what it had been when the Hasmoneans had begun their rebellion against the Seleucids and their followers. Thanks to Judah, the rebellion's principal religious purposes had been achieved and continued even after his death. The fact that Hasmonean supporters elected Jonathan to succeed Judah meant not only their desire to continue their struggle, but a decision to entrust also political leadership to that family. Of Jonathan they probably primarily expected defense against their victorious adversaries, i.e., the Hellenists, and against actions by their supporter Bacchides; next they wished him to continue the past struggle (1 Macc 9:29–30). The first of those expectations – considering the situation in which Hasmonean supporters then found themselves – was plain and obvious, but the second invites the question of how Jonathan's followers understood the purposes of further struggle. Unfortunately, an answer is impossible, what with lacking evidence to throw light on this issue and the changes triggered by developments in the Seleucid state provoked by recurring struggles between pretenders to the Syrian throne. Those developments opened before Jonathan new prospects that sidelined earlier intents, push-

[78] The Qumran community was one of those religious groups which created a comprehensive and fully original vision of social and religious order which was distinct from that existing in Judea at the time. Its reconstruction is possible thanks to our knowledge of the community's basic doctrinal documents: the *Damascus Document*, the *Community Rule*, the *Temple Scroll*, cf. Schmidt 2001: 138–197. Many other documents of a similar type show differences in presenting the community's accepted views and principles, causing some scholars to doubt their Qumran origin, cf. García Martínez 1996: xlix ff.; Wacholder 2007: 4.

ing them into oblivion. As Judea's leader, Jonathan confronted a unique opportunity to win official recognition of his position and considerably enlarge his political independence. He skillfully and successfully conducted a political game to maximize his gains from rivalries between Syrian pretenders, while his willingness to cooperate with outside partners increased his effectiveness. Jonathan's pragmatic approach to relations with neighbors is in stark contrast[79] to the attitude adopted by Judah Maccabee in this respect.[8080] Perhaps it was Jonathan's style of action, apart from any religious considerations, that gave his opponents grounds to criticize him.

No major change occurred when Simon rose to power. Despite perceptible differences, Simon's rule can be considered in many ways a continuation of his brother's policy. In foreign policy, Simon achieved objectives that had been beyond Jonathan's reach. He brought about a complete removal of any formal signs of dependence on the Seleucids: he captured Beth-zur and Acra, and obtained exemption from all fiscal levies for the Syrian king. He also succeeded in slightly extending Judea's borders to include territories that may not have been as large as they were important strategically and economically: the cities of Gezer and Joppa. His unprecedented decisions about the Hellenized populations of those cities set new standards in dealing with "others," a reflection of a drive to create a state that would be uniform ethnically, religiously, and culturally. Once he had removed from Judea the last Syrian garrisons and larger Hellenist groups, he succeeded in achieving that aim (cf. 1 Macc 14:36).

[79] Shatzman 2006: 242 ff.
[80] Cf. Smith 1978: 1–7; Schwartz 1991: 33-8; Shatzman 2006: 239–242, 252–258.

3. John Hyrcanus: Securing Independence and the Rise of Expansionist Policy

Simon's work to build his state's structures was violently interrupted by his death in an assassination instigated by his son-in-law Ptolemy, the son of Abubus. The latter had formed a conspiracy to murder all members of the Hasmonean family and take over rule of Judea (cf. 1 Macc 16:13–20). His will to power was so great that he went so far as to ask the Syrian king for help and was even willing to become his vassal (1 Macc 16:13.18). The plan failed because John, the son of Simon, then at Gezer, was warned of the danger and took steps to stop Ptolemy. The first, decisive step was to take control of the capital. With Jerusalem in his hands, John could officially claim the role of high priest and political leader after his father. Although such power landed in his lap quite unexpectedly, he was nonetheless quite well prepared to exercise it. He owed his knowledge of managing people and making decisions to his father, who had in due time entrusted to him command of the army (1 Macc 13:53). He had gained valuable experience in victorious campaign against a Syrian army under Cendebeus (1 Macc 16:2–3). It is not known whether Ptolemy's attempt met with any wider response in Judea's society. His imminent defeat and flight from the country seem to corroborate John's considerable popularity and the support he enjoyed among his subjects. Nonetheless, Ptolemy's plot must be seen as a clear sign of tensions existing in the ruling elites. After all, he managed to secure support from some among the military[1] and to keep his plans in strict secrecy – all of which may suggest that Ptolemy's plotting did not meet with as much resolute opposition as might be expected.[2]

Several months into the reign of John, who went on to be called John Hyrcanus in historiography[3] – Judea faced a serious conflict with Antiochus VII.[4] The Syrian

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[1] Most likely he was only supported by troops he commanded as governor of Jericho. He won their loyalty by promising them material gains. The author of 1 Macc does not once use phrases about Ptolemy's men that would suggest that they came from among traditional supporters of the Hasmoneans. That the Hasmonean army remained loyal is suggested by failed attempts by Ptolemy to bribe its commanding officers: 1 Macc 16:19.

[2] Cf. Sievers 1990: 130–131, 133–134.

[3] How he acquired that nickname is not known. Christian authors link it with his part in Antiochus VII's Parthian expedition: Synkellos, p. 419. 424; Fischer 1970: 40–41; Schwartz 1990: 3–4. Yet the association is not certain for the name was known in Judea even before that event, cf. Ilan 1987: 1–2, 4.

[4] Scholars usually date the start of John Hyrcanus' rule at 134. Such dating seems optimal as sources contain chronological data that are difficult to reconcile: many problems arise out of those supplied by 1 Macc. The reason is the chronological system (or systems) used by its author. According to one hypothesis, for events in the Seleucid state he uses the Seleucid era beginning in April 311, based on the so-called Babylonian calendar. For events within Judea, also dated according to that era, the beginning is October 312, calculated according to the so-called Macedonian calendar. Both calendars coincided only partially, which leads to grave problems in precise dating of many events related to the Hasmonean rule. More difficulties arise from dates quoted by Josephus and Porphyry (*FGH*, No. 260, F 32.18). Josephus in his narrative tries at times to correlate events in Jewish history with other chronological systems (the Olympic era and Roman

king took advantage of the precarious position facing the new Judean leader. Although sources do not point to a direct link between the king's expedition and Ptolemy's request for help, the domestic situation in the Jewish state provided Antiochus VII with a unique opportunity to restore his rule over the defiant land. Earlier, Antiochus VII himself had been in a tight spot as he battled Tryphon and, having thus engaged a large force in the struggle, he had to consent to the political independence of the then strong Simon. The latter's unexpected death gave Antiochus hope to restore his sway over Judea. This conformed to his policy to rebuild erstwhile Seleucid power. The official reason given for Antiochus VII's expedition against Judea was to punish Simon's previous insubordination and disrespect (Jos. *BJ* 1.61; *AJ* 13. 236). Syrian military action was probably aimed at several targets at once. One part of the force attacked Gezer and Joppa, while the rest, under the personal command of the king, assaulted Jerusalem. The months-long siege that ensued fully bore out the effectiveness of Simon's fortification work. However, after an almost year-long siege, provisions ran short and the defenders were forced to negotiate.[5] John Hyrcanus demanded that Judea have its traditional political system restored. This may sound surprising as the country's inhabitants had long regained all their traditional rights and liberties though the efforts of the Hasmoneans.[6] It may be that Josephus distorted the sense of this condition, while in reality it may have concealed a demand for a guarantee that the existing state of affairs be maintained, complete with the Hasmoneans still at the helm.[7] Antiochus VII's terms were not too excessive: an end to hostilities, payment of outstanding tribute on the cities captured by the Hasmoneans, a return of Gezer and Joppa, and Hasmonean consent to Syrian military presence in Jerusalem (Jos. *AJ* 13.246). The last condition was particularly difficult for John to accept for political and religious reasons. His perseverance combined with Antiochus' readiness to make concessions finally yielded a mutually advantageous compromise: the Syrian king relinquished setting up his garrison in Jerusalem, satisfying himself with accepting hostages and a tribute (Diodorus 34.1.5; Jos. *AJ* 13.247. 250). In return, he demanded that the city's defenses be demolished, to which John Hyrcanus agreed.[8]

consular dating), but his attempts do not always produce desired results. Nonetheless, his dating of John Hyrcanus' rise to power (*AJ* 13.236) lends itself to verification thanks to a papyrus document containing references to developments in the first months of Alexander Jannaeus' rule (cf. Clarysse/Winnicki 1989: 50 ff., no. 3). This source as well as the date of Antiochus VII's coins issued in Jerusalem (cf. VanderKam 2004: 288) supply valid arguments in favor of the date 135/134 Josephus says John Hyrcanus ascended to power. To accept this date as correct is to shift the dating of the rule of some Hasmoneans – from Simon's death to Alexander Jannaeus' ascent – forward by at least one year: Cohen 1989b: 118–121. According to Porphyry, Antiochus VII's attack came about in the third year of the 162nd Olympiad, i.e., 130/129. Attempts to iron out chronological discrepancies between Josephus and Porphyry encounter great difficulty, cf. Ehling 1998b: 236–237.

[5] Jos. *BJ* 1.61; *AJ* 13.237–241. It is thanks to information concerning Jewish religious feasts as passed on in accounts quoted that we can measure the actual duration of the siege: Sievers 1990: 136; Ehling 1998b: 237–238, 240. Material traces of the struggles fought – projectiles and remnants of arrows – were unearthed in excavations in Jerusalem's citadel: Shatzman 1989: 463–464; Berlin 1997: 30; Sivan/Solar 2000: 173–175.

[6] Jos. *AJ* 13.245: τὴν πάτριον αὐτοῖς πολιτείαν ἀποδοῦναι; cf. 2 Macc 11:25.

[7] Bikerman 1938: 135 ff.; Sievers 1990: 137.

[8] Cf. Diodorus 34.1.5; Jos. *AJ* 13.247; Plut., *Regum et Imperatorum Apophthegmata* 184E-F; Porphyry, *FGH*, No. 260, F 32.18; cf. also Lichtenstein 1931/1932: 287–288; Fischer 1970: 70–71; Fischer 1975b: 191 ff.; Rajak 1981: 71–72 (= Rajak 2002: 87–88); Ehling 1998b: 238 ff. Contrary to T. Rajak's contention

The treaty thus concluded surprisingly lacks any reference to John Hyrcanus' formal status. None of our sources touches on this issue, which suggests that Antiochus VII unquestioningly accepted John's standing.[9] Apart from those outlined above, the treaty between both rulers also contained other clauses as implied by known facts. They add up to the conclusion that John Hyrcanus' standing *vis-ŕ-vis* Syria was weaker compared to what his brother Simon had enjoyed (cf. Iust. 36.1.10). There can be no doubt that in agreeing to hand over hostages, pay tribute, and pull down Jerusalem's walls, John Hyrcanus was acknowledging his subordination to the Syrian king. That Antiochus VII desisted from trying to install a Syrian garrison in Jerusalem changed nothing in the new arrangement of mutual relations. A visible sign of dependence, a mint was opened in Jerusalem issuing coin with the name of the Syrian king,[10] and John Hyrcanus with his troops joined Antiochus in an expedition against the Parthians in 131–129.[11] Also,

(1981: 72 ff., 80–81 = 2002: 88 ff., 96–97), neither the circumstances nor the terms of the truce offer any grounds to maintain that Rome had any impact on their shape, cf. also Fischer 1970: 70 ff.; Giovannini/Müller 1971: 156 ff., 171; Fischer 1974: 90 ff.; Fischer 1981: 144; Will 1982: 412; Sievers 1990: 138–139; Mandell 1991: 218 ff.; Schwartz 1991: 18–19; Ehling 1998b: 240 n. 103; Shatzman 1999, 70–71.

[9] Sievers 1990: 141.

[10] Houghton 1983: 83–84 and no. 831-834; *SNG* Israel I, no. 2133-50; Houghton/Lorber/Hoover 2008: 391–392, no. 2123. Based on dates seen on the coins, they were most probably struck in 133(?)–130, i.e., from the lifting of the siege of Jerusalem to the start of Antiochus VII's Parthian expedition. Bearing on the obverse a lily rather than the king's likeness, a figure characteristic for Jewish symbolism – in biblical tradition a lily symbolizes Israel (Hos 14:5; Song of Songs 5:24. W. Wirgin (1972: 107, 109) points to an altogether different source) – the coins can by no means be seen as John Hyrcanus' own initiative to improve relations with Antiochus VII. It is doubtful that he should have organized and launched a mint without formal permission from the king or (equally important) independently chosen coin imagery. On the reverse, an image of an inverted anchor – a symbol common to Seleucid coinage – and its accompanying legend in Greek suggest that the coins struck in Jerusalem were issued under the supervision of Antiochus VII's officials, cf. Bikerman 1938: 219, 223, 228; Meshorer 2001: 31. Considering the circumstances in which the Jerusalem mint commenced operation, the classification of those issues by C. Augé (1989: 160) as belonging to city coinage must be considered incorrect. It is similarly difficult to accept his suggestion (1989: 157) that the Jerusalem mint sporadically turned out bronzes also under Antiochus VIII and Antiochus IX, as no evidence is available to support this opinion. It may be worth noting that an inverted anchor would reappear only once, on coins of Alexander Jannaeus (Wirgin 1973: 145–148; Mc Lean 1981: 153 ff.; Jacobson 2000: 73 ff., 80; Meshorer 2001: 36–39, 209–211). Existing interpretations have linked the anchor especially with the king obtaining access to the sea coast (cf. Meshorer 2001: 37). There is also a hypothesis that the symbol was intended to lend legitimacy to Alexander Jannaeus' political position as a successor to the Seleucids (Jacobson 2000: 80; Hoover 2003a: 58). However, the hypothesis raises many doubts. If the inverted anchor so helped justify Alexander Jannaeus' position, then why did none of his predecessors or successors use it for the same purpose? We need to bear in mind that previously the use of that particular design on coins issued in the name of Antiochus VII Sidetes might have brought to the Judeans associations with foreign domination and subjection to Syrian kings. Moreover, Alexander Jannaeus did not have to resort to thus emphasizing his right to the throne if he was given it on the strength of a decree passed by Judeans honoring Simon in 140 (1 Macc 14:25–49): van Henten 2001: 131 ff.; Krentz 2001: 151. Among speculations as to why Alexander Jannaeus used the Seleucid inverted anchor design on coins, an interesting hypothesis was proposed by Mc Lean (1981: 153–154). In his opinion, the symbol was used on the coinage of the Judean king as part of gradual replacement in monetary circulation of Syrian coins, which bore it on the reverses, with similar Judean coinage. There is another possible explanation of the practice: it may have reflected the king's desire to use symbolism associated with royal power for his own purposes.

[11] Jos. *AJ* 13.250–251. Josephus' reference, based on Nicolaus of Damascus, is the only one to record John Hyrcanus' part in the expedition. For more on Antiochus VII's Parthian expedition, see Fischer 1970: 29 ff.

Syria's king retained the cities of Joppa and Gezer with their neighboring territories (cf. Jos. *AJ* 13.261).

Even though John Hyrcanus was one of the longest-reigning Hasmoneans, the dearth of sources leaves us with only limited knowledge about the subsequent years of his rule. What outline of historical facts about the period we have we owe solely to Josephus Flavius. However, in recent years, much new knowledge has accrued thanks mainly to archaeological discoveries. They have supplied information that casts an all-new light on the chronology of selected events relating to John's rule.

Making peace with Antiochus VII did not stop John Hyrcanus from pursuing diplomatic action against him in Rome. This happened probably soon after the Syrian king withdrew from Jerusalem. Such attempts may have been designed to renew mutual relations with Rome while at the same time persuading the Romans to pressure Antiochus VII to return the cities he had captured and to pay damages for the plunder he had perpetrated in Judea. The effects were unimpressive. While the Romans declared readiness to maintain mutual relations, their promises of support for John Hyrcanus' territorial and financial claims were non-committal.[12] John's embassy to Rome did not in any way affect his co-belligerent obligations to Antiochus VII as regarding a planned Syrian action against the Parthians (Jos. *AJ* 13.250–252). The expedition went into effect in 131, but with Antiochus VII committing many serious mistakes, it ended in his defeat and death in 129. Unfortunately, we do not know the number and composition of John Hyrcanus' troops in the expedition, nor how many returned with him to Judea.

Josephus writes that John Hyrcanus, on hearing of Antiochus VII's death, took advantage of the absence of Syrian garrisons in the cities of Transjordan, Samaria, and Idumea to seize them (*BJ* 1.62–68; *AJ* 13.254–258). In quoting Josephus' account, some scholars believe that it was possible because John Hyrcanus returned from the Parthian expedition before its end.[13] There are no grounds to accept this hypothesis as true, if only because the outcome of the expedition did not become clear until spring 129. It is difficult to imagine that before its conclusion the Syrian king would allow John Hyrcanus or any other vassal ruler to return to his country.[14] The picture of events as painted

[12] Extant accounts suggest that in the first two years of John Hyrcanus' rule, the Roman senate at least twice passed decrees concerning Judea. The first dates probably to the years 134–132 (Jos. *AJ* 13.259-66; Shatzman 1999: 66–67), the second is several years later (Jos. *AJ* 14.145–148; Giovannini/Müller 1971: 160 ff., esp. 165; Timpe 1974: 147–148; Shatzman 1999: 69–70; VanderKam 2004: 294. An isolated view is offered by T. Fischer (1970: 97–98, 100; 1974, 90 ff.; 1981, 143), who dates the resolution at 139 owing to the name included therein of praetor Valerius Flaccus. Despite arguments he offers in favor of his proposed dating, the identity of the official in question remains uncertain.

[13] Cf. Fischer 1970: 56; Kasher 1990: 119–120, and n. 11; Barag 1992/1993: 3. They base their assertion of John Hyrcanus' earlier return from Media solely on rather vague wording used by Josephus in his *Antiquitates* (*AJ* 13.254; cf. *BJ* 1.62) and on his allegation that the Judean ruler refrained from fighting the Parthians. Such ambiguities seem to stem from poor quality of records rather than from established facts: Pucci 1983: 13–14. The tradition preserved in the *Josippon* about secret contacts John Hyrcanus maintained with the Parthian king is difficult to verify (cf. Pucci 1983: 13 ff.; Sievers 1990: 140–141). Theoretically, such contacts might be possible but only when the Judean troops were operating independently from the rest of Antiochus VII's force. What Josephus (*AJ* 13.251–252) quotes from Nicolaus of Damascus clearly suggests that the Judean contingent was part of the main Syrian force, an arrangement that certainly limited opportunities to establish and maintain such contacts.

[14] Fischer 1970: 56; Bar-Kochva 1989: 560, 561–562.

by Josephus, although basically true, refers in fact to a much later period.[15] We may surmise that it resulted partly from selective and none too careful use of his available sources, and partly from a conscious desire to play down John Hyrcanus' subordination to the Syrian king by exaggerating John's successes. Such a desire is confirmed by a highly laudatory description of John Hyrcanus in the *Bellum Judaicum* summing up his rule and his conquests (Jos. *BJ* 1.68–69).

The defeat of Antiochus VII in Parthia caused serious political turmoil in Syria. It was caused by the appearance in Antioch first of Demetrius II (ca. 130–125),[16] and slightly later of another pretender to the throne, Alexander II Zebinas (128–123), who was supported by Ptolemy VIII of Egypt.[17] It must have been struggles between them that prompted John Hyrcanus to attempt to carve out more independence for himself. His attempts might also have included some action beyond Judea, although its extent could not have been anywhere near what Josephus claims.[18] In this context, it cannot be ruled out that Demetrius II planned some retaliatory measures against the unruly Judean which never materialized (Jos. *AJ* 13. 267). Also Alexander II Zebinas, preoccupied as he was by his struggle with Demetrius II, did not take any action against John. Indeed, the two went on to establish friendly relations (φιλία) (Jos. *AJ* 13.269). What it meant in practice was a sanctioning of the existing state of affairs. It was not until more than a decade later that Judea attracted the interest of Antiochus VIII Grypus (123–197),[19] whom Josephus reports to have started preparations to move out against

[15] John Hyrcanus' conquests are presented by Josephus on three separate occasions. Each account differs in detail from the others, cf. *BJ* 1.62–68; *AJ* 13.254–258, 275–281. For example, two different reasons are given for the attack on Samaria: cf. *AJ* 13.254 (*BJ* 1.64) and *AJ* 13.275. Archaeological excavations in the city of Samaria have revealed that some details in the account of its capture do not conform to actuality, cf. Dąbrowa 2007: 456–457. Archaeological discoveries have radically changed our understanding of the chronology of John Hyrcanus' conquests and his rule after 129, therefore most proposed historical reconstruction and chronological findings based purely on Josephus account have lost their validity, cf. Kasher 1990: 119 ff.; Magen 2007: 193. See also below p. 000 and n. 25–30.

[16] Jos. *AJ* 13.253; App. *Syr.* 68; Iust. 38.10.7; 39.1.1. His expedition against the Parthians in 139-138 having failed, he found himself prisoner of Phraates II (Dąbrowa 1999: 1 ff.). The Parthian king later married him off to his own daughter, planning to use him to further his own political plans *vis-ŕ-vis* the Seleucids (cf. Dąbrowa 1992: 49–50). Demetrius was freed as Antiochus VII invaded Parthian territory to engage in sabotage in Syria and thus to force him to withdraw.

[17] Iust. 39.1.4–6; Jos. *AJ* 13.268; Wilcken 1893b: 1438–1439, no. 23; Grainger 1997: 7.

[18] Of the long list of John Hyrcanus' conquests given by Josephus, in that period no more than attempts may have been made to capture some cities in Transjordan (cf. Jos. *BJ* 1. 63; *AJ* 13.255). For attempted reconstructions of events dated at John Hyrcanus' early rule, see Schwartz 1991: 17 ff.; Bar-Kochva 1996: 124 ff., 291; Ehling 1998a: 141–149. It is not impossible that at that time (different dates are favored by respective scholars) John Hyrcanus renewed diplomatic attempts to regain lands lost during Antiochus VII's invasion: Jos. *AJ* 13. 260–266; Giovannini/Müller 1971: 157 ff.; Fischer 1970: 64ff.; Fischer 1974: 90, 93; Fischer 1981: 144; Sievers 1990: 138; VanderKam 2004: 293–294. Probably also soon after 129 he rebuilt Jerusalem's defensive walls (cf. 1 Macc 16:23): Bar-Kochva 1989: 162–163 and n. 31. However, the hypothesis must be firmly rejected that he launched an expedition at that time into Samaria against the Mount Gerizim temple, cf. VanderKam 2004: 292 (referring to Jos. *AJ* 13.256). In the light of available data on the actual date the sanctuary was destroyed, what Josephus cites as a "round" anniversary of the event sounds more like a literary figure of speech than a faithful reckoning.

[19] Jos. *AJ* 13.269–270; App. *Syr.* 68–69; Wellmann 1894: 2480–2483, no. 31; Grainger 1997: 31–32; Ehling 1998a: 149 ff.; Hoover 2007: 284 ff., 300–301. In the period 123–121, Antiochus VIII Grypus ruled jointly with his mother Cleopatra Thea. He owed the Syrian throne to her support and that of her brother Ptolemy VIII of Egypt.

John Hyrcanus (ca. 115/114) (Jos. *AJ* 13.270). Such plans were effectively thwarted by Antiochus IX Cyzicenus's[20] claim to the Syrian throne in 113. Once again, the Seleucid state was plunged for years in fratricidal fighting. This being so, both pretenders to the throne were too busy trying to destroy each other to care to intervene in Judean affairs (cf. Jos. *AJ* 13.272–273). In this situation, John Hyrcanus enjoyed impunity as he completely freed Judea from Syrian dominance and stopped respecting the limitations once imposed on him by Antiochus VII.[21] We do not know what happened with the Jewish hostages taken by the king as an assurance of Judean loyalty. What is surprising is that despite such favorable circumstances, John did not pursue more vigorous diplomatic activity. We only know that perhaps at that time he sent another envoy to Rome to seek support in regaining the areas seized by Antiochus VII. This time, the mission was successful, resulting in the Roman senate's resolution commanding Antiochus IX to return the contentious territories.[22] No evidence suggests that either claimant to the Syrian throne sought John's favor or support.

Although our sources devote little attention to pretenders to the Seleucid throne, not all of them were marginal figures. Evidence from their coinage (and new coins discoveries) show a much more complex picture of the distribution of powers in Syria and Palestine at the time than Josephus Flavius and other authors would have us believe. From such finds we learn that Antiochus IX, at the height of his success (114–112), controlled vast areas of the Near East from Tel Beersheva as far as Cilicia, including Idumea and Samaria. He owed his successes to the aid of Egyptian kings who had previously supported Antiochus VIII.[23] With such powerful backing, he did not have to ingratiate himself with

[20] Jos. *AJ* 13.271–272; App. *Syr.* 68; Iust. 39.2.10. Antiochus IX Cyzicenus ruled in 113–195: Wilcken 1894: 2483–2484, no. 32; Grainger 1997: 32–33; Hoover 2007: 284 ff., 300.

[21] Jos. *AJ* 13.273; cf. Iust. 36.3.9; Barag 1992/1993: 10–11. It seems that it was at that point that John began issuing his own coin, cf. Kanael 1950/51: 174–175; Fischer 1970: 63; Ben-David 1972: 96, 99. A. Ben-David finds the reasons for this decision mainly in the economy, as such bronze pieces were fairly frequently issued to serve local markets in various lands of the Syrian empire. His view was questioned by A. Kushnir-Stein (2001). F. De Saulcy's hypothesis (proposed back in the 19th century), according to which John Hyrcanus struck his first coins during the reign of Alexander II Zebinas or Antiochus VIII Grypus, is unconvincing (cf. Barag/Qedar 1980: 18 n. 56; Barag 1992/1993: 10; Meshorer 2001: 42). The presence of the Greek letter 'A' on coins of John Hyrcanus, classified by Y. Meshorer as group A, need not be thought an initial of the Syrian ruler's name. Such an interpretation is contradicted by presence of an 'A' also on coins classified as groups B and C (Meshorer 2001: 43, 202–203). Since other letters also appear on John Hyrcanus' coins, it should be assumed that there is no connection there with his current political position versus the Seleucids. For more on disputes about the beginnings of Hasmonean coinage, see Kanael 1950/1951: 170 ff.; Kanael 1963: 43–44; Ben-David 1972: 93 ff.; Meshorer 1974: 59 ff.; Barag/Qedar 1980: 8–19; Meshorer 1990/1991: 106; Meshorer 2001: 23 ff.

[22] Jos. *AJ* 14.247–255; Fischer 1970: 73–81; Giovannini/Müller 1971: 156–157, 171; Timpe 1974: 148; Fischer 1974: 93; Fischer 1981: 144; Sievers 1990: 138–139; VanderKam 2004: 294. The document is usually dated at 114–103, although some scholars believe that it was composed about 113/12, cf. Bar-Kochva 1996: 232; Shatzman 1999: 67 ff.; VanderKam 2004: 294. Nothing is known about the recipient's response to this resolution by the Roman senate. Josephus' silence about it may imply that it remained a dead letter. To John Hyrcanus, however, it was a valuable act as it formally confirmed his rights to contested territories, which he most probably succeeded in reclaiming on his own after 111, when Antiochus IX had lost control over Palestine, cf. Jos. *AJ* 13.395; Fischer 1970: 82.

[23] Egypt was then ruled by Cleopatra III and Ptolemy IX Lathyrus. For how they supported Syrian pretenders, see Höbl 2004: 187; Dąbrowa 2007: 450 ff. For a presentation of the political situation in Syria at the time, see Cohen 1989a: 15 ff.

John Hyrcanus, whose contribution in any case would have meant little to him.[24] Even if Antiochus VIII had tried to secure Jewish support, he was cut off from Judea by a wide belt of Samarian territory controlled by Antiochus IX. In this situation, all John Hyrcanus could do was to watch developments passively and observe keenly. Since John behaved similarly toward the rivalry between Demetrius II and Alexander II Zabinas, and again between Alexander II and Antiochus VIII Grypus, we may conclude that, politically independent or not, he did not have sufficient force at the time to risk a conflict with either party, especially if it enjoyed Egyptian support. Confined to the sidelines, John Hyrcanus nevertheless refused to stay idle. He used the peaceful spell to accumulate resources he could use to further his own cause as soon as opportunity arose (cf. Jos. *AJ* 13.273).

At a point we may think the least opportune, when Antiochus IX's power was at the zenith, John Hyrcanus entered a territory the Syrian king controlled. The course of events suggests that he had made careful preparations for the campaign. It began at the height of the struggles between Antiochus VIII and Antiochus IX, when both engaged a majority of their troops, stripping some areas of their military garrisons.[25] The Judean waged war in several places at the same time and continued warfare, with varying intensity, for the next several years. Such large war effort was possible because John had gathered a large force and divided command between himself and his two sons: Antigonus and Aristobulus (cf. Jos. *BJ* 1.64–65; *AJ* 13.276–277. 282). Operations focused on Idumea and Samaria (Jos. *BJ* 1.63–66; *AJ* 13.255–257. 275–281). The chronology of John Hyrcanus' conquests can be reconstructed based on fragments of imported Greek ceramics and coins obtained from excavations in the antique cities of Marisa, Shechem, Samaria, Scythopolis, on Mount Gerizim, and elsewhere.[26]

Major targets for Jewish assault included the Mount Gerizim temple and the city of Samaria. The former drew hostility as a place of worship competitive to the Jerusalem temple. To see it destroyed, along with the town of Shechem at the foot of the holy mountain, was to believers in Judaism an act of religious significance.[27] Different reasons lay behind the attack on Samaria. At that time, that important Samarian stronghold was a fully hellenized city. It made Antiochus IX an important base from which to exercise power over a vast territory stretching from it to the Mediterranean coast. Quite clearly, to capture Samaria was a challenge of great consequence to John Hyrcanus. The siege laid to the city, punctuated by Antiochus IX intervening to succor the defenders, took

[24] As he fought for Samaria, Antiochus IX tried to succor the besieged inhabitants at the head of a 6,000-strong Egyptian force supplied at his request by the rulers of Egypt: Jos. *AJ* 13.278.

[25] Numismatic and archaeological data show beyond any doubt that John began the operation only about 113, and not in 129/128 as has until recently been generally thought based on Josephus (*BJ* 1.63; *AJ* 13.254–258). For more on the previously accepted chronology of John's campaigns, see Bar-Kochva 1989: 560 ff.; Schwartz 1991: 17 ff.; Finkelsztejn 1998: 43 ff.

[26] Wright 1965: 181 ff.; Sievers 1990: 144 ff.; Barag 1992/1993: 1-12; Kushnir-Stein/Gitler 1992/93: 15 ff.; Barkay 1992/1993: 26; Magen 1993b: 103–104, 114, 119, 122, 133–134, 142–143; Bar-Kochva 1996: 130–131; Finkelsztejn 1998: 40 ff.; Safrai 2000: 66–76; Meshorer 2001: 26; Barkay 2003: 39; Shatzman 2006: 267 ff.; Magen 2007: 193, and n. 43.

[27] Cf. Zeitlin 1922: 84–85; Lichtenstein 1931/1932: 288. On advances in archaeological work, their results, and their impact on the current state of knowledge about the past of both those locations, see Wright 1965: 170–184; Magen 1992: ix–xi; Magen 1993a: 484–492; Magen 993b: 91–148; Bar-Kochva 1996: 131 n. 29; Freyne 1999: 45 ff.; Shatzman 2006: 268, and n. 59; Magen 2007: 157 ff.

more than two years.[28] Once captured, the city was destroyed (although Josephus makes the act look more drastic than it was in reality), and its inhabitants sold into slavery.[29] The rationale behind such heavy, protracted fighting may seem elusive, but we have reasons to believe that the effort brought John tangible gains. Losing Samaria was a major reverse for Antiochus IX, who, without this stronghold, could no longer effectively control areas to the south of it. This enabled John's troops to reach as far as Mount Carmel (Jos. *BJ* 1.66). Moreover, the Syrian king was now hindered in interfering in the affairs of the land by the same name. By contrast, to the Judean ruler, seizing Samaria opened the way toward Galilee with its major city of Scythopolis.[30] In this way John Hyrcanus, although not an active participant in struggles between Syrian pretenders, by capturing Samaria and conquest of vast areas of Palestine, contributed signally to weakening the position of one of them.

Josephus finds reasons for John Hyrcanus' expansion in the political situation within the Seleucid state (cf. *BJ* 1.62; *AJ* 13.254), and the chronology of John's military operations bears out such an explanation. Yet we are entitled to suppose that it was just one of several reasons for actions taken. Apart from external political considerations, a strong motivation may have come from factors of a different nature.[31] One such likely factor may have been John's inspiration with his father's successes and an ambition to match him. Although Simon's attainments should not be overestimated, it must still be remembered that he was guided by a desire to regain power over ancestral territories, an awareness of which could not have left his son unaffected.[32] This is suggested by the kind of policy he pursued in conquered territories. Information on the subject we owe mainly to Josephus, who, as we have noted, supplies a superficial picture of developments. Hence attempts to complement the picture by searching for reverberations of John's and his successors' policies in other texts which, scholars believe, either were composed in the Hasmonean era or more or less directly refer to the period. Yet such attempts do not always produce

[28] Jos. *BJ* 1.65; *AJ* 13.276–278, 282–283. Josephus (*AJ* 13.280) informs us that Hyrcanus succeeded in capturing Samaria after a year's struggle. This information is not confirmed by archaeological sources. These suggest that the fighting outside the city began about 112/111 and ended about 108/107. Yet the conclusion of the combat is none too well documented, which inclines us to shift the date to autumn 110 or sometime 109: Dąbrowa 2007: 455. Cf. Zeitlin 1922: 86; Lichtenstein 1931/1932: 289–290.

[29] Jos. *BJ* 1.66; *AJ* 13.282–283. Cf. Safrai 2000: 70 ff.; Dąbrowa 2007.

[30] Jos. *BJ* 1.66; *AJ* 13.280. It was captured in spring 109 or 108, several months after Mount Gerizim fell, cf. Zeitlin 1922: 85–86; Lichtenstein 1931/32: 288–289.

[31] John Hyrcanus' reasons for conquests and his policies on seized territories in Idumea and Samaria have attracted numerous scholarly interpretations. Given the number and variety of hypotheses offered, it would be difficult to list them all in detail here. Still a note may be made of at least those that share certain elements. The most frequent among them emphasize the demographics: conquests were intended either to supply new recruitment potential or solve overpopulation problems by settlement outside Judea that would improve colonists' economic well-being. Apart from demographics, another major reason for expansion was the economic factor. Territorial gains were to provide the ruler with new sources of income both though increasing his own property and through taxes paid by new subjects. Biblical tradition is thought to be a special ideological factor to justify John Hyrcanus' expansion and subsequent policies toward the Gentiles. Some scholars even cite the Roman conquests as a possible inspiration for John Hyrcanus' expansionist policy. See Bar-Kochva 1977: 167 ff.; Smith 1978: 1 ff.; Kasher 1991: 344 ff.; Schwartz 1991: 17 ff.; Pastor 1997: 68 ff.; Weitzman 1999: 37 ff.; Safrai 2000: 75–76; Schwartz 2001: 36 ff.; Dąbrowa 2006: 113 ff.; Schwartz 2006: 223 ff.; Shatzman 2006: 267 ff.

[32] Cf. Shatzman 2006: 270.

clear results. A significant obstacle in a proper understanding of some of these texts is their tendentiousness resulting from the religious attitudes of their authors, who could not help expressing their own subjective views of events involving John Hyrcanus or, in a wider sense, the Hasmoneans. The major problem in using the alleged references or allusions to specific events in such texts is that scholars themselves are not agreed about the time of writing of some texts.[33] Advances in studies into the post-biblical literature, along with recent archaeological discoveries, have caused many long-standing opinions to be questioned. With new dating suggestions for some apocryphal and pseudepigraphic texts, attempts to use the information they convey to study the ideology and realities of the Hasmonean period may involve a risk of misinterpretation.[34]

According to ancient authors, John Hyrcanus' principal method of assimilating the populations in conquered territories was their forced Judaization.[35] With respect to the Idumeans, it was conducted with exceptional severity. Those inhabitants of Idumea who refused to be Judaized were compelled to leave their native land; the presence of Idumean groups in Egypt is thought to have been caused by such policy.[36] According to Ptolemy, the obscure author of the *History of Herod* living probably at the end of the 1st century BCE (Stern 1974, 356, no. 146), and Josephus (*AJ* 13.257–258; 15.254–255), the policy was to perform forced circumcision and enforce observance of Jewish laws and customs.[37] Since circumcision was as ritual as it was hygienic and was also practiced by

[33] Differences in dating the post-biblical texts, i.e. the Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha, may be, and often are, as large as decades. In the period of the 2nd–1st centuries BCE when most of those texts were composed, religious views of the groups that scholars believe produced most of them, and their attitudes toward the surrounding world, evolved rapidly under pressure from current developments. Because of that, an interpretation of the same text made in the historical context dictated by the dating assumed may lead to completely different conclusions.

[34] D. Mendels (1987) based his study on the "land of Israel," understood as a political concept in Jewish literature of the Hasmonean era, on the *Book of Judith*, *Book of Jubilees*, *Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs* (especially the *Testament of Levi*), taking for granted his assumed dates when the respective texts were written (cf. Mendels 1987: 82 ff. esp. 92–99). New hypotheses and arguments concerning the dating of those apocryphal and pseudepigraphic texts, combined with archaeological data obtained after 1987, have rendered many of his findings obsolete; e.g., according to Mendels (1987: 57 ff.) the *Book of Jubilees* was written about 125 and conveyed the atmosphere of events occurring after 140, i.e., the time of Simon. But in the opinion of VanderKam (1997: 19–20) the book should be dated somewhere between 160 and 150 (cf. Shatzman 2006: 258–259, and n. 38). Many more examples can be quoted; see also Kugel 1992: 1 ff.; Berthelot 2007: 53 ff. The problem with using references to historical events in biblical and pseudepigraphic literature is not only in dating difficulties for particular texts. It lies mainly in their interpretations geared specifically to an assumed hypothesis, see Ackroyd 1953: 125 ff.

[35] For the various possible interpretations of the term and its origin, see Kasher 1988: 69–76; Schwartz 1989: 384 n. 17; Cohen 1999: 175–197.

[36] For more on Idumean presence in Egypt and its connection with the conquest of Idumea by the Hasmoneans, see Rappaport 1969: 77 ff., 81–82; Finkelsztejn 1998: 42–43, 47, 50–51; Cohen 1999: 115. An important element in Idumean identity was the cult of the god Koz (Qos) (cf. Jos. *AJ* 15.253).

[37] Similarity of customs between the Idumeans and Judeans is also remarked on by Strabo 16.2.34 [760]: προσεχώρησαν τοῖς Ἰουδαίοις καὶ τῶν νομίμων τῶν αὐτῶν ἐκείνοις ἐκοινώνησαν. There is nevertheless a major difference between the mentioned authors and Strabo, for he claims that the Idumeans accepted Judaism voluntarily. For more on interpretations of the accounts cited, see Kasher 1988: 46 ff., 56–68; Cohen 1999: 110–118, and n. 21. Cohen points out that most scholars base their own interpretations of this policy solely on Josephus (*AJ* 13.257–258) while ignoring the value of other evidence (a review of major evidence is also given by Kasher 1988: 50–55). Still, other sources show the Judaization of Idumeans (and also of other ethnic groups later conquered by the Hasmoneans) in a different perspective. See also Oren/Rappaport 1984: 152.

other ethnic groups in the ancient Near East, including Idumeans, it seems that the most acutely felt effect of Judaization for populations thus coerced must have been the obligation to participate in new religious practices and observance of imposed religious rules, including a prescribed dietary regime.[38] As for the Idumeans, the most obvious proof of their conversion to Judaism was the fact that most remained in their native country.[39] a special act of religious impetuosity committed under John Hyrcanus' policy toward conquered territories was the destruction of the temple on Mount Gerizim. No source offers a clear explanation for that decision. Without a doubt, however, it was a fully deliberate act intended to raze a religious center that had long competed with the Jerusalem temple. The rivalry between both temples had gone back to the time of Alexander of Macedon, who allowed Samaritans to erect a temple of their own on Mount Gerizim. It proved to be a bone of contention between inhabitants of Judea and Samaria, leading to resentment, animosity, even conflict.[40]

For a proper assessment of John Hyrcanus' religious policy, its origins should be considered. Biblical tradition is often cited as its ideological underpinning[41], but many scholars suggest that that was not his only inspiration. They point out that strict though the biblical rules were that regulated Jews' contacts with others, they had never been so rigorously enforced in practice, especially not to entire ethnic groups, as was the case with the Idumeans.[42] When the first Hasmoneans referred to the Bible, they were really trying to justify their conduct in their struggle against proponents of the Hellenistic religious reform. As 1 Macc suggests, rebels under Mattathias and Judah Maccabee practiced forced circumcision on all those inhabitants of Judea, including their male offspring, who sympathized with the reform and had either not been circumcised or removed the effect through surgery (*epispasmos*).[43] In contrast, we do not know that the practice was used in Judea under Jonathan and Simon.

As they study the nature of John Hyrcanus' religious policy, scholars point to important political, social, and economic aims that may have determined it. Still, it would be wrong to assume that those were the only motivation for his actions. It seems that an

[38] For more on the various aspects of Judaization as practiced by the early Hasmoneans and interpretations of relevant accounts, see Kasher 1988: 44 ff.; Schwartz 1989: 384–385; Cohen 1999: 110 ff., 135 ff.; Weitzman 1999: 38 ff., 49 ff.; Schwartz 2001: 40 ff.; Schwartz 2006: 223–226; Shatzman 2006: 270.

[39] In antiquity, believers in Judaism did not obviously differ from other inhabitants of Palestine or from the population of the entire Mediterranean world, cf. Cohen 1999: 25 ff.; Roth 2005: 37 ff. esp. 42 ff.

[40] Such prejudices are believed to surface in the many anti-Samarian tones both in late editions of biblical texts and in works composed in Hellenistic and Roman times. Josephus, too, displays an unfriendly attitude toward the Samaritans: Pummer 1982: 183 ff.; Coggins 1987: 257–273. For more on Judeo-Samarian relations: Dąbrowa 2006b: 116 n. 18 ff. (see also the bibliography).

[41] Its principal rules for various relations with "strangers" are given in Deut (7:1–26; 20:1–18).

[42] To Z. Safrai (2000: 76–77), the impact of biblical tradition on attitudes of the Hasmoneans beginning with Mattathias is obvious. Other scholars are more cautions in their opinions on this subject: Cohen 1999: 118 ff.

[43] 1 Macc 2:46: καὶ περιέτεμον τὰ παιδάρια τὰ ἀπερίτμητα, ὅσα εὗρον ἐν ὁρίοις Ισραηλ, ἐν ἰσχύι. Since it refers to Israel's borders (the phrase is found in the text of 1 Macc preserved in *Codex Alexandrinus*, while that in *Codex Sinaiticus* speaks of "sons of Israel"), a question suggests itself about the nature of the rebels' action. Some think that the expression may mean that it was extended to all, including the Gentiles. The narrative in 1 Macc implies quite clearly that the targeted population were the Hellenists, cf. Cohen 1999: 118; Weitzman 1999: 45–51. According to J. Sievers (1990: 35), such wording was in fact meant to justify and legitimize Jonathan's policies. Other scholars disagree (*contra* Weitzman 1999: 51).

equally important factor must be considered: his religious conviction. John Hyrcanus was the only Hasmonean whose religious activity as high priest is known to us in some detail. His interest in Temple worship and his performance of priestly duties won him respect and admiration. Also, he had certain prophetic abilities.[44]

Nor was John a stranger to citing biblical tradition on taking state decisions, as his predecessors had done before him. This applied in particular to decisions concerning populations inhabiting lands he annexed. The problem of Gentiles, however, was of a different magnitude than in his father's day. Since John conquered vaster areas, more local inhabitants were subjected to his rule. They were people of various political, cultural, and religious backgrounds. It was the sheer number of new subjects that prevented him from copying a solution Simon had employed which was to displace a local population and settle the lands thus evacuated with Jewish colonists. His conquests would provide his people and himself with various advantages, not least among them being economic. It was economy that precluded expropriating inhabitants from captured land: as labor force and taxpayers, they made a valuable spoil. Besides, Judea did not have a population large enough to people new territorial acquisitions and assure economic effectiveness. Movement of large numbers of colonists to newly acquired areas could have done more harm than good in any aspect of the country's life. Still, a purely administrative annexation of territorial gains to Judea carried a threat of seriously upsetting the state's structure and its religious order. This being so, forced Judaization seemed the only effective and lasting way of integrating them with Judea. With this policy in place, it was also possible to address the problem of different styles of social and political life of such local populations. That John Hyrcanus intentionally used religion as a state-integrating tool is suggested by his elimination of local places of religious cult. Their destruction stripped the ethnic groups gathered around them of an important part of their identity. Their new and only place of worship was now to be the Jerusalem temple.

Written sources paint a picture of John Hyrcanus' religious policy that may seem rather one-sided. Yet archaeological data suggest that the picture is not entirely true in its details, mostly because such policy was not equally rigorously applied everywhere and to all. At its most extreme, it was pursued in Idumea and partly in Samaria. The destruction wreaked there was of such magnitude that some of their cities never recovered after the conquest.[45] Archaeological finds also suggest that many centers existing in such areas and inhabited by non-Jewish populations survived the conquest relatively unharmed and continued to function, even if their further development was considerably thwarted.[46] Such facts, in our opinion, permit the conclusion that John Hyrcanus' ideological justification for his actions was the memory of past events, whether biblical or more recent, in which Judeans and their neighbors often stood on opposing sides. In the case of the Idumeans and Samaritans, common origins, often also religious tradition

[44] Josephus attaches much importance to them (*BJ* 1.68; *AJ* 13.299). He proceeds to quote instances when such abilities manifested themselves to spectacular effect: *BJ* 1.69; *AJ* 13.282. 300.

[45] Cf. Safrai 2000: 68–69, 70–73.

[46] Cf. Safrai 2000: 70, 73–75.

with the Judeans caused much more dramatic consequences than for other ethnic groups to which John Hyrcanus' religious principles were apparently more leniently applied.[47]

Despite the unquestionable success of John's expansionist policy, in the last years of his rule, he had to face events which today pose much difficulty to interpret correctly. Those events are known from Josephus' accounts in both his works and from rabbinical tradition; in many details the latter is convergent with the historian's version.[48] Josephus' accounts differ between them not only in volume but also in style of presentation. The story in *Bellum Judaicum* (1.67) is very concise. It suggests that toward the end of his rule, John Hyrcanus faced social unrest (ἐγείρει στάσιν τῶν ἐπιχωρίων) as serious as to force him to wage open war on the rebels (καὶ πρὸς φανερὸν πόλεμον ἐκριπισθέντες ἠττῶνται). His victory enabled him to restore law and order in the state. The laconic account offers no hint as to the nature of the rebellion referred to. All we know is that it was aimed against the ruling family (καὶ πολλοὶ κατ' αὐτῶν [i.e., the Hasmoneans] συνελθόντες οὐκ ἠρέμουν). Nor can we identify the ruler's opponents. The language used implies that the movement was violent and was quelled with a firm hand.

