The Importance of the Hoplite Army in Aeneas Tacticus' *Polis*[1]

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Abstract: The identification of Aeneas Tacticus has always been a matter of dispute. Most often he is supposed to have been a mercenary officer, probably from Stymphalus, to whom Xenophon makes reference in *Hellenica*, 7.3.1. Accordingly, one may find the views that in Aeneas' treatise a mercenary perspective is adopted, a claim also supported by the observation that the author records the phenomenon of the ubiquitous popularity of paid soldiers in the Greek warfare system of the fourth century BC. In this paper it is argued that Aeneas' outlook in fact had little in common with mercenary ethics; instead, it is the writer's deep commitment to civic values (explicitly stated in the *Preface*) that is stressed. Especially worth pointing out remains Aeneas' belief that during siege civic patriotism still matters. It is a value on which success in overwhelming the invaders depends: all the steps and preventive actions of the city's dwellers leading to a successful defense of a native *polis* must be rooted – according to him – in the conviction that *polis* in its material (territory, estates, shrines, temples, walls) and spiritual dimension (religion, gods, respect for the parents) constitutes the best framework for life. By the same token, a relatively high importance is given by Aeneas to hoplite troops, usually consisting of yeomen and farmers who were the owners of land. In the author's conviction they could provide the best possible protection to a *polis*. Looking from a purely military point of view, hoplite forces – together with auxiliary troops (the light-armed and cavalry, if possible) – were also useful at the time when the enemy entered the city's territory and ravaged it before attempting a direct assault on the walls.

Keywords: Aeneas Tacticus, the hoplites, the Greek warfare.

1. Manuscript, as usual

As every reader of Aeneas' treatise knows, the text of his work has been preserved in a very bad condition (cf. Hunter/Handford 1927: xl). There is practically no sentence which has not been corrupted in some way. In this respect the case of Chapter XV § 5 remains interesting but on the opposite basis: this time the meaning of the sentence is clear enough, but one word has been replaced by the modern editor. When describ-

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ing how the defenders' land forces sent against an enemy plundering their own terri-
tory should proceed (cf. Best 1969: 120; Lazenby 1994: 4), the writer advises that the
cavalry (if available, cf. also Aeneas, 6.6; 26.4; cf. Arist., *Polit*. 1321a, 8–12) and the
light-armed troops must first conduct a reconnaissance (cf. Galitzin 1874: 145; Ober
1995: 45; Trundle 2004: 51). Then, and only then, could hoplite troops ("the mainstay in
Greek armies in Xenophon's time"[2]) track with caution: Πρὸ δὲ αὐτῶν δεῖ πρώτους τοὺς
ὑπάρχοντας ἱππέας καὶ κούφους ἐξιέναι, μηδὲ τούτους <ἀτάκτους>, προεξερευνῶντάς
τε καὶ προκαταλαμβάνοντας τὰ ὑψηλὰ τῶν χωρίων, ἵν' ὡς ἐκ πλείστου προειδῶσιν οἱ
ὁπλῖται τὰ τῶν πολεμίων καὶ μηδὲν ἐξαίφνης αὐτοῖς προσπέσῃ.[3]

However, it is worth stressing that in the famous MS Medicus-Laurentianus LV. 4 the
noun ὁπλῖται is not found in the text, nor does it appear in the copies descending from
it. In the relevant place an anonymous Byzantine scholar wrote: ΠΟΛΙΤΑΙ. Accordingly,
working on one of the copies of MS LV. 4, the great Casaubon (1670: 1664) retained the
MS reading, translating it in the following way: *omnia diligenter explorantes* (sc. *eq-
uites et levis armatura*), *& loca edita occupantes ut quam primum resciscant **cives**, quid
hostes agant, aut ubi sint*. The first editor who decided to change the MS reading into
ΟΠΛΙΤΑΙ was Hermann Köchly (in Köchly/Rüstow 1853: 40–41), and his emendation
was accepted by later editors and translators, including Hercher (1870: 32), Hug (1874:
32), Oldfather (2001: 76–79), Hunter/Handford (1927: 30), and Schoene (1911: 31).
Recently this conjecture also won the favor of Whitehead (1990: 60) and Vela Tejada
(1991: 64, n. 79).

The emendation begs the question as to why the great German authority failed to
explain his reasons for replacement of *politai* by *hoplitai*.[4] The obvious answer is that it
was simply logic which led him to do so. Köchly might have found supporting evidence
in Chapter XVI, called ἄλλη βοήθεια ("another method of relief;" here and elsewhere
the translation of D. Whitehead 1990), where Aeneas tackles a similar problem, namely,
when a city tries to organize defensive operations while the enemy is already engaged
in plundering the countryside, hoplites – especially if the terrain is rough – must go out
in a compact array – τοὺς δ' ὁπλίτας ἀθρόους ἐν τάξει ("the heavy infantry in forma-
tion;" cf. also Xen., *Oec*. 8.4; *Vect*. 2.2; Arist., *Polit*. 1297b, 20–21). At both 15.5 and
16.7, then, the order of dispatching a relief as proposed by Aeneas remains essentially
the same: *hippeis* and light infantry should march in advance, and their task is eventu-
ally to enter a preliminary skirmish with the enemy troops. The fact that the hoplites
usually went at the end of the whole expeditionary force during such an operation was
a practice also proved by Aeneas' contemporary, Xenophon, in his *Education of Cyrus*
(*Cyr*. 4.2.24 and 5.3.56; cf. Vela Tejada 1991: 64, n. 79), as heavy infantry usually had
difficulties with quick maneuvering (cf. Diodorus, 15.44.2: δυσκινήτων ὄντων). Given
all this, when one comes back to Köchly's emendation, the connection between hoplites
and citizens seems to be quite obvious and understandable (see also Ridley 2007: 157).
Additionally, by way of comparison we may adduce other cases where the ancients iden-
tified the two terms. The first external evidence comes again from Xenophon, this time
from *Resp. Lac*. 11.4, where the MS Vatic. Gr. 1335 reads: ἑκάστη δὲ τῶν πολιτικῶν

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[2]   Lee 2009: 391; also Hunt 2007: 108–109; cf. Krasilnikoff 1992: 27; Spence 2002: 166.

[3]   Dain/Bon 1967.

[4]   The MS version was not changed by Haase (1835: 95–97) in his list of the proposed conjectures.