A much more comprehensive story is offered by Josephus in *Antiquitates* (13.288–299). While it identifies the source of the conflict and parties involved, it still fails to provide a clear answer about the real reasons for the rise of opposition against the Hasmoneans, its extent, or its stated goals. Heading the opposition were the Pharisees, long loyal to John Hyrcanus, who had possibly been a disciple of theirs. The Pharisees were an important partner for the ruler because they enjoyed great esteem in Judean society in matters of religion. In Josephus' version (the rabbinical tradition is similar in content) the conflict was sparked off during a celebration. As he was conversing with invited Pharisees, John heard much praise for his virtues and achievements. Despite that, one participant named Eleazar, who was known for his difficult character, requested that the ruler step down from the office of high priest on the grounds that his mother had been in Syrian captivity during the reign of Antiochus IV (Jos. *AJ* 13.290–292). According

[47] Safrai 2000: 76–77. Mentions found in various texts often emphasize customs and religious practices common to Samaritans and Judeans. On the other hand, scholars accentuate resentments between both peoples, as allegedly indicated, among others, by Hellenistic revisions of *Genesis* 34 made in the Second Temple period. They further claim that such revisions arose in close connection with John Hyrcanus' operation against the Mount Gerizim temple and his policy toward the Samaritans, see Collins 1980: 91 ff.; Pummer 1982: 177 ff. Though suggestive, such arguments are not universally accepted, cf. Kugel 1992: 1 ff.; Laato 1997: 269 ff.; Cohen 1999: 123. That conclusions drawn from such premises are of dubious value is confirmed by publications of the Dead Sea Scrolls. Discussions of the Hasmonean policy of Judaization make ample use of *Test. Levi*. Discovered at Qumran, fragments of the *Levi Aramaic Document*, which probably was one of its sources (the Aramaic version is now thought to have originated in the late 4th or early 3rd century BCE), as *Test. Levi* contains many quotation from it, help exclude meanings that were attributed to it in connection with that practice: Drawnel 2004: 63–85, 87–88, 228 ff. Cf. also Kasher 1988: 59; de Jonge 1991: 244 ff.; Flint 1999: 50; de Jonge 2003: 124 ff.; Atkinson 2004: 159 n. 73.

[48] Jos. *BJ* 1.67; *AJ* 13.288–299. The rabbinical tradition has preserved a story which is largely convergent with that by Josephus: Neusner 1987: 283 ff.; Sievers 1990: 148. Also known is an almost identical tale, though set in Alexander Jannaeus' time, in which only the main protagonists' names are different. For this reason it is usually considered as a double of an edition that referred to John Hyrcanus as it contains, repeated *verbatim*, the same accusation about the ruler's questionable lineage. For a discussion focused on those accounts and their interpretations: Friedlaender 1913/1914: 443 ff.; Piattelli 1971: 281 ff.; Geller 1979: 202 ff.; Efron 1987: 161 ff.; Neusner 1987: 285–286; Sievers 1990: 148–149, 152 n. 57; Rooke 2000: 307 ff.; Saldarini 2001: 86 ff., and n. 17; Schofield/VanderKam 2005: 83 ff., and n. 39.

to laws of the high priest's ritual purity, such a suspicion disqualified John from holding that elevated office (cf. Lev 21:14). The impudent statement angered the ruler (the historian goes on to claim that the accusation was false) as well as all the Pharisees present (Jos. *AJ* 13.292). The situation was aggravated by a close friend of John's, Jonathan, who was involved with the Sadducees. He used the opportunity to attack the Pharisees, accusing them of having preplanned the situation as a deliberate provocation against the ruler. Their complicity, the official went on, was proved by how mild a punishment they proposed for the perpetrator of the commotion. With his implacable attitude and further accusations against the Pharisees, Jonathan caused John Hyrcanus to sever contacts with them and shift his sympathies to the Sadducees instead (Jos. *AJ* 13.293–296). Such decisions led to public unrest (Jos. *AJ* 13.296) which the ruler managed to pacify eventually (Jos. *AJ* 13.299).

Comprehensive though it may be, the account still falls short of providing sufficient details for a satisfactory reconstruction of either the conflict's social background or its true nature. A comparison between both accounts creates an impression that the one in the *Antiquitates* is a story Josephus borrowed from some source chiefly for the dramaturgy of events presented, and rather offhandedly adapted for his own needs.[49] The impression is further strengthened by the markedly unfavorable picture it paints of John Hyrcanus. He is shown as impetuous, mean, misguided, and vindictive toward his former partners whom he abandons following a perfidious but unsophisticated manipulation by a courtier. The picture is completely different from the one Josephus so strenuously tries to present in his other historical works.[50]

The above remarks are no meant to question the value of that account. It is valuable testimony to the existence in Judea in John Hyrcanus' late reign of not just opposition but also of a serious social and political crisis. Interpretation of the storyline itself does not offer an answer to a major question: why an unfounded rumor about John Hyrcanus' family background, voiced in his presence in a limited circle of invited guests, caused a conflict that shook the state. Considered from a different angle, Eleazar's offending statement may be read not so much as a remark on the ruler's background but a public questioning of his status in the society. This is explicitly voiced in his opening suggestion that John Hyrcanus give up his high priesthood and satisfy himself with purely temporal authority (Jos. *AJ* 13.291). It was this suggestion that truly triggered John's anger as it contravened the law enacted by the "great assembly" in 142 which prohibited anyone from nullifying any decisions it passed concerning the powers of Simon and his successors, opposing them, or disputing them without express permission of the ruler (1 Macc 14:44). Thus Eleazar's statement was the first publicly voiced opinion, whether deliberate or inadvertent, on matters of the state's political system.[51] Although Eleazar is shown as a man noted for his difficult character – a phrase that may simply mean that he was opinionated and vocal in offering criticism regardless of circumstances – his voice certainly must not be treated as an isolated personal opinion. The thought he dared air

[49] A comprehensive analysis of the fragment for its redaction and ideological content concerning its picture of the Pharisees is given by Mason 1991: 215–230.

[50] Cf. Mason 1991: 230 ("His zeal to promote Hyrcanus and to denigrate the Pharisees has led to a redaction that is somewhat clumsy."), 245.

[51] In his discussion S. Mason (1991: 225 ff., 235-8) does not address the causes of the conflict.

must to some extent have reflected the views of certain Judean religious circles.[52] This is confirmed in Jonathan's accusation (subsequently repeated) that the Pharisees were showing sympathy for Eleazar, and even an ostentatious, if silent, support for his position so demonstrated. The accusation, it seems, was accepted as valid by John Hyrcanus himself (cf. Jos. *AJ* 13.293–296).

Further events suggest that religious and political divisions existing in the Judean society at the time were used by successive rulers in a political game designed to build or defend their position. That this was indeed the case is confirmed by John Hyrcanus' sudden reversal *vis-ŕ-vis* the Pharisees and his alliance with the Sadducees as described in Josephus' above-mentioned account.[53] Its consequences indicate that it was more than just a tactical maneuver to gain short-term support from a religious group distinct from the Pharisees: it was primarily a political alliance that promised to assure him real support in his conflict with his rivals. In this context, John's decisions abrogating changes in religious laws instituted by the Pharisees (cf. Jos. *AJ* 13.296–299) also appear to have a dimension beyond religion and well into politics, for they served to undermine the Pharisees' position and to contain their influence upon society.[54] Extant sources offer insufficient evidence to determine with conviction whether it was such actions that lay at the root of the already-mentioned hostile confrontation between the ruler and his subjects. Even if John Hyrcanus succeeded in coming out the victor, later developments demonstrated that his victory was short-lived. Impressing on the people their message in matters religious, the Pharisees managed to retake lost positions and stand at the head of what was now all-out opposition that would give John's successors many headaches. Josephus' efforts to paint John Hyrcanus' rule as a prosperous period in the history of Judea certainly were not in vain, but even the Hasmonean apologist he was could not pass over in silence a strong opposition against them that appeared at that time.[55]

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[52] Differences between John Hyrcanus and Jerusalem's religious circles in purely religious matters are thought to surface in two letters appended to 2 Macc (2 Macc 1:1–9. 10 ff.) that were sent from Jerusalem to Egypt in 124, bypassing the high priest: Sievers 1990: 146, and n. 38.

[53] Rooke 2000: 310. In the opinion of Sievers (1990: 151–152, 155), the story provides no grounds to draw any certain conclusions about John Hyrcanus' actual relations with either the Pharisees or the Sadducees. It should be noted that its interpreters are mostly interested in the truth in the accusation about John Hyrcanus' family background and its possible impact on the legality of his high priesthood, with less emphasis on his relations with those factions, cf. Schofield/VanderKam 2005: 84 ff.

[54] Laws introduced by the Pharisees, repealed by John Hyrcanus, were reintroduced during the rule of Alexandra Salome: Jos. *AJ* 13.408 (cf. observations by S. Mason (1991: 230–245, esp. 240 ff.) concerning those laws). Accounts concerning John Hyrcanus' initiatives in matters or religious legislation being rather random, it is impossible to determine if there is any direct link between such initiatives and his conflict with the Pharisees. Echoes of such laws have been preserved in the Mishnah: Geller 1979: 204–205; Schwartz 1988: 30 ff. He introduced regulations mainly concerning religion, but some of them instituted changes in the payment of required taxes for Levites and priests. According to scholars, the form of taxation he introduced had the effect of deteriorating the situation of Levites as it favored enrichment of priestly families, see Lieberman 1962: 140 ff.; Oppenheimer 1977: 33–42; Bar-Kochva 1977: 187 ff.; Sievers 1990: 150–151; Schmidt 2001: 209. B. Bar-Kochva (*loc. cit.*) points out that, contrary to frequently voiced opinions, the rabbinical tradition furnishes no critical voices about those changes and there is no basis to claim that revenues from those taxes were used in contravention of their stated purpose, i.e., instead of serving the priests they were misappropriated by high priests (i.e., the Hasmoneans) to finance their secular expenses.

[55] See Mason 1991: 218–219, 225 ff., 245.

A review of John Hyrcanus' rule cannot be complete without mentioning two important developments we know of only from Josephus (which he presents one by one). The first was John Hyrcanus opening the tomb of King David, while Jerusalem was being besieged by Antiochus VII, and removing from it a treasure worth 3,000 talents (Jos. *BJ* 1.61; *AJ* 7.393; 13.249; 16.179). He used the money to pay the tribute due to the king of Syria and to hire foreign mercenaries (Jos. *BJ* 1.61; 7.393; *AJ* 13.249). Small differences between both accounts are of secondary importance here.[56] What matters to our discussion is the credibility of such accounts and consequently the correctness – or error – of conclusions thus arrived at. One point to note is how Josephus displays no emotional attitude toward the act he attributes to John Hyrcanus and how he comments on what amounts to petty details. Nor does he mention any response at all to the act in society. This is surprising as the deed was a significant breach of the religious law perpetrated by the incumbent high priest. More importantly, the question begs to be asked why it was in King David's tomb that John expected to find the financial means he needed. The question is valid since no source makes mention of anything extraordinary happening to the vast fortune he had inherited from Simon, the size of which aroused envy in Antiochus VII, no less (cf. 1 Macc 15:32. 36). Even if John had used much of it to conduct warfare and needed more resources to continue it, nothing seems to justify his helping himself to the burial treasure of David. Although Jerusalem had been besieged many times before, and ruling leaders of Judea had been in much more dire straits, none of them had dared to reach for the royal treasure. Whether they lacked the audacity to do so or knowledge, we do not know. Choice of the second option leads to more questions about how it was possible that the treasure had remained intact through Jerusalem's earlier trials and tribulations, even when the city had on several occasions been occupied by foreign rulers who would without the least compunction have availed themselves of the hoard;[57] how its existence had been kept so concealed; and how John Hyrcanus had learned the secret. Although such questions bear on important issues from the past of ancient Israel, sources offer no evidence to help us find satisfactory answers. As for John Hyrcanus' awareness of the hidden treasure, we may only proffer an unwarranted supposition that the deposit might have been a part of his father's concealed financial resources.[58] Why exactly he had used David's tomb as a cache, or named it as the site of his alleged "discovery," can only be the subject of pure speculation.[59]

[56] The differences lie in that according to the description in *Antiquitates*, those events occurred after the conclusion of peace talks with Antiochus VII, while according to the *Bellum*, still during the siege. A somewhat different tradition that clumsily combines information from what must have been various sources is related by Synkellos (p. 419). At one point he says that the treasure was worth 30,000 talents and had been extracted by John Hyrcanus from the tombs of David and Solomon. Several sentences later he mentions that David hid in Solomon's tomb a hoard of gold and silver worth many tens of thousands of talents. He hastens to add that John Hyrcanus removed from David's sepulcher about 3,000 gold talents.

[57] Cf. Bar-Kochva 1977: 181–182.

[58] Cf. Bar-Kochva 1977: 185.

[59] It is worth noting that even in later times David's tomb was thought to be a place where enormous treasures had been concealed. Josephus (*AJ* 7.392–394; 16.179–183) claims that also Herod tried to tap into the hoard (this account seems to have been used by Synkellos, p. 419). Archaeological excavations done in Jerusalem's royal necropolis have, however, denied existence there of sepulchral complexes of the shape and size conveyed by tradition so clearly echoed in Josephus' account, cf. Vincent 1954: 313 ff. esp. 322-3; Fischer 1975b: 195–196; Mazar 1975: 183 ff.; Bar-Kochva 1977: 181–185; Levine 2002: 209–210, 322–323.

Josephus links the tomb of the David treasure discovery to employment of mercenaries by John Hyrcanus. Yet the events the historian shows as preceding this sudden decision offer not a hint of its justification.[60] Josephus' account of the siege of Jerusalem offers no basis to believe that the move was caused by Jewish soldiers showing disloyalty or insufficient zeal for combat. Almost a year long, the siege of Jerusalem was long enough for defenders to demonstrate a determination in combat sufficient to dismiss any such suggestions or suspicions as unfounded. Nor does the account imply that there might be any other important reason that could influence such a decision. Similarly lacking is an answer how, under a still continuing or barely finished conflict (the circumstances depending on which version of the account is considered) John Hyrcanus managed to gather a large enough mercenary force. Considering these factors, it should rather be supposed that the historian combined into one event affairs that really took place at different times. The tie-in was King David's tomb treasure which provided John Hyrcanus with means to finance both expenses: payment of the tribute to the Syrian king, and enlistment of mercenaries. Nevertheless, a rejection of Josephus' suggested point in time when foreign mercenaries were enlisted in the Judean army still leaves unanswered the reasons why the Judean ruler thought their services necessary.

Josephus' claim that John Hyrcanus was the first Hasmonean to recruit foreigners in his service is the only information on the subject we get. We are not told whether the recruitment was a one-off occurrence or the mercenaries remained as part of his army for good. Similarly, it is impossible to define when and how those mercenaries appeared in Judea.[61] To take Josephus' account as the sole point of departure is to be limited, as is the case of King David's tomb treasure, to more or less probable conjecture. Such conjecture is nonetheless justified insofar as it casts a somewhat different light on certain events during the rule of John Hyrcanus that we know took place.

Soon after Antiochus VII's siege of Jerusalem was lifted in 133, John Hyrcanus joined the Syrian king's Parthian expedition. An unprecedented event in Hasmonean history, it necessitated a relatively prolonged absence of the ruler in Judea with the consequent need to entrust state government to a faithful deputy for the duration of the expedition. Key qualities to be displayed by the deputy in such circumstances included loyalty and an ability to maintain order in the land. That was not an easy task since it was required that John Hyrcanus appear in the expeditionary force with a suitably large number of men. A fragment we know from a historical work by Nicholas of Damascus, while not detailing the numbers of troops led by the Judean ruler, still makes it clear that they were composed of Jewish soldiers. Their prolonged absence from the homeland – when the operation began there was no telling how long it might last or how it would end – could adversely affect the country's external security as well as its internal situation. It seems that it was this fact that may have prompted John Hyrcanus to decide to hire mercenaries. During his absence, they could assure the loyalty of his deputy and the undisturbed order in his state. Still, we cannot know for certain that those were indeed their assigned tasks. No evidence is available to suggest any occurrences during

[60] Cf. Bar-Kochva 1977: 185.

[61] D. Barag (1992/1993: 10) dates the start of mercenary recruitment at c. 112 and links it with John Hyrcanus' arms program following Judean independence. Other scholars explain mercenary recruitment into John's army by the expansionist operations he launched outside Judea, cf. Kasher 1991: 346.

John's absence, whether in Judea or Jerusalem itself, that could threaten his power. Nor can there be any doubt that if after his return he retained the mercenaries in his service, it must have meant assigning important tasks to them.

What evidence we have about John Hyrcanus' rule does not provide too much information about any direct steps he might have taken to improve or transform his state. Certain premises permit a supposition that such a process was indeed in place, taking the form of a search for new systemic solutions, a centralized fiscal system, further entrenchment of the ruling family, and that it entailed varied consequences of John's conquests. Such conquests necessitated introducing an administration in captured areas, implementing systematic economic exploitation, and introducing a new religious and social policy.

The decision to hire mercenaries no doubt involved a number of consequences. Its impact must not be neglected if only because it presented a stark contrast to Simon's, and also John's, desire to remove the Gentiles from lands inhabited by Jews. However, we cannot define either the mercenaries' place in the Judean army's structure, or the reasons they were enlisted in the first place.

Under John Hyrcanus' rule, many new occurrences and factors appeared that considerably affected his domestic policies. So important were they that they determined the actions of his successors. Some of them were the effect of his expansionist policy, others stemmed from processes at play in the society he was leading. Of particular importance was the appearance of religious circles that exerted great influence on the behavior and ideological attitudes of various social groups: it would lead to the rise of organized political-religious opposition in Judea.

4. Hasmonean Kings

When John Hyrcanus was dying after 31 years of rule, his state was larger and more powerful than that he had inherited from his father.[1] He was succeeded, against his will, by Aristobulus, one of his five sons. When their father was still alive, he and his brother Antigonus had made a name for themselves as good field commanders. They were largely responsible for the success of John's expansionist operations in Idumea and Samaria and the capture of the city of Samaria. Still, John favored his widow to succeed him as the head of state after his death (Jos. *BJ* 1.71; *AJ* 13.302). It is not clear why John should have made such a surprising decision. There is little conviction in Josephus' explanation claiming that John had been influenced by a prophecy which said that both eldest sons would never exercise power in the state (Jos. *BJ* 1.69; *AJ* 13.300. 322). More probably, John was anticipating rivalries between his sons and wished to prevent a possible civil war. If his widow rose to power such danger could be averted as she would be exercising political leadership, while one of the sons would attain high priesthood. However, John Hyrcanus could not foresee that his decision might cause a bitter confrontation for power between the mother and the eldest son (Jos. *BJ* 1.71; *AJ* 13. 302). Aristobulus ignored his father's testament and went on to claim full power. In the process, he imprisoned his mother and younger brothers (except Antigonus). For his mother, the conflict with Aristobulus ended in tragedy: she was starved to death in prison (Jos. *BJ* 1. 71; *AJ* 13.302). Antigonus received special favor from Aristobulus because both were on very good personal terms. Aristobulus put so much trust in his younger brother that, according to Josephus, he shared power with him (Jos. *BJ* 1.71. 72; *AJ* 13.302. 303).

Although Aristobulus stayed in power for less than a year[2], the time was fraught with important events. In external politics, they included new territorial gains as his brother Antigonus annexed lands in Galilee inhabited by Jewish populations[3] and through conquest of borderland territories between Galilee and Lebanon inhabited by Itureans.[4]

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[1] Cf. Jos. *BJ* 1.68; *AJ* 13.299; 20.240. According to Synkellos (p. 419), the Judea's ruler died of injuries sustained during fighting with Antiochus VIII Grypus and Antiochus IX Cyzicenus. The tradition is impossible to trace.

[2] Jos. *BJ* 1.84; *AJ* 13.318. Papyrological evidence concerning the so-called "War of Sceptres" (cf. below note 10) suggest that they came about in 105/104: Cohen 1989b: 119.

[3] The presence of a Jewish populations in Galilee prior to the Hasmonean conquests has long been the subject of debates among scholars, see Schürer 1987: 30 ff.; Freyne 1980 [2000]: 37–38. New arguments to confirm such presence to an extent greater than thought before are supplied by numismatic evidence: Syon 2006: 21 ff.

[4] Jos. *BJ* 1.76; *AJ* 13.318; Bar-Kochva 1977: 191 ff; Kasher 1988: 79–85; Shatzman 1991: 83; Horsley 1996: 25 ff.; Freyne 2000: 41 ff.; Aliquot 1999/2003: 172–178, 198 ff. Ancient accounts concerning the Itureans contain many inaccuracies because they extend the term to the population of areas which in fact were never inhabited by those people: Aliquot 1999/2003: 191–212, 271–272. It cannot be entirely ruled out that Antigonus also conducted some operations in coastal areas, near Straton Pyrgos. This seems to be

Like Idumeans and Samaritans before them, the Itureans were subjected to Judaization (Jos. *AJ* 13.318). Antigonus' successes quite unexpectedly affected the course of internal affairs in Judea for they inspired creation of a court coterie centered on Aristobulus' wife Alexandra that was hostile toward him. Josephus tells us that the group's prime objective was to eliminate Antigonus from political life and that Alexandra contrived a conspiracy which led to Antigonus' death (Jos. *BJ* 1.76; *AJ* 13.308). The historian also supplies a comprehensive description of court intrigue (Jos. *BJ* 1.72. 74; *AJ* 13.304–306. 310) with details that cast much light on Aristobulus' succession and Antigonus' death.

The appraisal of Aristobulus given by Strabo (cf. Jos. *AJ* 13.319) and Josephus (*AJ* 13. 318–319) is favorable in every way. In the first place, it contains not an accusatory hint of lust for power as his guiding motive. Such a picture is confirmed by his willingness and spontaneity in sharing his power in Judea with his brother and his behavior in behind-the-scenes political tussles at court where he was passive, largely unaware of the nature of the intrigues surrounding him, letting himself be manipulated by his closest associates. All the more surprising, therefore is, his behavior in the contention with his mother. Yet if the episode is looked at through the lens of his wife's role in removing Antigonus, it becomes highly probable that the conflict may have resulted from strong pressures she exerted on Aristobulus to make him claim his father's position. Alexandra's backstage activity at court is confirmed by the way in which Antigonus was removed. Her conduct was probably inspired by her own exuberant ambition, which may have been additionally fueled by her knowledge of Aristobulus' incurable disease.[5] Had Antigonus outlived Aristobulus, his would have been full power in Judea. Alexandra could then have fallen on hard times, a contingency she actively and successfully tried to prevent. With both brothers dead, faced with no serious competitor, she managed to take the initiative. Not only had she skillfully headed off a crisis of authority, but she could at the same time secure for herself an influential position under the new ruler who was of her own making (Jos. *BJ* 1.85; *AJ* 13.320).

Connected with Aristobulus' rule is a significant tradition. According to Josephus, he went down in the history of Judea as the first Hasmonean to accept the title of king (*AJ* 13. 301). Yet Strabo denies Aristobulus the precedence. He says the first Hasmonean to bear the royal title was his successor, Alexander Jannaeus (Strabo 16.2.40 [762]). Although some scholars consider Strabo's account the more credible, there are still no serious arguments against Josephus' credibility in this respect. His was by far the superior knowledge of Judea's past and of the deeds of figures he portrayed in his work.

For Aristobulus to assume the title of king was in many ways important, but real motives behind that move may only be guessed. First and foremost, it was a complete break with his predecessors' practice of using inferior titles which had put them at a disadvantage in contacts with other rulers.[6] Perhaps the decision was purely to mimic Greek

indicated by mention of its name in a prophecy about the place of his death: Jos. *BJ* 1.77–80; *AJ* 13.309–313; Shatzman 1999: 72.

[5] See Jos. *AJ* 13.314–317. In describing Alexandra's reign, Josephus repeatedly emphasizes her hunger for power which took precedence over the interest of the state and the people (*AJ* 13.417. 430). His account implies that the first symptoms of Aristobulus' illness appeared in the fall of 105, soon after he ascended to power, cf. Jos. *BJ* 1.73; *AJ* 13.304.

[6] As a sort of confirmation, Strabo (16.2.40 [762]) describes Alexander Jannaeus' predecessors as tyrants. A list of official titles used by the Hasmoneans is given by VanderKam 2004: 313.

ways. This supposition cannot be readily dismissed for after all Aristobulus bore the nickname "Philhellen," even if we know of no special favors re rendered Greeks that would merit the appellation (Jos. *AJ* 13.318). Use of a royal title enabled him to emphasize his status as a sovereign ruler.[7] Conceivably, too, he was trying to accentuate the secular aspect of his authority.

Alexandra probably had no real chance to claim officially the late Aristobulus' position. For this reason she released her husband's younger brothers from prison and vested power in the eldest, Alexander (Jos. *BJ* 1.85; *AJ* 13.320), whom she married.[8] Alexander, who would feature in history as Alexander Jannaeus, called himself king as his predecessor had.

Just months into his reign, Alexander Jannaeus found himself facing an unexpected danger that could jeopardize not just his power, but the very independence of Judea. Continuing his predecessors' policy of territorial expansion, he attempted to bring under his control maritime cities which were still enjoying independence. Of particular importance, because of its size and port facilities, was Ptolemais.[9] Their freedom in danger, the inhabitants turned for help to Ptolemy IX Lathyrus of Cyprus (Jos. AJ 13.328), who readily accepted the call. Interference in Palestinian affairs presented him with a convenient instrument to serve his own ambitious political plans (cf. Jos. *AJ* 13.329). Yet before Ptolemy arrived, the inhabitants of Ptolemais had changed their minds, fearing the consequences of his taking over the city (Jos. *AJ* 13.330–331). Despite that, Ptolemy with a great army landed near Ptolemais, his force quickly further reinforced with other allies joining in: inhabitants of Gaza, and Zoilos, ruler of the cities of Straton Pyrgos and Dor. On hearing of Ptolemy's arrival, Alexander Jannaeus withdrew from outside Ptolemais and made with the Cypriot a quite favorable truce (Jos. *AJ* 13.334–335). At the same time, he secretly made contact with the queen of Egypt, Cleopatra III, who was in conflict with Ptolemy IX, and he declared readiness to take joint action (Jos. *AJ* 13.334). On learning about Alexander's duplicity, Ptolemy decided to break the truce already made with him and launch a full-scale offensive against him. Attempts to stop Ptolemy's progress into Judea proved a failure. The heavy losses Alexander Jannaeus sustained in the process put him in a very difficult position. Further aggravation was only prevented through an intervention by Cleopatra III, who would not tolerate Ptolemy gaining too much strength. At some point, fighting between both Ptolemaic armies took an unexpected turn when Ptolemy, taking advantage of Egypt being largely stripped of armed forces, made a sudden attempt to seize control there. He was unsuccessful and, faced with Cleopatra's superiority at arms, he could do no better that to return to Cyprus.[10]

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[7] Although Josephus stresses the equality of the status of Antigonus and Aristobulus (*BJ* 1.71. 72; *AJ* 13.302. 303) he never refers to the earlier as king.

[8] Cf. Jos. *BJ* 1.107; *AJ* 13.320. 399–407; Geiger 2002: 4 ff., 15 ff.

[9] Jos. *AJ* 13.324. Josephus offers no explanation of why Alexander Jannaeus attacked this city. He merely reports that it was one of few coastal cities to be still independent. It is not impossible that his attempt to capture Ptolemais stemmed from a desire to acquire control of the port which shipped produce from the area lying between the Carmel Mountains and Galilee. Besides, located where it was, the city had great strategic importance: Jos. *BJ* 2.188–191; Abel 1967, II: 235 ff.; Kashtan 1988: 37 ff.

[10] Until recently, the course of the conflict was known to us only from Josephus' account (*AJ* 13.324–359). Thanks to Egyptian sources (papyrological and epigraphic), our understanding of the events relating

Fighting between Ptolemy and Cleopatra not only gave Alexander Jannaeus breathing space, but enabled him to gain an advantage in that he established friendly relations with the Egyptian queen and entered into an alliance with her.[11] In this way he succeeded in preserving his power and the independence of his state while also gaining freedom of action. He used the opportunity to launch a military operation in Transjordan. After several months' fighting, he captured Gadara and some other cities.[12] As hostilities ceased between Cleopatra III and Ptolemy IX and their respective armies left Palestine, Alexander Jannaeus sent his troops against the coastal cities.[13] Josephus speaks of the action as yielding among the gains the capture of Gaza after a year's fighting (*BJ* 1.87; *AJ* 13.358–364; cf. Strabo 16.2.30 [759]), but numismatic evidence indicates that in reality this did not happen until ca. 95/94.[14]

Later in Alexander Jannaeus' reign, his military activity subsided until the end of the 90's. He was again spurred into armed action by a mounting threat from the Nabatean state. Its rulers capitalized on the weakness of Syrian kings engrossed in incessant dynastic struggles to overrun large areas of their state. This led to a significant change in the balance of power in the region and to conflict of interest between Judea and the Nabatean state. The king of Judea was anxious to stop Nabatean expansion but in ensuing engagements with their rulers Aretas II and Obodas he suffered a series of signal defeats.[15] At the same time, Demetrius III[16], supported by Ptolemy IX Lathyrus, gained considerable advantage over other pretenders to the Syrian crown and, quite unexpectedly, very nearly ousted Alexander Jannaeus from the throne.

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to the conflict, also known as the "War of Sceptres," was expanded by many important details, affording greater insight into it: Van't Dack 1989: *passim*; cf. Whitehorne 1995: 197–205; Höbl 2004: 187 ff. Probably there are some hidden allusions to this campaign in the *Pesher on Isaiah* (4Q161 = 4QpIsaa): Amusin 1977: 123–134; Charlesworth 2002: 101 ff.; Eshel 2008: 96–100, 184–185. According to H. Eshel (2008: 101–115) the so-called *Prayer for the Welfare of King Jonathan* (4Q448) can be also associated with this war, see above p. 000, note 29.

[11] Jos. *AJ* 13.353. 355. According to Josephus (*AJ* 13.354), the queen's entourage advised her to take advantage of the situation and annex Judea. She apparently abandoned such plans faced with a firm resistance by her Jewish military commanders (Jos. *AJ* 13.354–355). Modern scholars, considering Rome's overwhelming influence in politics at the time and Egypt's dependence on Rome, categorically exclude any possibility that Cleopatra III might have harbored plans to annex even the least patch of land she occupied during her campaign against Ptolemy IX: Whitehorne 1995: 197 ff., esp. 198–199.

[12] Jos. *BJ* 1.86-7; *AJ* 13.356; Synkellos, p. 426; Stern 1981: 39–40; Schwartz 1990: 5. Major adversaries in the area included Theodorus, the tyrant of Amathus (Jos. *BJ* 1.86–87; *AJ* 13.356). Although victorious the king of Judea could not defeat him completely and had to face him again later (Jos. *AJ* 13.374). For identification and location of the fortress remains, cf. Mittmann 1987: 51 ff. esp. 55 f.

[13] Jos. *BJ* 1.87; *AJ* 13.357. It was probably during those operations that Alexander Jannaeus gained complete control over the city of Straton Pyrgos (cf. Jos. *AJ* 13.335). Its capture enabled him to extend his rule to a large section of Judean coastline: Levine 1974: 62 ff, 66 ff. Of the maritime cities targeted for attack by Alexander Jannaeus, Synkellos (p. 426) mentions Tyre, but the event is not otherwise known. Nor is it possible to establish when it took place.

[14] Kushnir-Stein 2000: 23–24; Hoover 2006: 25, 28–29. Establishing the date was made possible by numismatic evidence. Based on Josephus' account, suggestions were made of different dates, several years earlier, when Gaza was conquered: 101 (Bar-Kochva 1996: 294), ca. 100 (Kasher 1988: 88, 90; Shatzman 1991: 109), or (much more often) ca. 96 (Stern 1981: 40 and note 88).

[15] Kushnir-Stein 2000: 24. For more on Alexander Jannaeus' relations with the Nabateans, see Wenning 1994: 4–5.

[16] Willrich 1901c, 2801–2802, no. 42; Grainger 1997, 44.

The highly precarious position in which Alexander Jannaeus found himself early in the 80's resulted not just from unfavorable developments in neighboring lands, but also from a deep socio-religious rift in his own state. From Josephus' account we may only infer that the event that sparked off the conflict took place some time after Alexander Jannaeus contracted his peace agreement with Cleopatra III, during the festival of Tabernacles. As he presided over a temple ceremony, the congregation pelted the king with citrons, shouting offensive remarks at him which questioned the purity of his lineage and his right to exercise the office of high priest. In outrage, the king dispatched mercenary troops against the crowd, which resulted in many faithful being killed (Jos. *BJ* 1.88; *AJ* 13.372–373). The occurrence brings to mind a similar incident involving John Hyrcanus. The event is suggestive of a deliberate, organized provocation, for while the accusation of the king's dubious background was thoroughly baseless, it could still arouse a religiously ecstatic crowd. As had been the case with John Hyrcanus, the true purpose of the accusation was not to dispute the legality of Alexander's high priesthood, but to challenge openly the established political order. For this reason, the disturbance had most likely been inspired by the Pharisees. The king's violent response, however, failed to pacify his opponents. Contrary to his expectations, the temple massacre marked the beginning of a long and devastating conflict.

The next scene in the conflict was as bloody as it was dramatic. According to Josephus, fighting between the king and his opponents was resumed as a consequence of Alexander Jannaeus' defeat in battle by Obodas in Transjordan. Alexander barely managed to avoid being killed in the engagement (Jos. *BJ* 1.90; *AJ* 13.375). Back in Jerusalem, he was again attacked by the opposition on whom he cracked down with probably the same ruthlessness he had displayed on the previous occasion. Unable to remove Alexander Jannaeus by themselves, his adversaries finally decided to seek help from Demetrius III of Syria,[17] who answered the call, arriving in Judea with a large force. He was joined by many Jews. A battle ensued near Shechem in Samaria where Alexander Jannaeus suffered a defeat (Jos. *BJ* 1.93–95; *AJ* 13.377–378). Yet neither Demetrius nor his Jewish allies succeeded in reaping the fruit of the victory, since the Syrian king was unexpectedly forced to retreat to Syria owing to an unfavorable turn of events at home.[18] Left to their own devices, Alexander's enemies would not give up the fight which subsequently grew into civil war. With varying intensity, it continued for six long years, took

[17] Jos. *BJ* 1.92; *AJ* 13.376. Echoes of Demetrius III interfering in Judea, as well as a confirmation that his actions had been provoked by the Pharisees, can be found in a Dead Sea Scrolls (*Pesher Nahum* – 4Q169 (4Qp Nah), frgs. 3–4, col.1: *ll.* 2–3, 5). The publisher of the text, J.M. Allegro (1956: 92), was the first to identify the king Demetrius mentioned there as Demetrius III. This identification was at first challenged by H.H. Rowley (1956: 188–191), who instead linked the mention with an intervention by Demetrius I and introduction of Alcimus to Jerusalem. In his opinion, the repressions mentioned in the source may have been coincidental with the death of the Teacher of Righteousness (Rowley 1956: 191–193; the possibility, incidentally, was not excluded by Allegro 1956: 93). However, the arguments of Rowley did not win wide recognition. This did not deter other scholars from offering their own hypotheses and interpretations (they are reported by Doudna 2001: 26 ff.). At present, identification of that king Demetrius as Demetrius III is generally accepted: Doudna 2001: 25–26, 632–634; Charlesworth 2002: 114–115; Wise 2003: 70, no. 9; VanderKam 2004a: 325 ff.

[18] Jos. *AJ* 13.379. In his description of events presented in *Bellum* (1.95), Josephus explains Demetrius III's retreat by the fact that the Jewish troops, first fighting for Syria, switched sides over to Alexander Jannaeus, which markedly improved the situation of the recently defeated rival.

a heavy toll of lives, and caused immense destruction (cf. Jos. *BJ* 1.92). Little is known about its course, other than the king's enemies' last point of resistance was Bethoma or Bemeselis.[19] When it fell, all fighters captured there were dispatched to Jerusalem, where they were later crucified.[20] Those opponents who survived and would not accept defeat fled Judea (Jos. *BJ* 1.98; *AJ* 13.383). It might seem that opposition to Alexander Jannaeus was very strong if suppressing it took so long, but there is no evidence to support this view. It appears more probable that Alexander Jannaeus had far more pressing external threats to deal with at that time, which made crackdown on internal opposition fade into the background.

Defeated by Demetrius III, Alexander Jannaeus first had to concentrate on maintaining his own power and rebuilding his army to defend Judea from neighbors, especially the Nabateans, and the Syrian king in case he tried to raid Judea again. Such a program called for time and peace, and it was probably to gain it that Alexander Jannaeus relinquished to the Nabateans some of his conquered land in Moab (Jos. *AJ* 13.382).[21] Although the threat from Demetrius III abated since he was taken prisoner by the Parthians in 88/87,[22] another soon appeared. Victorious in struggles for Syrian succession was Antiochus XII Dionysus[23], whose ambition it was to reconquer territories captured by the Nabateans. In one of his expeditions he entered Judean territory.[24] Josephus seems to imply that the Syrian king simply meant to march through on his way to the Nabatean border. The assertion, however, is not obvious as the brief description affords little insight into Antiochus' real intentions. Still, the Jewish historian furnished some details that make us stop to ponder. First, it is surprising that the Syrian king chose that particu-

[19] The first version of the name is mentioned in *Antiquitates* (13.380), where it is called a city (εν Βεθομας πόλει), while the other appears in *Bellum* (1.96). Identifying and placing it has been the subject of much scholarly effort (a useful bibliography of the problem is provided by Schalit 1974: 302–308), producing highly varied conclusions. According to A. Schalit (1974: 310–318, esp. 314 ff.), what Josephus mentions as the Pharisees' last point of resistance ... *war eine Burg auf dem Berg Karantal, die anscheinend von Jannäus zu Beginn seiner Regierung dort erbaut und zu Ehren seiner Gattin, der Königin Salome Alexandra, auf hebräisch Bęth Šelomi, auf äramaisch Bę Šelami(n) benannt worden war* (p. 316).

[20] Jos. *BJ* 1.96–97, 113; *AJ* 13.379–380, 410. Much like Demetrius III's expedition, also the repressions used by Alexander Jannaeus – described in the Dead Sea Scrolls as "the Lion of Wrath" (Allegro 1956, 92; 1959, 47 ff.), an appellation he is given not only in *Pesher Nahum*, 4Q169 (4QpNah), frgs. 3–4, col. 2: *l.* 5, but also in *Pesher Hosea*, 4Q167 (4QpHosb), frg. 2: *ll.* 2–3; cf. Wise 2003: 71–72, no. 11 *contra* Doudna 2001: 601 ff. – were reflected in *Pesher Nahum*, 4Q169(4QpNah), frgs. 3–4, col.1: *ll.* 6–8; cf. Amoussine 1963: 389 ff., 393–396; Amusin 1977: 140–141; Charlesworth 2002: 99 ff., 115; Wise 2003: 71, no. 10; Eshel 2008: 117–131, 185–186. In truth, doubts are sometimes voiced about the correctness of identifying Alexander Jannaeus' opponents, as mentioned in the texts quoted, as "the Seekers-After-Smooth-Things," with the Pharisees (cf. Rabin 1956: 4 ff., 10; Saldarini 2001: 279–280), yet sources are quite clear about this: Baumgarten 1983: 421–422, and n. 42; Schiffman 1993: 274 ff.; Charlesworth 2002: 99 ff.; VanderKam 2003: 466 ff.; VanderKam 2004a: 328–331; VanderKam 2004b: 299 ff. esp. 311.

[21] In the context of the Judean king's contacts with the Nabatean state, it is worth noting a mention by Synkellos (p. 426) of a joint armed stand by Nabateans and Itureans against him. To pacify the Nabateans, Alexander Jannaeus dispatched his commander Diagos. The information contains some details that are difficult to interpret, cf. Schwartz 1990: 6.

[22] Jos. *AJ* 13.384–386; cf. Hoover 2007: 292, 294–295.

[23] Jos. *AJ* 13.387; Wilcken 1894c: 2484–2485, no. 33; Grainger 1997: 34; Hoover 2007: 298–299.

[24] The date of the event is unknown. Based on the last monetary issues of Antiochus XII dated 84/83, it may be thought that it took place at least several months before his death (cf. Houghton/Spaer 1990: 3–4; Hoover 2005: 99 n. 12; Hoover 2007: 298 n. 102; Houghton/Lorber/Hoover 2008: 607). It is therefore probable that he entered Judea about the year 84, cf. Shatzman 1991: 120.

lar route. As he held Damascus, he could have reached Nabatean-controlled areas much more easily and quickly from there than to march an extended route along the Mediterranean coast and then to traverse Judea. From a strategic point of view, such a plan carried much risk. Even if we accept that Antiochus XII knew about Alexander's recent defeat by Demetrius III and did not expect any serious hindrance from him, he still had to reckon with the fact that it was impossible to march swiftly and easily through Judea. Even in a period of peace, such an undertaking required time and preparation. As they entered unknown, hostile territory, Syrian commanders could not expect local populations to watch passively an alien army marching past, and had to consider the possibility of fighting erupting. With a limited size of the Syrian corps, any losses could jeopardize the whole campaign. This context lends significance to Josephus' remark that the Syrian troops appearing in Judea came as no surprise to Alexander Jannaeus (cf. Jos. *AJ* 13. 390). According to this account, Alexander prepared to offer resistance by building specifically for that purpose a system of fortifications between the cities of Antipatris and Joppa. This was to be a rampart about 28 km long, complete with towers for soldiers and special platforms for missile-throwing engines (Jos. *BJ* 1.99; *AJ* 13.390). It may therefore be thought that building the barrier required considerable time, resources, and labor. However, both relevant accounts by Josephus contain many details whose credibility is disputed.[25] If indeed Antiochus XII had only tried to march across Judea, even against its ruler's will, to reach Nabatean-held territory, building such defenses would have been wasteful and extravagant. After all, a Syrian victory over the Nabateans would indirectly have played into the hands of Alexander Jannaeus by relieving Nabatean pressure on Judea itself and on lands of interest to the Judean king. Such fortifications in Judea would have made sense only in response to real danger from Syria,[26] but we are not even sure if they were actually built.[27]

Alexander Jannaeus did not succeed in halting Antiochus XII, and the fortification system – so Josephus says (cf. Jos. *BJ* 1.100; *AJ* 13.391) – proved an insufficient obstacle for the Syrian king and failed to make him retreat. Yet apart from this testimony to Alexander Jannaeus' failure, we have another by the Byzantine historian Synkellos. His story echoes an otherwise unknown tradition which credits the Judean king with victories in clashes with the Syrian army.[28] It is impossible for us to determine whether Alexander's attempted counteraction indeed turned out quite ineffectual, or, in spite of all, it somehow affected the further route Antiochus XII chose for his army. All we know is

[25] Just as is the case with many other parallel accounts of the same events by Josephus here, too, both descriptions differ in detail. In *Bellum* (1.99) he mentions that the fortifications were erected in a hurry. By contrast, in *Antiquitates* (13.390) he suggests that they were built earlier, in advance. Differences between the stories are also discernible in descriptions of the fortification system itself: Berlin 1997: 38–39.

[26] Cf. Jos. *AJ* 13.389: ['Αντίοχος] ... στρατεύεται δ'εὐθὺς ἐλθὼν ἐπὶ τὴν 'Ιουδαίαν ...

[27] Discoveries in Tel Aviv and environs of various structural remains in which were found coins of Alexander Jannaeus permitted J. Kaplan to hypothesize that they were fragments of the fortification system erected by that ruler and mentioned by Josephus (cf. Kaplan/Ritter-Kaplan 1993: 1455; Fantalkin/Tal 2003: 108 ff. (a detailed description of those sites, 110–119). The hypothesis also won wide recognition among scholars. Yet a critical analysis of those archaeological sites and the items discovered there has shown that they have nothing to do with the military functions attributed to them, while their dating to the time of Alexander Jannaeus was based on very weak premises. For this reason, the architectural remains discovered can hardly be considered clear proof for the existence of a "Yannai line": Fantalkin/Tal 2003: 119–120.

[28] Jos. *AJ* 13.390–391; Synkellos, p. 426.

that in one way or another the Syrian king arrived in Nabatean-controlled territory and was soon killed in a battle fought near Cana,[29] his army dispersed and annihilated (Jos. *BJ* 1.101–102; *AJ* 13.391).

Failure to stop Antiochus XII's advance indicates that although some time had passed since the battle of Shechem and Judea's military strength had been rebuilt to some extent, Alexander's army could not match the limited but probably better trained adversary[30] and simultaneously effectively pacify domestic opposition. The likely cause was loss of hardened mercenary troops and the inexperience of freshly mobilized recruits. As another point, the long defense line must have necessitated spreading out the force available for its manning. In case of enemy attack, a rapid concentration was simply impossible. A telling example of Alexander Jannaeus' weakness at the time was the intrusion in 85 into Judea of Nabateans under their new king Aretas, who ascended to the throne after the death of Obodas. The Arab troops got as far as Adida and there inflicted a defeat on a defending Jewish army. Aretas withdrew from Judea following an accord he made with Alexander Jannaeus, the details of which remain unknown to us (Jos. *BJ* 1.103; *AJ* 13.392). At that difficult juncture, the Judean king needed not fear danger only from Egypt, where, since 88, the throne was occupied by his erstwhile adversary Ptolemy IX. Ptolemy was too engrossed with internal problems in Egypt to contemplate active political involvement in Syria.

Alexander Jannaeus relatively quickly overcame the effects of his failures and resumed operations in Transjordan. They continued incessantly for three years[31] and were targeted at local centers of power and Greek cities there (Jos. *BJ* 1.104–105; *AJ* 13.393–394). As a result, Judea's borders were extended and Alexander's own finances improved considerably from the ample booty he obtained. For local inhabitants, the new rule meant thorough changes: Greek cities were stripped of their autonomy, while immense destruction wreaked by war undermined their administrative and economic importance. Like his predecessors, Alexander Jannaeus thought that the most effective way to "integrate" conquered populations with Judea was to forcefully Judaize them. Due to insufficient evidence, it is difficult to tell whether the policy was implemented along past lines or some alterations were made. That Alexander could be thorough and ruthless in this respect seems to be suggested by an instance Josephus reports of forced Judaization of Greek inhabitants of the city of Pella (Jos. *AJ* 13. 397). Scholars are still not in agreement over the credibility of that account with respect to whether the forced Judaization could apply, other than to Semitic people, also to members of a Greek pop-

[29] Jos. *BJ* 1.102; *AJ* 13.391. The chronology of the last dated coins of this king suggests that he was killed about the year 83. The battlefield is usually placed somewhere in the Negev, south of the Dead Sea, cf. Abel 1967, II: 149 (the scholar's reference (*loc. cit.*) to Jos. *AJ* 14.80 has nothing to do with the raid by Antiochus XII as it refers to a later expedition of M. Aemilius Scaurus against the Nabateans): Kasher 1988: 106 n. 182. His army, despite the aid it received, faced great difficulties with its commissariat, so it may give us pause as to how Antiochus XII handled the problem if he could not rely on any help in that territory. Considering this aspect, we may question the correctness of the locality suggested. Much more convincing is an identification of that Cana with a place by the same name in the Hauran: Negev 1977: 537. Probably we can identify that place with Canatha (mod. Kanawat) in the Jebal Hauran.

[30] According to Josephus (*AJ* 13.389), Antiochus XII's army numbered 8,000 infantry and 800 cavalry.

[31] The exact chronology of those campaigns or their purposes is not well known. Nonetheless, the chronology of Alexander Jannaeus' monetary issues found in areas he had subjugated helps throw some light on them, cf. Gibson/Urman 1990/1991: 70; Shachar 2004: 5 ff.

ulation.[32] Because residents of Pella firmly refused to accept the conqueror-imposed religious practice, the city was razed.[33] Alexander's brutality here was unexceptional: his predecessors and himself had behaved in similar, or only slightly more lenient way, toward captured cities.[34]

Territorial gains in Transjordan helped improve Alexander Jannaeus' image with the populace and secured him a favorable welcome when he returned home from the campaign (Jos. *BJ* 1.105). The ruler's illness, which beset him in his last years, prevented making full use of such propitious social sentiment. Despite ailments, Alexander Jannaeus did not give up on military involvement, although its effects are largely unknown to us. We may only guess that he was active in strengthening his dominion in Transjordan. This is suggested by the fact that he died while he was laying siege to the fortress of Ragaba.[35]

Alexander Jannaeus' external policy was completely different from that of his predecessors. From Judah Maccabee to John Hyrcanus, each Hasmonean tried to ensure the best possible relations with Rome. On assuming power, each tried to renew such friendly ties. Even if advantages were not immediately tangible, Rome's favor made for a certain guarantee of safety in case of conflict with the Seleucids. In contrast, we have no evidence to document an attempt to refresh, or at least to maintain, relations with Rome for the reign of Alexander Jannaeus (this also applies to Aristobulus, but his rule was too short for him to engage in any such initiative). This absence of diplomatic action by Alexander Jannaeus in the Roman capital may be explained by the fall of the Seleucid state, which invalidated the need to seek Roman protection from aggression by its kings. By then, the political center of attention of the eastern Mediterranean had shifted from Syria to Armenia and Anatolia. The grand conquests by Mithradates VI Eupator, king of Pontus, and Tigranes, king of Armenia, in the first decades of the 1st century BCE, their military power and aggressive policies threatening Roman interests, made them front-line rivals of Rome, absorbing its attention and forces for decades to come. In such circumstances, the good disposition of Roman senators was no longer so vital to Judea. Politically, the more important partner became the Parthian rulers, who had become major players in Syrian affairs. Tradition has preserved certain traces of contacts with them, but little more than that can be said.

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[32] See Kasher 1990: 156 ff.; Cohen 1999: 111 n. 3; Schwartz 2000: 69*; Dąbrowa 2006b: 114.

[33] Traces of damage inflicted are also confirmed by archaeological excavations made in Pella (Safrai 2000: 69–70) including coins found in the process: Shachar 2004: 20 ff.

[34] Dąbrowa 2006b: 114. In the opinion of U. Rappaport, Alexander Jannaeus' hostile attitude toward Hellenistic cities also explains his lack of interest in closer ties with Rome. However, it is difficult to accept.

[35] Jos. *AJ* 13.398. Alexander Jannaeus' domination in Transjordan was implemented by his gaining control over strategic points there. This is suggested both by the place of his death and by the fact that Alexandra Salome continued the siege to a successful end. The location of Ragaba (Tell el-Mrabbâ) was of key importance in controlling a large area and an important road to Gerasa: Mittmann 1987: 60 ff. esp. 62–63. The town played a role similar to that served by Alexander Jannaeus' earlier captures (Jos. *AJ* 13.393), Amathus and the city and fortress of Essa, located on the hill of Tulűl ed-Dahab: Mittmann 1987: 56 ff. The extent of Alexander Jannaeus' conquests is outlined by three different descriptions of the Hasmonean state near the end of his rule: Jos. *AJ* 13.395–397; 14.18; Synkellos, p. 426. For more on some attempted interpretations of those descriptions and their consequent controversies, see Schalit 1967/1969: 3 ff.; Kasher 1988: 97 ff.

Alexander Jannaeus' limited political contacts, with little effort to develop such, can be explained by his preoccupation with expansionist policy. That the policy occupied an exceptional place in his mind is best indicated by the time and energy he devoted to pursuing it. After he conquered the coastal cities, he concentrated his efforts on Transjordan. Thanks to this, he could successfully, despite temporary setbacks, oppose the Nabateans, the only really dangerous adversary in his last years on the throne. With no other enemies, he had a unique opportunity to secure his own interests. Still, it should be remembered that the favorable overall outcome of the Judean king's external policy was not just his own making, but was also due to a confluence of various favorable occurrences which enabled him to give his state the shape it last had in biblical times.

Little can be said of Alexander Jannaeus' domestic policy as sources only show it through the lens of his conflict with the Pharisees. Apart from political consequences, the antagonism entailed social and material consequences that are not to be overlooked. Its enormous number of victims must have caused a long-term demographic slump and damage beyond estimation. To this tragic toll must be added the human losses suffered in Alexander's many battlefields. And yet the pace at which Alexander Jannaeus rebuilt his army after the Shechem defeat may indicate that, in spite of all the heavy demographic losses it suffered, Judea under his rule was populous enough to replenish the decimated ranks relatively quickly. Nor can it be ruled out that fresh soldiers were recruited not only among Judeans proper, but also in territories conquered and Judaized by Alexander's predecessors. Perhaps it was this consideration of reinforcements for his army that helped affirm his conviction of the need to pursue Judaization of populations in newly acquired lands. This seems all the more likely as sources are silent as to any use of mercenaries in his later reign. And yet Alexander certainly possessed sufficient resources to finance such enlistment.

While he tried to portray Alexander Jannaeus as an inveterate conqueror, Josephus did not omit occasion to address other aspects of his rule[36] and thus in the historian's account of Alexander's reign we find valuable details that cast an added light. His bloodbath on the opposition in his last years had pacified the situation in the state, but it was clear that such peace could not last. With a large number of his opponents outside Judea, and their continued influence in the society, another outbreak was inevitable. The key point in maintaining the hard-won peace was the question of succession and of Alexander's successor's relations with the domestic opposition. The dying king saw his wife, Alexandra Salome, as his successor, an idea he had certainly given much thought. This seems to be confirmed by his advice given on his deathbed to his wife on how to arrange relations with subjects, and especially with influential and dangerous Pharisaic opposition. To make it easier for his wife to assume power, Alexander went so far as to bid her, even at the cost of sullying his memory, to establish good contacts with the Pharisees (Jos. *AJ* 13, 400–404). Judging by their eventual effects, his endeavors to smooth Alexandra Salome's transition into power must have been far-sighted as they indeed gave his state several years of relative peace, even at the price of strong tensions and conflicts arising within the royal family.

[36] Even though Judea attained its greatest power though conquests by Alexander Jannaeus, Josephus submits no favorable opinion of his achievements. In the historian's opinion, the peak of Hasmonean success and prosperity came at the time of John Hyrcanus: Mason 1991: 83, 247–248.

Alexandra Salome's ascent to power (76–67) created many important changes in Judea. As a woman, the new queen could not hold the highest religious office. While reserving full political powers for herself, she had to entrust high priesthood to someone else: it fell to her eldest son Hyrcanus.[37] This choice had the important advantage that, with his temperament and personal qualities, Hyrcanus, unlike the younger son Aristobulus, was free of any greater political ambition. This made him a convenient and docile partner for her.[38] In the last years of her reign, she decided on a course of action that had had no precedent in Hasmonean political practice. She appointed Hyrcanus her co-ruler, thus enabling him to combine political and religious powers.[39] The reasons behind her unusual decision are not known. We may only suppose that an illness prevented her from exercising a ruler's routine duties (cf. Jos. *BJ* 1.117; *AJ* 13.422). Yet despite her illness, Alexandra personally made important decisions until her death (cf. Jos. *BJ* 1.118; *AJ* 13.428–429).

Other changes resulted from Alexandra Salome's desire to win solid support in society and affected the country's social and political elites. So far dominant and privileged, the Sadducees – a group or religiously conservative Judean aristocracy, loyal and actively supportive of Alexander Jannaeus in his struggle against the Pharisees – began to be replaced by their adversaries, whom Alexandra Salome preferred. This soon bolstered the Pharisees' power and influence (Jos. *BJ* 1.112; *AJ* 13.408–409). However, the shift, though it gave the queen a solid power base, generated grave tensions in the social elite and caused political conflict which led to fratricidal fighting toward the end of her reign.

An analysis of Josephus' account of Alexandra Salome's reign suggests that the changes she introduced to Judea's social and political elites by no means resulted from her late husband's dying advice to admit the Pharisees to share in government (cf. Jos. *AJ* 13.400–404). To a far greater extent she was acting on her own religious convictions (cf. Jos. *BJ* 1.111) and from a fully conscious, even cynical, choice of political aims. For this reason Josephus, while appreciating Alexandra Salome's actual achievements (Jos. *BJ* 1.112; *AJ* 13.409), accuses her of egoism stemming from her lust for power.[40] As a result, the queen, although quite aware of sharp tensions existing in the nation,

[37] Jos. *BJ* 1.109; *AJ* 13.408; 15.179. Enforced by circumstances, this division between secular and priestly duties can in no way be seen as a reform introduced by Alexandra Salome. Elledge (2004: 140–141, 146) tries to prove otherwise, unconvincingly.

[38] Jos. *BJ* 1.109; *AJ* 13.408; cf. 20.242; Schwartz 1994: 222–223. Josephus stresses character differences between both brothers repeatedly and on many occasions (cf. *BJ* 1.117. 120; *AJ* 14.13. 44). It is part of his own appraisal of reasons which led to loss of Judean independence. These include the ascent to power of Alexandra Salome (cf. *AJ* 13.417. 430–432; Mason 1991: 257 ff.) and the conflict between her sons, which he describes as στάσις. Despite his harsh assessment of the rivalry between Alexander Jannaeus' sons, given its fateful consequences for Judea, Josephus still shows much sympathy to Aristobulus II: Mason 1991: 251–252, 254, 255–256, 258–259.

[39] Jos. *BJ* 1.120. According to Synkellos (p. 427), shortly before Alexandra Salome's death, Hyrcanus received from her hands royal power and Aristobulus priestly authority. In *Antiquitates* (13.423; 14.4), Josephus presented the question of Hyrcanus exercising power during the reign of Alexandra Salome in a most confusing way. This is the effect of his erroneous dating of the event, which he aligns simultaneously in the Olympic era and the consular system; in conversion it corresponds to late 70 or early 69. This dating is contradicted by his information elsewhere about the dates of Aristobulus II's (*AJ* 14.97; 20. 244) and Hyrcanus' reigns (*AJ* 15.180).

[40] Jos. *AJ* 13.417. 430–432. Cf. Mason 1991: 249 ff., 257–258; Schwartz 1994: 219–220.

made no effort to suppress them or encouraging, by lack of firm action and even by certain acquiescence, a gradual loss of control over the course of events. Her inability to foresee the consequences of her own behavior cost Judea its hard-won independence. What few departures from Alexandra Salome's set course were made did not stem from her political foresight or her commitment to the good of the nation, but rather from pressures exerted by her associates.[41] Unconcerned as the queen was about the Pharisees' abuses of power and their attempts to eliminate members of Alexander Jannaeus' entourage,[42] she nevertheless worked tirelessly to strengthen her own position. To that end, Alexandra Salome accumulated resources away from Jerusalem, greatly expanded the army and enlisted mercenaries (Jos. *BJ* 1.112. 117; *AJ* 13. 409. 417). The presence of mercenaries in the queen's service was a particularly expressive sign, since employment by the Hasmoneans of foreign troops was one of the accusations leveled against the dynasts by their political opponents. It is difficult to imagine that the Pharisees showed so much consideration for Alexandra Salome as to reverse their opinion in this matter. They must have still remembered events in the reign of Alexander Jannaeus in which he used foreign troops to combat them.[43] In this situation, the only probable reason the queen nevertheless decided to keep mercenaries could be her desire to maintain, even against the Pharisees' wishes, a politically and ideologically neutral force she could use to defend her power against any possible enemy.

Rabbinical tradition, being of disputable historical value, lacks sufficient credibility for us to believe that shifts in Judea's social and political elites under Alexandra Salome did not involve any major systemic reform of government.[44] Nor does Josephus supply hints of any such reform taking place. Although his appraisal of the queen's domestic policy does emphasize some of her accomplishments, this appraisal by no means implies any deeper-reaching transformation of the state itself. Nor could her positive actions counterbalance the negative effects of her admitting the Pharisees to government.[45] It was because of them that Alexandra Salome's reign showed little in the way of continuing her husband's policies. Nonetheless, in her actions she displayed independence in what were to her key areas: foreign policy and the military. Judea's good standing, assured by Alexander Jannaeus, combined with Alexandra Salome's military build-up, enabled her easily to arrange relations with her neighboring nations on favorable terms.

[41] Jos. *BJ* 1.113–114; *AJ* 13.411–417. Aristobulus made his mother assure the safety of Alexander Jannaeus' former commanders by persuading her about dangers to state security should they defect and choose to serve in neighboring nations' armies. His defense of his fathers' associates not only won him their support, but it also made him a leader of all those dissatisfied with her rule (cf. Mason 1991: 253–254). It should be stressed that there are no indications that the opposition was religious in nature, even though it rose in response to overwhelming Pharisee influence. While the queen's policies were contested, no action was taken against her, not until the last weeks of her life when Aristobulus openly started a struggle for succession.

[42] Cf. Jos. *BJ* 1.113; *AJ* 13.410–411. Not only Pharisaic influence, but also the queen's relations with them, are negatively viewed in the Dead Sea Scrolls (4Q322; 4Q324b): Ilan 2001: 57 ff., esp. 65–68. On the other side the Pharisaic tradition presents very favorable picture of her rule, cf. Eshel 2008: 145 n. 39.

[43] That the king used the services of mercenaries in fighting his adversaries is expressly stated by Josephus (*BJ* 1.88). But in his detailed account of the same event in *Antiquitates* (13.372–374), he says not a word about who perpetrated the massacre of the faithful in the temple. Just after that description comes a mention of Alexander Jannaeus having mercenary troops, but it does not clearly relate to the event (374).

[44] That such a reform was introduced is believed by E. Baltrusch (2001: 173–174).

[45] Mason 1991: 110 ff., 248–259.

She could even pressure the rulers of some nearby countries to deliver hostages to her court as a guarantee of their loyalty (cf. Jos. *BJ* 1.112; *AJ* 13.409). Little can be said of Alexandra Salome's military activity as our information is quite random. What we do learn concerns an expedition – not exactly successful – by Aristobulus to Damascus against Ptolemy, the ruler of Chalcis, who took control of that city about the year 71.[46] One account by Josephus implies that it could happen in about 69 (cf. *AJ* 13.418–419), another provides no hints on chronology (*BJ* 1.105). Based on data regarding Ptolemy's activity in Damascus, it can thus be approximately dated at the period between the years 71 and 69. The expedition itself may be treated as an attempt to prevent Ptolemy gaining strength and using Damascus as a base for raids into Galilee or Transjordan.[47] Judea's military capabilities, while sufficient to defend its territory against neighbors, were still not sufficient for its queen to meet a much greater threat. For this reason, when Tigranes, king of Armenia and Syria, arrived at Ptolemais with his army, Alexandra Salome prudently made friendly contact with him to head off the danger of his possible attack on Judea (Jos. *BJ* 1.116; *AJ* 13. 419–420). Probably like Alexander Jannaeus, in foreign policy Alexandra Salome strictly limited her interests to adjacent areas and tried to maintain her dominance within the region. An awareness of her strength gave her a sense of security sufficient not to look for foreign allies. At any rate, we know of no attempts by her to renew or establish relations with Rome.

The political gains in foreign relations that Alexandra Salome derived from having a strong army (Jos. *BJ* 1.112; *AJ* 13.409) prompt us to have a closer look at her attitude toward the military. According to Josephus, she doubled the size of the army she had inherited from Alexander Jannaeus (Jos. *BJ* 1.112; *AJ* 13.409). This piece of information supplies no numerical data, leaving us to speculate. Comparing figures for Alexander Jannaeus' predecessors' forces, we may assume that the army which he had at the time of his death and which was capable of fending off the Nabatean threat, (while simultaneously fighting to conquer new territories) must have numbered at least between ten and twenty thousand men. Therefore, if that army was indeed much strengthened by Alexandra Salome, its numbers might have run to tens of thousands.[48] Such a number, when viewed against the background of the nation's demographic potential and the resources the queen could afford to expend to maintain such a large force, is not improbable. On top of the numbers regularly at arms, there was another, unknown, but probably large mercenary force. What is most surprising about that extensive arms build-up is its reason: it cannot be accounted for by the country's military involvement or by the appearance of any major external threat to the nation's existence. Josephus' account implies that all the armed forces were under the queen's control, which may mean that she

[46] Jos. *BJ* 1.115; *AJ* 13.418; Schottroff 1982: 134. The last coins of Tigranes struck in the Damascus mint are dated about 72/71: Hoover 2005: 99.

[47] Given insufficient sources, the hypothesis put forward by A. Kasher ((1988: 108): (...) *it would be reasonable to assume that one of the queen's objectives in sending an army led by Judas Aristobulus II on the military campaign to Damascus was her desire to divert his energies into other channels, away from his growing rivalry with his brother John Hyrcanus II. However it appears that in reality things unfolded differently (…) In our opinion the campaign "failed" because the Ituraean-Hasmonaean dispute was resolved by means of political negotiations by Judas Aristobulus II, who in this way sought to win over the Ituraeans as his allies* (…)) is solely based on unverifiable speculations.

[48] More on the subject below.

treated them as an important factor to guarantee the stability of her rule and assuring control over the state. Also, it was one of few structures in the state in which the Pharisees exerted no influence. It seems that a large part of that army might have been used to man the many fortresses scattered in so many strategic locations in Judea (cf. Jos. *AJ* 13.422. 424. 427) guarding not only the nation's security, but also the queen's personal wealth (cf. Jos. *AJ* 13.417). Perhaps that was the reason for the arms build-up program.

In the year 67, at a time of political crisis in the last weeks of Alexandra Salome's reign, it turned out that part of the army she had gone to such expense to expand, took the side of her own son Aristobulus (II), pretender to the Judean throne. He enjoyed the backing of many senior officers grateful to him for saving their lives (cf. Jos. *AJ* 13.422). He also won hearts with his lively temperament, which so set him apart from his elder brother and which met the expectations of many as to the personality of a new king. Also, his objection to the overwhelming Pharisaic influence helped his popularity. To many people attached to Alexander Jannaeus, Hyrcanus' listlessness could mean even greater Pharisaic dominance than under Alexandra Salome, which would further aggravate their already unsatisfactory position (cf. Jos. *AJ* 13.423). It cannot quite be ruled out, either, that they pinned hopes on Aristobulus II for the continued conquest policy of his father's, a policy Alexandra Salome had abandoned.

It is convincing testimony of Aristobulus II's popularity among the military that within two weeks of his rising against his mother and Hyrcanus, he succeeded, without much difficulty, to win control over many fortresses across the nation and to obtain ample resources to finance recruitment.[49] The fighting concluded with a battle outside Jericho in which forces loyal to Hyrcanus were beaten. Following the defeat, his soldiers went over to the camp of the victorious Aristobulus (Jos. *BJ* 1.120; *AJ* 14.4). The fratricidal fighting for the throne was interrupted by an accord between Aristobulus II and Hyrcanus. In its outcome, Hyrcanus relinquished his political and priestly claims for the sake of his brother.[50] The accord, which satisfied (at least officially) not only both signatories, but also masses of subjects, was respected up to a point. Josephus does not make it clear when the breach occurred, but he points at Antipater, the father of Herod, as the chief culprit responsible for renewed fighting between the brothers. As Hyrcanus' adviser, Antipater gained great influence over him. For example, he persuaded Hyrcanus to fight for his seniority rights to the crown (Jos. *BJ* 1.123–124; *AJ* 14.11–14).[51] Thanks to personal contacts and a diplomatic talent, Antipater succeeded in gaining a powerful ally to support Hyrcanus' cause: he was the Nabatean king Aretas III, the same whom more than a decade before Alexander Jannaeus had combated. For helping Hyrcanus regain the throne of Judea, Aretas III was to be rewarded with some lands in Transjordan that had been conquered by his father (Jos. *AJ* 14.18). Assisted by a Nabatean army,

[49] Jos. *AJ* 13.425. 427. Josephus clearly suggests that Aristobulus II's resources came not only from looting his mother's treasures but also from other sources (*AJ* 13.427): Ἀριστοβούλῳ δὲ ὡς ἂν ἐκ πολλῶν συχνὰ συνανηνέχθη. Rather enigmatic, this phrase means that he was probably supported by members of social groups previously connected with Alexander Jannaeus.

[50] Jos. *BJ* 1.121; *AJ* 14.6; 20.243. Reporting these events, Josephus makes no mention of Hyrcanus simultaneously submitting a resignation from high priesthood. Yet this is quite clear in his statement elsewhere: *AJ* 14.97; 15.41; 20.243.

[51] Jos. *BJ* 1.123–124; *AJ* 14.11–14. Echoes of this power struggle are reflected in a partly preserved Qumran text (4Q332), cf. Vermes 2007: 137; Eshel 2008: 137–138.

Hyrcanus regained power in Judea, while the defeated Aristobulus, deserted by most of his soldiers, was besieged in Jerusalem (Jos. *AJ* 14.20). Unquestionably, Josephus' picture of Antipater's actions and his assessment are not fully objective; Hyrcanus himself appears in a less than favorable light in spite of Josephus.

What with an unexpected intervention in Judean affairs by the Romans, this last scene in the fraternal conflict ended in an altogether surprising way. Roman presence in Palestine was part of Gn. Pompey's long-standing war against Mithradates VI of Pontus and Tigranes of Armenia. Toward its close, Pompey dispatched part of his force from Anatolia to Syria; then they proceeded toward Palestine. The Roman troops that reached Judea were led by M. Aemilius Scaurus (Jos. *BJ* 1.127; *AJ* 14.29–32). It was he who became the first high-ranking Roman official whose presence and decisions exerted significant impact on further developments in Judea. Aristobulus II made contact with Scaurus and for a price of 400 talents won his support for his own cause. Scaurus' assistance consisted in threatening Aretas III, with the latter being declared an enemy of Rome unless he lifted his siege of Jerusalem (Jos. *BJ* 1.128; *AJ* 14.30–32).[52] The Nabatean king preferred not get on the wrong side of Rome and decided to withdraw. Aristobulus II, who had retained freedom of movement, managed to gather a new force, attacked the withdrawing Nabatean corps and their allied Hyrcanus' troops, inflicting heavy losses (Jos. *BJ* 1.130; *AJ* 14.33). Still, the paid-for support given to Aristobulus by Scaurus was not tantamount to Roman action to secure lasting peace in Judea because any relevant decisions could only be taken by Pompey.[53]

For Judea, this first contact with Romans was a harbinger of an all-new way of pursuing politics, unknown to both Hasmoneans. Further developments showed that the long gap in Judea's diplomatic contacts with Rome, and Judea's resulting ignorance of Roman policies toward neighboring nations, carried a price. As they turned to Pompey to settle their dispute over power in Judea, neither brother had the slightest realization of the fact that, with Romans at their frontiers, the world they had known had changed radically. Their quarrels, motives, and arguments meant nothing to the Romans, whose overriding aim was the Roman state's interest, and that bade officials authorized by the Roman senate to pursue solutions of local conflicts to serve that interest.

On call from Pompey, in spring 63, Aristobulus II and Hyrcanus, each with his entourage, arrived at Damascus. Their appearance there was preceded by much earlier (fall 64), attempts by envoys of each party to secure Pompey's good graces.[54] In Damascus, apart from both throne-bent brothers and their aides, there appeared one more

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[52] See 4Q333; Eshel 2008: 138, 141–142.

[53] Arguments by J.D. Amusin (1977: 146–150) to show that events in the struggle between both brothers were reflected in *Pesher Hosea* (4Q166 (= 4QpHosa, col. 2: *ll.* 12 ff.; Amusin 1977: 146, gives a wrong reference to the text – 4QpHosb), have not gained recognition.

[54] Aristobulus II tried to win Pompey's favor by sending him a generous gift of a gold-wrought grapevine, so beautiful that it won wide fame among contemporaries and posterity (it was described by Strabo (cf. Jos. *AJ* 14.34–36), and probably also Pliny (*HN* 37. 12), see Galling 1958: 49 ff.; Baumann 1983: 31–32 n. 121). The favorable impression created by the gift was ruined by a tactless annunciation, offensive to a Roman listener, by his envoys, who, trying to persuade Pompey to accept Aristobulus II's reasons, suggested corruption of the Roman commander's close associates: Scaurus and Gabinius (Jos. *AJ* 14.37). Messengers from Hyrcanus brought no gifts and only presented to the Roman arguments for their master's right to the throne.

Jewish group whom Josephus describes as the people's representatives.[55] The essence of Hyrcanus' repeated accusations against his brother was that he had been deprived of the power due to him by right of seniority, and that Aristobulus II had limited his authority to just a small part of the country. Other grievances included that concerning Aristobulus provoking social unrest in Judea due to his drive for power, and his actions against Rome (Jos. *AJ* 14.42–43). In his turn, Aristobulus II made a speech in which he "blamed Hyrcanus' fall from power on his own character, which was ineffectual and therefore invited contempt. As for himself, he said that he had of necessity taken over the royal power for fear that it might pass into the hands of others, and that his title was exactly the same as that of his father Alexander."[56] The third delegation, claiming to be the people's representatives, requested that Pompey depose the Hasmoneans and restore the former political model in which power in Judea was exercised by high priest of the Jerusalem temple (Jos. *AJ* 14.41). Having heard all the parties, Pompey adjourned his decision until a later time, as an excuse claiming the need to conclude the planned campaign against the Nabateans and to study the situation in Judea personally.

Josephus' account of developments in Judea in the period between the death of Alexandra Salome and the intervention of Pompey is dominated by the story of the rivalry between Aristobulus II and Hyrcanus. For this reason, the only facts known to us about the short reign of Aristobulus II are those presented by Hyrcanus in his accusation of his brother before Pompey: looting raids on Judea's neighbors, piracy at sea, and generally causing chaos through violent behavior toward his own subjects.[57] Obviously, such

[55] *AJ* 14.41; cf. Diodorus 40.2. The terms used in the passage cited from Josephus to describe the group of representatives (καὶ τῶν Ἰουδαίων ... τὸ ἔθνος) are too general to decide whom or what circle (or circles) the delegation represented. The one thing that must be authoritatively excluded is that the group represented the views of the Judean society at large. At that time, the notion of representing the entire society was not connected with any specific institution or with a community that would be authorized to speak for the nation. Also, contrary to some scholars' beliefs (e.g. Lebram 1974: 243–244 claims that it represented the Sadducean point of view), the message delivered by members of the delegation is not sufficient to be identified with any known social or religious group (as does, without convincing arguments, Buehler 1974: 61). It may only be said that they expressed the views of advocates of a theocratic model of authority (cf. Goodblatt 1994: 39–44, 65, 74). The delegation's claims that they represented the people of Judea were probably meant to impress on Pompeius that Hasmonean rule did not enjoy popular support. According to Diodorus (40. 2), the delegation οἱ δὲ ἐπιφανέστατοι, as he calls them, numbered 200; also cf. Fischer 1975a: 46 ff.; Goodblatt 1994: 36 ff.

[56] Jos. *AJ* 14.44: ὁ δὲ τοῦ μεν ἐκπεσεῖν αὐτὸν τῆς ἀρχῆς τὴν ἐκείνου φύσιν ᾐτιᾶτο, ἄπρακτον οὖσαν καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' εὐκαταφρόνητον, αῦτὸν δὲ ἔλεγε φόβῳ τοῦ μὴ πρὸς ἄλλους μεταστῆναι τὴν ἀρχην ἐξ ἀνάγκης αὐτὴν ὑπελθεῖν, προσαγορεύεσθαι δὲ αὐτὸν τοῦτο ὅπερ καὶ Ἀλέξανδρον τὸν πατέρα. [(…) *as for himself, he said that he had of necessity taken over the royal power for fear that it might pass into the hands of others, and that his title was exactly the same as that of his father Alexander.*] (tr. R. Marcus). Special attention should be paid to the emphasis on the argument about fears that the "others" might exert influence on Aristobulus. Even earlier Josephus mentioned anxieties among Alexander Jannaeus' former commanders that the state might be dominated by the Pharisees if Hyrcanus rose to power (Jos. *AJ* 13.423), and there is no doubt that Aristobulus meant precisely them. Since our knowledge of events and circumstances in which Alexander Jannaeus took power is highly incomplete, as it is in matters concerning his family, the point of the argument in which John Hyrcanus justifies his right to the throne by recalling his father's example remains unclear to us.

[57] *AJ* 14.43: τάς τε καταδρομὰς τὰς ἐπὶ τοὺς ὁμόρους καὶ τὰ πειρατήρια τὰ ἐν τῇ θαλάττη τοῦτον εἶναι τὸν συστήσαντα διέβαλεν, οὐκ ἂν ουδ' ἀποστῆναι λέγων τὸ ἔθνος αὐτοῦ, εἰ μὴ βίαιός τε καὶ ταραχώδης ὑπῆρχεν. [*He also denounced him as the one who had instigated the raids against neighbouring peoples and the acts of piracy at sea, and added that nation would not have rebelled against him if he had not been a man given to violence and disorder.*] (tr. R. Marcus).

charges were meant especially to discredit the rival, a clear propaganda stunt, but they still imply that the rivalry for the throne did entirely preoccupy Aristobulus. Assuming the accusations were at least partly true, the most interesting among them is the one concerning piracy. Eliminating piracy was an important issue in Pompey's career and blaming Aristobulus for such practices was no doubt designed to put him in the Roman's bad books. As for Aristobulus II, an anti-Roman aspect of his piracy might have meant attacking and robbing ships belonging to Roman owners or looting cargoes which were Roman property. The presence of many such crafts in waters off the Judean coast might have been connected with the warfare waged by Pompey in the East. The ships might have been carrying cargoes of supplies for his troops or war booty he had captured. However, the clear motive behind such pirate attacks was to enrich the assailant, not to undermine Rome's military capabilities.

Although Josephus never says it expressly, Pompey's restraint in passing judgment, as well as subsequent developments suggest, that Aristobulus II's self-confidence bordering on arrogance did not win him the Roman's sympathy. The official was also worried about the large force and resources Aristobulus had at his disposal. Such fears were fully substantiated by Aristobulus himself when, disappointed with Pompey's delaying decision about Judea, he took openly hostile steps against him that could affect the success of the Roman's expedition against the Nabateans. In response, Pompey took an appropriate force and moved into Judea. Failed attempts at mediation between the pretender brothers, and the insincere behavior of Aristobulus II in meeting Roman demands finally ended in his being arrested (Jos. *BJ* 1.141; *AJ* 14.57). Hearing of this, Aristobulus' supporters locked themselves up in the Jerusalem temple and prepared to fight the Romans (Jos. *BJ* 1.142–143; *AJ* 14.58).

In this situation, Pompey had no option but to lay siege to the temple. He was joined by Hyrcanus and his force. In this way the conflict between the brothers regarding power in Judea had taken an unexpected turn.[58]

The capture of the Temple after a weeks-long siege and later events became deeply imprinted in Jewish minds for generations to come.[59] Only then did the Judeans have

[58] Events involved in Pompey's actions against Aristobulus and their consequences were reflected not only in Josephus' comprehensive account (*BJ* 1.133–158; *AJ* 14.48–79), but also in more of less detailed stories by many other ancient authors: Cic. *Pro Flacco* 5.28, 69; Strabo 16.2.40 [763]; Livy *Per.* 102; Diodorus 40.2; App. *Syr.* 50; *Mithr.* 106; Dio Cassius 37. 15.2–16.5; Florus, *Epit.* 1.40.30; Amm. Marc. 14.8.12; Oros. 6.6.3–4; Eutrop. 6.14.2; cf. Jos. *AJ* 14.68. In Jewish literature, those events were recorded only to a limited extent (cf. Piattelli 1971: 292–293; Dupont-Sommer 1972: 887–888). Their dramatic reverberations, combined with messianic visions, can be found in Qumran texts (cf. note below) and in *Psalms of Solomon* (*PssSol* 2; 8; 17). While scholars agree that among *Solomon's Psalms* 2 and 8 refer to developments of 63, it is still a matter of contention whether Ps.17 contains references to Pompey's capture of Jerusalem (cf. Atkinson 1996: 313, and n. 1; 2004: 138 n. 11 (bibliographic references)) or perhaps talks about later developments when Roman-supported Herod won the city. This latter hypothesis has received support from Caquot 1986: 217–218; Tromp 1993: 344 ff., 359 ff.; Atkinson 1996: 314–315, 318–322 (cf. 314 n. 12, which contains bibliographic references to other works that share this opinion). The last-named of those scholars, however, has changed his mind. In a recently published comprehensive analysis of the historical and social background of the *Psalms of Solomon*, he associates Ps. 17 with events of the year 63: Atkinson 2004: 135–139.

[59] Jerusalem was captured in the third month of its siege: Jos. *BJ* 1.149; *AJ* 14.66; Oros. 6.6.3; cf. Baumann 1983: 42 ff.; VanderKam 2004a: 344-5. More on developments surrounding the fighting for the Temple and on related circumstances: Regev 1997: 277 ff., 286–289; Atkinson 2004: 22–28, 37–45, 62 ff.

to realize that a new chapter had begun in the history of their land. Its beginning was marked by Pompey's decisions made just after the cessation of fighting, which practically put an end to Jewish independence in the state the Hasmoneans had built. Captured by the Romans, Aristobulus II with his closest family was taken out of Judea.[60] Hyrcanus was rewarded for his loyalty with the high priesthood together with a limited scope of administrative powers associated with that office in a Judea (that was from then on a vassal state of Rome).[61] Stripped of rights to conduct any independent policies, Hyrcanus was forced to obey Rome and support it at its beck and call.[62] To prevent any future Jewish attempts to regain freedom, Pompey ordered major Hasmonean-built fortresses and Jerusalem's defenses destroyed (Strabo 16.2.40 [762–763]; App. *Syr.* 50). As for the Jerusalem temple, Pompey magnanimously spared its riches and ordered that it be put in order after fighting ended.[63] Following Roman practice toward defeated enemies, he looted most goods belonging to the Hasmoneans.[64] The most painful effect of the Roman official's dictate was a trimming down of the Judean territory. His decision to restore independence to cities seized by the Hasmoneans meant that almost all of Judea's territorial gains since John Hyrcanus were separated from it.[65] The cities in such territories regained freedom and autonomy, understandably under the supreme authority of the governor of the Roman province of Syria, just then created.[66] Such *ad*

[60] *PssSol* 2:6; 8:21; 17:12 (cf. Atkinson 2004: 29, 37, 138); Jos. *BJ* 1.141. 154. 157–158, 168; *AJ* 14.71. 90; 20.244; Plut. *Pomp.* 39.2; 45.4; App. *Syr.* 50; Dio Cassius 37.16.4; Florus *Epit.* 1.40.30; Oros. 6.6.4. During the triumph celebrated by Pompey in Rome in 61, Aristobulus with his son Antigonus, trod in ranks of defeated rulers: Jos. *BJ* 1.158; Plut. *Pomp.* 45.5; App. *Mithr.* 117. Appian (*loc.cit.*) wrongly claims that after Pompey's triumph, Aristobulus was murdered. In reality, he remained in Rome with Antigonus as a honored prisoner of war. In 56 (Jos. *BJ* 1.171; *AJ* 14.92. 96), both escaped to Judea, there to engage in a failed attempt to fight the Romans (*BJ* 1.171–173; *AJ* 14.93–97). Captured, he was sent to Rome (*AJ* 14.97), where he was poisoned by Pompey's friends (*BJ* 1.184).

[61] Strabo 16.2.46 [764–765] (see *ad loc.* Stern 1974: 310); Jos. *BJ* 1.153; *AJ* 14.73; 15. 180; 20.244. Despite that, Josephus, when writing about later developments, often refers to Hyrcanus as king. Concerning Dio Cassius' work (37.16.4), it is only through erroneous phrasing that its suggestion may be thought to mean that Hyrcanus received the royal title.

[62] Cf. Piattelli 1971: 298 ff. For more on Hyrcanus later life, see VanderKam 2004: 345–374.

[63] Cic. *Pro Flacco* 28.67; Jos. *BJ* 1.152–153; *AJ* 14.73. Pompey's magnanimity toward the Temple did not extenuate his intrusion into the sanctuary: *PssSol* 2: 2–5; Jos. *BJ* 1.152; *AJ* 14.71–72; Florus, *Epit.* 1.40.30. To the Jews, this sacrilegious act from the start cast a shadow on their relations with the Romans. Echoes of events surrounding the capture of the Jerusalem temple, and of other developments more difficult to identify, found their way to several Qumran texts (4Q169, 4Q179, 4Q333, 4Q501; cf. 4Q468e), and to other writings composed after 63, cf. Dupont-Sommer 1972: 889–897; Mendels 1987: 123 ff.; Eshel 2001: 41 ff.; Wise 2003: 75 ff., nos. 19–25; Atkinson 2004: 19 ff., 30–39, 47 ff., 62 ff., 83–84, 134–139; Vermes 2007: 137; Eshel 2008: 142 ff., 186. They are also reflected in works by Josephus, who points to the fighting between Hyrcanus and Aristobulus as one of the causes for the collapse of the Hasmonean state and monarchy: Schwartz 1994: 217 ff.

[64] Cf. Diodorus 40.4; Jos. *AJ* 14.207–209 (and Pucci Ben Zeev 1998: 97); Dio Cassius 37.16.4.

[65] Baumann 1983: 37 ff; Wenning 1994: 6 ff. As an exception to the rule, the eastern part of Idumea was left belonging to Judea: Kasher 1988: 62 ff. For the legal aspects of Pompey's decision, see Bammel 1959: 76 ff.

[66] Jos. *BJ* 1.155–157; *AJ* 14.74–77; Synkellos, p. 431. We know from epigraphic and numismatic evidence that in most cases those cities celebrated their regained freedom by introducing a Pompeian era beginning in 64/63: Wenning 1994: 7–8, and n. 43. It should be noted, however, that some cities (Nysa – Scythopolis, Canatha, Marisa) released from Hasmonean dominance were probably only revitalized by A. Gabinius, as is suggested by their title Gabinia or by use in them of time reckoning according to a city era beginning at the time when he was governor of Syria: Gitler/Kushnir-Stein 2004: 87 ff., 92–93.

hoc measures did serve Rome to subjugate Judea, but they could not structurally disassemble the Hasmonean state. Attempts at such disassembly took the Romans much further effort[67], even though they would never become completely successful. Various political developments, combined with Rome's frequent vacillations in respect of later Judean rulers, helped preserve not only some Hasmonean achievements, but also their favorable remembrance down the generations.

[67] They were prompted to destroy Hasmonean legacy especially by risings of Aristobulus II and his sons and the wide social response to their calls to arms. An administrative reform in Judea introduced by A. Gabinius in 57 was designed to break up the nation's administration, society, and politics: Jos. *BJ* 1.166. 170; *AJ* 14.91; Bammel 1959: 81; Baumann 1983: 51 ff.

Part II:
The Institutions of the Hasmonean State

I. *The Ruler*

Information provided by sources leaves no doubt that the structure of the state created by the Hasmoneans was thoroughly subordinated to the needs of their rule and purposes of their policy. In building a system of government, the Hasmoneans could draw from their neighbors' experience in this respect, and even make use for their own purposes of some elements of government established in Judea by Syrian kings. Yet an analysis of the state's structures and institutions they created suggests that the Hasmonean rulers applied solutions that were their original invention rather than copies of models existing in neighboring countries or known in a broadly understood Hellenistic world. The originality stemmed from the Jewish religious and cultural difference which largely limited possibilities of imitating foreign patterns. Even if the Hasmoneans occasionally emulated such patterns, they would transform them to such an extent as to give them an altogether different shape and content. Any attempt to describe the institutions of the Hasmonean state must be prefaced by a reservation: the effort cannot always guarantee fully satisfactory results. The main reason is the limited number of our sources, their often incidental character, and the fact that some of them have survived to our time only in fragments.

Describing and interpreting selected events outside their broader context always carries a risk of oversimplification or incomplete analysis, as well as of omission of interrelations that may exist between them. With reference to the state institutions the Hasmoneans created, it is especially important to avoid such pitfalls if the resulting picture we want to produce is to be truthful. Such institutions combined hellenistic influences and Jewish traditions in which the Hasmoneans were able to discover and creatively exploit state-building elements.

This part of the present discussion will unavoidably contain repetitions of information given previously, if only for the reason that facts presented in various places of this study are shown in a historical context here, there in the light of changes caused by such facts. The purpose of the discussion in this part is to show the Hasmoneans as rulers and kings of Judea, to present the institutions and structures of the state they built and ways in which those functioned.

1. The Royal Priesthood or the Priestly Monarchy

An attempt to outline the political system created by the Hasmoneans first requires its definition, for it was not a copy of any preexisting form of government. As an essential characteristic, it was a combination, a fusion of two entirely different elements which, in Israel's biblical history, made for two distinct qualities: religious authority and secular power. Successive Hasmoneans, as high priests of the Jerusalem temple, held the highest spiritual office, while at the same time they were the political heads of a state that would eventually take the form of monarchy. D.W. Rooke analyzed all records pertaining to the execution of the high priesthood by the Hasmoneans and concluded that in the system of government they created the secular element heavily outweighed the religious. In her opinion, it was a monarchy disguised as priesthood, what she calls "the sacred kings or the royal priesthood."[1] The foundations for the system were laid during the leadership of Jonathan and Simon, to remain largely unchanged in the later period.[2] This is not to question the validity or accuracy of this opinion, but is seems that the high priesthood, at least formally, had far greater significance to the Hasmoneans than D.W. Rooke is prepared to ascribe to it. In our belief, this particular circumstance makes it more appropriate to describe the political system they created as a priestly monarchy.[3] a dispute over which of the two terms is more suitable is not mere wordplay: it is driven by a need to define how much space was dedicated to each constituent part in the system of government the Hasmoneans established in Judea.

The making of the political system of Hasmonean Judea is marked by three events which determined its course, each contributing new elements to the process. These cornerstones are: the nomination by Alexander Balas of Jonathan as the high priest of the Jerusalem temple in 152; recognition of Simon by the "great assembly" as the religious and political leader in 140, and assumption by Aristobulus I of the title of king (Greek βασιλεύς).

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1 Cf. Rooke 1998: 206 ff.; Rooke 2000: 289, 300, 302; van der Kooij 2007: 263.

2 Rooke 2000: 289–302, 326–327, 329–330.

3 Goodblatt 1994: 6–7, 22–26, 31–56; van der Kooij 2005: 443–444; van der Kooij 2007: 263.

2. The Priesthood

Questions relating to the office of high priest of the Jerusalem temple in the Persian and Hellenistic periods have long been of interest to scholars. Many opinions and hypotheses they have voiced concern especially the political aspect of the position. This is primarily because some high priests played a major role in the tumultuous events which occurred in Judea late in the 3rd and throughout the first half of the 2nd centuries BCE. This helped form the now quite commonly accepted view that high priests played an important secular role as political leaders.[4] Yet studies published in recent years whose authors attempted a comprehensive analysis of historical evidence relevant to high priesthood paint a picture that differs considerably from the received wisdom.[5] Such studies have shown that, in the light of the sources, many common beliefs and opinions about the status of high priests before the Hasmoneans call for thorough revision if not outright rejection.[6] Conclusions thus arrived at are not irrelevant to the way the Hasmoneans themselves are viewed.

The starting point in discussions of the role and importance of the office of high priest of the Jerusalem temple at the time it was held by the Hasmoneans is usually the year 152, when Jonathan became the first of them to attain it. Such discussions would, however, be incomplete without duly considering the whole sequence of events which had begun more than 20 years previously and in which the main protagonists were high priests of the same temple. Recalling those events is necessary to understand the special circumstances which overwhelmingly affected the functioning of this office in the Hasmonean era. It all started when Antiochus IV, having been promised a large financial gain, appointed to the high priesthood in Jerusalem a man named Jason, an advocate of the hellenization of Judea (2 Macc 4:7–10). Jason's schemes resulted in removal of the incumbent high priest Onias, a member of a priestly family which had held that office for generations. Antiochus IV's (decision in violation of biblical tradition) marked the start of an entirely new period in the history of the high priesthood. After Jason's appointment, it became the rule that all subsequent high priests were named by the Syrian king,[7] a practice that gave the sacred office an all-new dimension. First of all, it no longer was a hereditary position reserved for members of a single family. While it had kept its religious character, it had lost much of its sanctity if its holders were personally nominated by the king.[8] At length, candidates who purchased the title from the

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[4] Cf. Goodblatt 1994: 19 ff.

[5] See Rrooke 2000; VanderKam 2004a; Brutti 2006.

[6] M. Brutti (2006: 312) concludes her comprehensive discussion with a telling comment: ... *the question of the political authority of the high priest that had been the starting point of this investigation still remains an open question, and along with it the issue of the political status of the Jews, particularly under Seleucid rule.*

[7] Cf. 2 Macc 4:23–26 (Menelaus); 1 Macc 7:8–9; 2 Macc 14:12–13 (Alcimus).