μορῶν χει πολέμαρχον ἕνα ("each citizen regiment;" trans. E.C. Marchant, Loeb; cf. Lipka 2002: 194; Gray 2007: 173; emphasis mine – B.B.), but in the copy at the disposal of Johannes Stobaeus in the fifth century AD (*Floril.* 4.3.23), in the quotation of the same sentence from *Resp. Lac*. in the version ὁπλιτικῶν μορῶν appears. Xenophon's case was preceded by the passage in Old Oligarch's *Resp. Ath*. 1.2. In this famous pamphlet the editors read today οἱ ὁπλῖται καὶ οἱ γενναῖοι καὶ οἱ χρηστοί, yet, as G.W. Bowersock reminds us, the noun ὁπλῖται is also an emendation made by Krüger, whereas the principal manuscripts (ABCM) contain the version *politai*.[5]

It is clear, then, that according to the commonly held opinion the two terms simply overlapped – it was mainly the *politai* which served as a city militia and wore heavy equipment (Sekunda 2000: 4). This identification is seen perfectly, among others, in Xenophon's *Hell*. 4.4.19 and 5.3.25, where a careful distinction is made between the citizen army and allied forces (cf. Underhill 1900: 140 and 143).[6] In the first case the Spartan king Agesilaus seized the Corinthian walls that had been restored by the Athenians. On this occasion the reader is told that καὶ τότε μὲν ταῦτα πράξας ὁ Ἀγησίλαος τό τε τῶν συμμάχων στράτευμα διῆκε καὶ τὸ πολιτικὸν οἴκαδε ἀπήγαγεν; in the second instance, the same ruler intervened in the internal affairs of the citizens of Phlius who had surrendered to the Spartans: here one hears of the same phrase, namely that ταῦτα δὲ ποιήσας τοὺς μὲν συμμάχους ἀφῆκε, τὸ δὲ πολιτικὸν οἴκαδε ἀπήγαγε; earlier on, it was Aristophanes who in the *Knights* identified the citizens as *hoplitai* enrolled according to the muster lists, *katalogoi* (*Eq.*1369: Ἔπειθ' ὁπλίτης ἐντεθεὶς ἐν καταλόγῳ; cf. *Pax*, 1180–1181; also Thuc. 6.31; see Andrewes 1981: 1; Christ 2001: 399). A further example is provided by the Aristotelian *The Athenian Constitution*, 42.4, when reporting that the Athenian ephebes serving in border forts reviewed ἀσπίδα καὶ δόρυ παρὰ τῆς πόλεως ("a shield and a spear from the state" (trans. P.J. Rhodes); cf. Rhodes 1993: 508).

2. The problem

Given all this, one fundamental objection may certainly be raised against the remarks expressed above: whatever version we adopt in Aeneas 15.5, the final interpretation leads essentially to the same conclusion. Without doubt, Aeneas' *politai*, being well-to-do enough to afford arms, were mainly hoplites,[7] so – one would argue – there is practically no difference in evaluating of his military advice; in effect, the problem becomes quite secondary.

Yet if I mentioned this somewhat minor textual dilemma in Aeneas, I did so purportedly in the conviction that the MS lesson should be restored as it stood just for this fundamental reason:[8] there is the Medicus–Laurentianus LV.4 (otherwise, *codice M mendoso et lacunoso* – Schoene 1911: xii) no trace of a corruption. Nor do we have any remark from a Byzantine scholar who in copying Aeneas' text was always careful in putting in

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[5] Bowersock 2000: 474. See Marr/Rhodes 2008: 63–64.
[6] Cf. Bettalli 1990: 26–27.
[7] See Raaflaub (1997): "The hoplite farmers were *the* essential group among the citizens."
[8] I therefore translated it accordingly: Burliga 2007: 86.

marginal glosses which clearly indicate his doubts. Behind this, lies, however, a more general problem.

If, regarding the military aspect at least, it really does not matter whether at 15.5 we follow the MS or not, retaining the *politai*-lesson may carry some consequences, I would suggest, for reinterpreting the two problems in Aeneas. The first is the importance of the citizen hoplite force during siege and it may be formulated as follows: although in his *poliorketike biblos* the writer does not seem to be especially interested in the mechanics of hoplite battle or a detailed *Schlachtordnung* as such (small wonder – I will return to this topic below),[9] he nevertheless sees the presence of the hoplites as necessary in defending the invaded territory as it is the infantry militia which provides the most effective military protection of the countryside (Hunt 2007: 109; cf. Lissarague 1989: 43; Winterling 1991: 207; Chandezon 1999: 202; Rzepka 2011: 84). The second problem concerns Aeneas' social standpoint and his *Persönlichkeit*: since at that time the majority of hoplite infantrymen were citizens, he sees in them the (relatively) most loyal element among the city's inhabitants (Xen., *Oec*. 6.9–10; Ps. Arist., *Oec*. 1343b, 2–7); accordingly, for a would-be-commander they constitute the most valuable group of the defenders. If this point is valid, it allows us to look at the author himself from a slightly different angle.

As everyone agrees, a striking feature and novelty of Aeneas' handbook is its openly didactic and (sophistically) neutral manner which the writer adopts in instructing his audience (the rhetorical use of historical examples, the language imitating "military" commands; Burliga 2008). In this respect Aeneas was rightly regarded as a true literary pioneer. Bearing in mind that the book was written "in a curiously impersonal way" (Hunter/Handford 1927: xviii), one may feel justified in arguing that Aeneas addressed his works to a wider audience than did Xenophon in his two short military treatises on cavalry (Whitehead 1990: 39–40; Hornblower 2007: 51), so in this sense he may be labeled "objective" or (in a somewhat ahistorical manner) a "scientific" observer. As a consequence, a similar interpretation of the alleged political dimension of the treatise itself follows. It is suggested that Aeneas' work differs conspicuously from Xenophon's, whose aristocratic claims (or prejudices) were expressed so openly that they became something obvious (e.g. Lehmann 1980: 76). On this occasion, I also fully agree with Professor Whitehead's statement (1990: 32) that Aeneas' "socio-political vocabulary" differs from that of the political philosophers or, especially, the Old Oligarch, and in consequence, to quote another of Whitehead's perceptive remarks (1990: 31), the author's "political *Tendenz* is in fact indeterminable."[10] Indeed, through his written poliorcetic *apodexis* the author purportedly *seems* to have avoided expressing of his political sympathies or bias (but see e.g. Chapter 14) – in short, he appears not to be engaged in the disputes which he is actually describing.