[8] Cf. Rajak 1996: 104–105.

ruler were replaced by others who paid the Syrian king not in cash but in loyalty and readiness to help maintain Seleucid power over Judea. This new, political dimension of the high priesthood meant that its responsibilities were extended to include issues that had never before belonged to the high priest's competence. Although that did not make them royal officials in the strict sense, from then on they could count on support from the king's local administration. Such is the picture – a less than edifying picture, we may add – our sources paint of the role of the high priest of the Jerusalem temple in the period before Jonathan took the office. The leading roles in this picture are played by all those high priests who owed their investiture to Syrian kings in the period from ca. 175 to 152 and who compromised it not only by the way in which they obtained it, but especially by their disloyalty to their own nation.

These observations would imply that Jonathan's acceptance of the high priesthood from Alexander Balas in 152 should put him in an awkward position *vis-à-vis* his own supporters. And yet 1 Macc offers no hint that he might entertain any qualms or hesitation about accepting the office. It was their absence that might have caused the author to accord this crucial event in the Hasmoneans' struggle much less attention than it deserved.[9] Still, it should be acknowledged outright that, however much the prestige of the office of high priest had suffered under Seleucid rule, inhabitants of Judea in their numbers continued to recognize it as a symbol of their tradition and religious freedom, treating the person who occupied it as a leader. Thus the high priesthood of the Jerusalem temple mattered most to Jonathan as it gave him, once he took office, an excellent opportunity to strengthen and sanction his own position. Not only was it important for himself, but also for all those who saw in him their leader; his elevation afforded their joint action an entirely new dimension. Nor could it be ignored that his promotion made him not only the formal leader of his people but also a high official of the king (1 Macc 10:65), and accentuated his vassal status versus the Syrian king. The nomination meant that Jonathan, formerly leader of an anti-Seleucid religious resistance movement, had now become a Seleucid collaborator. From a persecuted rebel, wanted by Syrian generals, he became a recognized political partner. As high priest, Jonathan found himself in a completely different situation from that of all his predecessors. While they in their discharge of secular duties had been fully dependent on the king's help, he not only did not need it, but he was actually rendering assistance to the king. Jonathan's new standing was full of contradictions. Concentration in his hands of high priesthood, political leadership, and supreme military command, with simultaneous dependence on the Seleucids, was more than many of the Hasmoneans' followers could understand or accept, prompting them to leave his camp. The restraint of the Hasmonean-friendly author of 1 Macc in describing the event may be explained by just that ambivalence about Jonathan's position at the time.[10] The later developments showed that, ready though he was to get along with the Seleucids, he was in no way prepared to renounce further struggle to win greater independence for Judea.

The situation in which Simon found himself after Jonathan's death was more clear-cut than what his brother was compelled to face. First of all, Simon managed to steer

[9] 1 Macc 10:21. Cf. Jos. *AJ* 13.46; Sievers 1990: 84 ff.; Rooke 2000: 284 ff.

[10] In our opinion, it has no connection whatever with a more modest (as many scholars believe) than Judah's and Simon's presentation of his deeds, cf. van Henten 1996: 202; Rooke 2000: 296 ff.

clear of the negative mental associations that surrounded Jonathan's appointment to the high priesthood of the Jerusalem temple. By contrast, Simon ascended to the office and to political leadership in quite different circumstances and via appointment by Hasmonean followers (1 Macc 14:35), after he declared readiness to continue the fight begun by Mattathias (1 Macc 13:2–10). A confirmation by the Syrian king of Simon's right to hold those titles came later and was largely a formality. Even though Simon was on that occasion accorded the same routine honors as Jonathan had once been, the connotations of the fact were altogether different. As an exceptional occurrence, Simon received the high priesthood once again in 140, this time on the strength of a resolution of the "great assembly" which also sanctioned hereditary passage of the office within his family (1 Macc 16:41–2. 47). How profound that decision was is beyond dispute. The resolution must have been inspired by Simon himself. He must give overheard echoes of criticism which questioned the right of his followers to make the highest religious appointment in the Temple. An expression of will in this respect by representatives of the entire society gave Simon legitimacy to hold the high priesthood that was difficult to refute. Another important item in the resolution entrusted to him the administration of the Temple (1 Macc 14:42). This gave him decisive influence on the functioning of the sanctuary.

Two important issues are involved in the discharge of the high priest's office by John Hyrcanus. One is the prophetic abilities Josephus ascribed to John Hyrcanus; they lent his performance of high priestly duties an aura reminiscent of the times of biblical prophets (cf. Jos. *AJ* 13, 282–283, 300).[11] Such special ability is not confirmed by any other evidence pertaining to him. What the evidence suggests is that he took various decisions concerning religious worship and practices. Such evidence is an important record of his activity in this field.[12] The other issue has been presented in more detail elsewhere and concerns his criticism by the Pharisees, who were opposed to a fusion of secular and religious authority. The criticism sparked a long-lasting conflict between the Hasmoneans and the Pharisees. His determined response proves conclusively that he would not contemplate engaging in any dispute of his right to hold the highest religious office.

For a number of reasons, it would be highly interesting to hear John Hyrcanus answer to the question about who should succeed him as high priest following his death, if political power was to pass to his widow. We will never know if he singled out one his sons to become the next high priest. What we know for certain is that total religious and secular power was concentrated in the hands of Aristobulus I. The same was true for Alexander Jannaeus. The practice was only suspended for several years during the reign of Alexandra Salome. Of necessity, she reserved for herself only political power, delegating the high priesthood to her son Hyrcanus. Such separation of powers resulted from religious principles which ruled out priestly functions being performed by women. Religious and secular powers were again concentrated in one person during Hyrcanus' (II) short-lived single rule. The tradition was continued by Aristobulus II until Judea lost its independence.

[11] See also Cohen 2001: 217–223; Eshel 2008: 88–89.
[12] Cf. Rooke 2000: 306–307 n. 6.

At least from the time of John Hyrcanus, the exercise of the high priesthood by the Hasmoneans was assisted by a collective body (Hever ha-Yehudim), whose name from then on appeared on coins next to the name of each high priest. The legends on the coins suggest that the high priest might be its president. The council probably enjoyed some kind of autonomy. Such a conclusion is reached by the fact that its name is listed after that of the high priest. We know nothing of the capacity and role of this body, nor of its numbers. Its name is revealed to us solely though coins; no other written source contain any reference to it. This being so, any attempts to identify it with other known Jewish collective institutions or to detail its functions are bound to be purely speculative.[13] Despite such a dearth of information regarding Hever ha-Yehudim, it should be noted that its name never appears in association with the title of king, a possible indication that the institution was more religious than political in character.[14]

The Hasmoneans' determined response to criticism of their simultaneous exercise of religious and secular power throughout their rule in Judea (excepting only the reign of Alexandra Salome), and consequent suggestions that they relinquish the high priesthood, only goes to confirm that the religious aspect of their power was of great importance to them, even when their vast political powers enabled them to control effectively the situation in the state. It is highly indicative of the importance they attached to this fact that they emphasized it in legends on the coins they minted. Sources also supply evidence that, to the Hasmoneans, the high priesthood was not merely a titular honor. We are led to conclude that they performed their priestly duties equally during major, traditional Jewish holidays that attracted crowds to the temple and in other, less spectacular observances. It is still difficult to decide to what extent their policy toward "strangers" stemmed from their religious function, which involved guardianship of tradition. We can only suppose that highlighting the religious aspects of their policy may have made it appear more credible to their subjects. Appraisals of the high priest's role in the Hasmonean period usually underscore its political aspects. In this context, the religious attitudes of the Hasmoneans themselves are of secondary importance. This is understandable insofar as we do not have very many accounts available to us that would shed more light on them. Certain speculations in this respect may only be made based on archaeological excavations. Those seem to imply that the Hasmoneans' religious fervor may have been strong enough to influence their subjects' religious behavior. That that was the case may be indicated by a large number of ritual baths (mikqwa'ot) discovered in Judea dating to the period of their rule.[15] Similar baths have also been confirmed to have existed on the premises of the winter palace the Hasmoneans built near Jericho.[16]

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[13] Cf. Sperber 1965: 85 ff.; Jaselsohn 1980: 11 ff.; Goodblatt 1994: 99–103.

[14] It may be a sign of the "great assembly's" religious nature that its resolutions made no provision for any political council at the side of Judea's ruler (cf. 1 Macc 14:41–45). Even so, some scholars believe that it was a political body, see e.g., Tcherikover 1964: 72; Applebaum (1989a: 26: *I have no hesitation in ascribing to this term the meaning of a popular representative body, whether this was the Sanhedrin or a broader assembly of the sort convened by Simon between 142 and 140 BCE*.); Rajak (1996: 111: *... A political council, or else it may signify simply, the Jewish demos*.).

[15] See Reich 1981: 48 ff.; cf. also Reich 1988: 102 ff.

[16] Cf. Netzer 1982: 106 ff.; Schwartz 1988: 33 ff.; Netzer 2001a: 17; Netzer 2001b: 39 ff.; Levine 2002: 139 ff.

Such a large rise at the time in popularity of the ritual purification practice among believers in Judaism cannot be simple coincidence.

In trying to determine the Hasmoneans' reasons for firmly rejecting any suggestions that they desist from holding high priesthood of the Jerusalem temple, we should take a broad look at this office in all its aspects. From biblical times, the position of high priest enjoyed among the Jews an unwavering high prestige which stemmed not just from religious reasons, but also from tradition that placed it above all secular institutions, kingship included. For the Hasmoneans, any resignation from this office would have been, on the strength of the above principle, tantamount to subjection to successive high priests. Such a situation would certainly have caused many tensions and conflicts between palace and temple, threatening to undermine the Hasmonean family's prestige. As they attached great importance to their public image, they could not have missed the immensely important social role of high priesthood. It took on special importance as the high priest, dressed in ceremonial liturgical robes, performed religious offices in the Temple filled with crowds of pilgrims. Such views were bound to arouse in those present strong, deep emotions as testified to by Ben Sira.[17] Celebrating religious occasions gave the Hasmoneans numerous opportunities to appear before their subjects arriving from the remotest corners of the land. It certainly helped further instill social awareness of the Hasmoneans' position and enhance their prestige better than could secular authority, which did not involve such deeply emotional accouterments.

[17] Sir 50: 1-21; cf. Hayward 1997: 16 ff.

3. The Kingship

As the rebellion against the Hellenistic religious reform was progressing, with Judah Maccabee and Jonathan scoring successes, the Hasmoneans won great prestige and strengthened their position. Their prerogatives included military command, political leadership, and the judiciary. Yet the actual positioning of each of Mattathias' sons was conditional primarily on their practical enforcement capacities, and not only within the circle of their followers but also within other groups of Judean society more or less willing to consent to Hasmonean supremacy. Immensely important, too, was the size of the area they were controlling and over which they exercised authority.

Considering in these terms the standing of the first Hasmoneans, we may be certain that their rule did not exceed merely local boundaries until Jonathan's reign. The process was helped not only by his victories, but also by a propitious turn of affairs caused by events taking place in the Seleucid state. These combined to make Jonathan no longer recognized as a hunted warlord, but rather as a tolerated local leader who, at the height of the struggle between pretenders to the Syrian throne, won the status of a valuable ally of one of them. This role brought him tangible benefits, augmented by political concessions accompanying each of the string of honors that came his way, the most precious of which proved to be his appointment to the high priesthood at the Jerusalem temple. In this way, Jonathan was elevated to being almost a sovereign leader of Judea. Such perceived sovereignty, however, proved deceptive when power in Syria was claimed by Tryphon. In the showdown that followed, it turned out that the effects of Jonathan's years-long armed actions and political maneuvering (even despite his being backed by Rome) appeared less than permanent and, in the face of external threat, could easily be lost.

Simon's decision to defend his brother's achievements proved to be a major factor in entrenching the Hasmoneans' rule over Judea. Again, the cause was well served by developments in Syria as fighting between pretenders to the throne intensified. Yet the most momentous impulse to bolster the Hasmoneans' status was the resolution of the "great assembly." Among its chief decrees, it guaranteed hereditary rights to exercise political and religious power to the Hasmonean family.[18] It should be remembered that the resolution, before it took effect, was presented to Simon and only on his acceptance of its provisions did it become law. Given the critical importance of the provisions the "great assembly" made concerning not only Simon but also his successors, it is worth quoting them here (1 Macc 14: 41–5).

> (41) ... οἱ Ιυδαῖοι καὶ οἱ ἱερεῖς εὐδόκησαν τοῦ εἶναι αὐτῶν Σιμωνα ἡγούμενον καὶ ἀρχιερέα εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα ἕως τοῦ ἀναστῆναι προφήτην πιστὸν (42) καὶ τοῦ εἶναι ἐπ' αὐτῶν

[18] One clause read: εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα ἕως τοῦ ἀναστῆναι προφήτην πιστὸν [*until a trustworthy prophet should arise*] (1 Macc 14:41), meaning in effect indefinite exercise of power by the Hasmoneans: Silberman 1955: 80–81; Liver 1959: 184, and n. 107; Wirgin 1971: 35–38; Sisti 1994: 61ff.; Collins 2006b: 88. In the Bible and in Dead Sea Scrolls, the formula usually applies Moses, cf. below note.

στρατηγόν, καὶ ὅπως μέλῃ αὐτῷ περὶ τῶν ἁγίων καθιστάναι δι' αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων αὐτῶν καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς χώρας καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ὅπλων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ὀχυρωμάτων, (43) καὶ ὅπως μέλῃ αὐτῷ περὶ τῶν ἁγίων, καὶ ὅπως ἀκούηται ὑπὸ πάντων, καὶ ὅπως γράφωνται ἐπὶ τῷ ὀνόματι αὐτοῦ πᾶσαι συγγραφαὶ ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ, καὶ ὅπως περιβάλληται πορφύραν καὶ χρυσοφορῇ. (44) καὶ οὐκ ἐξέσται οὐθενὶ τοῦ λαοῦ καὶ τῶν ἱερέων ἀθετῆσαί τι τούτων καί ἀντειπεῖν τοῖς ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ῥηθησομένοις καὶ ἐπισυστρέψαι συστροφὴν ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ ἄνευ αὐτοῦ καὶ περιβάλλεσθαι πορφύραν καὶ ἐμπορποῦσθαι πόρπην χρυσῆν. (45) ὃς δ' ἂν παρὰ ταῦτα ποιήσῃ ἢ ἀθετήσῃ τι τούτων, ἔνοχος ἔσται.

The Jews and their priests have resolved that Simon should be their leader and high priest forever, until a trustworthy prophet should arise, and that he should be governor over them and that he should take charge of the sanctuary and appoint officials over its tasks and over the country and the weapons and the strongholds, and that he should take charge of sanctuary, and that he should be obeyed by all, and all contracts in the country should be written in his name, and he should be clothed in purple and wear gold. None of the people or priests shall be permitted to nullify any of these decisions or to oppose what he says, or to convene an assembly in the country without his permission, or to be clothed in purple or put on a gold buckle. Whoever acts contrary to these decisions or rejects any of them shall be liable to punishment. (tr. NRSV)

To guarantee implementation of the clauses applying to Simon and his successors, the resolution provided for unconditional obedience by subjects, excluding – on pain of severe penalties – the existence of any opposition. The purview in religious and secular matters the resolution reserved for Simon suggests an evolution toward monarchy in the political system being built by the Hasmoneans in Judea. As a visible sign of this, dating of official documents was made mandatory with regard to Simon's reign, and he was awarded the exclusive privilege to wear purple and gold.

As an important indication of the drive for monarchy to be created in Judea, the "great assembly" did not call into being any collective institution to represent the society *vis-ŕ-vis* the ruler or to advise him. This means that any collective bodies traditionally functioning in society had not acquired a formal basis to define their place and function in the system of government.[19] The content and spirit of those provisions clearly implies that the various titles used to describe Simon's respective prerogatives (*hegemon*, *ethnarchos*,[20] *strategos*) were purely a smoke screen to mask the absolute nature of his power.[21]

[19] Such a collective body were the "elders" (οἱ πρεσβύτεροι). This blanket term usually applies to representatives of higher-status social groups, whether secular or religious, who acted of their own accord to attempt reconciliation in critical situations or in conflicts between the ruler and the people (cf. Jos. *AJ* 13.428). On occasion, it could also apply to representatives of a single group, as was the case with the body which served as an advisory council to Judah Maccabee during the uprising (cf. 1 Macc 7:33; 2 Macc 13:33). The term "elders" or *gerousia* used in texts from the Hasmonean period is no evidence that there existed at that time any permanent council: Goodblatt 1994: 87–99, esp. 99.

[20] The title, as better suited to a head of state, was most likely chosen by Simon himself (1 Macc 14:47): καὶ ἐπεδέξατο Σινων καὶ εὐδόκησεν ἀρχιερατεύειν καὶ εἶναι σρατηγὸς καὶ ἐθνάρχης τῶν Ιουδαίων καὶ ἱερέων καὶ τοῦ προστατῆσαι πάντων. [*So Simon accepted and agreed to be high priest, to be commander and ethnarch of the Jews and priest, and to be protector of them all*.] (tr. NRSV)

[21] Cf. Piattelli 1979: 208–214.

The system of government decreed in the resolution of the "great assembly" survived unchanged to the time of Aristobulus I. His assumption of the title of king (*basileus*) in no way affected the structure of the system, merely conveying, accurately, its essence. The decision, even if it had no impact on the exercise of power, nevertheless carried serious implications as it introduced to political language the title of king, a term previously carefully avoided in political practice. The resolution of the "great assembly," insofar as it concerned Simon's political powers, contained no allusion to the title, not only with reference to himself, but also to the enigmatic figure of the "prophet" whose coming could legally put an end to Hasmonean rule. Such a solution was the best possible as it helped avoid any tensions that might occur in society, incited by biblical associations with Simon, had he been named king. In a political dimension, Aristobulus I's departure from the spirit of those provisions put him on an equal footing with rulers of neighboring countries, while at the same time it provided his religious opposition with high-caliber ammunition to question the legality of the royal position of the Hasmoneans.

From Simon till Aristobulus II, Judea's political system did not acquire any new elements. This is not to say it did not undergo some evolution resulting from successive Hasmoneans implementing their domestic and external policies. John Hyrcanus' policy shows a distinct rise in importance of the military. That was due, on the one hand, to an increasing threat from Syria, and on the other to John's expansionist policy toward neighboring lands. Both these factors contributed to his decision to build up military strength, including enlistment of foreign mercenaries. Sources corroborate the large role of the armed force in perpetuating Hasmonean rule. During Alexander Jannaeus' conflict with the Pharisees, mercenaries and regular troops were the backbone of his force which he used to fight the opposition. For Alexandra Salome, an extensive army was a true pillar of her rule over Judea, while Aristobulus II, confident in the strength of his regular troops, ostentatiously displayed his spirit of independence to Pompey.

An original feature of the Hasmonean monarchy in its later period was, on two occasions, designating by Judean rulers of their royal consorts as their successors. The first of those was the unnamed wife of John Hyrcanus, of whose reign nothing is certain. We do not even know if she actually came to power, as the conflict between her and her son Aristobulus I, who was denied the succession by his father, soon after John Hyrcanus' death ended with her rapid demise. The other woman appointed by the dying king to succeed him was Alexandra Salome, the wife of Alexander Jannaeus. Wishing to ensure her personal position and independence, she expanded the army, now composed of both native troops and foreign mercenaries. She also allowed for the Pharisees to share in the exercise of power. There is no certainty that the two Hasmonean rulers naming their consorts as their successors was in imitation of practices of the Ptolemaic monarchy, even if such suppositions are sometimes voiced.[22]

An emulation of the Hellenistic pattern was the royal titulature used by the Hasmoneans, which we only know from their coinage. It consisted of the royal title (*basileus*), followed by the king's name.[23] Its design emphasizes the personal nature of power as

[22] Cf. Sievers 1989: 133–134; Rajak 1996: 106.
[23] Virgilio 2003: 134 ff.

characteristic for Hellenistic monarchies. The use of this titulature by the Hasmoneans need not mean that they understood it in the same political and ideological terms as did Alexander of Macedon's generals who established their own monarchies after dismembering his empire. In the royal ideology of Hellenistic kings, the foundation of the power they wielded was their "conquest by the spear" of lands they held, a circumstance that in itself justified the personal nature of their kingship.[24] As for the Hasmoneans, we are dealing with an altogether different situation as they were ruling their own homeland. Because of this fact, their reasons for using this titulature should rather be thought to have stemmed from the only pattern they knew from coins and documents of Hellenistic rulers and had nothing to do with the land-conquered-by-the-spear ideology mentioned above.[25] Obviously, it cannot be ruled out that Aristobulus I, as he assumed a royal title, was making a conscious reference to that ideology. Yet the idea of an armed victory over the Seleucids, one that would give the Hasmoneans a right to rule Judea, was never part of their propaganda, and for this reason the hypothesis should be assumed more probable that they borrowed the pattern for their own titulature from Hellenistic monarchs.

The Hasmoneans' royal power was much different from that exercised by Hellenistic rulers, which was based solely on the personal power of the king, who treated the state as his personal property and who was free from emotional ties involved in the community of descent, tradition, and religion with most of his subjects.[26] The Hasmoneans' kingship, by contrast, displayed distinct nationalist qualities as well as attachment to a precisely defined territory. Although Hasmonean rulers did engage in expansionist endeavors, those were limited to lands that had once belonged to biblical Israel.

The "great assembly" defined in its resolution not only Simon's political powers, but also the visible attributes to highlight his status in the state. Those attributes were purple robes and gold ornaments (1 Macc 14:43–44). When Aristobulus I assumed the tile of king, the list had the royal diadem added to it (Jos. *BJ* 1.70; *AJ* 13.301). Archaeological finds have supplied evidence that an important attribute of Judean kings' power was the ring they wore, probably serving as a royal seal.[27] Impressions of other seals they used were preserved on several clay *bullae* used to secure the integrity of documents issued by the royal chancery and of those meant to be filed in an archive.[28] Such finds led to the conclusion that Hasmonean kings probably used at least several different seals at the same time. Some of these they used as kings, others as high priests.[29] Practice of this kind must be associated primarily with the chancery, which was responsible for developing and issuing various documents, and affixing them with appropriate seals for

[24] See Mehl 1980/1981.

[25] The special importance of numismatic sources is in the fact that they are the only ones to use such titulature as the Hasmonean rulers chose for themselves. Any other documents in which Hasmonean titulature is mentioned were issued by chanceries of other rulers who maintained contacts with them (cf. Goodblatt 1998: 3 ff.), but who did not consider Judea a separate state. For this reason, its leaders could only be called rulers of the Judeans (Goodblatt 1998: 5 ff.).

[26] Cf. Bikerman 1938: 3 ff.

[27] Barkay 1998: 65 ff.

[28] Avigad 1975a: 8 ff.; Avigad 1975b: 245–246; Meshorer 1990/1991: 107, and pl. 24; Avigad 2000: 257 ff.; Meshorer 2001: 57 ff.

[29] Cf. Avigad 1975a: 11; Avigad 1975b: 246.

authentication. Yet nothing much is known about the organization and working of such a chancery.

The resolution of the "great assembly" contains no clauses applying to the judiciary. From the time of Judah Maccabee, it had been a privilege of the Hasmoneans, and there was no reason to make any additional provisions to specify Simon's capacities in his field. The ruler's privilege to judge subjects was clearly set out in biblical tradition (cf. 2 Sam 8:15; 14:5–23; 15:2; 1 Kings 3:9; 3:16–28; 7:7). Sources provide no accounts to shed light on how justice was administered by the Hasmoneans. It is worth noting at this point that the *Statutes of the King* drawn up during their reigns and preserved in the *Temple Scroll* (11Q19) contains a provision that completely strips the king of the privilege to mete out justice all by himself. According to its wording, it was to be one of the responsibilities of a collegial tribunal (in effect, the king's council) which would include, other than the king himself, 12 of the elders, 12 priests, and the same number of Levites. Such collective dispensing of justice was meant to prevent corruption and abuses by the ruler.[30] If this solution were to be thought the effect of undesirable court practices known to the author, it could be cited as evidence confirming that the Hasmoneans committed abuses in the administration of justice. Since, as it seems, the realities of the Hasmonean era exerted no perceptible impact on the ideology and wording of the *Statutes*, its provisions can form no basis for any generalized conclusions in this respect (cf. below p. 000).

[30] 11Q19 LVII, 11–15; 19–21. Cf. Delcor 1981: 54 ff.; Hengel/Charlesworth/Mendels 1986: 33 (= Mendels 1998b: 371–372); Elledge 2004: 127 ff., 156–159.

4. Succession

Preservation and transfer of power within the ruling family is of fundamental importance to any monarchy. Clearly specified principles of royal succession are a condition on which depends the stability of this authority and the stability of the state in which it is exercised. Constitutional monarchies have the question of succession regulated by a number of legal clauses preventing any dynastic disputes from becoming an open conflict that would divide society into opposing camps. The case was very different in Hellenistic monarchies because the practically limitless power their kings enjoyed left only to them the decision to name the successor, a decision often taken amid pressures and intrigues. The striking testimony of the disastrous consequences of struggles for power within the ruling family are the dynastic contentions in the states of the Seleucids and the Ptolemies. In Hellenistic monarchies, the generally accepted and applied principle was for the reigning king to name his son as successor. A customary practice, it very often saw departures from it, which is why in effect the transit of power was not always smooth and free from conflict. The monarchy's person-centered nature meant that the king could just as well transfer authority according to his choosing, as if it was part of his personal property. Various rulers took decisions about succession, sometimes leading to dramatic events that affected the future of respective ruling houses.[31] How portentous such decisions could be is confirmed by the history of the Hasmonean family.

Tradition is silent about who really was Asmonaios, the eponymous ancestor of the Hasmoneans, and about his descendants, down to Mattathias.[32] The first known and important figure in the family's history was only Mattathias. All the knowledge we have of him we owe to his role in initiating resistance against the Hellenistic religious reform and in organizing an armed rising against the reformists. Before he died, he entrusted seniority in the family and leadership in the resistance movement to the eldest of his five sons, Simon. He justified his decision with Simon's personal virtues and his age he considered appropriate to fulfill his mission (1 Macc 2:65). We know, however, that Mattathias' will was not respected. For reasons unknown – we are confined here to pure speculation – it was Judah Maccabee, Simon's younger brother, who became the actual leader of the rebellion.[33] Still, it is clear that the change did not produce any conflict or tensions between the brothers. All Mattathias' sons acted as one, unquestionably recognizing Judah's leadership. When he died, the question of leadership of the insurgency, which was tantamount to leadership of political supporters of the Hasmoneans, was resolved, as it were, outside the family circle. The initiative came from soldiers fighting

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[31] For more on rules of succession in the Seleucid family, see Bikerman 1938: 17–24.

[32] Jos. *AJ* 12.265; cf. *BJ* 1.36; *AJ* 14.490; 16.187; 20.190; 20.238; *Vita* 4; 1 Macc 2: 1; 14:29. The ancestor's name is only known in its Greek form.

[33] Judah Maccabee's military talent (1 Macc 2:66) was more relevant to success at the early stage of the rebellion than Simon' abilities. Perhaps his choice as leader was made by insurrectionists themselves, as it was after Judah and Jonathan had died.

under Judah, who favored Jonathan as their commander. His personal qualities assured success of further struggle, or so the insurrectionists thought (1 Macc 9:28–31). Simon, in respecting this decision, again loyally stood by his younger brother. Loyalty is important here because any hopes that Simon might have entertained to play a public role dwindled as Jonathan went from strength to strength in combat and in politics, which made him the actual leader of Judea. An additional factor, which almost annihilated Simon's posited ambitions, was that Jonathan had sons (cf. 1 Macc 13:16.19).

Simon's situation changed dramatically the moment Jonathan was detained by Tryphon. Mattathias' eldest son was compelled immediately to take over leadership in Judea so as to continue what his brother had begun and to attempt to secure his release. Simon's attempts to have Jonathan freed seem to indicate that the eldest son of Mattathias never aspired to lead the rebellion, otherwise he would have immediately taken advantage of his brother's captivity. Not impossibly, after their father's death, Simon became the head of the family, a position that fully satisfied him. Given this attitude of his, harmonious relations could prevail in the Hasmonean family.

After Jonathan's death, Simon was the only male Hasmonean capable of taking over his political legacy. As was earlier the case with Jonathan, this was willed by that part of the Judean population which supported the Hasmoneans' struggle to free the country from Syrian dominance. This means that leadership by the traditional seniority rule in the Hasmonean family was not tantamount to leadership in Judea, which was at the time determined by members of the rebellion. At a point when achieving desired effects of the rebellion called for leadership by a charismatic figure that enjoyed authority and popularity among insurrectionists and sympathizers, departure from the seniority rule may have been accepted by the Hasmoneans.

We have noted above the fundamental importance of the resolution of the "great assembly", which defined the foundations of Simon's power and, obliquely, provided grounds for the hereditary character of Hasmonean rule in Judea.[34] No account mentions Simon's public announcement of his decision on succession. As a consequence of his death in dramatic circumstances, his successor took power following events that occurred in Judea at the time. We have grounds to believe that the eventual outcome of those events was consistent with Simon's intention to make John Hyrcanus his successor since he had been trying for some time to prepare his son for government (cf. 1 Macc 13:53; 16:2–3). It should be added, however, that what information we have about Simon's sons is insufficient to ascertain conclusively whether John was indeed the eldest son.[35]

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[34] See 1 Macc 14:41: οἱ Ιουδαῖοι καὶ οἱ ἱερεῖς εὐδόκησαν τοῦ εἶναι αὐτῶν Σιμωνα ἡγούμενον καὶ ἀρχιερέα εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα ἕως τοῦ ἀναστῆναι προφήτην πιστὸν . The resolution does not explicitly authorize Simon's sons to assume power, instead it sanctions it covertly as it stipulates the length of his reign. How the interests of Simon's offspring were respected is suggested by another provision in the resolution, cf. 1 Macc 14:48–49: καὶ τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην εἶπον θέσθαι ἐν δέλτοις χαλκαῖς καὶ στῆσαι αὐτὰς ἐν περιβόλῳ τῶν ἁγίων ἐν τόπῳ ἐπισήμῳ, τὰ δὲ ἀντίγραφα αὐτῶν θέσθαι ἐν τῷ γαζοφυλακίῳ, ὅπως ἔχη Σιμων καὶ οἱ υἱοὶ αὐτοῦ. [*And they gave orders to inscribe this decree on bronze tablets, to put them up in a conspicuous place in the precincts of the sanctuary, and to deposit copies in the treasury, so that Simon and his sons might have them.*] (tr. NRSV)

[35] Such is the impression when considering how Simon treated this son. But the ordering of the names of both eldest sons (1 Macc 16:2) suggests that Judah was older than John. However, elsewhere in the same

At the end of his reign, John Hyrcanus faced much more serious problems involving transition of power to a successor. It is not that there was no suitable candidate: he had five sons of varying ages, of whom at least three had reached manhood (Jos. *BJ* 1.68). Of those, the eldest two had had opportunities to display their command skills, even with much success (Jos. *BJ* 1.64–66; *AJ* 13.276–277). Despite that, John Hyrcanus, just before he died, placed all power in the state in the hands of his wife, whose name has not survived to our time.[36] The decision, quite surprising and inexplicable, provoked a series of events detrimental to the state. If we assume Josephus' account of it as true, the official explanation should be seen in a prophecy John Hyrcanus knew, according to which neither of his two eldest sons was ever to achieve the throne (Jos. *BJ* 1.69; *AJ* 13.300), which was to be inherited by the third son Alexander, who was younger than both and not very much after his father's heart (Jos. *AJ* 13. 321–322). It is difficult to tell now how much the prophecy influenced the ruler's behavior, himself allegedly possessed of some prophetic gift. Perhaps he only used it as a convenient excuse to justify his decisions. Nor can it be excluded that in passing the rule to his wife, John Hyrcanus tried to prevent any conflict among the sons.

Conflict over John Hyrcanus' legacy could not be avoided, however, its parties being mother and son. Aristobulus, who had received the high priesthood, was not satisfied and quickly proceeded to dispute his mother's right to rule. In its conclusion, the dispute revealed a deep crisis in the Hasmonean family. Aristobulus, against his late father's wish, claimed the throne, imprisoned younger siblings and mother, and soon brought about her death (Jos. *BJ* 1. 71; *AJ* 13.302). Operating behind the scenes of the contention was most probably Aristobulus' ambitious wife, known as Alexandra,[37] who persuaded him to claim his seniority rights.

If John Hyrcanus really considered possible a conflict over power erupting between his eldest sons, his fears proved well founded. Although Aristobulus made his brother Antigonus co-ruler, he did not share with him his newly-won royal title (Jos. *BJ* 1.71). This solution did not put an end to contention over John Hyrcanus' succession. Aristobulus' grave illness, and even earlier Antigonus' death inspired by Alexandra, soon made open the question of rule in Judea. Events following Aristobulus' death indicate that he himself had not taken any decisions in this respect. This being so, full initiative was seized by Alexandra, who, although she did not at that time decide to ascend to the throne, so directed events as to ensure for herself the dominant position in the state. She released from prison her husband's younger brothers, and relinquished authority to the oldest of them, the 22-year-old Alexander (he would go down in history as Alexander Jannaeus), whom she probably married.[38] Although this solution did not ensure

source (1 Macc 16:14), Judah is mentioned after his brother Mattathias, cf. Geiger 2002: 2, and n. 7.

[36] Jos. *BJ* 1.71; *AJ* 13.302. Elsewhere in *Antiquitates* (20.241), Josephus reports that John Hyrcanus designated Aristobulus I as his successor, cf. Geiger 2002: 2–3, 15, and n. 61.

[37] Josephus (*AJ* 13.320) says that her name was Salina (Salome). The Dead Sea Scrolls (4Q332; 4Q431; cf. Vermes 2007: 137) and some rabbinical texts record her name in a somewhat different form as Shelamzion (one of several other variants): Ilan 1993: 183 ff. According to Ilan (1987: 3) Alexandra owed her name to her marriage with Alexander Jannaeus.

[38] Jos. *BJ* 1.85. 107; *AJ* 13.320. 399–407, cf. 20.241. Josephus does not make it clear that Alexander Jannaeus married Aristobulus' wife. Still, scholars take this union for granted: cf. Ilan 1993: 181–182 n. 1–2 (a list of references and positions taken in the dispute); Geiger 2002: 4 ff., 15 ff. As she stresses missing con-

her direct exercise of power, it still enabled her to have an impact on state affairs by influencing her husband. Incidentally, already after he rose to power, Alexander Jannaeus himself removed another brother who tried to claim his rights. Absalom, the last of John Hyrcanus' sons, remained alive in return for a complete withdrawal from public life (Jos. *AJ* 13.323).

Alexander Jannaeus' decision as to his successor was a repetition of the solution applied by his own father. When dying, he placed power in the hands of his wife, Alexandra Salome (Jos. *BJ* 1.107; *AJ* 13.407; 20.242). Sources offer no clues to help explain the motives underlying his choice. It was surprising because of similarities to John Hyrcanus' decision, which had proved so damaging to Judea. In handing government over to Alexandra Salome, Alexander Jannaeus bypassed the dynastic rights of his two adult sons: Hyrcanus and Aristobulus. There can be no doubt that what Josephus presented as Alexander Jannaeus' dying moments, when the king, concerned about the future, gave political advice to his despairing wife (Jos. *AJ* 13.399–404), is literary fiction used as an excuse for her later policies. Strikingly, the account shows a dying king concerned about his wife, without so much as an allusion to the sons. We do not know where Josephus obtained his information about Alexander Jannaeus' last moments. His account cannot therefore be seen as a source of knowledge about the true reasons why Alexandra Salome was entrusted with state leadership. Josephus himself believes that the decision was due to the royal consort's political moderateness and the sympathy political opposition had for her, while adamantly hostile to her husband (cf. Jos. *BJ* 1.107–108). Yet regardless of whether or not it was those qualities that made her suitable to ascend to the throne at a difficult juncture in Judean history, Alexander Jannaeus' solution to the problem of succession suggests that, like John Hyrcanus, he aimed to prevent possible conflict between his sons, the older Hyrcanus and the younger Aristobulus. If only for his temperament, Aristobulus would not have respected his father's decision if it meant offering succession to the elder Hyrcanus, as tradition dictated. A somewhat different light on the contention about Alexander Jannaeus' succession has been offered by C. Saulnier. She believes that Hyrcanus might have been the son of Alexandra Salome and Aristobulus (I), as his age would indicate, while Aristobulus was Alexander Jannaeus' firstborn son. Were that the case, the earlier would claim his right to the throne on

firmation by Josephus, T. Ilan (1993: 181 ff.) strongly criticized the position. She believes that Alexandra Salome, the wife of Alexander Jannaeus, and Alexandra, the wife of Aristobulus, were different persons. Her arguments include onomastic data and Josephus' information on the sons of Alexander Jannaeus by Alexandra: Hyrcanus II and Aristobulus II (Ilan 1993: 187 ff.). Yet such information being inconsistent, so many problems arise that any attempted interpretations always run into insurmountable difficulties (cf. Saulnier 1990: 54 ff.). T. Ilan's proposed solution of the wife of Aristobulus I and Alexander Jannaeus likewise has its weaknesses. Doubts stem especially from the author's assumption that after Aristobulus I died, his consort Alexandra, freely ceded power to the already married Alexander Jannaeus. This seems unlikely, a difficult proposition to accept, if just months previously the same Alexandra had persuaded Aristobulus I to claim his mother's power, and soon afterward she had contributed to his brother Antigonus' death in order to prevent him ascending to power should her husband die. If it was her decision in which of John Hyrcanus' sons to vest power, she did not have to choose the already married Alexander Jannaeus, for his younger brothers were available. One of them, later murdered by Alexander Jannaeus for his excessive political ambition (Jos. *AJ* 13.323), was probably a little younger than he. In this situation, marrying him would have been more advantageous for her as it would have guaranteed her a share in government. It is difficult to picture this ambitious woman giving up all she had achieved if she could help it.

the principle of seniority; the latter would quote firstborn rights.[39] Since sources speak about both as sons of Alexander Jannaeus, this hypothesis, attractive though it sounds, does not explain convincingly all the problems involved in relations between members in the king's family.[40]

Even though it fell to Alexandra Salome to exercise power, her sons need not have been completely deprived of their heritage. Wishing to keep the high priesthood of the Jerusalem temple within the Hasmonean family, the queen appointed Hyrcanus to the position (Jos. *BJ* 1.109; *AJ* 13.408; 20.242). Although Josephus hints that the queen's choice was suggested by his lack of ambition and will to act, the nomination admittedly complied with the seniority principle.

Alexandra Salome's illnesses reopened the question of succession, leading to some tension between both her sons. The friction was increased when the queen, months before her death, named Hyrcanus co-ruler and handed to him appropriate royal attributes, including the title of king (Jos. *BJ* 1.126; cf. Synkellos, p. 427). Even previously, Aristobulus criticized his mother's behavior and tried to win the support of Alexander Jannaeus' former friends and associates, whom he consistently defended against repressions from the Pharisees. Winning allies was easy with him, what with his openness and lively temperament. Josephus quotes no evidence or example to show that Aristobulus' demonstrated dissatisfaction ever took the form of an organized attempt to capture power while his mother was reigning. He did make such an attempt when Alexandra Salome's death was a question of days. In preparation for that moment, he wanted to obtain the greatest possible advantage over his elder brother and, helped by his supporters, to take over power in Judea, even though Hyrcanus exercised it perfectly legally. The course of events following the queen's demise fully bore out Alexander Jannaeus' fears which had made him choose his wife to replace him. At the same time, he had proved the solution ineffectual as it only delayed the outbreak of fratricidal infighting.

From the time of Simon, any decisions concerning succession had been purely a family matter within the ruling house. The person indicated as successor, whoever he might have been, was not subject to public debate, nor did he need anyone's approval. The practice was in stark contrast with that in place earlier, at the time of the rebellion, when its successive leaders were chosen with the inhabitants of Judea involved. It cannot be said with any certainty whether such insurgency-time experiences had any impact on the wording of the "great assembly's" resolutions. What is certain is that stripping the society of any influence on chief appointments in the state strengthened the Hasmoneans' standing, lending their monarchy a fully hereditary status. No opposition was voiced in the society because criticism expressed by the Hasmoneans' adversaries applied chiefly to their model of exercising authority, not to ways of its transition.

The Hasmonean dynasty, like many other contemporary ruling houses, ran into problems with maintaining continuity of rule. They had been given guarantees of rule in Judea for an unlimited time, but the fact did not exempt them from the duty to abide by the rules they had themselves laid down. Any breach introduced an element of uncertainty, a menace to order in the state. Departure from the rules of succession were

[39] Saulnier 1990: 55 ff., esp. 60. A similar hypothesis was presented (unaware of C. Saulnier's conclusions) by Geiger 2002: 16.

[40] Cf. Saulnier 1990: 58 ff.

power struggles within the dynasty and the placement on the Judean throne of women who were expected to enforce law and order in the land. As it turned out, their reigns added even more fuel to the fire of intradynastic conflicts. The contentions happened to break out right at the time when the Near East, until then a region on the sidelines of Roman politics, suddenly became its focal point. Since the frictions posed a threat to Roman interests, they were ruthlessly pacified, consequently putting an end to Judea's political independence.

5. The Royal Family

To a ruler, his family is not only his natural entourage, but also an assurance of continuing future power of the ruling house. Sources concerning Hasmonean rulers contain a number of references to relatives of each of them. Yet actual information on respective family members is very scant and in most cases incidental. As a result, our knowledge of the Hasmoneans' family life is so fragmentary that we cannot even reconstruct their full genealogical tree. The wives of the Hasmoneans remain almost entirely obscure. No source hints at whether any of the kings had more than one wife. This scarcity of information is made more adverse by preventing our understanding of family relations among the Hasmoneans. Such an understanding would enable us to learn more about the dynasty's links with the outside world. Marriages of members of the ruling house were usually made to win the support of influential families among their nation's elite or to build closer ties with other ruling houses. We are denied the knowledge of who were the wives of Hasmonean rulers and their sons and from what families the husbands of their daughters originated. Sometimes all we know are only their names.

From among the consorts of all those Hasmoneans who reigned in Judea, we only know one name – that of Alexandra Salome, the wife of Aristobulus I and Alexander Jannaeus. Best known though she is among the Hasmonean women, sources have nothing to say about her background, or her parents or siblings. The wife of Simon, mother of John Hyrcanus, whose heroic attitude in the face of death is described by Josephus (Jos. *BJ* 1.57–59; *AJ* 13.231–233), remains nameless to us, as does John Hyrcanus' wife, to whom her dying husband entrusted government (cf. Jos. *BJ* 1.71; *AJ* 13.302). The only Hasmonean royal consort whose family relations we know in any detail is, also nameless, the wife of Aristobulus II (cf. Jos. *BJ* 1.121.168.185; *AJ* 13.424; 14.5. 90. 97). Most likely, she was a daughter of Absalom, Alexander Jannaeus' only brother, who survived the political turmoil after Aristobulus I's death (Jos. *AJ* 13.323; 14.71). She played a meaningful role in events surrounding the power struggles between her husband and Hyrcanus II (cf. Jos. *BJ* 1.121; *AJ* 13.424; 14.5), and again some years later, when she mediated between her own son Alexander, doomed to fail in his fight against the Romans, and his adversary A. Gabinius (Jos. *BJ* 1.167-8). Still later she interceded with the same Gabinius for the release of another of her sons, Mattathias Antigonus, who, together with his escaped father, tried to continue opposing Roman forces (Jos. *BJ* 1.174; *AJ* 14.97). Another known union in the Hasmonean family was that of Alexandra, the daughter of Hyrcanus II, and Alexander, the son of Aristobulus II.[41] We are not told when the marriage was conducted but because at Alexander's death in 49 their two children were still underage, we may surmise that it was in after 63. This union, like that of Aristobulus, was between close cousins. Both examples may suggest that marriages between close relatives were fairly common with the Hasmoneans, but they are still in-

[41] Sievers 1989: 142 ff.

sufficient evidence to believe that such was the norm. Regardless of that, until 63 there is no record of a marital union between a Hasmonean prince or princess with a member of any other aristocratic or ruling house outside Judea. Among the many husbands of Hasmonean daughters, only one name is known: Ptolemy, the son of Abubus, and only because he went down in history though a rather dishonorable act: to win power in Judea, he resorted to treason by assassinating Simon and his sons and asking the Syrian king for assistance (cf. 1 Macc 16:11–12; Jos. *BJ* 1.54; *AJ* 13.228). As in the case of Alexandra Salome, it is not known where he came from and who, beyond the name, his father was. Any attempts to determine these facts are purely speculative.

The life of the Hasmonean family changed radically after 63, when the previous social and political order was shaken, not so much by loss of independence – that, after all, did not entirely strip them of their elevated status in Judea – but in the aftermath of armed struggle against the Romans fought by Aristobulus II and his sons, and as a result of Herod seizing power. The fighting entailed much personal danger to Aristobulus' closest family members. In unclear circumstances, some of them found themselves in the hands of Ptolemy, a son of Mennaeus, the Ituraean ruler of Chalkis. One unexpected outcome of it was that his son Philippion became involved with an unnamed daughter of Aristobulus. His jealous father killed him to marry her himself.[42] This example shows that the fates of Hasmonean princesses could at times be decided, other than by politics, also by simple human emotions. A completely different role was played by Mariamme, a granddaughter of Hyrcanus II, daughter of Alexandra and Alexander, the son of Aristobulus II. With her royal lineage, she became the object of Herod's advances: he thought that marrying her would lend him, in the eyes of subjects, political legitimacy to rule Judea (Jos. *BJ* 1.241. 344. 432; *AJ* 14.300. 467).

The examples quoted above of Hasmonean women playing active roles in dynastic and public life must be seen as exceptional. Such instances were precipitated by turbulent events unfolding in the Hasmonean era, events that often made the women face difficult challenges which they could meet using their personal abilities and their royal lineage. Most information about the women's political involvement comes from the time immediately preceding Judea's loss of independence, which may create the impression that the women indirectly contributed to that outcome. It should be borne in mind, however, that the intention of the men who permitted them to wield power was to safeguard the state's interests, not to weaken the state. Even if factors and circumstances conspired to prevent that aim coming true, the very fact of the women overstepping the bounds of their customary duties and their entry in major politics was their great success.

Some more evidence relates to the male members of the Hasmonean family. Most of it concerns royal sons whose roles in broadly understood political life were an important part of dynastic propaganda. The first example of this is known from Simon's time. When his sons had achieved manhood, he began to entrust them with important tasks and functions. To John Hyrcanus, whom he particularly favored, he gave the responsible command over the army, authority over Gezer, and leadership in fighting Antiochus VII's general Cendebeus during a Syrian invasion of Judea. The same campaign against Cendebeus also gave opportunity to present his military talents to another of Simon's

[42] Jos. *BJ* 1.185–186; *AJ* 14.126; Aliquot 1999/2003: 258 ff., 263.

sons, Judah (1 Macc 16:2–3). In a somewhat similar context, first public appearances were made by John Hyrcanus' two sons, Aristobulus and Antigonus, as their father gave them the demanding task of capturing the city of Samaria. As did Simon's sons earlier, they, too, achieved success. The dramatic struggles with the Romans revealed the high virtues of Aristobulus II's sons, Alexander and Aristobulus.

Although sources offer only a very modest list of instances of public activity of sons of the ruling Hasmoneans, it is still possible to discern a certain practice which was aimed at objectives important for the family to maintain power. The first such objective was to prepare successors to rule when their time came. Tasks assigned to them by their fathers were intended to introduce them to the duties of a ruler and to teach them abilities needed to engage in warfare. Another objective, more important for dynastic interests, was to persuade the subjects of its strength, vitality, and ability to rule the land in future and, if need be, to fight in defense of its interests. Characteristically, almost all accounts concerning royal sons depict them as having performed glorious feats proving their courage, talents, and abilities to shoulder the burden of rule. Accounts in this vein can be found in 1 Macc and in Josephus' works. However we use them, we must be aware that the authors strove to show the Hasmoneans in the best possible light.

An interesting contribution to a description of the Hasmonean family can be discerned from the names they used, although the use of this roster involves a major difficulty. It stems from the fact that they used Jewish names known to us mainly from coins and the few mentions in written records, and names of unmistakably Greek origin under which they appear in Greek-language historical accounts.[43] Jewish names were given in the Hasmonean family according to tradition. It required that each generation repeated the same set of names. They were: Mattathias [Mattatiah], whose Greek equivalent was Antigonus, Judah [Jehudah] with Greek equivalent Aristobulus (Jos. *AJ* 20.240), John [Jechohanan], and Jonathan [Jehonatan]. The use of a limited set of personal names within the family for a succession of generations is not only a sign of attachment to the Hasmonean family tradition, but also an element of their dynastic propaganda.[44] Both these aims fit well into their demonstrated faithfulness to biblical traditions. Another expression of that faithfulness is the use by the Hasmoneans of biblical names: one of John Hyrcanus' brothers was named Absalom (Jos. *AJ* 14.71). Using their Jewish names wherever possible was probably a conscious practice by the Hasmoneans, designed to obtain a propaganda effect in society. Their coins serve as an example of this practice.

[43] Cf. Ilan 1987: 1 ff.
[44] Cf. critical remarks by Ilan (1987: 8 ff.) about this question.

6. The Court

Evidence concerning Hellenistic kings contemporary to the Hasmoneans provides much detail about their entourage, an inseparable part of their status. It was composed of not just family members, but also the king's numerous ministers and aides, officials of different levels, and servants. The entire community, with its hierarchies and structured functioning, fully deserves to be called a court.

Among members of the royal court, a place of honor belonged to members of a select body of advisors closest to the king whom Hellenistic nomenclature described as "friends" (οι φίλοι). Their rank in court hierarchy was indicated by the honorary titles they were awarded by the ruler. It was from the circle of the king's "friends" that usually were selected ministers, generals, and chief diplomatic envoys. Also, they made up part of the king's council, supporting the ruler with their knowledge and experience in making essential state decisions, whether in domestic or foreign affairs. Without their counsel, some kings could not bring themselves to take important decisions. Being included among the king's "friends" was a great honor as it afforded unlimited access to the king. It also bestowed personal prestige as well as ample material gains in land and occasional gifts. However, risks were there, too: a change on the throne might mean loss of influence and privileges for existing members, perhaps even loss of life; but then again, it could bring new honors and promotion. Regardless of what actual influence on affairs of state that group of officials had under the various monarchs, in the Hellenistic era the presence of such a body at the king's side was a matter of course. The advisors were the topmost political and social elite in every monarchy.[45]

The king's "friends" at the summit of the court hierarchy were one of many groups that composed the royal court. An indispensable part of the king's inner circle was the royal guard watching over his personal safety.[46] a number of studies published in recent years devoted to the courts of Hellenistic and Roman rulers with their organization and functioning show them as not only hierarchic structures, but also veritable closed microcosms keeping rules and routines all their own.[47] It should still be borne in mind that the existence and workings of the court served more than the needs of the ruler and his closest associates. In the first place, it was a political and social structure designed to assist the king in effectively administering the country, to assure his political footing,

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[45] For more on the role of "friends" in Hellenistic monarchies, see Bikerman 1938: 40 ff., 46 ff.; Mooren 1979: 256–290; Walbank 1984: 68 ff.; Mooren 1989: 575–581; Mooren 1998: 122–133; Weber 1997: 29–30 n. 12 (the earlier bibliography), 42–58; Virgilio 1998: 164–165; Savalli-Lestrade 1998; Savalli-Lestrade 2001: 263 ff.; Muccioli 2001: 295 ff.; Virgilio 2003: 136–137

[46] Kings' personal guard is usually included in their armed forces, cf. Bikerman 1938: 51 ff. In reality, with its unique tasks, its status differed considerably from that of other military formations. Even if guards units were used in campaigns as front-line troops, it was typically so by order of the king, or when he was personally commanding an army. As a general rule, guards were present near the ruler, hence they are treated here as an integral part of the king's court.

[47] Cf. Mooren 1998: 122 ff.; Meißner 2000: 1 ff.

and to guard his authority. In addition to these purposes, the court was also an important component of the king's image-building targeted at subjects and strangers alike, since rulers were seen not only through the lens of their achievements, but also through impressions they could generate in observers (cf. 1 Macc 15: 32–36).

Sources dealing with the Hasmoneans contain at least several mentions of their courts. While scant compared to the number of records on other contemporary monarchies, they still deserve our attention. The most suggestive picture of the Hasmonean court is given in 1 Macc account of a visit by Athenobius, envoy of king Antiochus VII, to Simon's court (1 Macc 15: 32–36). The story emphasizes the richness and splendor of the Judean ruler's court, which deeply impressed the visitor. Of Aristobulus I's court Josephus speaks unfavorably and goes on to emphasize the harmful influence the wife of the seriously ill king had on the courtiers (cf. Jos. *BJ* 1.72–77; *AJ* 13.304–310). Some more details are available about the courts of the last four Judean rulers: Alexander Jannaeus, Alexandra Salome, Hyrcanus II, and Aristobulus II. Profiles of the first two are found in a description of a political conflict during Alexandra Salome's reign between the Pharisees she supported and the Sadducees her late husband had preferred. The account is unique in additionally reporting on a concurrent deep and radical transformation within the Judean political elite and its long-term effects (cf. Jos. AJ 13.431–432).

Alexander Jannaeus' expansion into neighboring lands with its many campaigns offered an opportunity for many of his associates to display their military talent. Nonetheless, their usefulness to the belligerent king cannot be measured by their battlefield feats; their loyalty and devotion served him in implementing domestic policies, and especially in fighting internal opposition. They supported him with advice and scrupulously followed his orders, receiving in return, on top of other honors, the title of his "friends" (οἱ φίλοι).[48] Their eager service to the king won them many enemies within the persecuted opposition. Alexandra Salome's ascent to the throne and her alliance with the Pharisees threatened not just their position but their very lives. With the queen's tacit approval, many of Alexander Jannaeus' "friends" were removed from their positions (Jos. *BJ* 1.111–112; *AJ* 13.408–409), while some lost their lives in repressions (Jos. *BJ* 1.113; *AJ* 13.410. 413. 416). Survivors, at the intercession of Alexandra Salome's son Aristobulus, found refuge in the army, one of the few state structures remaining under the personal supervision of the queen (Jos. *BJ* 1.114; *AJ* 13. 416–417). The Pharisees' dominant standing during Alexandra Salome's reign did not derive solely from holding state offices. As members of the queen's circle of "friends," they could doubtless exert considerable influence on her.[49] Their position was so strong that even after the queen's death they did not cease being a source of tensions in higher social strata. Roman interference in Judean history upset the functioning of the Hasmonean court. With Judean independence gone, it no longer was a sovereign center of power. Assuredly, however, the court of former kings of Judea survived in some truncated version, serving

[48] Cf. Jos. *AJ* 13.422. Since in the Hellenistic period the term was used for the king's advisors, there is no reason to doubt that Josephus also used it in the same sense for aides of Judean rulers.

[49] Jos. *AJ* 13.405: τοῖς τε Φαρισαίοις... εὔνους δ' ἐποίησε καὶ φίλους. The queen's close contacts with the Pharisees are validated by Josephus' phrase (*AJ* 13.425): ἥ τε βασίλισσα καὶ τὸ ἔθνος (cf. 13.419). That the term *ethnos* in quoted passages refers to the Pharisees is positively proved by the context where it appears.

as a support base for Hyrcanus II in his role as high priest after 63. Its full glory was not restored until the time of Herod.[50]

Little can be said about the hierarchy of official positions at the Hasmonean court, about the responsibilities of officials performing roles we cannot even name. Nor do we know what processes helped form court life, or what relations prevailed in interaction between court and ruler. Despite efforts by generations of scholars, we are still unable to tell who, in fact, were members of the factions called the Sadducees and Pharisees which (starting from the rule of John Hyrcanus) exerted such profound impact on the Judean rulers. Unfortunately our knowledge about those groups allows only an observation that their names should be treated as synonyms for certain religious attitudes, deprived of any clearly defined social or economical content.

Of all references to the court of Judean kings, the most interesting are those concerning the last two rulers. From there we learn of one of Hyrcanus II's "friends," Antipater, whose strong personality and not strictly honest ways (cf. Jos. *AJ* 14.11–15) helped him win an exceptional status at the court, to the point of dominating the king himself. A slightly fuller picture is available of Aristobulus II's court. During his short but eventful reign, he went to great lengths to ensure that his entourage created an impression of royalty. We know that he had a circle of advisors whom Josephus describes as his "friends" (Jos. *BJ* 1. 135; AJ 14.12. 45). They tried to persuade Aristobulus II that it was necessary to make concessions to Pompey's demands as by then he had already marched into Judea (Jos. *BJ* 1. 135). As he relates a meeting of pretenders to the Judean throne with Pompey in Damascus in 63, Josephus stops to gloss over the retinues accompanying Hyrcanus II and Aristobulus II. Hyrcanus' attendants numbered more than a thousand, but the account implies that they were not close associates (Jos. *AJ* 14.43). Aristobulus II's entourage was less numerous, but it was made up of a cortčge of young people whose behavior and striking appearance met with Josephus' barely disguised aversion. Without a doubt, the group consisted of Aristobulus' courtiers.[51] Their presence at his side and their appearance contrasting that of other Jewish embassies was most likely part Aristobulus' image-building before the Roman (cf. Jos. *BJ* 1. 132).

Life at the court cannot have failed to influence the bearing and personal styles of members of the ruling family and officials. With the passage of time, the Hasmonean court can be seen to be gradually becoming similar in some respects to known courts of Hellenistic rulers at the time. Illustrations include the above example of Aristobulus II's courtiers and a record of the public appearance by Antigonus, filling in for his sick brother Aristobulus I at prayers in the Temple. On the occasion, the king's brother appeared dressed in resplendent robes, escorted by his soldiers (Jos. *BJ* 1.73; *AJ* 13.304–306).

To help visualize changes in mores at the Hasmonean court, we may well mention Josephus' account of a public execution in Jerusalem of Pharisee sympathizers appre-

[50] See Jos. *BJ* 1.671–673; *AJ* 17.196–199; Kokkinos 2007: 281 ff.

[51] Jos. *AJ* 14.45: καὶ δὴ μάρτυρας τούτων ἐκάλει τοὺς νέους καὶ σοβαρωτέρους ὧν ἐβδελύττοντο τὰς πορφυρίδας καὶ τὰς κόμας καὶ τὰ φάλαρα καὶ τὸν ἄλλον κόσμον, ὃν ὥσπερ οὐ δίκην ὑφέξοντες, ἀλλ'ὡς εἰς πομπὴν προϊόντες περιέκειντο. [*He then called, as witnesses to these statements, some young swaggerers, who offensively displayed their purple robes, long hair, metal ornaments and other finery, which they wore as if they were marching in a festive procession instead of pleading their cause.*] (tr. R. Marcus).

hended by Alexander Jannaeus' soldiers. The historian relates that the king personally observed the spectacle as he feasted surrounded by his concubines.[52] This shocking behavior of the king, compounded by his public appearance with concubines, hardly befitted the banners under which the Hasmonean family had set out to fight for a right to maintain their ancestral religion and customs.

As regards the Hasmonean court, our sources are too random to permit reconstruction of its organization and functioning. But even from available mentions, limited in number and content though they are, we may infer certain generalized conclusions. The court provided a backdrop to the ruler's public activity, highlighted his importance, and helped shape perceptions of the ruler both by his subjects and foreign visitors. It was therefore a substantial element of the image the successive Hasmoneans projected. We may also suppose that, accordingly, an appropriate ceremonial was in place there, too.

An important part of the court was the king's personal guard as befitting his status. Its primary duty was to ensure the ruler's security, but on top of that, it also helped build his image for subjects and strangers to see. For this reason, rulers typically spared no effort to ensure that their guards made an impressive presence. It is almost certain that the Hasmoneans, too, possessed that important attribute of authority. Writing about the reign of Aristobulus I, Josephus mentions soldiers guarding entry to the king's residence in the *baris*. His use of the word οι σωματοφύλακες about them (*BJ* 1.75. 77; *AJ* 13.307. 309) leaves not a shadow of doubt that they were not ordinary soldiers, but rather members of the king's guards unit. It is the only direct proof for Judean rulers having a personal guard. Regrettably, no allusion of any sort is made as to the nationality of the soldiers. The account of events in which the guards played a key role is an example of their absolute obedience to the king.

[52] Jos. *BJ* 1.97; *AJ* 13.380; cf. Ilan 2001: 60–61; Eshel 2008: 120–129.

7. The Capital City

The choice of place for the king's permanent residence, his capital, was typically determined by political, strategic, economic, or even prestige-related considerations. The Hasmoneans never had to face such choice as the historical and religious tradition of the Jews made Jerusalem the only worthy location. The Hasmoneans first became involved with Jerusalem in 164, when Judah Maccabee succeeded in capturing the city and restoring the Temple to Judaic worship. During the years 152–137, they were continuously present in the city, both as high priests of the Temple and as rulers of Judea.

Jerusalem was to the Hasmoneans not just a religious capital but the center of government. This crucial role the city played could not be without effect on its layout and growth trends. The rulers' permanent residence in the capital favored its urban development and population increase.[53] The number of inhabitants in Jerusalem likely started to rise the moment the Hasmoneans' authority over Judea had stabilized in the times of Simon and John Hyrcanus. The emergence and growth of the government's administrative institutions at the time, as a matter of course, brought to Jerusalem many high officials performing various functions at the ruler's side. Their duty to stay near him made them build residences that changed the face of the city. Unfortunately, very little archaeological evidence is available from the Hasmonean period to permit a reconstruction of such palaces. To a limited extent, this can be done based on remains of homes making up the residential quarter, revealed near David's Tower.[54] To the number of people settling in Jerusalem for reason of their connections to the Hasmoneans and in the Temple must be added a hard-to-determine mass of new arrivals simply hoping for a better life. To confirm a large increase in Jerusalem's population, the Hasmoneans built an aqueduct to supply water to the city from distant hills to the south, as local reservoirs proved insufficient.[55]

Jerusalem's rapid urban development under Hasmonean rule is suggested not only by a large increase in the city's area, with new defense walls then erected embracing the entire Western Hill, but also by mentions of structures the Hasmoneans built and by their remnants discovered by archaeologists.[56]

Among the largest construction projects the Hasmoneans completed in the capital was the fortification system girding Jerusalem (also including the Temple Hill). The

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[53] Considering the spatial extent of Jerusalem at the time, it had an estimated 30,000 inhabitants: Broshi 1975: 10, 13; Levine 2002: 106, 111. Scholarly opinion is highly divided as to the size of the population of Jerusalem, as well as of Judea, at various periods in history, cf. Byatt 1973: 51 ff. (it contains a listing of earlier estimates, p. 51–52); Broshi 1975: 5 ff. The estimates vary widely because of the nature of available data and the different calculation methods used by respective scholars.

[54] Avigad 1993a: 729; Bahat 1996: 39. Also from the Hasmonean period come remains of a large structure of indeterminate function discovered near the Double Gate leading to the Temple Mount: Mazar 2002: 22–23.

[55] Geva 1993: 719; Bieberstein/Bloedhorn 1994, III: 119; Geva 2000: 16.

[56] Cf. Geva 1993: 721, 723–724; Bieberstein/Bloedhorn 1994, I: 99 ff., 102 ff.; Geva 2000: 10.

work was begun by Jonathan, and was continued by his successors. It did not attain its final shape until after 129, during the reign of John Hyrcanus, who rebuilt portions of Jerusalem's walls from the damage done during Antiochus VII's invasion in 134.[57] It seems that the fortifications were much ahead of Jerusalem's actual inhabited area. The presumption is based on the topographic layout of the Western Hill area, which would not permit a gradual extension of its encircling walls. For the safety of current and future inhabitants, the defenses had to be appropriately sited from the start.

[57] 1 Macc 10:10–11; 13:10; 16:23. Cf. Mazar 1975: 30–31, 203–204; Gibson 1987: 87 ff., 91, 95; Geva 1993: 719, 721, 724, 725 ff.; Avigad 1993: 725; Wightman 1993: 81–157, 181 ff., 184 ff.; Bahat 1996: 37 ff.; Broshi/Gibson 2000: 150 ff.; Levine 2002: 87–88, 106 ff.; Mazar 2002: 20 ff.

8. The Palace and the *Baris*

Although Simon's capture of the Acra gave inhabitants of Jerusalem a full sense of security, he himself faced serious difficulty when, after a brief use of the former Seleucid fortress, he was compelled to demolish it.[58] The difficulty lay in Jerusalem not having a convenient place in which to garrison the native troops so far stationed in the Acra. Their presence in the capital was indispensable to guarantee the ruler's personal safety and to ensure order in the city. This situation forced Simon to build an appropriate facility. Apart from a new citadel, Simon also needed a residence worthy of a ruler. The importance he is known to have attached to symbols emphasizing his own political standing suggests that he would not have forgone having an official residence that would manifest his personal power, but also testify to Judea's political independence. We can assume as fairly certain that Simon indeed managed to complete some of his plans in this respect. The account of 1 Macc suggests that some functions previously served by the Syrian Acra were taken over by the new citadel he built adjoining the Temple Hill to the north, known from a later tradition as *baris*.[59] It became not just a quarter in which to station the garrison, but also the center of government as it also served as the Hasmoneans' residence until a specially designed palace could be built.[60] It housed liturgical

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[58] Cf. 1 Macc 13:52; 14:36–37; Jos. *BJ* 1.50; 5.139; *AJ* 13.215–217; Bar-Kochva 1989: 453 ff.; Dequerker 1985: 207–208; Wightman 1989/90: 36 ff.; Sievers 1994: 201-2. There are no grounds to claim that the Syrian Acra was not demolished but rather converted into a palace: Vincent 1954, 191 f., 194 note 6. Had that been indeed the case, it would have been pointless for Simon and John Hyrcanus to build the *baris* to serve the same function. From a political and propaganda point of view, converting into a dynastic seat a former Syrian fortress built by the Seleucids to keep Jerusalem in check could not have been a very small matter to the Hasmoneans. Ideologically, it could resonate decidedly differently to build their royal palace on the site where the Acra had reputedly stood (cf. Levine 2002: 112).

[59] 1 Macc 13:52: καὶ προσωχύρωσεν τὸ ὄρος τοῦ ἱεροῦ τὸ παρὰ τὴν ἄκραν. καὶ ᾤκει ἐκεῖ αὐτὸς καὶ οἱ παρ'αὐτοῦ. [*He strengthened the fortifications of the temple hill alongside the cidated, and he and his men lived there.*] (tr. NRSV). But Josephus attributes its creation to John Hyrcanus (*AJ* 18.91: τῶν ἱερέων τις Ὑρκανός, πολλῶν δὲ ὄντων οἳ τόδε ἐκαλοῦντο τὸ ὄνομα ὁ πρῶτος, ἐπεὶ πλησίον τῷ ἱερῷ βᾶριν κατασκευσάμενος ταύτῃ τὰ πολλὰ τὴν δίαιταν εἶχεν καὶ τὴν στολήν.) [*One of the priests, Hyrcanus, the first of many by that name, had constructed a large house near the temple and lived there most of the time.*] (tr. L.H. Feldman); cf. Jos. *BJ* 1.75. 118; 5.238; *AJ* 15.403; 18.91; Cohn 1987: 80; Wightman 1990/1991: 7 ff.; Bieberstein/Bloedhorn 1994, II: 443; III: 393; Levine 2002: 112–113. Despite the two accounts sounding different, the contradiction may be deceptive. Attribution of the *baris* to John Hyrcanus may be understood as him completing the project begun by Simon. The Greek term applied to the former Seleucid fortress, first used to describe the new castle, was later replaced by a word of oriental origin, cf. Will 1987: 253 ff. The wealth of detail concerning the Jerusalem citadel offered in the *Letter of Aristeas* (100–104), permits a supposition that it might refer to its contemporary *baris* (Cohn 1987: 90; Bar-Kochva 1996: 271–288, esp. 273 ff.). Archaeological research supports the belief that the *baris* had its own aqueduct to supply its occupants in water, cf. Bahat 2000: 183 ff. Rabbinical literature in texts relating to the Temple often features the term *birah*, fairly commonly interpreted as synonymous with *baris*, even though archaeological data rule out the possibility: Schwartz 1996: 29–49.

[60] Cf. Jos. *AJ* 13.307; 18.91. The account of John Hyrcanus' reception for the Pharisees contains no topographic indication of where it took place. Since John Hyrcanus most probably resided at the *baris* (Wightman 1990/1991: 10), we may surmise that that was where it happened.

robes and items of worship, what with the Hasmoneans serving as high priests (Jos. *AJ* 18.91–93). Movement between the stronghold and the sanctuary was made easier by a system of underground corridors (cf. Jos. *BJ* 1.75). With its defenses, *baris* could well also house some of the Hasmoneans' treasury (τὸ γαζοφυλάκιον) (cf. 1 Macc 14:49).

A structure that stood out in Jerusalem's cityscape was, for its sheer size and shape, the palace the Hasmoneans erected (τὸ βασίλειον) to be the dynastic residence and seat of the kings of Judea. Even though it was the site of momentous events for the city and all of Judea at the time of the Hasmoneans and until as late as 70's of first century BCE, there is such dearth of information about it that the basic facts of dating and location of the building remain obscure. What little we know about the palace we owe exclusively to Josephus; no material remains have survived to our time.[61] Although Josephus' story implies that the Hasmoneans' palace was to the west of the temple, near Xystos, his topographic details are insufficient to determine its exact location, scholars proposing at least several different sites where it might have stood.[62] The palace loomed so high above surrounding buildings that from its roof it was possible to observe the temple's yard and the entire area (Jos. *AJ* 20.190). The residence was connected to the temple with a bridge spanning the Tyropoeon Valley which separated both complexes. Since the earliest mention concerning the Hasmonean residence comes from the reign of Alexandra Salome, it may be thought that the building was erected no earlier than the time of Alexander Jannaeus.[63]

Known examples of Hellenistic capitals and Rome in the late republic and under the empire demonstrate that rulers and ambitious politicians alike often engaged in beautification of their metropolises by constructing, sometimes at enormous expense, temples, resplendent residences, stadiums, theaters, gymnasiums, and other public facilities. They treated such projects as an indispensable part of their image-building to impress subjects or fellow citizens, for their own names would be inseparably associated with the works they created. Impressive structures bore witness to a ruler's power and as such were a tool in dynastic propaganda.

Against this backdrop, sources are conspicuously silent about any such practices by the Hasmoneans. Other than their care to maintain defense walls in good order, we know of no example of a public building they would erect to serve only the city's inhabitants. For an explanation of this state of affairs, we need to consider the ethnic and cultural composition of Jerusalem at the time. After Simon had captured the Acra, all "strangers" until then living in the city were forced to leave. Also his successors' religious policies did not favor settlement of emigrants from neighboring lands. Jerusalem inhabitants' religiousness and attachment to Judaic tradition offered no impulse to raise impressive public facilities. Thus Jerusalem, despite its demographic and urban growth, remained under the Hasmoneans a city whose traditional makeup – except for such landmarks as the towering Temple, fortress, and the ruler's palace – was not obliterated, even if the large houses of state and temple officials lent it a new polish.

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[61] Any suggestions of possible origin in the palace of certain architectonic elements found in Jerusalem are purely speculative, cf. Mazar 1975: 204.

[62] Jos. *BJ* 2.344; *AJ* 20.189. See Cohn 1987: 75–76, 104–105, 106–107 and Map No. B1; Bieberstein/Bloedhorn 1994, I: 100–101; III: 393–394.

[63] Jos. *AJ* 13.411. It was also used by Hyrcanus II and Aristobulus II: Jos. *BJ* 1.122. E.W. Cohn (1987: 82) attributes the construction of the palace (without stating any arguments) to Alexandra Salome.

9. Propaganda and Self-Presentation

Kings striving to make a strong presence in their subjects' daily life were a characteristic feature of the Hellenistic period. Such presence had impact on how the king was perceived by his subjects and assured him a more or less permanent place in social awareness and memory. Therefore, every ruler tried as best he could to publicize and perpetuate the memory of his name and acts, and especially his image. Its use on a wide scale and in a variety of forms became common practice. Portraits of rulers were omnipresent: on coins, in public places, temples, and homes. Multiplied in innumerable copies, such portraits made the ruler almost physically present wherever they were found. The phenomenon was characteristic of all rulers and even usurpers.[64]

Nor were the Hasmoneans averse to the idea of promoting their name, even though their nation's cultural and religious traditions posed some obstacles in this respect that hindered no other contemporary monarch. Clearly the greatest difficulty stemmed from the rigorously observed Jewish prohibition to make or display images of people and animals. The prohibition robbed the Hasmoneans of a chance to use their own images as a propaganda tool. Out of respect for tradition, they made no attempt to circumvent the ban; instead they were compelled to seek other means to present themselves to subjects. Available historical evidence allows the conclusion that their activity in this field was not without certain achievements and took on various forms. In many cases, this variety closely reflected the political and religious roles in which they were serving. To demonstrate the complexity of the problem of relations between the Hasmoneans and their subjects, it is worth looking at it through the lens of their various manifestations.

A. Individual Propaganda

a) Self-Presentation

The image of a ruler, created by him, was an inseparable part of his self-presentation. It depended to a large extent on the importance he attached to it, on the breadth and intensity of actions undertaken to create it, on purposes to be served, and tools used in its making. We learn from sources that efforts toward that end were also made by rulers in the Hasmonean dynasty, but information about it is scattered and needs some ordering.

An invariable attribute of any ruler's public image is his dress and symbols of authority, for they are outward signs of his special status in the state and his place in society. His clothes made him conspicuous among his entourage, not only in official celebrations, but also during daily kingly routines. As it seems, the Hasmoneans solved the question of official royal dress early on, during Jonathan's reign, taking advantage of

[64] There is available large literature on portraits of Hellenistic rulers. Especially interesting studies offering synthetic treatment of the subject are: Newell 1937; Smith 1988; Fleischer 1991.

external circumstances for this purpose. As a reward for supporting Alexander Balas in his struggle for the throne, Jonathan received from him in 152 the high priesthood of the Jerusalem temple and, moreover, the status of the king's "friend" with accompanying symbolism: a purple robe and a gold crown (στέφανος) (1 Macc 10:20; Jos. *AJ* 13.45). For the political and military leader that Jonathan was, priestly garb, given the limitations inherent in its use, was not always helpful. But the accouterments of the status of a king's "friend" were ideal for such roles as they made him stand out and emphasized his authority. Exactly when and how Jonathan used those symbols is purely a matter of conjecture, but the meaning they implied to all those around him was obvious enough. This distinction was legislated in a clause in the "great assembly's" resolution of 140: it provided for Simon's exclusive right to wear purple robes and gold trappings.[65] Those legally sanctioned attributes of Simon's political leadership were no doubt taken over as symbols of power by all his successors. When Aristobulus I assumed the title of king, the official dress of Judean rulers had a diadem added to it, a symbol of the royalty of the Hasmoneans (Jos. *BJ* 1.70).

Hasmonean rulers attached great importance to how they were perceived by subjects, as may be demonstrated by the causes and circumstances of the brother of Aristobulus I, Antigonus. After returning from a victorious campaign in Galilee and Ituraea, he arrived in Jerusalem in gala dress, at the head a large group of soldiers, to make a sacrifice in the Temple on the Feast of Tabernacles in lieu and on behalf of his sick brother. Such was the resplendence of this public appearance that the king's retainers presented the event as something of a coup against Aristobulus, a scheme to humiliate him in the eyes of his subjects (cf. Jos. *BJ* 1.73–77; *AJ* 13.304–309). The matter implies that even such a close member of the king's family, after all named co-ruler, had to tread with much caution, or else his sheer vanity might bring on him suspicion of high treason. The belief that splendor in public appearances was a *sine qua non* for any ruler is reflected during the meeting of Aristobulus II and Pompey (Jos. *AJ* 14, 45). Although Aristobulus was appearing as a supplicant, he still carried on as a sovereign monarch conscious of his strength.[66]

An important manner of self-presentation among Hellenistic rulers, whether targeted at their own subjects or inhabitants of Greek cities, or Greeks living in other Hellenistic states, was to build, from their own funds, temples or other public facilities, or to support financially the operation of educational institutions like gymnasia. Not only did such benefactions win them popularity and respect in the recipient communities, but they served as a visible sign of their belonging to the Greek world. No evidence is extant for the Hasmoneans ever employing this tactic. Their reluctance in this respect might be explained by resentment of and perpetual struggle against "strangers." Still, it seems that using building projects for self-promotion among subjects was not entirely alien to

[65] 1 Macc 14:43. Interestingly, the resolution did not specify the shapes of such gold decorations. This could be because Simon gave up on a gold crown (στέφανος) as an attribute of his power. A crown was not only a Greek political symbol reminiscent of dependence on Syria, but also a religious emblem worn by participants in various ceremonies. For Simon, who was perceived by his supporters as Judea's liberator, such divergent connotations a crown carried, including in the context of his own attitude toward "strangers," could be awkward propaganda.

[66] Jos. *BJ* 1.132: παρῆν τε καὶ αὐτὸς ὡς οἷόν τε βασιλικώτατα κεκοσμηκὼς ἑαυτόν.

them. While no building the Hasmoneans erected in Jerusalem is known to have been named after any of them, we know of such cases outside the capital. Those special structures bearing the names of Hasmonean kings are the fortifications they erected. Sources indicate that the practice of naming them after a ruler was used for the most notable facilities of this kind built during his reign. Most probably, John Hyrcanus is remembered in the name of the Hyrcania fortress, and Alexander Jannaeus of Alexandreion.[67] Despite later vicissitudes of such castles, their original names remained in use long after the death of their founders. It is yet impossible to say whether such nomenclature had any impact on preserving the memory of past kings.

b) Coinage

The most effective propaganda tool of the Hasmoneans, with the widest impact on society, was the coinage they issued. So much has been written on the subject of coinage as a vehicle of propaganda messages that listing only the major opinions on the matter would take too much of our space. In essence, "monetary propaganda" rests on the fact that every coin struck in an authorized mint was not only legal tender, but with its imagery on the obverse and reverse, it also carried a message. Images were placed on coins using dies. Coinage being supervised by the king's officials, the ruler could easily change the message as he saw fit. By its economic nature, money was used throughout the state, therefore the ruler could reach all inhabitants with the message imprinted on obverses and reverses. However, for such transmission of propaganda messages to be effective, all users should be consciously involved. In practice, common illiteracy among subjects necessitated use of symbols clear enough to be understood.

The first Hasmonean to issue his own money was John Hyrcanus.[68] With few exceptions, the practice was continued by nearly all his successors. Despite immense, prolonged difficulties in cataloging this coinage and attributing it to respective Hasmonean rulers, many of the problems involved have now been resolved. Thanks to this effort, we are in a better position to read and interpret the coins' propaganda content. As a characteristic feature, the Hasmoneans issued mainly bronze and lead pieces which, being of little value, were intended solely for circulation within their state.[69] With few exceptions, reverses only bore a legend containing the king's name. More variety is seen in obverses, which usually feature symbolic vegetal imagery, occasionally accompanied by a legend. While largely stereotypical, the coinage does include some ideological content that the ruler wanted to convey. The first indication is the language of the legend. Legends on reverses (except for four issues of Alexander

[67] The exact dates when both fortresses were built are unknown. Their names are first mentioned in the context of events unfolding during Alexandra Salome's reign: Jos. *AJ* 13. 417. It cannot be ruled out that Hyrcania was built by John Hyrcanus, but it is equally possible that both were founded under Alexander Jannaeus, who might have named one for his father and the other for himself: Tsafrir 1982: 126. For more information on the history of both strongholds and their remains, see Plöger 1955: 142–151; Tsafrir 1982: 122–123, 127 ff., 134 ff.; Tsafrir/Magen 1993: 1318 ff.; Patrich 1993: 639 ff.; Garbrecht/Peleg 1994: 168 ff. All relevant source references are listed by Tsafrir 1982: 143.

[68] For more on this, see above p. 000

[69] Rajak 1990: 270.

Jannaeus) are given in paleo-Hebraic or Aramaic writing; the same writing is also used on obverses. Now the use of a writing system connected with biblical tradition – it had by then gone out of popular use – is therefore a characteristic propaganda sign, as is the sole emphasis in reverse legends on the fact of respective rulers being high priests. Here, too, a clear reference is made to the practice in place during Persian rule, when high priests were the supreme representatives of Jewish society. Coins then produced in Judea bore, next to its name, the name of the high priest. An important point in Hasmonean monetary legends is that high priests appear as issuers jointly with Hever ha-Yehudim ("Jewish community"). Undoubtedly, emphasizing the union of both partners, whatever or whoever the designation referred to, must have had some reason. We may suppose that kings of independent Judea were very careful to avoid in their coinage any allusions to their holding secular power. The motive behind this policy, we can guess, was to persuade the society that biblical tradition was the foundation of the Hasmoneans' position and that they remained faithful to it.[70] a notable example departing from this rule is the coinage of Alexander Jannaeus, which, although it repeats the described pattern of imagery and legend, introduces some quite new elements.

Alexander Jannaeus was the first Hasmonean whose coins bore legends also in Greek. On coins with Greek legends, he never appears as high priest, but solely as king (ΑΛΕΞΑΝΔΡΟΥ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΩΣ). Legends in Greek were placed on obverses, while on reverses the same message was expressed in paleo-Hebraic or Aramaic. Imagery on three out of four series of those coins departs considerably from previous patterns in making an open reference to royal symbolism.[71] Another exceptional element is the number 25 stamped on one of those series and interpreted as the date of issue, i.e. in the 25th year of Alexander Jannaeus' reign. The coin probably commemorated the king's anniversary on the throne.[72] The legends on the four series seem to contain Alexander Jannaeus' *sui generis* political manifesto, for it cannot be excluded that after he had cracked down on internal opposition which questioned the legality of his high priesthood, he gave up on propaganda that pointed to his religious office in favor of a new image in which he accentuated the secular nature of his power.[73] In no event is it a reference by Alexander Jannaeus to the practice of Alexander of Macedon and Hellenistic kings of Syria driven by a desire to demonstrate his independence from neighbors. Nor can it be thought to imply that the ideological foundation of his concept of power was modeled after Hellenistic monarchy.[74] If such had indeed been the purpose of Alexander Jannaeus' coins proclaiming his royal title, he would have used silver, not bronze coin. Implementing

[70] Cf. Rajak 1990: 270–271.

[71] Meshorer 2001: 209 ff. (Group K, L1-6, M, N); Shachar 2004: 6–7; Ostermann 2005: 57. Cf. Hendin/Shachr 2008: 88 ff.

[72] Meshorer 2001: 39–40; Shachar 2004: 7.

[73] Although it would fall outside our scope to discuss events in the struggle between Aristobulus II's sons after 63, it is worth mentioning here coins with Greek legends produced by Mattathias Antigonus. Their obverses bore his high priest's title in paleo-Hebraic, while on the reverses, a royal title in Greek: Meshorer 2001: 218 ff., cf. 40–41; Ostermann 2005: 59.

[74] Such a view is expressed by S. Rocca (2007: 328 ff., esp. 328 n. 49: (...) *His ideology of royalty was ... rooted in the Hellenistic conception of rule, not in the Jewish one.*

such long-range propaganda objectives with bronze pieces limited to local circulation would not have made sense.[75]

The above remarks suggest that coinage of the Hasmoneans, despite its limited scope and limitations imposed by religious tradition (absence of portraits on coins), was an effective vehicle of propaganda messages targeted at the entire population of Judea. This effectiveness is confirmed by the fact that through the entire period of existence of an independent Hasmonean state, the canon of legends and imagery on obverses and reverses as defined by John Hyrcanus persisted, continuing to emphasize the state's leaders' attachment to Biblical tradition.[76] The innovations introduced by Alexander Jannaeus did not make for any permanent alteration in the canon, perhaps because they were perceived as overly radical and generated negative emotions.

B) Dynastic Propaganda

The instances presented above of a propaganda program the respective Hasmoneans targeted at their subjects served primarily their individual political aims. The nature and randomness of our sources make for only a fragmentary picture of the content of that propaganda. In order to enhance it, it is worth consulting evidence concerning the Hasmoneans' dynastic propaganda.

The first measures that may unreservedly be thought as part of a planned public promotion of the Hasmonean family were taken already during Simon's reign. They were connected with his building an imposing and, for Judea, architecturally unique family mausoleum at Modein.[77] With its shape and specially chosen location where it could be admired from passing ships, it became an important landmark generally and unmistakably associated with the Hasmoneans. The monument's premeditated propaganda meaning and its special ideological message is made clear by its being intended as the

[75] That the Hasmoneans had no intention to use money either to propagate their status among neighbors or emphasize their ideological links with Hellenistic royal concepts is indicated by the fact that their minting system was not in the least affected by the need to pay foreign mercenaries. These would likely receive their remuneration in silver coin from the Tyre mint. An interesting, if not entirely convincing, hypothesis was put forward by E. Main (2006: 123 ff.), who suggests that some issues of John Hyrcanus' and Alexander Jannaeus' coins showing a rose (not a lily as some believe) might have been intended as payment to those mercenaries. After all it is difficult to imagine that the prospect of even large payment in small change was particularly attractive to foreign soldiers. But there is no doubt the practice was used for Jewish soldiers, cf. Hirschfeld/Ariel 2005: 72–73.

[76] New types of imagery (religious-inspired) on Hasmonean coins did not appear until the short reign of Mattathias Antigonus: Ostermann 2005: 59.

[77] 1 Macc 13:27–30: καὶ ᾠκοδόμησεν Σιμον ἐπὶ τὸν τάφον τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἀδελφῶν αὐτοῦ καὶ ὕψωσεν αὐτὸν τῇ ὁράσει λίθῳ ξεστῷ ἐκ τῶν ὄπισθεν καὶ ἔμπροστθεν. καὶ ἔστησεν ἑπτὰ πυραμίδας, μίαν κατέναντι τῆς μίας, τῷ πατρὶ καὶ τῇ μητρὶ καὶ τοῖς τέσσαρσιν ἀδελφοῖς. καὶ ταύταις ἐποίεσεν μηχανήματα περιθεὶς στύλους μεγάλους καὶ ἐποίησεν ἐπὶ τοῖς στύλοις πανοπλίας εἰς ὄνομα αἰώνιον καὶ παρὰ ταῖς πανοπλίαις πλοῖα ἐγγεγλυμμένα εἰς τὸ θεωρεῖσθαι ὑπὸ πάντων τῶν πλεόντων τὴν θάλασσαν. [*And Simon built a monument over the tomb of his father and his brothers; he made it high so that it might be seen, with polished stone at the front and back. He also erected seven pyramids, opposite one another, for his father and mother and four brothers. For the pyramids he devised an elaborate setting, erecting about them great columns, and on the columns he put suits of armor for a permanent memorial, and beside the suits of armor he carved ships, so that they could be seen by all who sail the sea.*] (tr. NRSV); Jos. *AJ* 13.210–212. The mausoleum probably survived at least to the 4th century CE: Schürer 1985: 213 n. 43.

final resting place of only those members of the Hasmonean family who were heroes in fighting against Hellenists and the Seleucids, i.e., Simon's parents and brothers. No other family member, though they were also buried at Modein, was accorded the honor (cf. 1 Macc 9:19). It may be assumed that Simon, too, was buried there, as seems confirmed by the number of pyramids that made up the mausoleum: each of the seven was to conceal one person's body. Since upon completion only six pyramids contained actual burials, it stands to reason that Simon intended the last one for himself (cf. 1 Macc 13:28). The only mention of the mausoleum comes from the period the structure was being built (1 Macc 13:30).

No evidence suggests that native Modein had any special significance for the later Hasmoneans. Josephus implies that the tombs of John Hyrcanus[78] and Alexander Jannaeus[79] were located in Jerusalem, but probably not close to each other, which may suggest that the Hasmoneans did not have a family necropolis in this city. Although the tombs of John Hyrcanus and Alexander Jannaeus were not located in the former necropolis of the kings of Israel and Judah[80] – perhaps because of the shortage of remaining space – they were still in close proximity to city walls (cf. Jos. *BJ* 5.304), close to the Jews' holy sites, and such placement could be of symbolic significance.[81] Yet nothing is known about dynastic propaganda capitalizing on this fact; in it, the place of honor was the mausoleum of first-generation Hasmoneans at Modein, as is indicated by twin mentions of the place in 1 Macc and its evocative description (1 Macc 9:19; 13:25–30).

Compared to other sources illuminating the Hasmoneans' dynastic propaganda, 1 Macc is a work whose importance in this respect cannot be overestimated. As a historical source, it calls for a special approach since its author recorded in it not only the events that unfolded in and around Judea in ca. 170–135, with the Hasmoneans as the main protagonists, but also, or perhaps primarily, he saturated the work with an ideological message. The structure and narrative of 1 Macc is subordinated to that message. While relating events connected with the Judeans' armed struggle against Hellenists and the Seleucids, the author uses every opportunity to highlight the special role and contribution of Mattathias and his sons, especially Judah Maccabee and Simon. Pointing to their similarity to biblical figures, he includes his heroes among the "chosen" defenders of the people of Israel. Moreover, to give his work a monumental appearance, he employs a literary technique of using the language and imagery typical for biblical books, especially the *Book of Judges* and *Books of Kings*.[82] Interestingly, despite the many religious themes present in the text, no suggestions are made about

[78] *BJ* 5.259. 304. 356; 6.169; Bieberstein/Bloedhorn 1994, III: 403–404.

[79] *BJ* 5.304; Bieberstein/Bloedhorn 1994, III: 402–403; Küchler 2007: 346–347.

[80] Cf. Jos. *BJ* 1.184; *AJ* 14.124. The royal tombs mentioned by Josephus Flavius when describing Aristobulus II's funeral may have been burials of his predecessors rather than Biblical kings of Israel.

[81] Indicative of their desire to lend the tombs such significance may be the fact that the Hasmoneans did not decide to erect for their deceased family members elsewhere in Jerusalem a mausoleum like that at Modein or like rock-carved family mausolea in the Kidron Valley belonging to rich priestly families (cf. Küchler 2007: 698–730), or to others discovered in Jerusalem (such as the tomb of Jason, cf. Rahmani 1967; Küchler 2007: 1029–1036). Building a mausoleum near city walls could be impossible for want of sufficient space there.

[82] For references in 1 Macc to biblical tradition, see Goldstein 1976: 6 ff., 14; Goldstein 1987: 77 ff.; van Henten 1996: 199 ff., 206; Rajak 1996: 108 ff.; Schams 1998: 114; Rappaport 1998: 175 ff.; Rooke 2000: 298–299; Egger-Wenzel 2006: 142 ff.

God's direct interference in developments. The author emphasizes instead that all actions by the Hasmoneans received divine blessing, a source of their successes as well as a sign of their having been chosen as a tool to carry out God's plans, just as had been the case in earlier, biblical history of Israel.[83] For this reason, any actions taken lawlessly by Hasmonean imitators were doomed to fail from the start (cf. 1 Macc 5:55–62, esp. 61–62).

This idea is one of the guiding thoughts in 1 Macc; it not only helps explain how Judah Maccabee and his brothers won victories even against seemingly hopeless odds, but it also lends their power, whether priestly or secular, a supernatural dimension, making their dominion indisputable and unquestionable.[84] An additional argument to support the Hasmoneans' special right to the priesthood – the author of 1 Macc emphasizes – was their blood relation to Phinehas,[85] who received from Yahweh a promise that he and his descendants would be priests for evermore (cf. Num 25:1–16; Sir 45:23–24). Such an origin of their mandate to exercise power imposed on the Hasmoneans certain obligations toward "strangers," who could be, depending on context, both the Seleucids and Hellenists, or inhabitants of conquered territories. In imparting a divine origin of the Hasmoneans' power, the author of 1 Macc gives the fullest expression to his pro-dynastic orientation[86] which included a picture of events that the Hasmoneans would want to project to suit their propaganda purposes. The author's clearly articulated ideological message persuades the reader that the Hasmoneans did not win their religious and political status through usurpation but owed it to God's mandate.[87] It is for such ideological considerations that we may hypothesize that the writing of 1 Macc was most probably inspired by a ruler in the Hasmonean family.

The proposition leads to questions about the time of writing, purpose, and authorship of the book. Views as to the point in time when 1 Macc was composed are generally in agreement, by far the majority of scholars believing that the work was completed during the reign of John Hyrcanus.[88] But more specific dating remains disputable. According to some, 1 Macc or its first draft was written ca. 130,[89] while others date it to the final years of that ruler's reign. Choice of either of these propositions affects ideological interpretation of the book's message, therefore the first step should be to weigh arguments

[83] 1 Macc 5:62: ἐκ τοῦ σπέρματος τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐκείνων, οἷς ἐδόθη σωτηρία Ισραηλ διὰ χειρὸς αὐτῶν. [*the family of those men through whom deliverance was given to Israel*.] (tr. NRSV); Arenhoevel 1967: 40–44; Goldstein 1987: 74–81, esp. 80 (not all of his conclusions on the ideological content of 1 Macc are plausible as they tend to be an overinterpretation of the book's message, cf. Collins 1987: 104); Collins 1987: 103–104; Rappaport 1998: 176–177.