To some modern scholars this observation led to the conviction that Aeneas must have belonged to an increasing group of military instructors, former commanders or, at least, itinerant mercenary officers (the writer knows distant regions of Greece and

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⁹ Or, as Whitehead (1990: 24) called him, "no prisoner of the pitched-battle mentality;" see, however, Aeneas' enthusiastic opinion on the victory the Abderites won over the Triballians (15.3), and his remarks on *parataxis*, 1.2.

¹⁰ Cf. already Bengtson (1962: 461) *contra* Lehmann (1980: 77). See Urban 1986: 1000.

is familiar with its northern areas, Peloponnese or the western coast of Asia Minor; cf. Spaulding 1937: 53; Bon 1967: ix–x), who were a common phenomenon in the military landscape of fourth-century Greece (McKechnie 1989: Chapter 4). If we connect this supposition with further attempts at identifying him with Aeneas of Stymphalus, a *strategos* of the Arcadians who liberated Sicyon (mentioned by Xen., *Hell*. 7.3.1; Hug 1877: 29–30; Whitehead 1990: 12: "probably"), a relatively clear portrait of the author seems to emerge. In this way, it is believed, the picture of a half-cosmopolitan figure – an officer spiritually closer to the mercenary soldiers of the Hellenistic era, and a man of great military experience and knowledge – agrees with his approach towards military matters: "cold," methodical, and analytical, rather than ideologically biased or colored.

In what follows, I would like to make a small amendment to this well established portrait. Generally, it is not my goal to deny the above interpretation: whether Aeneas was a hired *strategos* or not cannot be decided with certainty. But even if one assumes that he really belonged to a group of professional mercenaries, must it automatically lead to the conclusion that he had no personal observations, remarks or sympathies, even though they cannot be attributed to any particular political faction or constitution? The answer is: he certainly had these, and the case of *politai/hoplitai* at 15.5 may be taken as a point of departure in seeking "other" Aeneas: a personality deeply addicted to such social values as loyalty, friendship or even, I daresay, patriotism.[11] I see him neither as an adventurous swashbuckler nor a totally indifferent, "scientific" or cynical observer. Consequently, it will be argued that his character was not that of *il condottiero*, according to the later, popular stereotype attributed to this term and associated with the chiefs of medieval companies (Mallett 1974: 79–80; Burliga 2007: 81, n. 149, *ad* 12.4). Although he served as a mercenary,[12] he was no type of ancient "Hawkwood," like for instance Charidemus of Oreos (cf. Aen. Tact. 24.3–12; Pritchett 1974: 85–89; McKechnie 1989: 86), but a citizen-soldier whose political and military thinking was connected with the old civic *ethos* deeper than we care to admit; parochial in its essence, rather than worldly. If it is appropriate to make any sensible comparison, it could be said that with his cool mentality and realistic outlook Aeneas resembles Thucydides, rather than Xenophon: although well acknowledged with the sophistic methods of teaching and writing, a man of a highly conservative mind. To sum up: such a portrait of Aeneas – as far as the treatise permits to see it – fits well his remarks on the tasks and operations the hoplite army takes in the times of danger.

3. The hoplite ideal in fourth-century Greece

Modern discussions about hoplite warfare and the place (or: evolution) of the infantry troops in the *polis* system of the fourth century BC inevitably remain under the strong influence of the famous statement formulated by Demosthenes around 340 in the third

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[11]   On this see generally Baker 1999: 249.

[12]   Or whether he was "a man possessing sagacity and a range of experience which could only be gained by a career of travel and adventure such as fell to the captains of the fourth century" – Hunter/Handford 1927: xxxii.

speech against Philip of Macedon (*or.* 9; cf. Burckhardt 1996: 212–213). The passage became notorious as it contrasted the "old" way of fighting (§ 48) with the new methods introduced by the brute Macedonian conqueror (§ 49–50; cf. also Polyb. 13.3.1–8[13]). Leaving aside the question of how much the orator exaggerated the differences between them, let us recall the characteristics of classical (here: Spartan[14]) *polis* warfare (cf. Herod. 7.9β. 2; Hall 2007: 155). First, according to the statesman, it was based on seasonal campaigns (Λακεδαιμονίους τότε καὶ πάντας τοὺς ἄλλους, τέτταρας μῆνας ἢ πέντε, τὴν ὡραίαν αὐτήν);[15] the invaders ravaged the enemy land with hoplites and civic armies (ἐμβαλόντας ἂν καὶ κακώσαντας τὴν χώραν ὁπλίταις καὶ πολιτικοῖς στρατεύμασιν) and then returned home (ἀναχωρεῖν ἐπ' οἴκου πάλιν). In preferring this kind of war their behavior was "old-fashioned," chivalrous (οὕτω δ' ἀρχαίως εἶχον) and "civic" (μᾶλλον δὲ πολιτικῶς), that is conducted by rules and openly (εἶναι νόμιμόν τινα καὶ προφανῆ τὸν πόλεμον). He goes on to suggest that it was battles that decided the earlier wars whilst "now" (νυνὶ), under Philip, they did not (οὐδὲν δ' ἐκ παρατάξεως οὐδὲ μάχης γιγνόμενον; § 49). This was possible because the *polis* army was a hoplite phalanx, consisting of citizens (τῷ φάλαγγ' ὁπλιτῶν) – again in sharp contrast to the practices of King Philip, whose troops consisted of light-armed, cavalry, archers, hired soldiers (τῷ ψιλούς, ἱππέας, τοξότας, ξένους). Later on (§ 51), the "old" kind of land warfare is even called "a simplicity" by the speaker (τὴν εὐήθειαν τὴν τοῦ τότε πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους πολέμου; cf. Meissner 2010: 280).[16]

Demosthenes' views may be supported by recalling the congruent conservatism or civic chauvinism of Xenophon, voiced in the *Oec*. 4.2–3; 8.6 (cf. Hanson 1999: 317), who assumed that the best hoplites were farmers, and in *Ways and Means*, 2.3–4 conceded that the Athenian army "now" relied on foreigners, i.e. metics (Lydians, Phrygians, Syrians), instead of recruiting citizens to serve in the infantry (cf. Gauthier 1976: 63–64; Foxhall 1993: 142; Hunt 1998: 191). The same sentiment may be found in Isocrates, *On Peace* (or. 8.48, about 355 BC), revealing a longing for a "pure," civic army:

ὅτε μὲν εἰ τριήρεις πληροῖεν, τοὺς μὲν ξένους καὶ τοὺς δούλους ναύτας εἰσεβίβαζον, τοὺς δὲ πολίτας μεθ' ὅπλων ἐξέπεμπον· νῦν δὲ τοῖς μὲν ξένοις ὁπλίταις χρώμεθα, τοὺς δὲ πολίτας ἐλαύνειν ἀναγκάζομεν, ὥσθ' ὁπόταν ἀποβαίνωσιν εἰς τὴν τῶν πολεμίων, οἱ μὲν ἄρχειν τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἀξιοῦντες ὑπηρέσιον ἔχοντες ἐκβαίνουσιν, οἱ δὲ, τοιοῦτοι τὰς φύσεις ὄντες οἵους ὀλίγῳ πρότερον διῆλθον, μεθ' ὅπλων κινδυνεύουσιν

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[13]   With the notes of Walbank 1967: 416–417. As Walbank remarks, "P.'s discussion is clearly linked with the reference to the Lelantine War in Strabo, x. 448," but as Wheeler (1987) has clearly shown, the inscription quoted by Strabo from Ephorus and concerning an alleged treaty between Chalcis and Eretria is a forgery.

[14]   However, Ellen Millender (2006: 245) has clearly proved that even Sparta relied heavily on mercenaries: she even speaks of a "mercenary industry in the 390s;" no different was the situation in Athens – see Bugh 2011: 74; cf. below note 15.

[15]   Butcher 1903.

[16]   Likewise, in the First Phillipic (*or*. 4) written about 351 BC and calling for a retaliatory expedition against Macedonian territory after Phillip's unsuccessful 352 attempt at invading central Greece through Thermopylae pass (cf. Wooten 2008: 5; Trevett 2011: 68–71), Demosthenes advises relying *also* on a civic army. He deplores the situation (4.23) when "now" it is mercenaries who defend the city instead of the citizens; cf. Bugh 2011: 74.

In those days, when they manned their triremes, they put on boards crews of foreigners and slaves but sent our citizens to fight under heavy arms. Now, however, we use mercenaries as heavy armed troops but compel citizens to row ships, with the result that when they land in hostile territory these men, who claim the right to rule over the Hellenes, disembark with their cushions under their arms, while men who are of the character which I have just described take the field with shield and spear![17]

No different was Aristotle's theoretical analysis presented in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1116a, 15–19. Considering the nature of bravery, the philosopher maintains that it is a civic value (Ἔστι μὲν οὖν ἡ ἀνδρεία τοιοῦτόν τι […] πρῶτον μὲν ἡ πολιτική; cf. Herod. 7.103.3),[18] since it is the citizens alone who possess courage (δοκοῦσι γὰρ ὑπομένειν τοὺς κινδύνους οἱ πολῖται διὰ τὰ ἐκ τῶν νόμων ἐπιτίμια καὶ τὰ ὀνείδη καὶ διὰ τὰς τιμάς). Inevitably (1116a, 27–29), civic courage means virtue – it is based on honor and a sense of pride (δι' ἀρετὴν γίνεται· δι' αἰδῶ γὰρ καὶ διὰ καλοῦ ὄρεξιν (τιμῆς γάρ)). Such a conviction agrees with the critique of the mercenaries (ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς δ' οἱ στρατιῶται) at 1116b, 5–1116b, 23. Here the argument runs as follows: being experienced in the war (δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναι πολλὰ κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου), they are cowards, in fact (οἱ στρατιῶται δὲ δειλοὶ γίνονται), and if confronted with an enemy who is more numerous and better equipped (ὅταν ὑπερτείνῃ ὁ κίνδυνος καὶ λείπωνται τοῖς πλήθεσι καὶ ταῖς παρασκευαῖς), they just run away (πρῶτοι γὰρ φεύγουσι). Conversely, a man who participates in the government dies bravely (τὰ δὲ πολιτικὰ μένοντα ἀποθνήσκει; cf. Eurypides, *Rhes.* 510–511). The citizen's ethos is then glorified again: as the escape is a shame for him, death is preferred, not safety (τοῖς μὲν γὰρ αἰσχρὸν τὸ φεύγειν καὶ ὁ θάνατος τῆς τοιαύτης σωτηρίας αἱρετώτερος).[19] Hired men are audacious, to be sure, but, Aristotle continues, they are deprived of the sense of honor, so in the face of death they simply flee (φεύγουσι, τὸν θάνατον μᾶλλον τοῦ αἰσχροῦ φοβούμενοι; cf. Demosthenes, 4.47). Someone who is really a brave man acts differently (ὁ δ' ἀνδρεῖος οὐ τοιοῦτος; cf. Vernant 1988: 48; Bryant 1990: 501–505).[20]

Such and similar voices reflect a strong belief in the superiority of the citizens fighting together in the ranks of the infantry (cf. Lysias, 14.6 and 11; Cartledge 2001: 161; van Wees 2004: 116). The sentiments are, of course, moral in their tone, and the phenomenon has of late rightly been called "hoplite ideology" (Connor 1988: 17; Hanson 1996: 295; 2000: 117–118; Prost 1999: 73ff).[21] Its beginning may be found even in ancient times, with Homeric poetry (cf. *Il.* 2.198–199; cf. van Wees 2004: 195) or, later,

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[17]   Mathieu 1942; trans. G. Norlin, Loeb.

[18]   Bywater 1894.

[19]   Such sentiments were anticipated as early as the fifth century, especially in the speeches of Pericles as recorded by Thucydides; cf. Lengauer 1979: 25–26, who adduces relevant passages; cf. Cartledge 2001: 161.

[20]   See Dover's (1974: 229–234) discussion on *philotimia*: he quotes on this occasion several sources, e.g. Lycurgus, *Leocr.* 15; cf. Bassi 2003: 32–37. According to the Xenophontic definition of glory, it relies essentially on bravery (*Resp. Lac.* 9.2: δῆλον δὲ ὅτι καὶ εὔκλεια μάλιστα ἕπεται τῇ ἀρετῇ; ed. E.C. Marchant).