[84] Cf. 1 Macc 3:18–22; 4:8–10; 4:30–33; 7:40–42; Levy 1955: 16; Attridge 1984a: 172 ff.; Harrington 1999: 122 ff., 134; Williams 1999: 98 ff.

[85] 1 Macc 2:26. 54; cf. Jos. AJ 5.119.

[86] See Fischer 1992: 440–441.; Harrington 1999a: 122, 134; Williams 1999: 98, and n. 8. It is worth noting that sources concerning the Hasmonean period cite no instance or even allusion to the Hasmoneans opposing mixed marriages as reneging on the Jewish religious tradition, even though that was the chief reason for an angry outburst by Phinehas, cf. Himmelfarb 1999: 1 ff., esp. 19–22.

[87] Abel/Starcky 1961: 15.

[88] Differing views on this matter are rather isolated (cf. Rooke 2000: 267, and n. 4). Dating of 1 Macc to Alexander Jannaeus' reign, but with no convincing arguments to support it, is favored by Goldstein (1976: 62 ff.; 1983: 71–83; 1987: 73, 75).

[89] Schwartz 1991; Williams 1999: 122.

that bear on the matter. Before that, however, it is necessary to present some information about the work itself and its content.

The original title of 1 Macc is unknown to us.[90] The designation we use goes back to antiquity. Our knowledge on the subject we owe mainly to Christian authors who used the appellative "Book of the Maccabees" with an accompanying numeral. The oldest evidence for the use of the title 1 Macc in its present form in Greek comes from the 2nd century CE (Clemens Alex., *Stromata* 1.21.123). The traditional source behind the practice of naming the book "Maccabean" was most probably the nickname of one of the Hasmonean heroes in struggles against the Seleucids, Judah Maccabee.

The author of 1 Macc remains anonymous. His work offers no hint that would cast at least some light on himself. Little has been contributed in this respect by analyses trying to define his worldview and, consequently, pinpoint the religious circle which produced him. The only result is to exclude any connections with the Pharisees and rather to link him with the Sadducee circle.[91] Yet 1 Macc implies that its author was a devoted and sincere supporter of the Hasmoneans. His familiarity with the geographic realities of Judea and neighboring lands implies that he was a native,[92] although scholars sometimes suggest that he might have acquired that knowledge though skillful use of information contained in written sources or conveyed in oral accounts. The structure of 1 Macc, the author's expertise in using the written word to express his thoughts, and his familiarity with biblical literary tradition all suggest a man of good education and intellectually astute. Then his detailed knowledge of the Hasmoneans' political, diplomatic, and military activity implies that in working on his book he drew from a variety of sources which most likely included documents from the Hasmoneans' archive (cf. 1 Macc 14:49). This would constitute proof of the king's trust in him and his close ties with the king's inner circle. It is also believed that, next to written sources, the author of 1 Macc also drew from oral tradition.[93] References surviving in early Christian works make it clear that the original 1 Macc was composed in Hebrew or Aramaic (cf. Euseb. *HE* 6.25.2). Indicative of this is the presence of many Hebraisms in its Greek translation.[94]

All these clues help narrow down considerably the circle which may have produced the author of 1 Macc. The only community where John Hyrcanus could have found an author capable of writing a historical work to serve Hasmonean interests were the scribes. It should be stressed that not only their professional skills predestined them for such tasks: they were, after all, next to priests and Levites, guardians and propagators of Jewish tradition. Historical sources do not pay too much attention to them, keeping them on the sidelines of the main stream of events. Studies published in recent years about scribes have cast much light on their role in different historical periods.[95] Find-

[90] Its wording arrived at based on an account by Eusebius (*HE* 6.25.1-2), who cites the book's Hebrew name, is purely hypothetical: Goldstein 1976: 15 ff.; Wirgin 1971: 39–40; Rappaport 2001: 711.

[91] Levy 1955: 19; Fischer 1992: 442.

[92] Bar-Kochva 1989: 184.

[93] Abel/Starcky 1961: 16–17; Attridge 1984a: 176; Sievers 1990: 1–2.

[94] Bickermann 1928: 779–780; Levy 1955: 35–36.; Momigliano 1976: 657 ff.; Attridge 1984a: 171; Sievers 1990: 1; Fischer 1992: 440. There are known to have existed translations into other languages (Latin and Syriac) used by local Christian communities. 1 Macc was preserved by being included in the Christian canon of Bible: Fischer 1992: 439–440; Harrington 1999: 135, 150–151.

[95] See Schams 1998; Saldarini 2001: 241–276.

ings indicate that, in the Hellenistic and Roman periods, apart from their basic duties defined by the name of their profession, they also served a variety of important public functions. An analysis of records which mention scribes reveals that their professional abilities earned them considerable prestige in society and they often occupied privileged positions. The group included not only literate people, but also experts in legal regulations and administrative officials of various ranks; their presence is also attested in the army. Particularly interesting are records indicating scribes' part in fighting Hellenists and the Seleucids on the side of the Hasmoneans.[96] This suggests that the scribal community was not apolitical. It may well be thought that their pro-Hasmonean sympathies stemmed not just from ideological sentiments, but involved hopes for a career in the administration the new rulers were about to build. Even if some in this professional group did not accept the political system created by the Hasmoneans, or their religious attitude, nor did they intend to cast their lot with them, there certainly were others who were ready to support the Hasmoneans and place their skills in their service. Our author must have been one of those. His possible connection with the scribal community – on top of his familiarity with Judea's geographic realities – may be seen as another argument for his Judean background.[97]

That 1 Macc was published in Hebrew or Aramaic clearly indicates that the work was meant for the Judeans to read. It was their ancestors, in addition to individual protagonists of the events described: Mattathias and his sons, who were the collective heroes of 1 Macc. The acts of the Hasmoneans could never have led to success, if they had not been supported by common inhabitants of Judea (ὁ λάος). A highlight on their role must have been quite intentional and, given the propaganda message of 1 Macc, it must have, I believe, a deeper justification, for the political resonance of this is obvious. We may therefore ponder toward whom such praise of common people may have been aimed.

In 1 Macc we find many unambiguously targeted political and propaganda overtones. It should be remembered that while the book was a historical work, its aim was not only to recall past events, but also to defend the Hasmoneans against criticism and accusations from their political opponents. This end would be served by illuminating the events so as to serve the dynasty's interests. That was the reason why the book's author proceeded to manipulate history.

The author of 1 Macc is sometimes blamed for idealizing the figure of Simon and excessively emphasizing his role in fighting against Hellenists and the Seleucids, to the detriment of his brothers' achievements.[98] Yet if the book was composed after Simon's death, then he could not be personally interested in having his figure shown in the best possible light – but his successors could. The cornerstone of Simon's and his brothers' status was the will of their supporters, who, in a desire to maintain unity in the resistance movement, entrusted its leadership to members of a single family, believing in their effectiveness. After Simon died, his successors' power was based on the resolution of the "great assembly" of 140 (1 Macc 14:41–45). Just how important it was to the Hasmoneans is testified to by its *in extenso* quotation above. When Simon was exercising

[96] 1 Macc 5:42; 7:12–13; Schams 1998: 114 ff., 121; Saldarini 2001: 251 ff.; 2 Macc 6: 18; Schams 1998: 123–124; Saldarini 2001: 253–254. See also Schams 1998: 279–280.

[97] Cf. Troiani 2008: 348–359.

[98] Cf. e.g., van Henten 1996: 202; Rooke 2000: 296 ff.

rule, his authority backed by supporters was a sufficient safeguard of his power. The Hasmoneans felt compelled to reach for historical arguments only when accusations against them from their political opponents were threatening to resonate in Judean society and jeopardize the status of the ruling family. The first such situation occurred under John Hyrcanus, when he was sharply criticized by the Pharisees. Decades after his father died, with many others gone who had fought under his command and steadfastly supported his power, the memory of the first Hasmoneans' deeds and their impact on Judea's subsequent political shape had faded somewhat, and social and political realities had also changed. The criticism must have brought it home to John Hyrcanus that administrative measures alone were not enough to neutralize the opposition's influence once and for all. Rather, it was advisable to appeal to his subjects' emotions and remind them of the acts and achievements of the Hasmoneans – such a purpose could be well served by circulating a historical book containing a message that played into the dynasty's interests. These circumstances support dating 1 Macc during the reign of Simon's son; they also support its being a response to the Pharisees' criticism of Judea's political system in place. If we knew when the conflict with the Pharisees took place, the problem of dating 1 Macc could be considered resolved. A lack of information on the subject only suggests that perhaps the conflict was part of the social unrest that occurred late in John Hyrcanus' reign, which in turn leads us to support the position of those scholars who believe that it was then that 1 Macc was written.[99]

John Hyrcanus' initiative to publish a work that would imprint the Hasmoneans' achievements on public awareness must be considered as one of the most important and long-lasting feats of their dynastic propaganda. It not only helped save those achievements from oblivion, but proved a valuable argument for the family's next generation in its struggle against political opposition. A summary of John Hyrcanus' reign included in the closing passage of 1 Macc (16:23–24) serves primarily to emphasize the continuity of tradition of the Hasmonean house as it links him with his heroic predecessors. At the same time, it promotes his own achievements.

The importance of 1 Macc as a historical work and a propaganda vehicle deserves attention for one more reason: it testifies to an extensive transformation in the image of the Hasmoneans entertained by some segments of Judean society in the course of the 2nd century BCE. The process can be traced thanks to texts created in the 2nd and 1st centuries BCE. Some of those texts use only allusions which, with their meanings or transparent symbolism used, permit no doubt that they refer to the Hasmoneans. Others contain sharp criticism of Judea's religious order, blaming the incumbent high priests, i.e. the Hasmoneans.

The earliest references to the struggles fought by the Hasmoneans are found in *1 Enoch* (90:6–19).[100] The book's anonymous author, using symbolic imagery not always intelligible to us, passes a favorable judgment on the fight of Judah Maccabee (pictured as a single-horned ram), who successfully defended the people of Judea (shown as a herd of sheep) against enemies. Yet the author does not define the future importance

[99] The synthetic epilogue closing 1 Macc (16: 23–24) is an insufficiently convincing argument for dating the origin of 1 Macc at a time after John Hyrcanus: Rooke 2000: 267.

[100] For a comprehensive commentary on this passage together with the history of its redaction, see Nickelsburg 2001: 396–401. Cf. Eshel 2008: 21 n. 22.

of Judah Maccabee's success in terms of divine intervention (1 Enoch 90:14), because it is not he who is central to the struggle. In the conclusion there appears a white bull (1 Enoch 90: 37–38). The meaning of this symbol is unclear. Thus the vision in *1 Enoch* vindicates Judah Maccabee's important contribution, but no allusion is made either to the future ruler or to his lineage.[101] It is further believed that a short mention in the *Book of Daniel* refers to the efforts of Judah Maccabee and his supporters.[102] As in *1 Enoch*, the book's concluding vision of the future does not hint at the Hasmoneans, but then neither does it mention the Judean throne as passing to a ruler from the line of David. It envisions a new order as presided over by a transcendent ruler – angel Michael sent by the Almighty (Dan 12:1–3).[103]

Both above-mentioned texts were composed at the time when the Hasmoneans were only beginning their campaign against the Seleucids and Hellenists;[104] it is therefore hardly surprising that their authors placed no hopes for the future with that family. Given the disproportionate forces, no one could predict the outcome of the fighting. As time passed and the Hasmoneans went from strength to strength, the initial reserved uncertainty about them among religious circles was replaced by appreciation and approval.

Some scholars try to find confirmation of this in the *Septuagint*. Studies published in recent years point to many significant differences between Hebrew and Aramaic books of the Bible, and their Greek translation. A comparative analysis of the Greek version of biblical books vs. originals revealed that the earlier contain many allusions to notions and institutions known to the translator(s) from personal experience, and to events taking place at the time the translation was made.[105] This important insight proved helpful in discussions centered on pinpointing the actual time the *Septuagint* was created and respective books were translated, as well as on the impact of contemporary views and political concepts on the final shape of the *Septuagint* itself and on its themes. Among historical allusions and references so far identified in the Greek Bible, prominent are those assumed to concern the Hasmoneans. They are found in many books, and the list of such allusions is by no means complete as work on identifying them started only recently.

The first scholar to discover Hasmonean hints in prophecies in the Septuagint's *Book of Ezekiel* was Johan Lust.[106] More followed, in the same book,[107] but also elsewhere in the *Septuagint*, especially in the *Psalms*, identified by other researchers.[108] Interpreters

[101] This passage in 1 Enoch is the subject of multiple interpretations, as some scholars believe it to be one of the earlier pieces of evidence for the rise in Judaism of the messianic idea after 200, in hopes of the restoration of Davidic line (cf. Goldstein 1987: 72–73; other references: Nickelsburg 2001: 406 n. 13). However, not all share this opinion; what is more, many cannot see any messianic elements in the passage: Nickelsburg 1987: 55-6; Collins 1995: 34; Laato 1997: 261–262; Nickelsburg 2001: 406–407.

[102] Dan 11:34: βοηθηθήσονται βοήθειαν μικράν [*they shall receive a little help*] (tr. NRSV)].

[103] Collins 1995: 34–38, esp. 37-8; Laato 1997: 262–269.

[104] Nickelsburg 2001: 25–26, 361, 398.

[105] Cf. Talshir 1984: 129–147, esp. 147.

[106] Cf. Ezek 21:25–27; 28:11–19; Lust 2004a: 22 ff., esp. 24–26 (although the original of the text was published in 1985, it was first publicly presented in 1983).

[107] Cf. Ezek 34: 23–24; van der Kooij 2005: 440–445.

[108] See Rooke 2000: 298–299 (he believes that *Ps.* 72 is close in its content to 1 Macc 14:4–15); Williams 2001: 261 ff., 270 ff., 275–276; van der Kooij 2001: 232 ff. Speaking about pro-Hasmonean hints in

of such passages believe they contain elements which suggest not only the translator(s) being active in the period of Hasmonean struggles against the Seleucids, but also, in view of ideas introduced in the Greek translation of biblical books, his/their support for the struggle. Indeed, some of them seem to supply arguments to justify the Hasmoneans' right to exercise simultaneously the twin powers: religious and secular.[109]

As we recognize the significance of such ideas for the Hasmoneans' perceived rights to hold power, we must not be blind to the weaknesses inherent in proposed interpretations. In so far as pro-Hasmonean overtones in the *Psalter* may argue for its translation being made before the end of the 2nd century BCE,[110] it still remains an open question where the redaction was performed. The point is not irrelevant if we look at it through the lens of those pro-Hasmonean overtones. In Judea, they were not just legible: they constituted part of discernible theological endorsement for the Hasmoneans' status, while everywhere else they lost much of their clarity, conveying no more than the translator's personal sympathies. But scholarly opinion is divided as to exactly where the Greek translation of the *Psalter* originated, which, compared to other books of the *Septuagint*, contains the most pro-Hasmonean allusions. Some scholars favor the hypothesis that the *Psalter* could have been created in the Palestinian community.[111] By contrast, A. Pietersma is convinced of an Egyptian origin of the *Psalter.* He voiced this opinion repeatedly, and felt reassured after analyzing the *Psalms*' various references to the geographical environment, history, and religion.[112] Such a marked difference of opinion makes much less attractive the hypothesis of the pro-Hasmonean attitude of some *Septuagint* translators and the version's possible propaganda value. It is difficult to imagine such subtle arguments supporting Judean rulers' political aspirations to be understood and stir any emotions in Egyptian readers. Until issues relating to the place of origin of the *Psalter* – and of other parts of the *Septuagint* possibly referring to the Hasmoneans – are properly explained, its testimony, though it may cast some light on favorable attitudes toward Judea's ruling family in some social circles, is of little use.[113] This means that at least at present it cannot be considered a plausible foundation for any generalized conclusions to be drawn.

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the *Psalms*, we consider especially the new findings made in recent years. Previously, such accents were noted in *Ps.*109 (110), cf. Gerleman 1981: 19; Rooke 2000: 329–330; van der Kooij 2001: 238 ff. Not all scholars who pursue his interpretation share the position, cf. Schaper 1995: 106–107 n. 388 (in his analysis of this psalm (p. 101–107), the author concentrates only on its theological content); Rooke 2000: 90 ff., 289–290.

[109] As with many other texts in Jewish literature, differences of opinion about their understanding can be quite considerable. And so, according to J. Lust (2004a: 24 ff.; 2004b: 199–200; cf. van der Kooij 2005: 439–440) some passages he identifies in the *Book of Ezekiel* carry critical overtones of Jonathan, while A. van der Kooij thinks they convey a much different message (2005, 440): *From the perspective of the mode of reading prophecies at the time of the translator, it is plausible to assume that this passage* [Ezek 21, 25–27], *actually was meant to legitimize the Maccabean rulership.* Cf. also van der Kooij 2005: 445–446.

[110] Williams 2001: 275–276.

[111] Cf. Schaper 1995: 34–45, esp. 45; van der Kooij 1983: 68 ff., esp. 74; van der Kooij 2001: 245 ff. (he also admits the possibility that the *Psalter* was created in Egypt by translators originating from Judea (p. 246).

[112] Pietersma 2001: 258 ff., esp. 273 (cf. presentation of earlier findings and hypotheses, p. 253–258).

[113] It cannot be contradicted even by the presence in the *Septuagint* of Hasmonean influences, see Lust 2004b: 199–200.

Another book that contributed to the Hasmoneans' image-building was 2 Macc. Its present form is the result of work by an anonymous epitomist who introduced significant alterations and abridgments to the story of Judah Maccabee's campaign, as presented in a five-volume historical work by Jason of Cyrene. Although the exact date of 2 Macc is disputed, it seems that Jason's book was composed soon after his main protagonist's death, while an abridgment of his opus was probably made no later than ca. 124 (cf. 2 Macc 1:1–9). Unlike the author of 1 Macc, who relates struggles with the Seleucids from the outbreak of hostilities in 167 until Simon was declared Judean leader in 140, Jason of Cyrene concentrates solely on the first years of rebellion against Hellenistic religious reform, with Judah Maccabee unquestionably the hero. Jason's story also differs in ideological content. Its primary focus is on the religious dimension of the rebels' efforts, including what he believes to have been divine intervention. His adoption of this historical perspective of events makes both Books of Maccabees often seem mutually ideologically contrasting. It is not without reason that 1 Macc is called the "Book of the dynasty" and 2 Macc the "Book of the Temple." Even though Jason aimed to show the struggles for the temple and for religious freedom, and not to commemorate the deeds of the heroes involved, his account of events in which Judah Maccabee played the foremost part must have meant much to the Hasmoneans.

It cannot be maintained that the passage of time erased memory of the first Hasmoneans' achievements in Judea's popular awareness. Yet even if it was still vivid, it was not entirely reflected in the people's attitudes toward subsequent generations of rulers in the dynasty. Not all their actions were accepted and not all were willing to recognize their right to rule as derived from the memory of their illustrious ancestors. Such was the beginning of an opposition, the response to which was an unprecedented commission for a work of historical propaganda which 1 Macc certainly is.

II. *The State*

1. Local administration

During Hasmonean rule, their state's borders frequently changed. The first alteration was made already during the rule of Jonathan. Rather than through conquest, it was by administrative decision of king Demetrius I of Syria, who added to Judea three districts he removed from Samaria: Aphairema, Lydda, and Ramathain (cf. 1 Macc 10:30. 38; 11:34; Jos. *AJ* 13.50. 127) The first to enlarge Judea by force of arms was Simon. Although his gains were little, embracing Joppa with the area connecting it to the rest of Judea and Gezer (1 Macc 13:43–48; 14:5), their capture marked the beginning of gradual Judean expansion. The process gained momentum under John Hyrcanus, who conquered Idumea and Samaria, and small parts of Galilee with the city of Scythopolis (Beth-Shean). During the reign of Aristobulus I, Hasmonean rule was extended to more lands in Galilee and a part of southern Lebanon. Judea reached its greatest territorial expansion under Alexander Jannaeus. At the end of his reign, he controlled, in addition to lands mentioned above, a coastal strip from Gaza as far as Strato's Tower (except for Askelon), the Golan Heights, and large areas across Jordan in what had been biblical Gilead and Moab.[1]

Efficient government of a steadily growing state required organization of territorial administration and appropriately staffing it. Neither element of the Hasmonean state is clearly confirmed in sources. It should be expected that the groundwork for this administration began to be laid with the first successes in fighting the Seleucids, and that its creator could be Jonathan. This was necessitated by instituting governance on gained territories. Insufficient sources and their nature provide no clues as to even the most generalized shape of institutions on which depended efficient implementation of respective rulers' various political agendas. In this situation, we are largely confined to guesswork and speculation.

Any such attempts start from the assumption that the model the Hasmoneans used in building their administration were the structures of government introduced in Judea by the Seleucids as they incorporated it in their state.[2] This is suggested, on the one hand,

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[1] Cf. Jos. *AJ* 13.395–397; 14.18; Synkellos, p. 426. For more detailed information about Hasmonean conquests from John Hyrcanus to Alexander Jannaeus, see above.

[2] The structures of pre-existing Ptolemaic administration in Judea (known from papyrus documents in Zeno's archive: Rooke 2000: 251–252) are certain to have been gradually removed after 198, although its memory might long have remained in social awareness. With reference to three Samaritan districts annexed by Judea (1 Macc 10: 30. 38; 11:34), the author of 1 Macc consistently uses a term from Egyptian administrative terminology (νομοί), cf. Virgilio 2003: 140. This may suggest that their recognition as autonomous administrative structures came about under the Ptolemies. Josephus uses various names instead (*AJ* 13.50: καὶ τῶν τριῶν τοπαρχιῶν; 13.127: καὶ τοὺς τρεῖς νομοὺς), which may mean that he was not sure of their proper form of name.

by titles of Syrian officials managing Palestinian affairs and those the Hasmoneans received from the Seleucids, and on the other by titles of Hasmonean officials, which we only know in their Greek form. The best known among them is *strategos* (στρατηγός). Administrative practice with both the Seleucids and the Hasmoneans suggests that it applied to officials combining military and civilian authority; their purview also included supervising the collection of taxes.[3] In the reigns of Jonathan and Simon, the title was used by commanders of fortresses and officials in charge of respective areas.[4] Judea's administrative personnel was made up, in addition to *strategoi*, also of other, lower-ranking officers.[5] Among them certain persons administering the Temple. From the time of Simon, the right to appoint them was also the ruler's prerogative.[6]

From the time of the Hasmonean monarchy, we have only two mentions in which an official's name is accompanied by title of his function. The first refers to Antipas, grandfather of Herod, who was appointed governor of all Idumea during the reign of Alexander Jannaeus.[7] The other mention is of Peitholaos, a familiar figure in the ruling Hasmonean elite. Under Hyrcanus II, he served as *hypostrategos* of Jerusalem, the second top official responsible for governing the city.[8] His decision to join Aristobulus II's camp with a thousand soldiers implies that he was their commanding officer, i.e., he combined administrative functions with a military command. While the hierarchy of positions in Jerusalem's administration is clear enough, the range of competences in respective positions remains a matter of pure speculation.[9] From the time of Alexander Jannaeus comes a mention of one Demetrius, local administrative official, whom the king relieved from his duties in displeasure over his performance. Although the official's title is not mentioned in our

[3] For more information on the *strategoi* and their functions in the Seleucid state, see Schwahn 1935: 1148 ff.; Bikerman 1938: 65, 198 ff.

[4] An example of such an official is Ptolemy, the son of Abubus (1 Macc 16:11: στρατηγὸς εἰς τό πεδίον Ιεριχω). It is not known whether, at the time he attempted to gain power, any regular garrison was stationed on Jericho plain, but 1 Macc implies that he commanded a number of soldiers of unstated ethnicity (cf. 1 Macc 16:16–22).

[5] The existence of a more complex structure of administrative positions may be inferred from the "great assembly's" resolution of 140 (1 Macc 14:42), which empowered him to appoint officials of different categories all by himself (καὶ ὅπως μέλῃ αὐτῷ περὶ τῶν ἁγίων καθιστάναι δι' αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων αὐτῶν καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς χώρας καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ὅπλων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ὀχυρωμάτων) [[to] *appoint men over its tasks and over the country and the weapons and the strongholds, and that he should take charge of the sanctuary*] (tr. NRSV), and from the confirmed fact of its actual functioning, cf. Jos. *BJ* 1, 172.

[6] No evidence has survived from the Hasmonean period to detail the organization and functioning of the Temple. An opinion on this matter can be formed based on sources from a later period: Safrai 1976: 874 ff.

[7] Jos. *AJ* 14.10: ὃν Ἀλεξάνδρου τοῦ βασιλέως καὶ τῆς γυναικὸς αὐτοῦ στρατηγὸν ἀποδειξάντων ὅλης τῆς Ἰδουμαίας. It seems that the territorial administration created by the Hasmoneans lacked a fully defined hierarchical structure, enabling the rulers to change it swiftly as need arose. A different position in this matter is taken by Freyne 2000: 45. In his opinion, the Hasmoneans followed the patterns of the Syrian administration by naming officials who exercised full authority over entire conquered lands.

[8] Jos. *BJ* 1.172: καὶ Πειθόλαος ἦν ὁ ἐξ Ἱεροσολύμων ὑποστράτηγος (...).

[9] a mention concerning a time several years later supplies the information that Phasael, the son of Antipater, *strategos* of Jerusalem at the time, had authority over not just the city, but also the area around it (Jos. *BJ* 1.203: Φασάηλον μὲν δή... Ἱεροσολύμων καὶ τῶν πέριξ στρατηγὸν καθίστησιν; *AJ* 14.158). Such a broad scope may indicate a subdivision of competences between his subordinate officials. In view of the circumstances of Phasaels's appointment (cf. Jos. *BJ* 1.201–203; *AJ* 14.156–158) we cannot be certain whether previous *strategoi* of Jerusalem also extended their authority to territories in the city's vicinity.

source, we can infer that his rank was that of *strategos*.[10] To this modest picture of Hasmonean administration we may add one more detail. This administration needed more or less trained clerical personnel to ensure its daily functioning. Such staff would make necessary official arrangements on a local level, maintain contact with higher authorities, and develop various documents as ordered: lists of inhabitants and their property, tax figures, etc. Our knowledge of Judean society at the time in question suggests that the only group which was sufficiently qualified to perform those tasks were scribes.

An attempt to outline the functioning of territorial administration in the Hasmonean state cannot overlook addressing its rulers' policies toward the cities, whether in Judea proper or in captured territories. As has been said, those policies were decidedly hostile. Cities had been stripped of their formal status (if ever they had had it), and any measures taken about them were designed to weaken them as centers of enterprise and destroy their economies. By the same token, they could no longer serve as local hubs of social life and spread civilization within surrounding rural areas. A picture of such policies, seen though the lens of Josephus' account, is thoroughly unfavorable as they resulted in extensive or near-complete destruction of most cities captured by the Hasmoneans. However, recent data suggest that they were not always so categorical in such practices. Nor do those findings confirm the truth of all the information the historian supplies.

Many new details about the Hasmoneans' attitudes to Greek cities, and some corrections to Josephus' relation, we owe to archaeological findings and numismatic evidence. These enable us to establish that Judean rulers were the most ruthless toward captured cities, especially in Idumea and Samaria. They were completely or almost completely razed. Much more leniency was shown to cities on the coast and in Galilee and Transjordan, where conquest-related destruction was relatively small, sometimes imperceptible. Still, that is not to mean that those cities were permitted to maintain their previous status. Many of them suffered from their inhabitants emigrating than from actual physical damage. Regardless, however, of how harmful the effects were of Judean rulers' policies toward individual cities, those effects needed a long to time to heal. They were not remedied by decisions by Pompey (Jos. *BJ* 1.155–157; *AJ* 14.75–76) or Gabinius (Jos. *BJ* 1.165–166; *AJ* 14.87–88) which restored to most Hasmonean-captured cities their lost liberties and city status, nor were efforts at reconstruction of much help. Many centers would never recover, and some did only after decades.[11]

Hasmonean policies toward cities, as against the policies of their contemporary Hellenistic rulers in this respect, may seem to have hurt their own interests. In our belief, the key to answering this problem is the growing number of enemies as the rebellion progressed. At an early stage in the rebellion against the Hellenistic religious reform, when it was led by Mattathias and Judah Maccabee, the enemy were the Hellenists. Under

[10] Jos. *AJ* 13.394: ἐγκαλῶν δὲ πολλὰ Δημητρίῳ τῷ τῶν τόπων ἄρχοντι περιέδυσεν αὐτόν. Another mention suggests that this Demetrius was the commander of the fortress at Gamla captured by Alexander Jannaeus, and that from that position he was removed (Jos. *BJ* 1.105). Considering the ruler's motives behind his decision, the earlier version of events seems more probable.

[11] Such a picture emerges from an analysis of available archaeological and numismatic evidence (Shatzman 1991: 73–82; Berlin 1997: 31–32, 39-40; Pastor 1997: 75 ff.; Roll/Tal 1999: 253; Safrai 2000: 66 ff.; Hirschfeld 2000: 684; cf. Hoover 2006: 25 ff.). It contradicts the plausibility of S. Applebaum's arguments (1979/1980: 168–177 = 1989b: 39–46; 1989a: 20) intimating the Hasmoneans' friendly policy toward cities.

Jonathan's leadership, a major battle cry in the movement became a fight with the "strangers." That blanket term applied not only to Jewish Hellenists, but also a segment of the population allied with the Seleucids and differing in ethnicity, culture, and religion. One example of methods employed in fighting the alien element in Judea was when Simon removed inhabitants of Gezer in order to settle it with orthodox Jews. John Hyrcanus, in his turn, seeing a need to unify the areas he conquered within the rest of Judea, resorted to forced Judaization of local non-Jewish populations. This was intended to pacify especially Greek cities whose status and economic standing posed a potential menace to Hasmonean rule and could in no way be made to agree with the autocratic style of government founded on Judaism. Besides, populations inhabiting those cities cherished the very cultural and religious traditions that the Hasmoneans had long fiercely opposed. Only a rejection of those values and acceptance of Judaism could spare local communities from expulsion or perhaps even extermination, and their homes from destruction or seizure.[12]

The Hasmoneans never established a new city in Judea, nor did they grant any existing center a city charter. The reason appears to lie not only in their hostility toward the "strangers," but also in a deep contradiction inevitably existing between their desire for absolute rule and the autonomy and economic independence of cities (*poleis*). As to why the Hasmoneans stopped short of granting Jerusalem city status, we may suppose that it was out of their especial respect for tradition which had made it a place holy to all Jews. Its pace of life was defined by religious festivals, and its government was exercised by high priests. Additionally, it cannot quite be ruled out that the Hasmoneans would not have wanted their actions to be seen as complying with the Hellenists' efforts to win for Jerusalem the status of a *polis* from Antiochus IV and to introduce a Greek style of life into its walls.[13] Moreover, they must have been wary of increasing opposition to them

[12] Cf. Rajak 1990: 271 ff. (= Rajak 2002: 72 ff.).

[13] Cf. 2 Macc 4:9–17. For a long time, a small portion of this text (τοὺς ἐν Ἱεροσολύμοις Ἀντιοχεις ἀναγράψαι (2 Macc 4:9)) has been the subject of various scholarly interpretations and disputes. The difficulty lies especially in establishing who those Antiochians were, what their legal status was, etc. Some believe this phrase suggests that Jerusalem had obtained the status of a *polis*, thus making all its inhabitants citizens. Others contend that the Antiochians mentioned in the respective fragment of 2 Macc were a small group of advocates of hellenization descended from the upper classes who owed their distinct status to their belonging to a *politeuma*, an autonomous structure in the city which gave its members a more privileged status compared to the rest of inhabitants. Still others believe those Antiochians to have been Syrian colonists established in Jerusalem near Acra (Dequerker 1985: 199). An argument in favor of Jerusalem having the status of a *polis* is that it met all formal criteria required to become one (a review of positions and hypotheses offered in the dispute, complete with previous literature on the subject, was presented by Parente 1994: 5–22; cf. also Saulnier 1994: 83 ff.; Cohen 1994: 243 ff.; Grabbe 2002: 6 ff.). Some new arguments in favor of Jerusalem obtaining the status of a *polis* and its entire population being recognized as citizens was supplied by the discovery of an inscription containing correspondence between king Eumenes II of Pergamon and inhabitants of the city of Tyriaion. The main subject of the correspondence relates to their attempts to obtain for Tyriaion the *polis* status (Jonnes/Ricl 1997: 3–4 = *SEG* 47, 1745 = Virgilio 2003: 295 ff., no. 30). Some of their requests to the king about this matter are identical to those made by Jason to Antiochus IV. The similarity of both cases confirms the hypothesis of Jason's desire to win for Jerusalem the *polis* status (Ameling 2003: 107 ff., esp. 110–111; Mandell 2003: 80 ff.; Kennell 2005: 15–16, 23). What is puzzling is the lack in the sources of any information about the point in time and circumstances of the city losing this status. M. Hengel (1996: 269 ff.) in his comprehensive article on Jerusalem's vicissitudes and character in the Hellenistic period does not at all address the issue of its city status. No sufficiently reliable evidence is available to confirm opinions sometimes made about Jerusalem having the status of a *polis* at the time of Herod and under Roman rule: Tcherikover 1964: 61 ff., esp. 78.

among a large segment of Jerusalem's population. In such realities, should their critics or enemies seize power in the city, their vested dynastic interests might be threatened. Such a contingency could be prevented by maintaining the *status quo* and exercising effective control over Jerusalem by entrusting its administration to reliable, loyal associates.

2. FINANCES

As to the first Hasmoneans' financial resources, we know that they were large enough to support an army, build and expand necessary military installations, reward members of their close circle, and implement a limited social policy. Their income was so vast that despite all Simon's expenditure, late in his reign he possessed a fortune which, even though difficult to estimate, truly astonished Antiochus VII Sidetes' envoy as he visited the Judean ruler in Jerusalem (cf. 1 Macc 15:32. 36).

Probably much of the treasury inherited from Simon was spent by John Hyrcanus in his first years on the throne to cover costs incurred in a defeat at the hands of Antiochus VII Sidetes and to finance his forced participation in the Parthian expedition of this king. Sources suggest, however, that within more than a decade he had not only recovered those losses, but had taken advantage of favorable political circumstances to greatly multiply his resources. From John Hyrcanus until the loss of Judean independence in 63, the Hasmoneans never had to face serious financial problems. This brings us to the sources of their wealth. We know that during the intense fighting by the first Hasmoneans against Syrian rulers, much of their revenue came from plundering the areas where their army operated, seizure of property belonging to Hellenists, and taxes payable by Judeans to the Seleucids but intercepted in part or in whole by the Hasmoneans to finance their own needs.

The principal source of revenue for any ruler was taxation, therefore it is here that a scrutiny of Hasmonean finances should properly begin. A reconstruction of the fiscal system of the Hasmonean state is not easy, nor possible in full, primarily because of shortage of sources. To use a picture of the fiscal system created in Judea by the Seleucids as a reference point for our reconstruction proves of little help because the only notable remarks on the subject are found in 1 and 2 Macc, therefore their credibility is largely unverifiable.[14] As another hindrance, both sources are at variance in their information.[15] We know that the Seleucids reduced or canceled those taxes that were paid to them on goods delivered to the Temple to be used in worship, and it is hardly likely that the Hasmoneans would reintroduce them. This being so, any discussion of the fiscal system in place in their state may only try to answer which Seleucid-imposed taxes were retained by the Hasmoneans, what were the rates, and what new taxes were introduced by themselves. Some information about it can be gleaned indirectly from an edict of Julius Caesar of 47 which defines the rights and obligations of Hyrcanus II and inhabitants of Judea (Jos. *AJ* 14.202–210). It should be noted, however, that scholars differ in their interpretations of its provisions.

The principal taxes in the Seleucid empire were land tax paid by every land holder at a rate proportional to the value of his real estate (it was known by various names, most

[14] No other source offers information convincing in itself, cf. Bar-Kochva 1977: 172 n. 4.
[15] Cf. Mittwoch 1955: 352–353; Aperghis 2004: 166 ff.

commonly *dekaté* (ἡ δεκάτη) and tribute (φόρος) levied on rural, urban, and religious communities.[16] Tax collection in Judea and transfer to the king's treasury was the responsibility of the high priest.[17] Any tax rebates and exemptions were the privilege of the king. Other than the above, taxes in Judea were paid on various crops and cattle, for royal monopolies and occasional levies for the ruler, on income, customs duties etc.[18] The most controversy surrounds the land tax and the tribute, for it is uncertain whether inhabitants of Judea were obliged to pay both contributions at once. An analysis of sources revealed that the reign of Antiochus IV saw important changes in Judea's tax system. As a penal measure for unrest first caused over struggles for the high priesthood between Jason and Menelaus, and later for the rebellion breaking out against the religious reform, amounts of tribute payable were raised.[19] The supposition cannot therefore be completely excluded that opposition to the Syrian fiscal system could have a place of its own in the rebellion's ideology.[20] With Judea breaking free from the Seleucids, the tribute was abolished.[21] It was replaced by a lower land tax (*dekaté*).[22] This is confirmed by Julius Caesar's edict. It mentions a land tax payable to Hyrcanus II by his subjects as was the practice under his predecessors (Jos. *AJ* 14.203). It is unclear when the land tax began to be levied on the general population. It certainly did not happen before the Hasmoneans took real control over Judea, therefore ascribing this move to Simon may be correct.[23]

Little is known about other forms of taxation in place during Hasmonean rule. Considering tax practices used by other contemporary rulers, we may surmise that some of the duties previously paid to the Seleucids remained in force, in one form or another, contributing no small share of the new rulers' revenue. Probably taxes were levied on salt, foodstuffs, and cattle, in addition to a variety of customs duties. Over and above all those, the general population of Judea paid traditional contributions that did not go to the ruler's treasury. Namely, they were religious-related taxes exacted as a share of crops. They served the needs of the priestly caste, the Levites, and the poor. Some were paid annually, others every specified longer period.[24] Without a complete knowledge of the fiscal system in force in Judea in the Hasmonean period, it is impossible to estimate the total tax burden shouldered by inhabitants or how it might have changed over time. What we should note, however, is that neither sources concerning the Hasmoneans nor Jewish literature created in their time contains any hints to suggest an excessive tax bur-

[16] Cf. Bar-Kochva 1977: 172 n. 1; Aperghis 2004: 137 ff., 142 ff., 167, 169–170.

[17] Cf. Bikerman 1938: 106 ff.

[18] Cf. 1 Macc 10:29–31. 33. 42; 11:34–35; 13:39; Bikerman 1938: 111 ff., 115 ff., 131–132; Aperghis 2004: 166 ff. S. Applebaum's remarks (1989a: 17–18, 21–22) on taxes paid by Judeans concern hypotheses posed by B. Bar-Kochva (1977). They contribute nothing significant to the dispute about Judea's tax system under the Hasmoneans.

[19] Mittwoch 1955: 354 ff.; cf. Bar-Kochva 1977: 172 n. 2.

[20] Cf. Mittwoch 1955: 360–361.

[21] In the judgment of the Seleucids, the Hasmoneans' political autonomy did not exempt them from paying tribute for territories they had conquered but which the Syrian kings considered their own property. Payment of overdue tribute was demanded of Simon by Demetrius II (1 Macc 15:28-31), and of John Hyrcanus by Antiochus VII Sidetes: Diodorus 34/35.1.5; Jos. *AJ* 13.246. Cf. Aperghis 2004: 171.

[22] Cf. Bar-Kochva 1977: 173, 186 n. 4, 190.

[23] Bar-Kochva 1977: 172–173, 185–186.

[24] Cf. Bar-Kochva 1977: 172, and n. 3, 185 ff.

den. It may therefore be assumed that the Hasmoneans' fiscal policies were not overly restrictive.

If this was so, then considering the maintenance costs of the army and the court, of prolonged military operations, or of erecting impressive buildings, we may be certain that the Hasmoneans obtained income other than from taxation to enable them not only to meet current expenditure, but also to amass a considerable fortune. We learn from historical sources covering the Hellenistic period that apart from taxation, which varied between respective monarchies, an important source of rulers' income were profits from their estates,[25] from obtaining natural resources, commerce and leaseholds, and from spoils of war. Our knowledge of the Hasmoneans' revenue is too insufficient to enable us to identify all its sources, let alone estimate its actual value, but available information helps cast some light on the matter.

One stable source of considerable income to Hellenistic monarchs was use of landed estates which typically made up a large proportion of overall arable land. Such estates had previously been the property of Alexander of Macedon, who appropriated lands belonging to rulers of Persia, or had been seized by his successors from various local rulers they had defeated.[26] The vast landed properties held by Hellenistic rulers also served them as important political leverage. Kings donated or favorably leased their land to their own dignitaries or local leaders to ensure their loyalty and cooperation. It had probably been in this way that the Hasmoneans had obtained their first larger estates outside their native Modein. This came about under Alexander Balas, who, in giving Jonathan the city of Ekron with environs, was rewarding political loyalty and military assistance he rendered Balas as the latter was fighting for the throne.[27]

From that point until the time of Alexander Jannaeus, the Hasmoneans constantly expanded their personal holdings. The process was only helped by the expansionist policies they pursued. After Jonathan died, relations with Syria, so far peaceful, deteriorated. In the aftermath, Simon's reign saw removal from Judea of all forms of Seleucid presence. In the process, the Syrian kings' estates in Judea itself passed to its new ruler (cf. 1 Macc 15:29). The lands in question may have comprised possessions taken over from the Ptolemies (Ekron was most likely part of them) or estates confiscated from opponents of the religious reform. Simon also took control of Gezer and Joppa, lying outside Judea and also the property of the Seleucids. Yet as Simon took real control over Judea, he did not appropriate all the booty. It was in his best political interest to return lands to all those supporters and subjects who had previously lost theirs under repressions and confiscations, and to make grants of land to those who had none. Even after restitutions and reparations to his subjects, that part of the booty must have remained

[25] The wealth of agricultural produce and cattle farming in Judea gave landowners considerable profits. It is accepted that the large increase in farmland used for the most profitable crops and their introduction to various other regions resulted more from government decisions than initiatives by smallholders. Detailed information about Judea's economy and various forms of business pursued by inhabitants of Palestine from the 1st century BCE to the 1st century CE was compiled from various sources by Applebaum (1976: 631–700). Although it applies to a later period, it can be a useful guide to the economic situation in Judea also for the Hasmonean period.

[26] Cf. Bikerman 1938: 180–181, 184–185.

[27] 1 Macc 10:89; Jos. *AJ* 13.102; Pastor 1997: 64–65.

in his hands which included, apart from Syrian kings' property,[28] land confiscated from the Hellenists. Some of his acquisitions may have presented considerable value, both in size and in yield. One example are estates around Jericho. It is not known exactly when they became Hasmonean property, not impossibly already under Jonathan, but it certainly happened no later than during Simon's reign.[29] The flatlands around that city were famous for ample waters, fertile soil, and especially for their plantations of palm trees and balsam shrubs.[30] Since such produce was exceptionally profitable, it may safely be assumed that the lands, before the Hasmoneans took over, were the property of the Seleucids.[31] The Hasmoneans attached a great deal of importance to those assets. Simon entrusted their administration to his own brother-in-law; later the area saw the construction of a royal winter palace.[32] What we cannot be certain of is whether Simon derived any immediate profits from capturing Gezer and Joppa, where he settled Jewish colonists, as we have no information if those colonists were obliged to pay him any tenancy rates. Previously, both cities must have supplied the king of Syria with considerable income.[33] As to Simon's other revenues, not much is clear, but, in view of the sheer size of the fortune he amassed, it may well be thought that the mentioned estates were not his only sources of income.

While the treasury John Hyrcanus inherited was respectable, his first years of reign saw it dwindle. His defeat by Antiochus VII cost him not only Gezer and Joppa (cf. Jos. *AJ* 13.261), but a payment of 500 talents in contribution to the victor (Jos. *AJ* 13.247). In addition, he had to sustain the cost of his part in Antiochus VII's Parthian expedition and to meet the bill for his mercenary troops. It is impossible to estimate how far those expenditures depleted his reserves or how much he lost in revenues. The situation was reversed by another outbreak of fighting between pretenders to the Syrian throne. Once

[28] That the Seleucids held large estates in Judea is clearly confirmed by the wording of Antiochus VII's demands made to Simon and the amount of expected compensation for lost profits and other losses caused by Simon's operations in their lands: 1 Macc 15:29–31.

[29] Cf. 1 Macc 16:11. Before 152, Jericho was still in Seleucid hands as a stronghold fortified by Bacchides: 1 Macc 9:50. Cf. Schwartz 1988: 27 ff.

[30] After Judea was overrun by the Romans, the plantations became renowned far abroad. Mentions of them can be found in the writings of many ancient authors: Strabo 16.2. 41 [763]; Pliny *NH* 5.70; 12.111–117; Jos. *BJ* 1.138. 361; *AJ* 14.54; 15.96; Tac. *Hist.* 5.6.1; Iust. 36.3.1–4; cf. Applebaum 1976: 675–676.

[31] They previously belonged to the Ptolemies and Persian kings: Schwartz 1988: 26.

[32] Archaeological excavations made on the palace premises by E. Netzer helped establish that its construction was begun by John Hyrcanus (Netzer 2001a: 14 ff.). Originally, it was a small mansion, but Alexander Jannaeus greatly extended it. He enlarged the residential area and on remains of John Hyrcanus' structure he erected a heavily fortified palace (Netzer 2001a: 26 ff.). More construction work, and further extension, followed during Alexandra Salome's reign (Netzer 2001a: 30 ff.). The Hasmonean palace complex was destroyed in an earthquake in 31. On its remains, Herod built his own residence. It was destroyed during the unrest that followed his death: Jos. *BJ* 2.57. For more on the further fate and architecture of palaces of the Hasmoneans and Herod, see Netzer 2001a; Netzer 2001b: 1–10, 301–330. Scholars point to allusions in the Dead Sea Scrolls (4Q175, 4Q379, *ll.* 22–25) to the construction of this palace, see Newsom 1988: 68 ff.; Eshel 1992: 409 ff., esp. 419–420; Eshel 2008: 63–87.