[21]   Cf. Thucydides, 7.77.4; 8.83; 8.97.1, with the comment of Hornblower (2008: 1034): "hoplite constitution;" Aristotle, *Polit.* 1297b, 1–2. At Thucydides, 6.21.1, Nicias gives advice that the Athenians must take not only a fleet and less worthy crews but a large body of infantry, especially if they want to do something worthy of their plans (οὐ ναυτικῆς καὶ φαύλου στρατιᾶς μόνον δεῖ, ἀλλὰ καὶ πεζὸν πολὺν ξυμπλεῖν, εἴπερ βουλόμεθα ἄξιον τῆς διανοίας δρᾶν).

with Tyrtaeus,[22] Aeschylus (*Persae*, 240),[23] and many others.[24] The same conviction was proudly manifested in Greek art (vase painting or sculpture – e.g. the friezes of the Lycian Nereid Monument from Xanthus; cf. Hölscher 1998: 155;[25] Childs/Demargne 1989: pl. 20 [BM 859], 54 [BM 875], 55 [BM 871L]). It is therefore claimed nowadays that the nostalgic voices heard from ancient elite writers prove, at best, their strong pretentions to cultural dominance in a *polis* society (Snodgrass 1999: 77). This hoplite ideology, it is additionally argued, was thus a social phenomenon at its roots; its goal was to create a strong sense of identity (Ober 1996: 60). It expressed civic ethics, the communal values of *polis* citizenry, where honor and courage were praised and highlighted not as abstract ideals but as true virtues of the *politai* who, serving in amateur armies, defended their possessions (Raaflaub 1999: 137) and thus proved a deep "commitment to their native city" (Krasilnikoff 1992: 28, n. 16; cf. Mitchell 1996: 98). The glorifying of the hoplites was made, of course, at the expense of "the others," less well-to-do groups participating in war: either non-elite city-dwellers who could not afford heavy armor and fought as light infantry (cf. Thuc. 4.80.5; 4.90.1; 7.57–58.3; 8.25; cf. van Wees 1995: 162–164; Raaflaub 2007: 132; Krentz 2010: 44–45), served as naval crews, or the slaves who were the attendants (*skeuophoroi*) – in a word, all those who were ideologically excluded and their role either diminished or simply omitted (Anderson 1970: Chapter 7; Loraux 1986: 162; Osborne 1987: 140–141; 2000: 28ff.; Strauss 1996: 313–314; Hunt 1998: 190–191; van Wees 2004: 61–76; Miller 2010: 331–332).

When dealing with the socio-political conditions in the fourth century BC especially, it has often been pointed out of late that this phenomenon still remains particularly visible, but the military reality was different (Xen., *Hell*. 4.3.15). Rather, Delbrück's (1900: 115) famous old verdict may here be quoted as representative for such an interpretation: he spoke of "Der allmählige Übergang vom Bürger-Kriegerthum zum Sold-Kriegerthum," and in this view, it is further claimed, the voices of the ancient observers like Demostenes and others were highly distorted. Around the middle of the fourth century warfare certainly become more complicated, for, as Sekunda (1994: 192) put it aptly, "Hoplite infantry ceased to be the queen of the battlefield" – already the famous bloodbath which the Athenian light-armed troops under Iphicrates (cf. Aeneas, 24.16; Sage 1996: 144) managed to inflict on the Spartan *mora* at Lechaeum in 390 BC may be recalled as a representative example of this process (Xen., *Hell*. 4.5.10–17).[26] In effect,

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[22]   Tyrtaeus, fr. 11, 4 West; cf. Ducrey 1986: 61.

[23]   Bovon 1963: 580–584, figs. 1–4 and 7; 589, fig. 13; Hodkinson 1983: 256; Lissarague 1990: 13ff. and Lissarrague 2002: 113ff.

[24]   Ps.-Hesiod. *Scut*. 139ff. (ed. F. Solmsen); Callinus, fr. 1, 10 West, *IEG*; Euripides, *Her*. 157–164; Plut., *Lac. Apopht*. = *Mor*. 220A; *Inst. Lac*. 34 = *Mor*. 239B; also Horace, *Carm*. 2.7.10 and Valerius Maximus, 6.3.1. The opposite – abandoning the arms – meant cowardice: Archilochus, fr. 5 West; Alcaeus, fr. 357, 15 Lobel & Page; Anacreon, fr. 381b Page, *PMG*; Theophrastus, *Char*. 25.3–6.

[25]   Hölscher's analysis pertains to Athens, but his observation in fact remains valid when one regards manifestations of hoplite values.

[26]   There were other famous precedents in the fifth century BC, reported by Thucydides (cf. Best 1969: 17–18). Here I omit the problem of what hoplite fighting really looked like in the archaic age (cf. Schwartz 2009: 102–105). Opinions vary. In his study, P. Krentz (2000: 183–199) gives an extremely useful and suggestive list of cases of deception in Greek warfare: it seems as if less honest means of conducting the wars were always accepted and employed by the Greeks (cf. Polyb. 9.12.1–5). It is also clear that there was quite

what we should bear in mind is a gap between the literary or pictorial representation and the less obvious importance (not to speak of dominance) of the heavy infantrymen in warfare in the times of Demostenes (and Aeneas).

Additionally, the problem is complicated by the question of whether communal values prove the existence of "a middle class,"[27] as Aristotle suggested in *Politics* (1297b, 16; with Robinson 1995: 109–111; cf. Andrewes 1974: 34; see *Hell. Oxyrh.* 6.3, cf. McKechnie/Kern 1988: 133).[28] Were the hoplites a relatively homogenous political group (*mesoi*, farmers; Lazenby 1989: 78; Ober 1996: 60; Raaflaub 1999: 135), bound by sharing the same values,[29] or was the structure of heavy infantry forces in a *city* hierarchical by its nature (van Wees 2004: Chapter 4; but see Schwartz 2009: 175), consisting of men of different social statuses and backgrounds,[30] who strove (see Plato, *Resp.* 556c–d; van Wees 2002: 70 ff.), if opportunity permitted (Burliga 2012), for personal glory and excellence, often in the mode of Homeric heroes?

Aeneas' handbook is an interesting piece of evidence in this respect.

4. Old veteran's testimony

If we had to answer the last question, it should be stated that the author suggests the latter be true, rather than the former – as far as the situation in the mid-fourth century BC is at stake (cf. 10.20; 14.1). No honest hoplite ideal of "arms and valor" (ὅπλα καὶ ἀρετή – Xen., *Anab.* 2.1.12; trans. C.L. Brownson, Loeb) is praised by him in an open way. It was always a striking feature of Aeneas' work that his view is that of the soldier and pragmatist: first of all, the only thing he believes in without any restrictions is careful preparation (*praef.* 3: παρασκευῆς); the second is the fundamental rule of "trusting no one" (1.3; 22.7). As a result, as has been mentioned above, at first glance he stands above the "ideological" prejudices and the diseases of factionalism of his day (cf. 11.7–11.10: the episode at Argos). But even if Aeneas was a careful disciple of the sophists and their ways of teaching, it would be naive to assume that he was totally indifferent to what he was analyzing. If anything, the gloomy social reality in a fourth-century *polis* provides a true basis for his book (see e.g. Chapter 10), so everything he advises is inevitably based on the presumption that *polis* society is deeply divided and civil strife always remains an potential and imminent danger (cf. also *Hell. Oxyrh.* 17.1). Since the lack of agreement among the citizens is an established fact and the mutual distrust remains a common, daily matter, these factors must have been taken into account by any com-

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a wide spectrum of hoplite activities "beyond phalanx" (in L. Rawling's phrase 2000: 234) in which hoplites were useful (cf. also especially Ober 1994: 174–190; see too Anderson 1970: 138–140).

[27]   Or, taken in more general terms, beginning already in the archaic epoch, with a "middling tradition," as some scholars maintain (Morris 1996: 28, term; at p. 35). Morris maintains that phalanx "became the standard image for citizen solidarity").

[28]   Regarding Athens, cf. *Resp. Ath.* 7.4.

[29]   See the discussion by Hall 2007: 162.

[30]   As it is assumed today that not every infantryman in a phalanx wore a full hoplite panoply; see the discussion in Krentz 2010: 40–44. If the depository at Olimpia can be a guide, breastplates were the rarest type of armor.

mander of a city under attack. In this way, it is obvious, social circumstances determined military steps: the latter are undertaken in a response to the actual, political situation. Where, then, according to Aeneas, should the remedy be sought?

My answer to this question is less obvious than those given in many excellent books and commentaries on this author. Although far from any open enthusiasm for hoplite bravery and manliness (ἀνδρεῖα), honor (τιμή) or shame (αἰδώς), Aeneas saw the best solution in relative terms to the problem in appealing to and relying on the "old" civic ideology. It is communal values (see Thuc., 2.42.2; cf. note 43, below) that are praised, and in fact, in his view the whole idea of defending the city is embedded in this.[31] It is plain, then, that such ideology could not have been exposed by an experienced soldier without illusions in an ostentatious way, and that in this respect the author's language is far more reserved than it was in the case of the other members of the literate elite. Nevertheless, it is present in Aenas' *poliorketike biblos*, and this is less surprising than one might expect from an experienced mercenary captain.[32]

How is it possible to detect traces of this traditional hoplite rhetoric in Aeneas' booklet? In two ways, I think.

The first is relatively clear to acknowledge. The civic ideology may easily seen by reminding ourselves of Aeneas' judgment of the "others" in a *polis.* Generally, the others are for him foreigners, dangerous especially, if comprising a military force (Bengtson 1962: 467; Aymard 1967: 303–304). One might say that in his military calculations, they are certainly Aeneas' obsession[33] – it would be appropriate here to invoke the famous phrase of Thucydides (3.109.5): when the historian describes hired men in the army of Amprakiots battling the Athenians and Acarnanians in 426 BC, he uses a derogatory tone: τὸν μισθοφόρον ὄχλον [τὸν ξενικόν] ("mercenary followers;" trans. R. Warner; cf. also Aeneas, 8.25).[34] It was no different (not surprisingly) with Aeneas. From his perspective, as he just suggests it, the best solution would be to avoid the presence of the others inside the walls, but this is of course a dream (cf. 24.1), so military employment of the *xenoi* must be done with utmost caution (13.1: Ἂν δὲ δέη ξενοτροφεῖν, ὧδε ἂν ἀσφαλέστατα γίγνοιτο; see Ducrey 1986: 133–134). Paid soldiers are constantly contrasted by Aeneas with city dwellers (cf. also Demosthenes, 4.25), hence Aeneas' great emphasis on the walls (cf. McK Camp II 2000: 47). At 3.3 and 22.29 he narrates the cases when the walls of the *polis* are guarded by the allied forces: φρουρίου ὑπὸ συμμάχων φρουρουμένου. No doubt, according to the author, such a solution creates a highly dangerous situation, as in the opinion of the writer they provide "a potential source of trouble" (Whitehead 1990: 104). Likewise, at 22.19 he advises keeping the ways up to the wall kept closed. Of exceptional importance is the famous chapter concerning the proclamation of the "An-

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[31]   On this cf. Wheeler 2007: lxi; see Moggi 2002: 205.

[32]   H. van Wees (2004: 76) rightly reminds us that the ideal of the hoplite citizen was still alive at the end of the fourth century; in fact, hoplite sentiments were strong in the Hellenistic epoch – as Chaniotis (2005: 21, 79) points out, the epigraphical data prove that the rise of professional armies did not mean an end to the citizen militias: "in many, if not most, Hellenistic cities, citizen armies survived and were an important element of local pride;" see also Ma 2000.

[33]   As Trundle (2004: 30) has observed, it is ironic that "the Greek mercenaries who served outside the Greek mainland were themselves hoplites," whereas those "who fought for the Greek cities themselves did so with servile and non-Greek weapons;" cf. especially Roy 2004: 270.