[33] In response to Antiochus VII's demand (1 Macc 15:28-31) for a total payment of 1000 talents for the damage and lost income, Simon offered to pay 100 talents only for Joppa and Gadara (1 Macc 15:35). The context of his reply suggests that the sum he proposed was meant as compensation only for the tribute from those cities that the Syrian king had lost. We may presume that while Antiochus VII's claim was higher than his actual losses (this left him some room for concessions in any negotiations), Simon's offer was probably understated since the outstanding tribute was due for some several years.

again, John Hyrcanus was free to act, which enabled him to regain control over Gezer and Joppa and conclusively rid himself of Seleucid dominion (Jos. *AJ* 13.273). Josephus' account implies that the new complete freedom from Syrian supremacy brought John Hyrcanus highly favorable financial benefits. Even more gains came his way with his expansion onto Idumea and Samaria. Not only did he acquire new territories – and new subjects, presumably increasing his tax revenue – but he could also add to his personal fortune as some inhabitants fled the conquered territories, enabling him to seize their property. Not impossibly, he may have assigned some of it to new Jewish owners.[34] What seems fairly certain, however, is that, as had been the case with his predecessors, he appropriated in those lands all properties of Syrian rulers and their officials, and probably those belonging to Greek cities.[35]

Such transfer of property is preciously recorded in Caesar's 47 edict. It speaks about confirming Hyrcanus II's property rights to villages lying on the Great Plain, that is Plain of Esdraelon, which belonged to his ancestors.[36] They were most probably acquired by the Hasmoneans in the final years of John Hyrcanus, soon after his army occupied Scythopolis (Beth Shean) (Jos. *AJ* 13.280). With its fertile soil, the Plain of Esdraelon must have belonged to Syrian rulers. That Syrian kings owned land in this area is confirmed by an inscription at Hefzibah, a town near Beth Shean, in the Valley of Jezreel. Its message suggests that king Antiochus III granted Ptolemy, the son of Thraseas, the use of some of his lands located there.[37] Since the Valley of Jezreel is contiguous in the west with the Plain of Esdraelon, we may assume both these areas to have been part of a vast complex of royal estates belonging first to the Ptolemies and then to the Seleucids. To John Hyrcanus they must have been a source of considerable revenue.

Little can be said about the sources of income of the next Hasmoneans. Annexation of more territories by Aristobulus I and Alexander Jannaeus certainly helped increase the Judean rulers' personal possessions. For Alexander Jannaeus, scholars sometimes quote archaeological data and references in sources dating to a much later time which they claim point to other areas of Judea that may have been his property. However, such claims are not positively substantiated.[38] To reject them is not to say that Alexander Jannaeus discontinued his predecessors' practices aimed at increasing their wealth; it only questions the credibility of sources those scholars quote to attribute property in certain

[34] Colonization by the Hasmoneans of captured territories is confirmed by archaeological evidence: Berlin 1997: 28 ff., 31.

[35] Pastor 1997: 69 ff.

[36] Jos. *AJ* 14.207; cf. Pucci Ben Zeev 1998: 90; Udoh 2002: 130 ff. F.E. Udoh contests generally accepted identification of the Great Plain mentioned by Josephus with the Plain of Esdraelon. According to him (Udoh 2002: 134 ff.) Josephus had in mind rather the Plain of Sharon.

[37] Ptolemy was governor of the Ptolemies' possessions in Palestine. When Antiochus III waged another war on Egypt for those possessions, he went over to his side and was rewarded with land (for more on Ptolemy and his career, see Landau 1966: 66–67; Gera 1998, 29–34). The inscription consists of the text of several letters Ptolemy received from the royal chancellery in the years 199–195(?) in response to his inquiries concerning administering and management of the lands he had so gained. Since its publication in 1966, it has often been the subject of commentaries and interpretations. Its text with full relevant bibliography is given by Virgilio 2003: 286–291, no. 27.

[38] Cf. Pastor 1997: 76 ff., esp. 80 ff. Much attention to identifying the Hasmoneans' possessions was devoted by S. Applebaum (1989a: 15 ff., 22 ff., esp. 24–28), although his interpretation was criticized by other scholars.

areas to him. We know that Alexander Jannaeus, like his predecessors, imposed tribute on the population of conquered territories (Jos. *BJ* 1.89). With the Hasmoneans, it became traditional to use every opportunity to increase the family's wealth. This is confirmed by Josephus' account of a conflict between Alexander Jannaeus and Theodorus, a local ruler in Transjordan. Alexander Jannaeus made it his aim not only to occupy Theodorus' fortresses, which were strategically important for the capture of Gerasa, but also to appropriate his valuables. The treasures were kept in Amathus fortress, but Theodorus removed them before Jews overran the location. As he retreated, he inflicted heavy losses on the Judean king's forces, killing many soldiers and capturing supplies (Jos. *BJ* 1.86–87). This setback slowed down Alexander Jannaeus' impetus against Theodorus, but he never gave up on his desire and eventually seized the treasures (Jos. *BJ* 1. 104; *AJ* 13.393).

An end to expansion that followed Alexander Jannaeus' death did not have any apparent effect on Judea's finances. Alexandra Salome, his successor, despite a large build-up in the standing army and mercenary troops, possessed such large financial reserves that, for security, she deposited them in several closely guarded fortresses (Jos. *AJ* 13.417. 427. 429). This proves that the Judean rulers' revenues at the time greatly surpassed their expenditures. When Aristobulus II ascended to power, his mother's entire resources became his, enabling him to enlist mercenary soldiers (Jos. *AJ* 13.427) and later to bribe Roman officials (Jos. *BJ* 1. 128; *AJ* 14.30). Following his predecessors, Aristobulus II not only expended inherited wealth, but also tried to multiply it by looting neighboring lands.[39]

Our information on the income of Judean kings may create an impression that they considered all their revenues and acquisitions as their personal property to be left to their successors. Yet this may not be an entirely true picture. Josephus must be credited with a mention that casts a little light on the question of royal property. In his account of the ending of the first phase of the conflict between Aristobulus II and Hyrcanus II, just after Alexandra Salome died, he mentions Hyrcanus II's decision to withdraw to his private estate.[40] The historian's wording suggests that he meant an estate that was Hyrcanus II's personal property. Although incidental, the remark implies that respective members of the Hasmonean family could have their own property, the income from which was intended to satisfy their private needs.[41]

The above picture of the Hasmoneans' sources of income and their wealth is probably incomplete. Although receipts from taxes and rents on their land were the chief source of regular payments to their treasury, they cannot be said to have been the foundation of their immense wealth. The persistence with which Alexander Jannaeus strove to seize Theodorus' treasures was behavior equally typical for other members of the family. Source evidence makes it perfectly clear that plunder and looting during mili-

[39] Cf. Jos. *AJ* 14.43. Even if exaggeration is suspected in Josephus' information (*AJ* 13, 78) about the occupying Romans seizing more than 10,000 talents in various enforced payments, it still is a remarkable indication of the wealth of the Hasmonean treasury.

[40] Jos. *AJ* 14.6: αὐτὸν δὲ ζῆν ἀπραγμόνος, καρπούμενον ἀδεῶς τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν αὐτῷ κτῆσιν; cf. *AJ* 14.42.

[41] It is in this light that Hyrcanus' poverty should be seen as compared to Aristobulus II, who, in exercising full power, had the royal treasury at his disposal, cf. Jos. *AJ* 14.31.

tary campaigns was invariably practiced by the Hasmoneans, from Judah Maccabee to Aristobulus II, and brought them considerable profits.

The Hasmoneans' rapacity was severely condemned in *Pesher Habakkuk* (cf. 1QpHab viii, 8–13; ix, 4–6; xii, 9–10). Even if the criticism was not fully justified, it still confirms their attitudes toward financial questions as known from other sources. Another fact of some consequence, this greed was recognized as a betrayal of religious dictates and, together with accusations of impure descent, served as an argument to question the Hasmoneans' right to lead the nation. It is worth noting an important detail here. The same document that condemns Judean rulers' greed and blames them for a decline in religious purity does not once make an accusation of misuse of the high priest's funds, that is, misappropriation of the Temple's resources in violation of their purpose.[42] Given that other grievances are repeated in *Psalms of Salomon*, an absence of this particular accusation, combined with John Hyrcanus' attention to the priesthood's finances, may be considered a valid, affirmative sign of the Hasmoneans' honesty in matters involving the Temple.

[42] The Temple's treasury received ample sums from religious taxes. For questions about these sums and rules of their expenditure, see Safrai 1976: 879 ff.

3. Army

The army was one of those few institutions of the Hasmonean state of which relatively much is known. We owe this knowledge not so much to ample written sources as to the wealth of archaeological data. Their detailed interpretation was performed by I. Shatzman (1991), therefore here we confine ourselves to a brief outline of the Hasmonean military institutions.

John Hyrcanus' ascension to power in Judea may be considered the beginning of a new phase in the Hasmonean military because his reign saw events which led to significant changes in this field. John Hyrcanus, as the first among the Hasmoneans, introduced foreign mercenary troops to the Judean army. As we mentioned earlier, this came about most probably in connection with his participation in Antiochus VII's Parthian campaign and was necessitated by a need to safeguard his own interests in Judea while he was away. That decision, even if prompted by momentary circumstances, had a lasting effect. From then on, mercenaries became part of the Hasmoneans' armed forces, even though their presence in Judea aroused much vexation, for a number of reasons. The Judean ruler's part in the Parthian campaign afforded him insight into the working of the Seleucid army and an opportunity to gain experience in conducting a campaign away from native country and in adverse conditions. The skills and knowledge he acquired on that occasion were subsequently put to a practical use. As a prime example, his army included heavily armed infantry called *hekantomachoi*, protected by characteristic long shields covered in bronze plate (cf. Jos. *AJ* 13.339). That formation was most probably modeled after a similar one existing in the Seleucid army, which was called *chalkaspides*.[43]

Sources provide minimal information about the structure and organization of the Hasmonean army, recruitment, or terms of service. One exception is the above-mentioned remark about the *hekantomachoi*. It suggests that the heavy infantry numbered 8,000 soldiers divided into 800-strong units – and hence its name (Jos. *AJ* 13.339). Since no later mentions were made about this force existing, it should be concluded that following the battle near Asophon, when those troops were crushed, Alexander Jannaeus decided against restoring it. The mainstay of the Judean king's army always were infantry troops, although it did also include some cavalry (cf. Jos. *BJ* 1.93). The course of fighting in Samaria under John Hyrcanus, as well as Alexander Jannaeus' campaigns in Transjordan, suggests that the Judean army was capable of laying prolonged sieges, even in most adverse terrain.

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[43] Bar-Kochva 1976, 56. The *hekantomachoi* formation is confirmed to have existed in the day of Alexander Jannaeus. Its troops took part in a battle against Ptolemy IX's forces near Asophon (Jos. *AJ* 13.338–344). The battle came about in the first months of Alexander Jannaeus' reign, which excludes his credit for creating, training, and equipping the formation; its creation must therefore be attributed to John Hyrcanus.

The presence in the Hasmonean army of mercenary troops and specialized formations, its ability to operate outside its home territory and to win victories against well trained and numerous enemies are all arguments for it being a standing army.[44] Its strength is not easy to determine, especially in view of incoherent data offered by sources.[45] Some of the figures given seem to some scholars too high in relation to Judea's demographic potential at the time. The problem is that the demographic criterion as applied to Hasmonean Judea evades any attempts at verification. Another difficulty lies in divergent data about numbers engaged in the same event, related by one author in different places. Sources also betray a tendency to over- or underestimate such figures – depending on the author's sympathies. It is still worth bearing in mind that in most cases, the figures apply to emergency situations where an exceptional mobilization of forces was required. For this reason, without quite questioning the credibility of sources in this respect and considering Judea's territorial expansion under the Hasmoneans with its consequent demographics, I. Shazman's estimates may be considered plausible. In his opinion, the Hasmoneans' standing army in the period from John Hyrcanus to Alexandra Salome could number – mercenaries excluded – from 20,000 to 30,000 men on average.[46] In the same period, its strength could fluctuate, even significantly, depending on the political and military situation at a given time. Nor can we ignore the large military potential of militia. Even though Judea's rulers did not need to use it during the country's independence, it nonetheless played a major part after 63. It made up the core of the force of Aristobulus II and his sons against the Romans.

Some of the soldiers serving in the Hasmonean army probably never saw combat, since an extensive network of fortresses required the presence within the defenses of more or less numerous garrisons. Therefore, the total number of soldiers manning the forts could be quite large. Nor can it be denied, therefore, that respective campaigns necessitated additional enlistment among subjects eligible for military service. This permitted reinforcements following personnel losses sustained by units in combat.

Mercenaries made up a special group in the Hasmonean army. This category of fighting men was familiar enough in the Mediterranean, and later also in the Hellenistic world. Mercenaries were of service to Alexander the Great as well as to the rulers of great Hellenistic states, and to the heads of minor states. This being so, the presence of mercenaries in Judea would not have been anything exceptional if not for the fact that from the capture of Acra in 143, no foreign soldiers were present on Judean soil. The Hasmonean army was religiously uniform. John Hyrcanus' decision to enlist the services of foreign soldiers visibly disrupted this uniformity. It has been mentioned before what special circumstances made him take this decision. Yet with those circumstances no longer applicable, the solution, once introduced, remained in place, and the example of John Hyrcanus was followed by his successors.

The use of mercenaries was no doubt determined by their loyalty and obedience to their employer. Two exceptional instances of their loyalty are known from the reign of Alexander Jannaeus. The first was the mercenary intervention in the Temple on his orders.

[44] For a definition of a standing army in Hasmonean times, cf. Shatzman 1991: 31.

[45] a listing of all known numbers concerning the Hasmonean army, from Judah Maccabee to Alexander Jannaeus, is given by Shatzman 1991: 25–26.

[46] Cf. Shatzman 1991: 25–35.

They were ruthless in dealing with a congregation which attacked the ruler, demanding his step-down from the high priesthood. To believe Josephus, their intervention caused death to several thousand of those present (Jos. *AJ* 13.373). The second example is even more suggestive. During the civil war between Alexander Jannaeus and his religious opposition, king Demetrius III of Syria, siding with the latter, tried, before the battle of Shechem, to persuade the mercenaries in the service of the Judean king to come to his side, but his proposal met with a refusal (Jos. *BJ* 1.93; *AJ* 13.377). In the same battle, one that Alexander Jannaeus lost, all those mercenaries died as they fought to the last on his side (Jos. *BJ* 1.95; *AJ* 13.378). Both examples cast some light on the kind of tasks Judean rulers used their mercenaries for. Without a doubt, those were first strictly military tasks. The mercenaries' skill and discipline meant a great deal on the battlefield. They were usually the spearhead of the army and their bearing largely determined the outcome of a confrontation. Mercenaries' loyalty also predestined them for the role of palace guards, but the question whether the Hasmoneans' guards (cf. Jos. *BJ* 1.73. 75; *AJ* 13.307. 309) were indeed mercenaries must remain unanswered, sources providing no such information. Another, equally important task to be performed by mercenaries in Hasmonean service would be to guard royal treasures in the various strongholds in which they were located (cf. Jos. *AJ* 13.417). Besides, mercenaries could be especially valued in policing. Their effectiveness in this regard stemmed not only from loyalty to the ruler, but especially from their unemotional attitude which could affect their performance of such tasks as the above-mentioned intervention in the Temple.[47]

Now that the Hasmoneans kept mercenaries in they employ, questions beg to answered about their ethnicity, numbers, relations with the native population, if any, etc. Just as for all questions about the realities and the institutions of the Hasmonean state, our knowledge in this respect is defined by our sources. For this reason, we cannot find answers to all the questions that scholars would want to see explained. As for he numbers of mercenary troops, we only have data given by Josephus in his description of Alexander Jannaeus' and Demetrius III's forces in the battle of Shechem. These only give us a generalized impression as each of his two accounts of the battle supplies different information. According to *Bellum* (1.93), Alexander commanded 8,000 mercenaries, while the *Antiquitates* (13.378) makes it only 6,200. For other troops, differences in numbers are even greater and we can hardly guess which of the figures given is closer to the truth. We may surmise that the size of the mercenary force, as of the entire army, varied, determined not only by needs and resources available to a given ruler, but also availability of mercenary soldiers.

Enlistment of a suitable number of mercenaries could pose a serious problem if the hiring ruler was concerned not only about their professional skills, but also their ethnic background or nationality. We know that the Hasmoneans were very particular about these matters. Alexander Jannaeus hired mercenaries especially from Asia Minor,[48] per-

[47] Probably for this particular reason mercenaries might have been seen by the religious opposition as a negative symbol of the Hasmoneans' royal power, cf. Diodorus 40.2.

[48] Among the most sought-after mercenaries were inhabitants of Pisidia and Cilicia (Jos. *AJ* 13.374; Kasher 1991: 349; Shatzman 1991: 32), renowned in the Greek world for their warrior skills. Hearing them described as Greeks (cf. Jos. *AJ* 13.378) should be treated as a convenient simplification (cf. Bar-Kochva 1977: 177 n. 2), for owing to mountainous terrain, both those lands were only hellenized to a limited extent. Hellenization was advanced only in a flatland area of Cilicia which had many cities and through which a main road ran connecting Asia Minor with Syria.

haps also from the Balkans,[49] to the complete exclusion of those from Syria.[50] The same ethnic criteria were probably observed by other Hasmoneans. Those special requirements about the mercenaries' background might have stemmed not only from fears of their insufficient loyalty or obedience, but – not impossibly – also from a desire to limit potential tensions between foreign soldiers and Judeans in matters of religion and customs. It is regrettable that no information is available about such relations.[51] The only passing mention referring to them indirectly implies that mercenaries were seen by some inhabitants as a symbol of the Hasmoneans' regal power (cf. Diodorus 40.2). Yet this mention, if only for the context in which it appears, cannot by any means be considered an illustration of the actual state of affairs. Besides, mercenary troops were present in Judea for decades on end, a time span in which the local population's attitudes might have evolved. On the other hand, the absence of any information in this respect may be thought to connote the mercenaries' isolation from mainstream society. To some extent, this isolation may be explained by their deployment in areas remote from larger population centers, such as in fortresses (cf. Jos. *AJ* 13.417). Still, it does not seem likely that all foreigner soldiers should be too far away from the ruler, as this would have inhibited their usefulness in coming to his relief should an emergency arise. In any case, such a possibility is materially contradicted by the events involved in the mercenary intervention in the Temple on orders by Alexander Jannaeus which occurred before the faithful had a chance to leave the premises. The soldiers' swift response is clear proof that much of their force must have been permanently stationed in Jerusalem. The place in Hasmonean Jerusalem which could serve as mercenary barracks, while maintaining their isolation from Jewish society, might have been the *baris*.

In discussing the problem of mercenary presence in the Hasmonean service, we must mention their enlistment by Aristobulus II as he fought Alexandra Salome and Hyrcanus II for power. At the outset, he commanded no force of his own, but possessed sufficient means to recruit hastily all volunteers (regardless of nationality) to fight on his side. In this way he managed to build an army composed mainly of inhabitants of Judea's neighboring lands who answered his call in hopes of many future benefits (Jos. *AJ* 13.427; cf. *BJ* 1.117). Josephus fails to mention the numbers of mercenaries Aristobulus II managed to assemble, or what their military value was, or what role they effectively played. It seems that their role was not significant enough to merit a single word in the historian's further narrative, an impression further confirmed by the less-than-favorable

[49] This may be indicated by the nickname Thrakidas (Jos. *AJ* 13.383), given to Alexander Jannaeus by his subjects. Thracians were notorious for their cruelty. Not impossibly, Judeans might have had occasion to observe that cruelty in close contact with them, cf. Kasher 1991: 349; Shatzman 1991: 32, and n. 94. Although Jannaeus' nickname alone is weak evidence for the presence of Thracians among his, or other Hasmoneans', mercenaries, it must not be entirely ignored if only for the reason that they served in the armies of many Hellenistic rulers. One more premise may suggest Thracian presence in Judean service. One castle, Dok, is identified with a fortress called Threx (Strabo 16.2.40 [763]), a name perhaps derived from Thracian mercenaries stationed there: Tsafrir 1982: 124.

[50] Jos. *AJ* 13.374. Although Josephus says that the chief reason for this attitude was his fighting against the Syrians, the description should be treated in geographic rather than ethnic terms (cf. Bar-Kochva 1977: 177 n. 2). Dismissing them involved not just doubts about their loyalty, but also fears of strong tensions between such mercenaries and Judeans on account of long-standing mutual prejudices.

[51] B. Bar-Kochva (1977: 177 ff.) rightly observed that any opinions on this matter, based on records applying to a different historical context, are simply baseless speculations.

outcome of Aristobulus' struggle with his brother from the moment the latter obtained assistance from Aretas, the king of the Nabateans.

An important part in the Hasmoneans' efforts to have a strong and effective army and to control the territory of their own state was to expand the network of fortresses by upgrading the existing defenses and building new ones. Already Jonathan and Simon attached importance to the issue, and extant testimonies suggest that all subsequent Judean rulers, from John Hyrcanus to Alexandra Salome, continued building different kinds of fortifications.[52] As a result, the territory of the Hasmonean state was densely covered by a network of defense works with permanent garrisons. Informed by archaeological excavation results, we can now largely reproduce it. Fortresses and castles served varied functions.[53] They could be the seat of royal officials[54] or offer a refuge to local residents in times of danger.[55] All were erected in strategic locations. Some enjoyed the status of royal treasuries, as their walls housed part of the Judean rulers' financial assets,[56] or of royal residences. Probably every fortress had a commanding officer who was directly responsible to the ruler (cf. Jos. *BJ* 1.137). Incidentally, those commanders (οἱ φρουράρχοι) were the only group of commanding officers in the Hasmonean army to merit having a name all their own in sources.

Even with our limited data, the Hasmonean army can be said, for a small state, to be numerous, well organized and trained. During Judean independence, the army went through changes according to needs and tasks set before it. Such changes and their connection with the current situation are exemplified by enlistment of mercenaries or creation of the *hekatonmachoi* formation based on a Syrian model. The decision not to reconstruct this unit following the defeat at Asophon is also evidence for behavior responsive to realities of the wars the Hasmoneans were fighting. It should be borne in mind that, except for isolated episodes, this army never opposed armies of Hellenistic kings, but rather fought against those of local rulers. Their forces would certainly be less numerous, but well suited to fight in familiar territory. Since most campaigns of the Hasmoneans played out in difficult terrain, in narrow valleys or in mountains where heavy infantry or cavalry was of limited use (cf. 1 Macc 10:70–73), creating and maintaining such a formation would have generated high costs without ever translating into effective operation of the force itself.

The Hasmoneans did not concentrate solely on developing offensive military potential, although it certainly helped make their expansionist policies effective. Equal attention was devoted to defensive works, but they probably did not create a uniform

[52] For more detailed information on these fortifications and archaeological evidence regarding their chronologies, see Plöger 1955: 142 ff.; Tsafrir 1982: 120 ff.; Shatzman 1991: 36–97; Netzer 2004: 272–277. Notable among them is the unique military facility built under Alexander Jannaeus on the Dead Sea shore at Kh. Mazin. It consisted of a watchtower and a dry dock to house several patrol boats: Hirschfeld/Ariel 2005: 73–79.

[53] Tsafrir 1982: 142; Meshel 2000: 112 ff.

[54] An example of such a castle residence is the Dok fortress (1 Macc 16:15), built probably on the site of an earlier fortification by Ptolemy, the son of Abubus, governor of Jericho, cf. Tsafrir 1982: 122, 126. Archaeological works have supplied knowledge about the stronghold's outline and its water supply system: Garbrecht/Peleg 1994: 164–165; Meshel 2000: 110 ff.

[55] Cf. Shatzman 1991: 95 ff.

[56] Cf. Jos. *AJ* 13.417. Elsewhere, this particular function is clearly stated: τὰ ἐν τοῖς γαζοφυλακίοις χρήματα (*AJ* 13.429).

defense system to protect all of Judea.[57] Those mutually complementary activities deserve special emphasis. When in 63 Romans entered Judea, fortresses erected by the Hasmoneans proved useless for political reasons, but later some of them became centers of resistance against Roman domination. Herod found many of those strongholds useful, rebuilding those destroyed or greatly expanding those intact.

[57] Cf. Tsafrir 1982: 124–125; Shatzman 1991: 96–97; Berlin 1997: 41–42.

Part III: Society

1. Judean Society during Hasmonean Rule

Our knowledge about Judean society under the Hasmoneans is very limited. Little is known about its structure, relations between respective social groups, or their political and religious attitudes. Authors of sources did not devote too much attention to social issues, unless they felt it necessary to provide a brief outline as a backdrop of events they were describing. This being so, a generalized description of Judean society in the Hasmonean period must be based on the few mentions in sources and on conclusions drawn from interpreting archaeological evidence. Any attempts to use for this purpose information dating from a later period must be considered doomed to fail since such information applies to different political and social realities.

Social realities in Judea and Jerusalem after 63, especially during Herod's reign, had changed since Hasmonean times, largely due to the political and social structure of the Hasmonean state having been upset by Pompey and Gabinius,[1] to constant Roman presence in Judea, and to political changes introduced by Herod. Those transformations went side by side with entirely new occurrences in religious life. With all those elements of the new reality, our knowledge about Judean society at the time is of little help in answering questions about the preceding period.

It should be stressed that Judeans' social attitudes in the Hasmonean period were formed by an awareness of having their own nation state which was governed by a native dynasty. Even if satisfaction with the Hasmonean governance was not always widespread, the memory of their ancestors' struggle for Judea's political and religious freedom was not without effect on attitudes in at least some groups of society. Another factor affecting popular attitudes was the outcomes of the policies the dynasty implemented. As a result of the Hasmoneans' conquests, not only were the state's boundaries enlarged, but tangible economic benefits were shared by the entire Judean society. That this was indeed the case is confirmed on the one hand by absence of information about any major social upheavals that might suggest widespread discontent with adverse living conditions, and on the other by the massive support Aristobulus II and his sons received from the rural population in their struggle against the Romans.

The reign of John Hyrcanus was an important watershed in Judea's political history as well as in its social history. The territorial expansion begun by him and eagerly con-

[1] In discussing their political shifts and administrative reforms, scholars often overlook the fact that their decisions to cut off from Judea the lands conquered by the Hasmoneans caused large Jewish populations living there to be isolated from their country: this included local elites associated with the Hasmoneans.

tinued by his successors caused a rapid and significant territorial growth of the state and increase in the number of subjects. While the scale of the growth evades any estimates, it must have been fairly large, even if parts of the conquered populations left their native lands preferring not to submit to Judaization.[2] Those who accepted the new situation without too much reluctance – they included in particular local elites – were allowed to retain their possessions and social status.[3] Those who refused had their property confiscated. The Hasmoneans could seize such confiscated property for their personal possessions, assign it to officials, or possibly divide it into allotments for colonists.[4] As a usual practice, the ruler took hold of large estates since use of stretches of agricultural land in one piece was more profitable, while less attractive real estate was donated as a reward for veterans or used to settle colonists.[5] Although no clear-cut evidence is available in sources that the Hasmoneans followed this practice, it can be indirectly inferred from information about large clusters of Jewish inhabitants existing in some parts of captured areas.[6]

In the Hasmonean period, by far the greatest part of the Judean population was rural.[7] Such population structure was determined on the one hand by Judean cities being few, and on the other by rulers' policies toward cities, and especially toward Greek *poleis.* As a drastic example of this policy, many captured Greek cities were destroyed in Idumea, Samaria, and Transjordan. Those cities that had evaded this tragic fate lost their charters and did not play any greater role under the Hasmoneans, either politically or even economically, even if they continued to be inhabited by some of the original population. One exception was Jerusalem: it developed considerably to become the major center of urban life in all of Judea. Even though it served a crucial role in political and religious life, under Hasmonean rule it never obtained the legal status of a city. This, however, did not greatly affect its urban growth. The symbol and outward sign of its urban status was that it possessed defensive walls which meant security to its inhabitants and announced the independence of the rulers residing within them.

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[2] Among the better-known examples of such behavior of local populations is the immigration to Egypt by a number of Idumean inhabitants, see Pastor 1997: 69–70.

[3] The role and importance of members of such local elites is highlighted by the political career of Antipater and his sons: Jos. *BJ* 1.123; cf. *AJ* 14.9–10.

[4] Cf. Pastor 1997: 70 ff., 73.

[5] Pastor 1997: 69 ff. Organized colonization of conquered territories helped not only to secure areas of special strategic importance, but also to solve the frequent rural problem of overpopulation and shortage of arable land. Some scholars believe that it was this social-economic aspect that mattered most in Hasmonean colonization: Bar-Kochva 1977: 173 ff.

[6] Pastor 1997, 70, 74 f., 78 f., 81–82. Such clusters are known to have existed around Jamnia (Strabo 16.2.28 [759]), Galilee (cf. Jos. *BJ* 2.576; 3.41–43; *Vita* 235) and in Samaria (cf. Jos. *AJ* 13.275; Pastor 1997: 70). No evidence is available on the presence in Galilee, before Alexander Jannaeus' reign, of a larger Jewish population; we may therefore presume that it appeared there as part of an organized settlement plan, see Bar-Kochva 1977: 174 f., 191–194.

[7] All statements about the social and economic situation in rural Judea in the Hasmonean period are more presumptions and speculations (cf. Bar-Kochva 1977: 169 ff.), than known facts, see Pastor 1997: 70. Rural life in the ancient Mediterranean world inevitably included slavery. However, in Judean farming slaves played a much lesser role than elsewhere, see Stern 1976: 624 ff. For the Hasmonean period, no evidence exists to throw more light on slavery, other than that it existed in Judea.

Jerusalem's capacity as the nation's capital largely helped shape its social and political outlook.[8] Mentions concerning Jerusalem's inhabitants *vis-ŕ-vis* tensions and conflicts occurring in the city suggest not only their active participation in related events, but also their great influence on such events. To cite an example, there was an incident in the Temple in which Alexander Jannaeus, in his priestly duties, was pelted with citrons by the assembled faithful (Jos. *BJ* 1.88–89; *AJ* 13.372–373). Although such behavior was customary, the accompanying hostile shouts caused him to respond violently. His response sparked a lasting and bloody conflict. Despite the presence in the Temple of many pilgrims on that occasion, the contribution of Jerusalem inhabitants to this event raises little doubt, because even earlier they displayed ostentatious resentment to Alexander Jannaeus, a fact that caused tensions in mutual relations persisting for most of his reign (cf. Jos. *BJ* 1.92. 94; *AJ* 13.376). We also know about Jerusalem inhabitants' involvement in political events at the time Hyrcanus II was fighting against Aristobulus II. An account by Josephus suggests that their sympathies were heavily on the side of Hyrcanus II. They joined his immediate entourage and the Romans to combat supporters of Aristobulus (cf. Jos. *BJ* 1.142–143. 150; *AJ* 14. 20. 22–24. 58–59. 70). Such political sympathies in Jerusalem become understandable when viewed in the light of the religious attitudes of the parties involved. It is clear that Aristobulus II's party was composed of Sadducees and their supporters, while Hyrcanus II was supported by the Pharisees. The fact that most of the city's population sided with Hyrcanus is evidence that they were under strong influence from the Pharisees. No arguments with sufficiently convincing force are available to conclude that the large part of the religious, intellectual, and political elite living in Jerusalem and connected with the Temple sympathized with the Sadducees only. It is only natural to assume the existence within those elites of varied religious attitudes and deep political divisions. Sufficient premises exist to indicate that the religious and political elite, whether Jerusalem-based or living out of town, exhibited marked religious differences. Such disagreement most probably goes back to the time of John Hyrcanus, a consequence of his conflict with the Pharisees. A further rift must have come when Alexander Jannaeus and Alexandra Salome were on the throne. It was during their reigns that a dependence was formed between the political attitudes of the higher social strata and their religious sympathies.

The composition of higher social strata of Hasmonean Judea seems to have been quite varied. Apart from old aristocratic priestly and secular families, there appeared new groups: representatives of social elites of conquered lands whose readiness to cooperate with the Hasmoneans secured them high positions in their service, and high-ranking military leaders. The latter group is singled out here due to the role it played at the side of John Hyrcanus and Alexander Jannaeus since we do not know the rules of social advancement and military careers in effect at the time. It is highly probable that some among the senior military might have descended from old aristocratic families. From among the assuredly large body of the Hasmoneans' senior commanders, only a handful

[8] Z. Safrai's interesting remarks (1996: 65 ff.) on Jerusalem's elite and on the origins of its members refer to a much later period. Nonetheless, some of them may, with much confidence, also apply to the Hasmonean period, also cf. Stern 1976: 580 ff. Equally interesting, in search for mechanisms at play at the time that formed the social makeup of the city and its religious atmosphere, are the findings of A.I. Baumgarten (1996: 50 ff., esp. 58 ff.).

are known to us by name: Diogenes, who was presumably one of Alexander Jannaeus' generals and was responsible for penal measures against the defeated Pharisees (Jos. *BJ* 1.113; *AJ* 13.410); Peitholaos, who served under Hyrcanus II and the Romans and first fought the rebel forces of Alexander, son of Aristobulus II, and then switched sides joining Aristobulus II when the latter started another round of insurgent fighting against the Romans and Hyrcanus II (Jos. *BJ* 1.162; *AJ* 14.84; *BJ* 1.172), and Malichos, who was in the service of Hyrcanus II (Jos. *BJ* 1.162; *AJ* 14.84).

Aristocracy made up a distinct social group which Josephus describes by various names.[9] In the light of his account, it appears as a fairly varied community, not only in terms of financial status, but in members' political and religious attitudes. The latter became clearly manifest when Hyrcanus II and Aristobulus II were fighting for the throne, each having an aristocratic party form around him. It seems nonetheless that not all members of aristocracy, or generally higher social strata, wanted to take part in the confrontation or to side unequivocally with one claimant. Therefore, in some situations they could be coerced to do so[10] or pressured by intense canvassing (cf. Jos. *AJ* 14.11). It would be difficult to decide whether such methods of persuasion were equally applied to members of old aristocratic families and local elites, or just the latter as being more dependent on the ruler's good graces.

No information has survived to offer closer insight into the financial status of groups placed high in Judea's social hierarchy or what their sources of income might have been. Random mentions suggest that at least some secular aristocrats possessed large financial assets.[11] We are left to pure speculation as to whether their possessions came from income from their offices in the Hasmonean service or from land obtained by individual grants, or from rent on family estates. Priestly aristocracy drew their wealth from rent from farm land and from the population's contributions which increased from the time of John Hyrcanus.[12]

A discussion of higher social strata in Hasmonean-period Judea invites considering the rivalry between the Sadducees and the Pharisees. Although we are hard put to decide when this rivalry began, one thing seems certain: its most spectacular phase came during the reign of Alexandra Salome. A long-repeated picture of the conflict emphasizes differences between both parties in religious matters, largely ignoring their social outlook. Josephus suggests that the Sadducees stood for conservative, wealthy religious and secular aristocracy, while the Pharisees represented a different style of religious

[9] For aristocracy, he uses the following descriptions: *dynatoi* (*AJ* 13.411; cf. 13.424), *dynastai* (*AJ* 14.11), *dokimotatoi* (*AJ* 14.43), *aristoi* (*BJ* 1.169). The multiple terms, used inconsistently, render it impossible to determine whether each referred to a closely defined group or their usage was simply guided by purely literary considerations.

[10] The best-known example of such support is the participation of more than a thousand representatives of the higher social strata during Hyrcanus II's appearance before Pompey in Damascus. Whether their presence there was entirely voluntary is debatable, cf. Jos. *AJ* 14.43: συνηγόρουν δὲ αὐτῷ ταὐτα λέγοντι πλείους ἢ χίλιοι τῶν δοκιμωτάτων Ἰουδαίων Ἀντιπάτρου παρασκευάσαντος. [*In making these accusations he was supported by more than a thousand of the most reputable Jews, whom Antipater had provided for that purpose.*] (tr. R. Marcus).

[11] Evidence of this is the size of the financial support they gave to Aristobulus II when he began his fight against Alexandra Salome, cf. Jos. *AJ* 13. 425. 427.

[12] Bar-Kochva 1977: 187 ff. An example of such priestly properties were the Hasmoneans' family estates near Modein, cf. 1 Macc 2:1; Schwartz 1993: 307.

thought and action, which brought them closer to lower social orders and helped them realize better what were the common people's expectations.[13] This need by no means imply that the Pharisees themselves were of humble origins.

Although Josephus devoted much space to the conflict between the Pharisees and the Sadducees, his characteristics of both groups do not go beyond the commonplace. On close scrutiny, what little information is available appears to imply that, in the social dimension, the differences between both parties were far smaller than has been made of them so far. Mentions concerning figures in the Sadducean circle make it thoroughly clear that their senior civilian and military positions made them members of a social elite. At the same time, Josephus' narrative offers no evidence that, compared to them, the Pharisees were far below in social hierarchies as they were advisors to John Hyrcanus up until the point they questioned the legality of his high priesthood. When Alexandra Salome was regnant, with her consent the Pharisees overran most public offices and were only prevented from holding military commands because the queen insisted on keeping to herself the control over the armed forces. Nor is it equitable to surmise that the piety Alexandra Salome so appreciated in the Pharisees was the only quality to predestine them to perform the state's highest offices, usually earmarked for members of the higher social strata who possessed some experience and qualifications, in addition to proper descent. It can therefore be said that both the Sadducees and the Pharisees came from environments that made up the religious and political elite of Judea. Based on Josephus' account, the Pharisees can be characterized as a group, on the one hand, highly principled *vis-ŕ-vis* its rivals, and on the other, quite flexible and ready for compromise in ideological questions. With such attitudes, they could have no compunction about having a hand in governing the state at the side of a queen who belonged to the same dynasty as John Hyrcanus and Alexander Jannaeus, against whom they had long fought a civil war.

The peculiar milieu around the Temple and religious life was made up of scribes. Recently published studies have cast much light on their place in society and their role in historical events. It is their role in society and the state, a role far exceeding religious questions, that justifies isolating them as a distinct social group. In the social hierarchy, scribes must be placed between the people and the aristocracy, although the real position of each of them depended on whom they were serving.[14]

The least information we get is about the lowest social orders, the common people of Judea. While they constituted a major force in the rebellion against the Hellenistic religious reform, under Hasmonean rule their share in political life was minimal. Source evidence to confirm active participation of rural populations in larger events in Judea only concerns the period of struggles between Aristobulus II and Hyrcanus II, and especially that phase in the conflict which also involved Romans.[15] It may even be felt that, at that juncture, the mobilization of Judeans equaled that they had showed when they rose against the Seleucids in defense of their Temple. It is worth noting that, so much as Hyrcanus II's and Antipater's first attempt to prevent the rural population from joining in for Aristobulus II against Romans was successful, its effects proved short-lived. Another

[13] Jos. *AJ* 13.298; cf. *BJ* 2.162–166; Bar-Kochva 1977: 191; Schiffman 1993, 285 ff.; Rooke 2000: 311.
[14] Cf. Jos. *BJ* 1.479; Schams 1998: 135.
[15] Questions concerning this population as taking part in the fighting are discussed further below.

anti-Roman stand by Alexander, the son of Aristobulus II, in no small part due to overwhelming support from the Judean population, briefly curtailed Hyrcanus II's power over much of the country. Such a course of events leads to some conclusions. We may suppose with much probability that the memory of the struggle against the Seleucids led by Judah Maccabee and his brothers survived among the country population precisely because that segment of the population provided soldiers for their units, and their battles were fought mainly in rural areas. Such support lent by the rural population to Aristobulus II and his sons is testimony to the common faithfulness to the Hasmoneans and to the survival of their legend. No impact by the Pharisees or any other religious group opposed to the Hasmoneans could persuade the general population of Judea to turn their backs on the ruling family, or at least on those of its members who remained faithful to their ancestors' ideals. A betrayal of those ideals led to the undoing of Hyrcanus II's standing with inhabitants of villages. His collaboration with the Romans, and the active part Hyrcanus II's troops played in pacifying rural settlements after each insurrectionist attempt, helped erode his authority even further. It can be taken for granted that Judea's rural population, both then and much later, played a far greater role than texts on the Hasmonean period would imply.

2. The Hasmoneans and their Critics

The Hasmoneans, with their political and religious status, were often the subject of criticism by those demanding that they step down from some of their titles. Some texts composed in the second half of the 2nd century and first half of the 1st century BCE are thought to be critical toward the Hasmoneans, and for this reason it is worth presenting them here, if only as a brief review, what was the substance of the criticism and the form in which it was expressed.

At the core of all anti-Hasmonean attitudes was opposition to the vastness of power they combined in their hands. The Pharisees were the first to venture to voice publicly their opinion on the matter. Their criticism, though veiled (the ostensible pretext given for suggestions that John Hyrcanus submit a resignation from high priesthood were rumors of his impure lineage), proved pregnant with consequences. First, a crisis ensued in relations between the ruler and the Pharisees, as a result of which they lost their influence, and soon afterward, under Alexander Jannaeus, the crisis escalated into a full-scale conflict. Criticism so expressed proved ineffectual, what with the lack of any desired outcome and with repressions they suffered. The behavior of the Pharisees after Alexander Jannaeus' death also implies that, despite their declared anti-Hasmonean attitudes, they were willing to collaborate with them under certain circumstances. Although at Alexandra Salome's side they played the first fiddle in her internal policy making, they did not attempt to change the state's political system, and even tolerated what they had previously condemned. This being so, the Pharisees' opponents had a right to consider their previous, Hasmonean-critical attitudes as insincere and opportunistic.[16]

It is believed to be a clear sign of resistance to the order instituted after the Hasmoneans rose to power that messianic concepts started appearing in various religious texts composed in Judea from the second half of the 2nd century BCE onward.[17] Although this new trend in Jewish religious thought pointed to the future, we have reasons to believe that it was largely influenced by contemporary realities. Its criticism of current political events was skillfully veiled in theological discussions and visions of a new world order that would be free from all the undesirable religious, social, and political developments

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[16] The strongly adverse feeling of the Qumran community for the Pharisees is reflected in the name they used in the Dead Sea Scrolls: "the Seekers-After-Smooth-Things," p.ex. *Pesher Nahum* (4Q169), frg. 3–4, col. 1: *ll.* 2, 7; col. 2: *ll.* 2, 4; col. 3: *ll.* 3, 6–7. Cf. Schiffman 1993: 274 ff.; Ilan 2001: 58 ff., 65 ff.

[17] On the understanding of the messianic concept and related notions as occurring in the Dead Sea Scrolls, see Talmon 1986: 214-24; Collins 1987: 101 ff., 104 f.; Charlesworth 1992: 24 ff.; Garcia Martinez 1995b: 160 f.; Collins 2006b: 71 ff., esp. 75–76. The works cited were selected from vast literature on the messianic themes contained in the Qumran texts. A successful attempt at their orderly presentation is contained in studies published in: H. Charlesworth, H. Lichteberger & G.S. Oegema (eds.), *Qumran-Messianism. Studies on the Messianic Expectations in the Dead Sea Scrolls*, Tübingen 1998 (there also a bibliography up to 1998: 204–214). For more general observations on the concept of the messiah and messianism in Judaism see Talmon 1986: 203 ff.; Collins 1987: 97 ff.; Charlesworth 1992: 3 f., 13 ff.; Talmon 1992: 79 ff.

the authors of such writings could observe. This new order was to result from an intervention by special eschatological, divine messengers called messiahs.[18] One strain of messianism saw hope for change in the coming of a royal messiah who would restore the Davidic monarchy. Theologically, the idea was grounded in God's promises, found in various books of the Bible, of eternal rule of the house of David over Israel[19] and perceptions, through imagery preserved in biblical tradition, of this king, despite his various human weaknesses, as an ideal ruler, a personification of Israel's might founded on its covenant with God.[20] An analysis of Jewish literary works composed after the period of exile confirms that there might have been a connection between the Hasmoneans rising to power and the appearance of messianic expectations. Namely, hopes for a restoration of the Davidic monarchy are absent from Jewish literature until a new political order was established in Judea under Hasmonean rule.[21]

The expectation for David's monarchy to be restored by a royal messiah is further reflected in at least over a dozen texts in the Dead Sea Scrolls, most of which are considered among the principal doctrinal documents of the Qumran community. Their number includes the *Damascus Document* (CD), the *Rule of Community* (1QS), and the *Rule of Congregation* (1QSa).[22] The figure of the royal messiah is concealed under various designations: the "Prince" or the "Prince of the Congregation," the "Branch of David," the "Scepter". Apart from these, an eschatological sense is occasionally contextually discernible in other, less common descriptions.[23] The Qumran texts feature one more eschatological figure, a priestly messiah.[24] The chronology of texts containing references to both messianic figures is difficult to establish as the dating of respective documents and their subsequent redactions still remains the subject of scholarly dispute.

[18] The term messiah which appears in a variety of Jewish texts does not always refer to eschatological figures: Schiffman 1992: 116 ff.; Collins 1995: 11 ff.; Tromp 2001: 179–180; Atkinson 2004: 144 ff.

[19] Cf. Num 24:17; 2 Sam 7:11–17; Isa 11:1–9; Jer 23:5-8; 30:9; 33:14–22; Ezek 17: 22–24; 34: 23–24; 37:15–28. See Talmon 1986: 209 ff.; Hanson 1992: 67 ff.; Roberts 1992: 39 ff., esp. 44–50; Talmon 1992: 84 ff.; Collins 1995: 22 ff.; Pomykala 1995; Schniedewind 1999a; Collins 2006b: 76 ff.

[20] Tromp 2001: 199 f. See also Laato 1997: 68 ff., 81 ff.

[21] See Liver 1959: 179; Davenport 1980: 86; Collins 1987: 98 ff.; Collins 1995: 40, 49, 51 ff., 56, 94 f., 167, 195; Stegemann 1996: 503 ff.; Steudel 1996: 524; Laato 1997: 279, 285; Collins 2006b: 78 ff. Tromp (2001: 182 ff.) looks for the origin of the idea of Davidic restoration in the 2nd–1st century BCE in a combination of factors among which, however, he does not list the rise of anti-Hasmonean opposition, but only a longing for an ideal, eschatological king: Tromp 2001: 182, 187 ff., 201. Yet it is only natural to note that such longing usually stemmed from a sense of injustice. The chronology of messianic texts in the Dead Sea Scrolls suggests that most them were strictly inspired by the Qumran community's internal developments. Some of them contain references to the contemporary situation in the Temple: Oegema 1998a: 89 f., 97 ff.; Oegema 1998b: 56 f., 63 ff. Based on an interpretation of Qumran texts, Stegemann (1996) and Steudel (1996), recognizing the Qumran community and Jonathan as parties in the dispute known as the conflict between the Teacher of Righteousness and the Wicked Priest, proposed the hypothesis that in the preceding period the messianic expectations in the community did not involve any specific messiah. The hypothesis was criticized by Puech 1999: 549 f.

[22] a list of documents containing mentions of a royal messiah is given by VanderKam 1994: 212–219; Collins 1995: 56 ff.; Abegg 1995: 143 and n. 64; Oegema 1998b: 57 ff.; Evans 2000: 135 ff.