[34]   See Bettalli 1995: 132–133.

nouncements" (Κηρύγματα). On the eve of the enemy approaching the walls (9.1: Ἂν δὲ θρασύνεσθαί τι ἐπιχειρῶσιν οἱ ἐπιόντες πρὸς σέ), severe restrictions against the mercenary forces standing in the city must be issued: so, at 10.7 every citizen is forbidden Στρατιώτας μὴ μισθοῦσθαι μηδὲ ἑαυτὸν μισθοῦν ἄνευ τῶν ἀρχόντων (to "hire soldiers, or to serve as a soldier for hire, without permission of the authorities"), whilst at 10.9 "foreigners arriving must carry their weapons openly and ready to hand" (Ξένους τοὺς ἀφικνουμένους τὰ ὅπλα ἐμφανῆ καὶ πρόχειρα φέρειν). Special proclamations (10.18–19) must be issued to the mercenary troops (ξενικῷ στρατοπέδῳ). Most of all, such an army cannot be numerically superior to citizen troops; if it is, the community inevitably falls under the mercenaries' control (ἀεὶ χρὴ ὑπερέχειν πλήθει καὶ δυνάμει τοὺς ἐπαγομένους πολίτας τῶν ξένων· εἰ δὲ μή, ἐπ᾽ ἐκείνοις γίγνονται αὐτοί τε καὶ ἡ πόλις). The same remains true of a piece of advice sounding like a proverb (12.4; cf. also 12.3) that Δεῖ οὖν μήποτε εἰς πόλιν οἰκείαν μείζω δύναμιν ἐπακτὸν δέχεσθαι τῆς ὑπαρχούσης τοῖς πολίταις, ξένοις τε χρωμένην ἀεὶ δεῖ τὴν πόλιν πολλῷ ὑπερέχειν τῆς τῶν ξένων δυνάμεως· οὐ γὰρ ἀσφαλὲς ξενοκρατεῖσθαι καὶ ἐπὶ μισθοφόροις γίγνεσθαι. Especially striking is Aeneas' warning that mercenaries (ξενικὸν: 23.11) are generally the *a priori* hostile element not only in a city but near it, if they are at the disposal of an enemy who aims at seizing a *polis* (11.8 – the case of Argos; 18.13 – the case of Teos; 24.6: ξένους τεθωρακισμένους under Charidemus; 28.5 – the case of Clazomenae). One of the most emotionally passages certainly remains that at 24.8, where the author ends the story of Charidemus by writing that when his mercenary force entered the city (Ὅπου δὴ εὐθὺς οἱ εἰσελθόντες), it "got to work (ἔργου εἴχοντο), killing the gatekeeper (τόν τε πυλωρὸν ἀποκτείναντες) and generally behaving as mercenaries do" (καὶ εἰς ἄλλας ξένας πράξεις ὁρμήσαντες) – again, the last remark is close to the opinions expressed by such keen observers as Thucydides, 7.28–30 (on the Thracian mercenaries and their annihilation of the Boeotian city of Mycalessus; cf. Hornblower 2008: 599), Polyb. 13.6.4 (on the mercenaries of Nabis; cf. Walbank 1967: 420, referring to Theopompus, *FGrH* 115, F 225), or Polyaenus, 2.30.1 (Clearchus' hired troops).[35]

All these passages leave no doubt that Aeneas' attitude towards the ubiquitous phenomenon of the mercenary service is characterized by great dislike (cf. Best 1969: 126–127, who speaks of "gangs of mercenaries;" also Bettalli 1990: 26–27). The difficulty with the author's attitude, supposing that he was a hired soldier, is hard to explain unless we assume that his condemnation of mercenary military garrisons stationing in the cities (not to speak of the mercenary army awaiting outside the walls; cf. Isocr. 5.120–121; cf. Bugh 2011: 74) was based on grounds different than military ones:[36] it must indicate that there were other reasons for doing so. Be that as it may, this does not mean that

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[35] See Isocrates' *Evagoras* (9.8–10) and *Philip* (5.96, with Landucci Gattinoni 2001: 74). A more positive picture of mercenaries and their milieu is given by Menander (see Bugh 2011: 73–74), although his perspective is that of a playwright.

[36] Trundle (1999: 30) thinks the picture of a well-disciplined mercenary army of Jason of Pherae in Xenophon, *Hell.* 6.1.4–7 is positive. This is true, as it highlights the professionalism of the mercenaries and relates to Jason's military regime, which was in fact clearly different from the world of the Greek *polis* communities (cf. Sprawski 1999: 111). Like Xenophon (cf. *Hiero*, 10.6–8, with Gray 2007: 141; *Equit. mag.* 9.3–4; *Hell.* 4.4.16: the Arcadian hoplites avoided a pitched battle with the peltasts under Iphicrates; on the other hand, the same peltasts feared the Lacedaemonian heavy infantry); Aeneas was also very much aware that the amateur army (6.2: οἱ ἄπειροι τάξεων καὶ πολέμου) might be less effective than the troops of the

by the same token the citizen-militias (1.1: τῶν σωμάτων σύνταξιν; 1.5: σώματα; 2.1: σωμάτων; 3.1: τοὺς πολίτας; cf. Raaflaub 1999: 137) were an ideal solution to the dif-ficulties an ordinary city met in the face of siege. Yet in such circumstances as he wit-nessed them, civic militiamen appeared in the eyes of a conservative observer to be the only remaining remedy.

A constant factor in Aeneas' thinking is that a city under siege may be captured not only by an assault carried by an invading enemy force (16.1: τοὺς ἐμβεβληκότας; 23.6: οἱ δὲ καὶ ἔξωθεν; 29.2: ἔξωθέν τι φοβερὸν), even if it is great (8.1), but by the treason of its inhabitants, as there are many plotters inside the city (1.6: τοῖς ἐναντία θέλουσιν ἐν τῇ πόλει; 10.3: τῶν ἐπιβουλευόντων; 10.14: τινὰ ἐπιβουλεύοντα τῇ πόλει; 14.1; 23.6: οἱ μὲν ἔσω τῆς πόλεως; 29.2: ἔσωθεν φοβερὸν).[37] Unanimity (10.20;[38] 14.1) is thus a condi-tion much desired by the city-commander, and it sometimes happens (22.21; cf. Gehrke 1985: 357–358, n. 11). But most often it happened that the opposite was true (17.1). From the point of view of a *strategos*, the majority of his efforts must have concerned the establishment of a firm group of supporters (1.5; 1.6): their help is compared by the author to the role of a citadel in a city (ἀντ' ἀκροπόλεως); they must be τῶν πολιτῶν τοὺς πιστοτάτους ("the most trustworthy citizens;" see 1.4; cf. also Onesander, *Strat.* 2.2–3: τοὺς εὐνουστάτους τῇ πατρίδι, πιστοτάτους, εὐρωστοτάτους), satisfied with the actual government (1.6: εὔνους τε καὶ τοῖς καθεστηκόσι πράγμασιν); elsewhere, at 9.3, their presence is also taken for granted by Aeneas (τοῖς μὲν φιλίοις θάρσος ἐμποιήσεις).