[23] See Knibb 1995: 167 ff.; García Martínez 1995b: 161–170; García Martínez 1996: 19–40 (= García Martínez 2007b: 16–32); Laato 1997: 294 ff.; Abegg/Evans 1998: 191 ff.; Evans 2000: 136.

[24] VanderKam 1994: 220–233; García Martínez 1995b: 170 ff.; Collins 1995: 74 ff.; Atkinson 2004: 146–149; Collins 2006b: 81–77. See also Oegema 1998a: 89–97.

The principal difficulty lies in the absence in many of those texts of clear chronological indications.[25]

An important example of messianic expectations for a restoration of Davidic monarchy are *Psalms* 17 and 18 in the 1st century BCE collection of *Psalms of Solomon*.[26] The set was probably composed in a religious circle equally hostile to the Hasmoneans (*PssSol* 8;17:5–7.20.22.33)[27] and to the entire priestly establishment centered on the Temple (*PssSol* 2:3–5; 8:7–13). It was on the rulers and priests – for their many sins and transgressions against God – that the author places blame for the Roman invasion of Judea and the misfortunes suffered by its inhabitants because of that.[28] The figure who personifies messianic expectations in *Psalm 17* is a divine messenger descended from the house of David,[29] on whose appearance usurpers occupying the throne will be deposed.[30] The messenger will have qualities to make him God's tool to purify the people of Israel of its wicked ways, to deliver it from foreign rule, and to establish a new order in the entire world.[31]

The eschatological future of Israel as depicted in Jewish literature of the Hasmonean period has two facets: one is a vision of independent rule by the messiah-king, the other is a rule of two cooperating messiahs: a priest and a king, the earlier clearly predominating. One of the earliest texts to convey the concept of separation of the priestly function and royal rule, with a superior status of the priest, is the *Book of Jubilees* (or the *Jubilees*).[32] Likewise eschatological in tone are passages referring to

[25] Despite such difficulties, scholars have presented many different hypotheses concerning the developmental phases of Qumran's messianism and their chronological relationships, cf. Stegemann 1996: 501 ff.; Laato 1997: 290 ff. However, none of them won general approval. A new attempt at ordering messianic texts from Qumran using a critical historical analysis that considered the making of the texts (its sequence of editions) was presented by Oegema (1998a: 88 ff.; 1998b, 55 ff.).

[26] Wise 1990c: 16 f.; Knibb 1995: 166; Winninge 1995: 12 ff.; Laato 1997: 279 ff.; Atkinson 2004: 4–7, 84 ff., 206 ff.

[27] Winninge 1995: 171 ff.; Atkinson 2004: 133, 149 ff.

[28] Some scholars suppose the author of these psalms might have come from a circle similar to the Qumran community, though differing in its theology: Winninge 1995: 14ff.; Atkinson 2004: 2–3, 7–8, 36–53, 64–84, 86–87. M. Winninge (1995: 141 ff., 170 ff., esp. 180) supports the oft-repeated hypothesis that the psalms were composed in the Pharisee circle. Yet he does not rule out their author also being influenced by the *hasidim* community: (...) *I suggest that the PssSol are the ultimate link between the Chasidim and the Pharisees* (180).

[29] *PssSol* 17:21: καὶ ἀνάστησον αὐτοῖς τὸν βασλέα αὐτῶν υἱὸν Δαυιδ. Elsewhere in the same psalm, the author speaks of him outright as of a divine messenger: *PssSol* 17:32: καὶ βασιλεὺς αὐτῶν χριστὸς κυρίου (Rahlfs). The correct form of the last two words causes some controversy among scholars as to whether it should be in the nominative, as Greek manuscripts cite them, or, according to the rules of the language, in the genitive case (so reconstructed by A. Rahlfs in his edition of the *Septuagint*), cf. Knibb 1995: 170; Laato 1997: 283–284; Atkinson 2004: 131 n. 2 (lists detailed bibliography of the dispute). Their translations also vary. In older literature, a more generalized form became popular: "anointed of the Lord" (cf. Davenport 1980: 78 f., 91 n. 34). Atkinson (2004: 131) translates the expression as "the Lord's Messiah"; see *id*., pp. 139 ff.

[30] *PssSol*. 17:6; Atkinson 2004: 139. Arguments offered by Tromp (1993: 345 f., 350, 360–361) against the anti-Hasmonean message in this psalm are not convincing, nor are his suggestions about the time of its writing.

[31] Davenport 1980: 71–83; Tromp 1993: 358–359; Knibb 1995: 166 ff.; Atkinson 2004: 139 ff., 149–151.

[32] Jub 31; Liver 1959: 178 f.; Collins 1995: 84 ff.; Laato 1997: 273 ff. Cf. also Jer 33:17–18; Sir 45:24–25; Schniedewind 1999b: 527 f. On hypotheses about the book's time of writing and its character, cf. VanderKam 1997: 19–20; VanderKam 1999b: 511–518. For more on the concept of a diarchic system of government and its origin, see Goodblatt 1994: 57–76, esp. 73 ff.

royal and priestly powers contained in the *Testament of Levi* (Test Levi 18:1–14) and the *Testament of Judah* (Test Judah 21:1–5), as preserved in the Greek book *Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs*.[33] Some scholars believe this collection to be some of the best evidence for the existence in Judaism of the concept of two messiahs (also known from the Qumran texts): the *Testament of Levi* presents the messiah-priest, the *Testament of Judah*, the messiah-king.[34] However, interpreting the concept in the light of the entire *Testaments* is not easy. While of Jewish origin, the collection contains an accumulation of many later additions, especially Christian, which obscure the original version and the time of its writing, thereby preventing scrutiny of the roots of the concept.[35] Still, what matters in it is a recognition of the superiority of the eschatological priest over the messiah-king.[36]

Some Dead Sea Scrolls, written, it seems, mostly in the first half of the 1st century BCE,[37] similarly picture the figure of the messiah-priest, described as the messiah of Aaron, mentioned together with the messiah-king, referred to as the messiah of Israel.[38] Passages where the messiah-priest appears clearly imply that with his status and rank he

[33] Owing to its wealth and variety of concepts, not only messianic ones, the *Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs* have attracted the interest of many scholars for more than a decade, see Oegema 1998a: 73–74, n. 1 (bibliography).

[34] Liver 1959: 168–174, 178; HultgÍrd 1980: 95–105; Collins 1995: 85 ff.; Oegema 1998a: 75–81. According to M.G. Abegg (1995: 144), the concept of two messiahs is parallel to that known from Qumran. Fully lacking in conviction is A. HultgÍrd's hypothesis (1980: 106–107) about the picture of a messiah-priest being influenced by the same ideas which helped shape the ideology of the Hellenistic-Roman cult of the ruler.

[35] Liver 1959: 163 ff.; Knibb 1995: 181 ff.; Collins 1995: 89 ff.; Oegema 1998a: 73 ff., and n. 2–5. The *Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs* as we know them probably acquired this form in the 2nd century CE (cf. Oegema 1998a: 75). The earliest parts of the collection are dated to the 2nd century BCE, cf. Oegema 1998a: 76 ff.

[36] Liver 1959: 178.

[37] Cf. Oegema 1998a: 90 ff.

[38] These figures appear together in the *Damascus Document* (CD), the *Community Rule* (1QS), and the *Rule of the Congregation* (1QSa), and the phrase in which they are introduced is: *mĕšîh[e] 'ahărôn weyiśrâ'çl*. Ever since the documents were first published, the correct form of the phrase, and thus its understanding, has been hotly disputed by scholars. At first it was thought that the name applies to only one figure (cf. e.g., Silberman 1955: 77 ff., esp. 80–82; La Sor 1956: 425 ff., esp. 427, 429; Laurin 1963: 38 ff., esp. 52). Only later did the view become popular that the term refers to two different figures, see e.g., Talmon 1986: 219–220; Talmon 1987: 122 ff.; Schiffman 1992: 119–120 (only in the *Community Rule*); Talmon 1992: 104 ff.; VanderKam 1994: 211, 220 ff., esp. 234; Collins 1995: 74 ff.; Cross 1996: 2 ff.; Laato 1997: 288–289. At present, scholarly opinions about interpreting this phrase are divided, cf. Abegg 1995: 125 ff. esp. 143–144 (at 144: *The title in CD, "messiahs of Aaron and Israel", reveals at the very least a dual nature.*); Charlesworth 1998: 120 ff.; Wacholder 2007: 214: *The plural refers to those that have been sanctified with oil, set apart for a particular task within historical Israel, whereas the singular pertains to the anticipated Messiah of the future*). The division was reinforced by publication of all Dead Sea Scrolls, which helped strengthen some scholars' conviction about understanding the quoted phrase as referring to two separate figures: Garcia Martinez 1995b: 177 ff.; Garcia Martinez 1996: 18 (= Garcia Martinez 2007b: 15–16); Lichtenberger 1998: 9 ff.; Schniedewind 1999b: 529–544; Evans 2000: 141 ff. Often raised in the dispute is the question of the time of writing of respective documents and possible evolution in the authors' views which would explain the two messiahs not being present in all texts. For this reason, some scholars show restraint in approving the concept of two messiahs with reference to the *Damascus Document* (CD 12:23–24; 14:19; 19:10–11; 20:1; Laurin 1963: 49 ff.; Brooke 1991: 221 ff., 229–230; Schiffman 1992: 118 f.; Wacholder 2007: 214) or the *Community Rule* (1QS, 4QS) (Charlesworth 1998: 122–133). A broader presentation of views on the matter is given by Schniedewind 1999b: 523–524 and n. 4 (bibliographical references).

is definitely superior to his royal partner.[39] Such a dominant role of the priest should be understood not solely in terms close to the Qumran community's ideology, or to those of the author of the *Psalms of Solomon*. The picture painted in some texts of betrayal of forms of worship in the Temple as dictated by the law and tradition are an undisguised accusation against specific, if unnamed, high priests responsible for corruption appearing and being tolerated. Without a doubt, therefore, they, too, can be considered an expression of discontent with how the highest priestly office was executed by the Hasmoneans.[40]

The above review of salient elements in the messianic concepts expressed in Jewish texts written in the 2nd and especially the 1st centuries BCE goes to substantiate the hypothesis that a certain relationship existed between the appearance of messianic expectations and the political realities of the Hasmonean era. This is not to say, however, that all such concepts appearing should be seen as expressing opposition to their rule, because some of these messianic writings contain no reference to contemporary rulers of Judea. They must have been created at that stage in the development of messianic literature when authors no longer sought direct inspiration for their visions in the realities that surrounded them. Any criticism of the Hasmoneans that may be found in the mentioned examples of messianic ideas only rarely addresses forthright the negative effects on Judea's religious and social life of the system of power they created. Instead, the authors tend to focus on ways of undoing that system. Even though messianic writings cite examples of corruption by Judean rulers, no calls are made for civil disobedience or rebellion. This absence may mean acceptance of the existing state of affairs until divine messengers appear: until the messiah-king rebuilds the Davidic monarchy and the messiah-priest returns religious life to much-needed purity.[41] In this way, the people will be restored to former harmony with God, marking the beginning of an awaited eschatological era.[42]

Arguments in favor of anti-Hasmonean attitudes and the religious opposition to their rule are found in a unique document. It is the *Temple Scroll* (11QTemple = 11Q19), discovered in Cave 11.[43] An exceptional text, it was intended by its author (or authors) to be a new Torah, a New Covenant to supersede Mosaic Law. The document contains detailed regulations concerning the calendar, religious life, and political system.[44] The last-named are grouped separately and make up *Statutes of the King*, also called the *Law of the King* (11Q19, LVI:12– LIX:21). They contain a number of provisions detailing the

[39] Schiffman 1992: 121 (ad 1QSa); Collins 2006b: 87 ff.

[40] Collins 1995: 95; Oegema 1998a: 97–102; Oegema 1998b: 63 ff.

[41] At least a few Dead Sea texts contain mentions concerning one more eschatological figure, a prophet who was to play an important role in events at the end of history (see esp. 1QS 9:11). A close study of those mentions has led scholars to conclude that the prophet is to be Moses, see Philonenko 1992: 97–98; Sisti 1994: 69 ff.; García Martínez 1995a: 186–187; García Martínez 1996: 30 ff. (= García Martínez 2007b: 24 ff.); Laato 1997: 308; Lichtenberger 1998: 10; Evans 2000: 143 ff.; Bowley 1999: 354 ff., esp. 366 ff.

[42] Cf. Evans 2000: 138.

[43] The *editio princeps* (1977) of this scroll was by Y. Yadin. Fragments of this document identified later were the subject of separate publications (cf. García Martínez 1999: 431–435; Elledge 2004: 5–13). For the present state of knowledge on the *Temple Scroll* (with essential bibliography), see White Crawford 2000.

[44] For the contents of the *Temple Scroll* and its constituent parts, see White Crawford 2000: 29, 33–62.

king's status, rights, and obligations.[45] Because of those provisions, the *Statutes* could be compared to the political treatises popular in the hellenistic world and usually titled περὶ βασιλείας ('On Kingship'), which offered discussions on the nature and exercise of royal power. Such tracts were intended as guidebooks for kings, offering good advice on how to rule to benefit the state and the people.[46] But other than this superficial similarity, the *Statutes of the King* have little in common with their Greek counterparts. Formally, they address the same issue, but ideologically they represent an altogether different system of concepts and values.[47] Greek treatises were usually composed by philosophers who built their concept of royal power on a foundation of the philosophical system they preached. For the *Statutes*, such a foundation is provided by prescriptions concerning royal power contained in Deuteronomy (17:14–20). Although the author of the *Statutes* used the relevant biblical passages as a model, he did not just copy them but comprehensively expanded scriptural text to include many ideas from other books of the Bible. In this way, the *Statutes* acquired a more explicitly ideological character.[48]

The central issue being debated concerning the *Temple Scroll* is the dating of its final compilation as well as its respective parts, for it has been demonstrated beyond any doubt that it is not the work of a single writer. Its present form is the result of much editing and combining into one of at least a few smaller texts created at various times, with the *Statutes of the King* as one of them.[49] The dating has long been the subject of dispute. Paleographic data suggest the composition of the oldest manuscript in the *Temple Scroll* (4Q524) to 150–100 BCE. Still, scholars agree that it is not an original but rather one of many copies. This being so, any dating determined for the writing of this manuscript may at best serve as an approximate *terminus ante quem* the *Statutes* were composed.[50] Therefore, contrary to views common a dozen years ago, the prevailing belief now is that the *Statutes* were written in the period preceding the final editing of the *Temple Scroll*.[51] a large number of different hypotheses have been voiced in the matter with many arguments to support them, but the differences in suggested dates

[45] The first who show the complex structure the *Temple Scroll* and the distinct status of the *Statutes* were Wilson/Willis 1982: 275 ff., 283 f., 287 f. According to Mendels (1998a: 326 ff., 333) the treatise by Aristeas (*Letter of Aristeas to Philocrates*), a hellenized Jew probably born in Egypt, a large part of which is a depiction of an ideal monarch, shows much more shared ideology with the *Statutes of the King* than with the Greek tradition.

[46] Literature on the Hellenistic treatises on royal power is very rich, see Goodenough 1928: 55–102; Aalders 1975: 17 ff.; Walbank 1984: 75 ff.; Mendels 1997: 67 ff.; Gehrke 1998: 100 ff.; Murray 1998: 262–267, 268; Hahm 2000: 457–464; Haake 2003: 83ff.; Virgilio 2003: 47–65; Murray 2007: 13–28. See also Muccioli 2005: 26 ff.

[47] Elledge 2004: 59–62.

[48] Wise 1990a: 228–231; Swanson 1995: 160–173. See also Delcor 1981: 48 ff.; Yadin 1983: 344 ff.; Hengel/Charlesworth/Mendels 1986: 30 (= Mendels 1998b: 368); White Crawford 2000: 58 ff.; Elledge 2004: 22 ff.

[49] Wilson/Wills 1982: 283f., 287 f.; Schiffman 1988: 300, 304, 310, 311; Wise 1990: 101–127; García Martínez 1991: 226–227; García Martínez 1999: 437.

[50] See Hengel/Charlesworth/ Mendels 1986: 28–29 (= Mendels 1998b: 365–366); Wise 1990: 26–31, 198 ff.; García Martínez 1991: 232; Swanson 1995: 173; García Martínez 1999: 442 ff.; White Crawford 2000: 24 ff.; Batsch 2005: 186 ff.

[51] See Yadin 1983: 345–346; Hengel/Charlesworth/Mendels 1986: 28 ff., 37–38 (= Mendels 1998b: 365 ff., 377–378); cf. Wise 1990: 110 ff.).

run into centuries, not decades.[52] Some scholars link the writing of the *Statutes* with the Hasmonean period. They believe that some references in the document clearly favor such dating, and even probably pinpoint its creation to the period between Simon's and Alexander Jannaeus' rules.[53]

The arguments quoted to underpin the hypothesis that the *Statutes* were composed under the Hasmoneans chiefly point to those prescripts which its supporters claim reflect the realities of the period. Those include special guidance for relations between king and priests, recommendation to recruit only Jewish subjects to the army and the king's personal guard, advice on the composition of the king's council, on the scope of royal power, and prohibition of a war of expansion.[54] In addition to such regulations, another argument given as indicating a connection between the *Statutes* and the Hasmoneans is the document's structure. It is claimed that some fragments differ from the Biblical original, a departure that enabled the author to introduce allusions to contemporary historical events and social relations as known to him.

Among the most often quoted of such passages is the prohibition for the king to make war against Egypt for material gains (11Q19, LVI:16–17). Contrary to arguments and interpretations offered, the prohibition is completely out of place as no source indicates any offensive action by the Hasmoneans against that country, whether in fact or in design. The only known instance of open hostilities between the Hasmoneans and the Egyptians took place about 103 BCE when the army of Ptolemy IX and Cleopatra III invaded Palestine. Faced with an armed Egyptian entry into his territory, Judea's then king Alexander Jannaeus was forced to take military action against the attackers, but all of it was a purely defensive operation (cf. Jos. *BJ* 1.86; *AJ* 13.328–358). Nor do we know of any later king of Judea fighting against Egypt or maintaining diplomatic contacts with it. For this reason, none of the interpretations so far suggested for that prohibition can be held plausible.[55] Another fragment where some discern a clear allusion to the Hasmonean historical context is an exhortation for the king to maintain a native personal guard whose duty must be to keep constant vigil to prevent the king's

[52] According to H. Stegemann, the *Temple Scroll* was written in the 5th century BCE. However, he is isolated in this position. Most scholars favor the 2nd century BCE, cf. White Crawford 2000: 24 ff.; Batsch 2005: 186 ff.

[53] The use in the *Statutes* of the designation "king" cannot be seen as a dating clue with reference to any of the Hasmoneans using this title, as Deut. 17, on which they are based, refers to Israel's ruler only by that appellation (Elledge 2004: 45 ff.). For this reason, the argument that the *Statutes*' author accepted and recognized monarchy as the system of government of Hasmonean Judea carries no conviction (Hengel/Charlesworth/Mendels 1986: 30–31 (= Mendels 1998b: 368-9)). For the proposed dating of the *Statutes* to the Hasmonean period, see Hengel/Charlesworth/Mendels 1986: 31, 38 (= Mendels 1998b: 369, 377) (*… at some point between 103/2 and 88 B.C.*); Schmidt 2001: 176 (*... in the reign of John Hyrcanus (134–104) or with more certainty in that of Alexander Jannaeus (103-76)*; Elledge 2004: 37–45, 68, 228, esp. 44: (*… the royal laws are best dated to the two decades following the death of Jonathan (143–125 B.C.E.*). L.H. Schiffman in one of his earlier articles (1988: 300, 310, 311), other than stating that the *Statutes* come from the Hellenistic period, did not indicate a single passage that he believed suggested unambiguously a reference to Hasmonean times. It was not until his later publications that he tried to show a more specific reference to the Hasmoneans.

[54] Cf. Delcor 1981: 51, 61; Yadin 1983: 345–346, 348–349, 359; Hengel/Charlesworth/ Mendels 1986: 31 ff. (= Mendels 1998b: 370 ff.); Elledge 2004: 30–32.

[55] Cf. Hengel/Charlesworth/Mendels 1986: 36 (= Mendels 1998b: 375–376); Elledge 2004: 93 ff. Wise (1990: 111–114) accounts for this phrasing as caused solely by the writing technique.

capture by an enemy (11Q19, LVII:5–11). Adherents of this hypothesis believe that the passage criticizes the Hasmonean practice of using alien mercenaries, first hired to his service by John Hyrcanus (cf. Jos. *BJ* 1.61; 7.393; *AJ* 13.249). Such criticism, it is further claimed, is closely linked with the capture of Jonathan by Tryphon,[56] or with an episode during the reign of Alexander Jannaeus when he nearly got killed in battle in a ruse by the Nabatean king.[57] However, the interpretations suggested concerning the king's personal guard are not convincing, since the wording of the prescription offers no warrant whatsoever that the author was indeed referring to the Hasmonean-time events in question. Equally well, his postulate may have been guided by biblical models with which he was thoroughly familiar.[58]

It is also alleged that the *Statutes* are anti-Hasmonean because their author places decisive authority with religious representatives (priests and Levites) (11Q19, LVII:12–13). The rules are formulated to suggest that the presence of priests in the king's midst and the need for him to obtain their approval in any major decision effectively deprives him of any independent political and military power (11Q19, LVII:11–15). More emphasis on the priestly importance is posited in the *Statutes*, the predominance of the high priest over the king in warfare (cf. 11Q19, LVIII:18–21), even if none of those regulations specifies unambiguously the high priest's role in society. In this case, too, it must be concluded that the *Statutes*' stipulations as applying to priests, when read through the lens of Biblical tradition and other parts of the *Temple Scroll*, by no means contain the notions attributed to them by scholars as would have served to undermine the status of the Hasmoneans.[59]

In focusing their attention mainly on those points that are thought to be clear allusions to the *Statutes*' author's contemporary Hasmonean times, scholars failed to notice other references that may also be taken to be anti-Hasmonean. Among them will be regulations limiting the king's power abuses and wealth-seeking through war-time plunder (cf. 11Q19, LVI:15–19; LVII:19–21). All too often, both practices were employed by the Hasmoneans while they fought wars against the Seleucids and against the pro-Seleucid hellenized inhabitants of Judea. It was not by accident that such practices met with condemnation in another Qumran find, *Pesher Habbakuk*. Yet the value of this argument is still problematic as similar criticism of the behavior of Jewish kings has a long tradition and is repeatedly featured in the Bible. Another allusion that could be held to be unfavorable to Judea's ruling dynasty is the warning to the king voiced in the final part of the *Statutes* (11Q19, LIX:13–15), threatening that if he violated the covenant with God, his offspring would lose the right to the throne. Its anti-Hasmonean message may seem likely as no such warning is present in Deuteronomy, which forms the backbone of the *Statutes*, meaning that it was a deliberate introduction by their author. Nonetheless, also in this case, the biblical origin of this warning precludes any connection with Hasmonean times. In referring to the promise of lasting rule over Judea by David's descendants,

[56] 1 Macc 12:40–46; Schiffman 1994: 49; Elledge 2004: 31, 38 ff.

[57] Jos. *AJ* 13.375; Hengel/Charlesworth/Mendels 1986: 31 (= Mendels 1998b: 371).

[58] Wise 1990: 103 ff.; Swanson 1995: 122 ff.

[59] Wise 1990: 117 ff. The ideology of the *Temple Scroll* cannot be viewed as separate from the Qumran community's religious practice, see Kugler 2000: 90 ff., 94, 112.

it cannot apply to any member of the Hasmonean dynasty, which the Qumran community did not believe had a right to the throne.[60]

Considering the *Statutes* as applicable to the king and the nature of the *Temple Scroll* of which they form an integral part, one may get the impression that they refer primarily to the future. They paint a portrait of a king as a thoroughly idealized figure unconnected to any specific historical context. To the author of the *Statutes*, the supreme model of a ruler is biblical David[61] and it is through this lens that he views any successor to rule over Israel. This state should be organized on a common foundation of the twelve biblical tribes (cf. 11Q19, LVII:5–7. 11–12). The author's recognition of this traditional model of Jewish social organization as still valid, although at the time the New Law was being written this model was beyond retrieval, means that social and government institutions described in the *Statutes* are treated as more symbolic than real, an offshoot of biblical tradition rather than the author's contemporary realities. It is especially striking for the description of the king's personal guard which suggests that it should be made up of troops supplied by each of the twelve tribes (11Q19, LVII:5–11). A biblical model is also followed in the postulated organization of the army (11Q19, LVII:2–5) and the composition of the king's council which was to comprise, in addition to priests and Levites, all tribal leaders. It is all too obvious that any such institutions would have been purely anachronistic in Hasmonean times. Equally misapplied would have been the regulations concerning the king himself, such as prohibition of his polygamy or marriage to a foreign woman (11Q19, LVII:15–19). This restriction, which made sense at the time of the united monarchy and the kingdoms of Judah and Israel, cannot plausibly be extended to form an admonition to the Hasmoneans themselves. No evidence exists to suggest that any of the dynasty's members had more than one consort at a time or took himself a foreign wife.

The above discussion inevitably leads to the conclusion that, notwithstanding repeated efforts to present the *Statutes* as a document containing critical references to Hasmonean-introduced political system and their practices of government, there are no premises to accept this hypothesis as true.[62] Any allusions in the document to the author's contemporary realities as are sometimes purported, or any allegedly anti-Hasmonean overtones, are only conditional on accepting that the writing of the *Statutes* is closely linked with the Hasmonean period. When analyzed independently of that epoch and viewed through a lens of the overall ideology of the *Temple Scroll*, they are completely devoid of any anti-Hasmonean hints attributed to them. This observation amounts to the conclusion that in writing a New Torah for Israel's future generations, its authors were consciously referring only to models and values arising out of their religious tradition. As they compiled a New Law, they tried to avoid any clear allusions to their own times, which makes the actual time of writing so difficult to trace. Even if some laws seem to contain references to Hasmonean realities, they are too flimsy and

[60] Swanson 1995: 155 ff., 166 f.; Schniedewind 1999: 162–163.

[61] Swanson 1995: 160–168.

[62] Not all scholars share the belief that the political realities in place at the time of writing necessarily inspired the author of the *Statutes* in formulating respective provisions concerning the king: Wise 1990a: 110–121, 127; Rajak 1996: 100–101.

ambiguous to be treated as a serious argument to justify claims that the *Statutes* are critical of the Hasmonean monarchy.[63]

The rise of messianic thought reflected in 2nd– 1st -century BCE. Jewish literature poses questions about its resonance in society at large and its impact on Judeans' attitudes at the time. Ours sources being scant, answers are difficult but not impossible. The actual or assumed denunciation of the Hasmonean rule as conveyed in texts mentioned here was, for the most part, harbored in small, closed circles. In so far as we can establish it today, it emanated chiefly from communities voluntarily isolated from public life, and in particular from all participation in religious worship centered on the Temple.[64]

Any writings produced in those communities, including those permeated with messianic ideas, were meant solely for their members. The language used by authors could only be understood by the initiated: it was full of special notions and symbols unintelligible to an outsider. Writers used such language to present the theological concepts of their community, as well as to censure what they saw as harmful in surrounding realities or to recount specific events in which they participated or which they merely witnessed.[65]

Even if Judea had many such religious groups at the time, their typical hostility or criticism of the Hasmoneans cannot be automatically extended to those religious circles which actively participated in the Temple worship. The voluntary self-isolation of communities opposed to the Temple, combined with their inherently hermetic message, made for their criticism of the ruling dynasty being practically limited to their own closed circle. A time when eschatological visions, contrasted with political realities, began to trigger social emotions in Judea was yet to come.

[63] Delcor 1981: 51, 61; Schiffman 1988: 311; Hengel/Charlesworth/Mendels 1986: 31 (= Mendels 1998b: 369); Schiffman 1994: 49; Mendels 1998a: 327; Schmidt 2001: 173 ff.; Elledge 2004: 31–32, 42 ff., 51, 66 ff. etc.

[64] An important attempt to outline principal theological differences between the Qumran community and the Temple circle is believed to have been made in the so-called *Halakhic Letter* (4QMMT) preserved among the Dead Sea Scrolls. The prevailing opinion is that it was never delivered to its assumed addressee in Jerusalem. H. Stegemann (1996: 502–503) is of a different opinion.

[65] Cf. Ilan 2001: 57–58. She rightly noted that many historical allusions contained in the Dead Sea Scrolls are only intelligible when they can be referred to events described by Josephus. More on the value of the Dead Sea Scrolls as historical evidence for the Hasmonean period, see Amusin 1997; Charlesworth 2002; Wise 2003; Eshel 2008; Dąbrowa, forthcoming.

3. Social attitudes toward the Hasmoneans

A picture of the Hasmoneans would not be complete if we ignored those sources which speak about the prevailing feeling among Judea's society toward its rulers. Such sources offer an opportunity to confront the scathing denunciation of the Hasmoneans in texts written by their religious opponents with attitudes of those social groups on which rested the Hasmoneans power. The weakness of such records is that the events in which we are interested are shown in them from a distant, more than a century-long perspective, and that they all came from a single author, Josephus, who proudly emphasized his blood relation to his protagonists (cf. Jos. *Vita* 2–6). Thus his objectivity is called to question. Yet with no alternative source extant, we are confined to his account.

Before we proceed with an analysis of information supplied by Josephus, a reservation must be made that facts about the Hasmonean rule over Judea, known and confirmed by various sources, question the truth of such a picture of realities as sometimes emanates from texts by different authors subscribing to specific religious sympathies. Such writings are most often filled with highly emotional judgments about events described, the picture of events they convey being deformed to suit the authors' convictions. When they surfaced, researchers of the history of Hasmonean Judea found themselves in a peculiar position. They had gained a chance to study closely the views of religious groups opposed to the ruling house but placed in the fringe of political life, but they were denied even a single text that could in all certainty be said to present the point of view of much more influential groups active in religious and political life, such as the Pharisees or the Sadducees.

From the time of John Hyrcanus until the capture of Jerusalem by Pompey in 63, the Hasmoneans repeatedly relied on support given them by either the Pharisees or the Sadducees. Such mutual relations were based on immediate political interests, one example of which being the variable Pharisees attitude: they could openly criticize some of the Hasmoneans, even go so far as to engage in open conflict with them, while they willingly played along with some others. Josephus implies that John Hyrcanus remained under their strong influence almost to the end of his reign, and Alexander Jannaeus advised his wife Alexandra Salome to make an alliance with them if that was what it took for her to remain in power, even if it meant betrayal of his Sadducean supporters. The rivalry between religious factions lay at the root of many negative occurrences as exemplified by fratricidal fighting for Judea's throne between Sadducees-supported Aristobulus II and Hyrcanus backed by the Pharisees. Its lasting effect was destabilization in the functioning of the state since one rival group gaining the upper hand meant removal from state offices of members of the defeated party, at times even their persecution.

Attitudes toward developments in the state among those members of secular elites who were not attached to either of the dominant religious groups largely depended on what political and financial profits could be obtained in return for support given to the

ruler or a pretender to the throne.[66] We may only suppose that those elites at different times included various interest groups, but little can be said with certainty about them.[67]

Josephus affords some more information on attitudes toward the Hasmoneans in other, less privileged social groups in Judea. How important their role was in the insurrection against the Hellenistic religious reform and in the making of Judea's political system under the first Hasmoneans is discussed elsewhere in this volume. It proved no less important at a later time, although our knowledge on the subject is limited and incomplete. Source information on the reigns of John Hyrcanus and his successors tends to focus on their expansion onto neighboring territories and on the clash with the Pharisees. Ordinary inhabitants of Judea appear as little more than a backdrop for the events described, rather than their protagonists. Much more information on their role is only available for the period of fighting between Aristobulus II and Hyrcanus. Josephus' (*BJ* 1.117) account suggests that in the early phase of the conflict, Aristobulus used the help of mercenaries, and his sense of strength, up till the confrontation with Pompey, rested rather on his numbers and the fortresses he possessed in Judea. The attitudes of lower social orders at that stage in the dynastic conflict are a subject we know little certain about. Without a doubt, they were not indifferent to the events unfolding all around. That this was the case is suggested by Pompey's fears about rural populations joining in the fighting in their numbers on Aristobulus' side, as well as by his gift to Hyrcanus of the high priesthood and rule over Judea in gratitude for his preventing such a contingency (Jos. *BJ* 1.153). Unfortunately, we do not know how Hyrcanus II accomplished that,[68] although we know that that state of affairs did not last long.

Neither Aristobulus II's defeat by the Romans in 63, nor exertions by Hyrcanus and his mainstay Antipater discouraged Judea's rural population from supporting Alexander, the son of Aristobulus II, when, having fled from Roman captivity in 57, he attempted to oppose Hyrcanus. He managed to assemble a force of more than ten thousand and used as his bases the former Hasmonean fortresses of Alexandreion, Hyrcania, and Machaerus (Jos. *BJ* 1.160–161). With his army he even succeeded in briefly capturing Jerusalem (Jos. *BJ* 1.160), but could not hold out against the combined forces of Hyrcanus and Roman legions (Jos. *BJ* 1.163). Some months later also Aristobulus II himself could see proof of the Judeans' unwavering sympathy. When, having escaped from Roman captivity, he returned to his homeland and attempted to organize an army to fight the Romans about 56, he found no difficulty in enlisting volunteers (Jos. *BJ* 1.171). Such was indeed their great number that some had to be turned down as Aristobulus II could

[66] Josephus describes several situations when political and especially military support was extended to either Aristobulus II or Hyrcanus based on hopes for future gains (cf. Jos. *AJ* 13.427). Yet when one pretender to the throne was defeated, those who supported him so far did not hesitate to join the winner, cf. Jos. *BJ* 1.120; *AJ* 14.4. 19.

[67] W.W. Buehler (1974: 53–69), based on information in Josephus' works, attempted to reconstruct a picture of Judean society in the period from Alexandra Salome's death to the rise of Herod. His superficial and often oversimplified interpretation of that information lowers the value of his conclusions and generalizations.

[68] We know more about later actions by Hyrcanus to curb rural support for any anti-Roman risings by Aristobulus II and his sons. One method involved severe penalties for their supporters, combined with seizure of their property, cf. Jos. *AJ* 14, 156–157.

not arm and equip them all. He managed to raise an eight-thousand-strong force which also included Peitholaos' command of a thousand deserters from Hyrcanus' army (Jos. *BJ* 1.172; *AJ* 14.93–94). Aristobulus II' inability to provide arms for a greater number of rural volunteers and the recruits' inexperience in combat took their toll on their performance and the final outcome of his struggle (Jos. *BJ* 1.172–173; *AJ* 14.95–96). About 55, another desperate attempt to resist the Roman presence in Judea was again made by Alexander, the son of Aristobulus II (Jos. *BJ* 1.176; *AJ* 14.100). This time, too, he swiftly raised a large army composed of militia.[69] Yet the combat value of such troops was limited, and facing Romans near Mount Tabor they were routed (Jos. *BJ* 1.177; *AJ* 14.102).

It deserves note that each call to arms against the Romans by Aristobulus II or another member of his family met with a favorable response among the population of Judea (cf. Jos. *AJ* 14.93. 100). Certainly not all who joined their ranks did so out of loyalty to the last Hasmonean king. We know well enough that there were those among the troops who saw any armed conflict in Judea as an ideal opportunity for robbery and plunder (cf. Jos. *BJ* 1.171; *AJ* 14.93. 100). Without dismissing the extent of this practice, it would be difficult to claim the prospect of gain to be the sole reason for mass enlistment in the army. After all, many members of the militia fell already in the first larger clash with the Romans.

Even so, sources offer no clear explanation of reasons for such large-scale support for Aristobulus II and his son among the rural population. For Aristobulus II, the reason might have been his fame.[70] For Alexander, the motives are less clear, although among many different factors, it was probably not irrelevant to those who joined him that he was the son of Aristobulus II.[71] His brief reign rather excludes the supposition that such wide backing stemmed from his social policy. Real reasons must be sought in his determination to fight "strangers" threatening Judea's freedom. In some respects, the struggle resembled that of his ancestors, Judah Maccabee and his brothers, who had fought against the Seleucids. We may suppose that his standing up to Pompey won him the respect of subjects, a sentiment extended to his entire family. For this reason, despite successive defeats by a far stronger enemy, Aristobulus II and Alexander could always count on broad support in society for their anti-Roman attempts.[72]

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[69] Josephus reports that the army numbered as many as tens of thousands (30,000: Jos. *AJ* 14.100; the *Bellum* account (1.177; cf. 1.176) implies an even greater number.

[70] Jos. *BJ* 1.171: ὃς αὖθις πολλοὺς Ἰουδαίων ἐπισυνίστη, τοὺς μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦντας μεταβολῆς τοὺς δ'ἀγαπῶντας αὐτὸν πάλαι; *AJ* 14.93: πολλοὶ δ' Ἀριστοβούλῳ τῶν Ἰουδαίων κατὰ τὴν παλαιὰν εὔκλειαν προσέρρεον .

[71] Cf. Jos. *AJ* 14.100: ὁ γὰρ Ἀριστοβούλου παῖς Ἀλέξανδρος παρελθὼν ἐξ ὑστέρου πάλιν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν κατὰ βίαν πολλοὺς μὲν τῶν Ἰουδαίων ἀπέστησε . From the context of this information it is difficult to infer what exactly the nature of Alexander's enforcement was.

[72] a telling example is the case of Peitholaos. In 57, when Alexander first rose against Hyrcanus, Peitholaos fought him alongside the Romans under Mark Antony's command (Jos. *BJ* 1.162; *AJ* 14.84). But when shortly after Alexander's rising was suppressed, Aristobulus II himself arrived in Judea, Peitholaos switched sides and joined him with a thousand troops (Jos. *BJ* 1.172; *AJ* 14.93), and after the king was captured by the Romans, he continued guerrilla warfare until he was captured himself and sentenced to die (Jos. *BJ* 1.180; *AJ* 14.120). His attitude certainly did not stem from a personal disappointment with service for Hyrcanus as Peitholaos held a high rank in the administration (cf. Jos. *BJ* 1. 172: Πειθόλαος ἦν ὁ ἐξ Ἱεροσολύμων ὑποστράτηγος; *AJ* 14.93: Πειθόλαος γοῦν τις, ὑποστράτηγος ἐν Ἱεροσολύμοις ὤν. Peitholaos' name appears in one document from Qumran (4Q468g), but in a context that is somewhat ambiguous, cf. Charlesworth 2002: 113; Wise 2003: 79, no. 28; 79–80 n. 70; Vermes 2007: 137–138; Eshel 2008: 142 ff., and 143 n. 33.

Attitudes of various Judean social groups, and particularly rural populations, toward the Hasmoneans in different periods of their rule and after their fall suggest that they enjoyed the genuine support of some of their subjects which proved lasting regardless of any perceptible religious leanings. While it is true that, in the period of tensions caused by John Hyrcanus' and Alexander Jannaeus' conflict with the Pharisees, the part of society under their influence actively resisted the Hasmonean rule, such resistance was too ineffectual to depose the ruling family, or even to enforce any changes in the existing political system.[73] Thus religious circles, influential though they were in Judean society and strongly opposed to successive kings, were not able to undermine the loyalty of the Judean population to the ruling dynasty.[74]

[73] Buehler's opinion (1974: 61) about anti-monarchic attitudes among lower social orders in Judea stems from a thoroughly erroneous understanding of the Josephus' text, cf. Jos. *AJ* 14.41.

[74] It might have been a sign of long-lived memory of the Hasmoneans that their names remained popular among Judea's population: Ilan 1987: 13 ff. Still, caution is advisable in drawing conclusions from this as sources informing us of the currency of those names concern the period from the 3rd century BCE to the 1st century CE. Across such a long time span, choice of names might have been influenced by various factors including fashion.

Conclusions

It is not without a reason that the first part of the present study shows the history of the rise, flowering, and decline of the Hasmonean monarchy against a backdrop of events in neighboring states. Only in such context is it possible to assess properly the rule by that family and dynasty, and to discern their inspirations in creating institutions for their own statehood. Such a historical perspective is also necessary to trace the development of those institutions.

First attempts to create public institutions were made already by Judah Maccabee. He recognized the need to organize the insurrectionist movement in structures to permit more efficient leadership. Such institutions included those geared to providing sustenance to insurrectionists, and to ensuring them a chance to share in some decision-making or to make their opinions heard. Judah Maccabee's death put an end to what he had achieved in this respect. After several years, the task of creating Judea's political institutions was undertaken by Jonathan. His diplomatic skill and success in combat enabled him to be recognized as no longer an enemy but an ally to the Seleucids. This status allowed him to begin laying foundations for his own governance in Judea, a task in which he was greatly helped by winning a leadership position on being named the high priest of the Temple. His close relations with Syrian kings involved Jonathan and his brother Simon in the world of Hellenistic politics. His active role in it enabled him not only to secure a large extent of independence from the Seleucids, but also to study closely the various aspects of Hellenistic monarchies in action. Experience so gained certainly had an impact on the shape and development of some institutions in Hasmonean Judea.

Simon's part in the state's institution-building is difficult to overestimate. Certainly his greatest achievement in the field was to create a formal basis for his rule in Judea, guaranteeing its heritability in the Hasmonean family, and ensuring for himself political powers sufficient for an unimpeded creation of any state structures.

With our limited evidence on state institutions in the Hasmonean monarchy during the period from John Hyrcanus to Aristobulus II, it is difficult to paint a full picture of them or trace their development. Despite the fragmentary and random nature of our information, we can confidently state that the Hasmonean state differed from all of its contemporary Hellenistic monarchies. This assertion is in no way contradicted by the Hellenistic origin and form of some institutions, as has frequently been emphasized above. To justify this conclusion, it is necessary to consider more deeply the question of Judea's Hellenization under the Hasmoneans. To most scholars, not only the Hellenistic nature of the Hasmonean monarchy, but progressive Hellenization of Judea under

their rule is considered almost as a given. In our opinion, this position deserves to be questioned.

Hellenization is usually understood as a process of conscious adoption of Hellenistic cultural patterns in all their manifestations and their adjustment to local conditions. Scholars determine the degree of advancement of the process by comparing it to a canon of elements believed as archetypal for Hellenization.[1] Among them, a major quality is the archetype of a hellenistic monarch. It is based on realities proper for the Macedonian, Ptolemaic, Seleucid, and Attalid monarchies, which are known to scholars from multiple written sources, archaeological relics, and numismatic evidence. Its universality across all Hellenistic monarchies created on the ruins of Alexander of Macedon's empire stems from their common historical, cultural, and religious tradition. The lack of any deeper connection of the Hasmoneans with that tradition is not sufficiently emphasized by believers in a hellenized Judea, who prefer instead to focus on those features of the Hasmonean state which indeed deserve to he called hellenistic.[2]

The policies of respective rulers of the Hasmonean dynasty show many shared traits. In the period from Simon to Alexander Jannaeus, their guiding thought was to turn Judea into a uniformly Judaic nation. Driving "strangers" out of the country and destroying many a Greek city can hardly be said to be a practice typical for hellenistic monarchies. Also the Hasmonean expansion onto neighboring lands lacked elements characteristic for Hellenistic kings' ideology of land "conquered by the spear." At the root of this expansion lay a desire to reclaim lands once belonging to biblical Israel, and it was made possible by a favorable set of external circumstances. Likewise, in broadly understood public life as well as in the Hasmoneans' private life we see many examples of behavior that has nothing to do with any Hellenistic models.

Such distinctly nationalist practices are contrasted with the nature of the power the Hasmoneans exercised, which displays many qualities typical of Hellenistic monarchies. Bearing in mind how the Hasmoneans began their political career by leading an insurrection against a religious reform designed to hellenize Judea, we might think that as time went by they abandoned their ancestors' guiding ideals. Yet on closer examination of events occurring in their state and of the institutions they created, we must conclude that features traditionally ascribed to the Hellenistic monarchic pattern were solely meant to serve as a tool for effective government and were never inspired by anything else than political pragmatism.

Jonathan was the first to introduce in Judea practices characteristic for the Hellenistic system of power. He had had ample opportunity to study Hellenistic ways in his years-long close contacts with Syrian kings. Working with him, his brother Simon arranged for the "great assembly" to pass a resolution formally laying fundaments of his secular powers and for a monarchy to be introduced in Judea based on the Hellenistic model. Even so, Simon consciously refrained from using the title of king to avoid possible unfavorable associations it might cause in society. There is no questioning Simon's decisive role in the making of Judea's system of government based on models borrowed from the Hellenistic world as his successors' relations with that world were too loose and too

[1] Cf. Dąbrowa 2006a: 159 ff.
[2] Cf. Rajak 1996: 104 ff.

random to produce deep systemic change in their own state. John Hyrcanus' contacts with Antiochus VII most probably influenced reforms in the military, while Alexander Jannaeus' short-lived contacts with Ptolemy IX and Cleopatra III were a mere brief episode, leaving no observable trace. It is difficult to decide how far Aristobulus I's later decision to adopt the royal title resulted from his knowledge of Hellenistic monarchies (nothing is known about his foreign contacts), and how far a simple formal confirmation of the actual state of affairs.

Using Hellenistic models to build his power base in Judea, Simon secured for himself and his successors a chance to rule effectively without having to share power with anyone. However, his efforts toward that goal show no sign of his trying to hellenize Judea itself.[3]

Another argument against claims about rapid Hellenization of Judea under the Hasmoneans is their internal policy, which aimed to remove from territories under their control any ethnic, cultural, and religious elements that could threaten the Judaist outlook of their state, and a deliberate isolation from the outside world. If, despite that, Hellenization of Judean society did take place, its causes must be sought not only in residual traces of the Ptolemies' and Seleucids' rule in Judea and in Hellenistic influences, but also in close contacts with the hellenized Jewish diaspora, whose members arrived in Jerusalem for religious observances.

Regardless of whether we try to magnify or play down the role of Hellenistic patterns in the Hasmonean monarchy, it remains certain that their skillful use by the Hasmoneans for their own ends enabled them to create a strong and efficient state whose institutions ensured effective exercise of government and guaranteed external security. This pragmatic use of Hellenistic models, however, did not cause them to reject their national traditions. Observing and cherishing their heritage helped them build their image among their subjects and made an important contribution to their political ideology. Nonetheless, attempts to combine two distinct traditions not always met with popular approval and contributed to many conflicts. Despite that, subjective feelings about the Hasmoneans as expressed by their contemporary critics should not overshadow their vast contribution and the importance of their work for the preservation of Jewish religious and cultural identity *vis-ŕ-vis* the Hellenistic, Roman, and Christian world.

[3] Schwentzel 2007: 147 ff.

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