Having discussed the author's bias against the others, we may pass to the second argument and adduce the evidence that shows how important (and crucial, in fact) the loyalty of the citizens was for him; by the same token this latter case will show how indispensable the same citizens were in exercising their military functions – as χάλκεοι ἄνδρες, "the men of bronze" (to recall Herodotus' famous phrase, 2.152.3) serving in phalanx for the defense of the city under siege and therefore proving that in the author's days they still mattered and by no means constituted "dinosaurs" (to quote Professor Hanson's famous comparison).[39]

To begin with, we must recall something obvious and trivial. It is worth remem-bering that Aeneas understands "siege" – to follow Korus (1969: 511) and Whitehead (1990: 20) – in the broadest possible sense (cf. 10.20: ἐν πολιορκίᾳ; see also 10.23); the term encompasses the time when peace still holds (Chapters 1–14; cf. 22.26: Ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἀκινδυνοτέροις; ἀκινδύνων δὲ καὶ εἰρηναίων) and when the enemy is approaching and the invasion of "our" territory becomes a fact (4.1; 4.5; 7.1; 10.23; Chapters 15–30; cf. 23.1: τοῖς προσκαθημένοις πολεμίοις; 32.1: Πρὸς δὲ τὰς τῶν ἐναντίων προσαγωγὰς σώμασιν). Such a broad understanding of the term "siege" has important consequences for the author's whole line of argument, since the bulk of military actions on the part of the defenders is undertaken outside the walls, in the hinterland – the city's countryside (cf. Xen., *Mem.* 3.5.27; cf. Burford Cooper 1973: 162); as a consequence, a relevant

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trained mercenaries (cf. Parke 1933: 20–22). However, in the situation that is the subject matter of his hand-book, there is no choice – loyalty is a much more important value (cf. 1.4; 1.6; 10.11).

[37]   See Bryant (1996: 244–245), who speaks of "the decomposition of the Polis-citizen bond."

[38]   A famous chapter which is used as a source of information on the social conditions in a fourth-century *polis.*

[39]   Hanson 1999: 321–349.

(quite large) part of the treatise deals by necessity with the question of sending sorties and regular army in order to prevent any land assault (1.2: Τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ἐκπορευομένους; 1.5: εἴς τε τὰς ἐξόδους; 4.5: τὰ ἀποστελλόμενα ἐκ τῆς πόλεως) and field operations (4.5: ἐπί τινα πρᾶξιν) – otherwise an old form of warfare, as Thucydides has already noted (1.15.2).

All such advice is firmly based on a broader, fundamental conviction that the survival of a *polis* is crucial for the citizens' identity (cf. Whitehead 1991: 144; Foxhall 1993: 143). It is striking to observe how grand, if not bombastic vocabulary is used on this occasion by the old-fashioned mercenary soldier. Suffice it to say that in one place he calls such a possibility a misery (18.2: κακουργεῖται). Such "civic" philosophy resembles not only the famous remarks Aristotle presented in his *Politics*, according to whom *polis* constituted the framework of a civic life, but – above all (and unsurprisingly) – the political "philosophy" recorded by Thucydides in the second half of the fifth century (Lengauer 1974: 24; 1979: 25).[40] The loss of a *polis* is viewed as a potential catastrophe, so in the solemn language in which *the Preface* is composed, the native territory is contrasted by Aeneas to a life abroad, spent in the mode of exiles (*praef.* 1; cf. Kulesza 1998: 110 quoting Tyrtaeus, fr. 10 West). The existence of the "native soil and state and fatherland" (οἰκεία τε χώρα καὶ πόλις καὶ πατρίς) is thus essential for being a Greek and human likewise (cf. Ostwald 2000: 50);[41] equally, saving the ἱερῶν καὶ πατρίδος καὶ γονέων καὶ τέκνων ("shrines and fatherland and parents and childrens": *praef.* 2) is included by Aeneas in "the fundamentals" (τῶν μεγίστων; *praef.* § 3: ὑπὲρ τοσούτων καὶ τοιούτων; cf. Garlan 1974: 20; Hansen 2004: 49–52) and his civic rhetoric may be compared to the values defended by the Athenians in the times of the Persian wars (Herodotus, 8.144.2); nothing, in fact, the author argues, can be compared to the doom of the *polis* when a siege will appear successful – there will be οὐδεμία ἐλπὶς σωτηρίας ὑπάρξει ("no hope of salvation;" Bettalli 1990: 212; Foxhall 1993: 143; Kulesza 1998: 112).[42] There is little doubt that Aeneas would agree with an anonymous writer that *polis*, i.e. *oikiai*, *chora* and *ktemata* (possessions), enable a good life (*pros to eu dzen*; Ps.- Aristotle, *Oec*. 1343a,10).

These appeals to communal, civic values are relatively clear in Aeneas' work, although no open hoplite chauvinism or snobbery, even less any Xenophontic aesthetic delight of the visual beauty of hoplite ranks, can be detected. On the contrary, generally this is far from the case. Nevertheless, bearing in mind that there is no rule without an exception, occasionally the author departs from his usually cold approach. There are four places in his handbook where he formulates something more than a mere appreciation of hoplite troops, thus bringing him nearer to the civic sentiments held by Isocrates or voices expressed by Demosthenes.

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[40]   Pointed out especially in Thucydides' version of the speech of Nicias at 7.61.1; 7.64.2; 7.69.2; cf. 7.75.5 (on the retreat of the Athenian army during the war against Syracuse): οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἢ πόλει ἐκπεπολιορκημένη ἐῴκεσαν ὑποφευγούσῃ.

[41]   It does not differ in tone from the famous oath of the Athenian ephebes (= Lycurg, *Leocr*. 77): ἀμυνῶ δὲ καὶ ὑπὲρ ἱερῶν καὶ ὁσίων καὶ ο<ὐ>κ ἐλάττω παραδώσω τὴν πατρίδα; cf. Tod 1948: 303, no. 204 = Rhodes/Osborne 2003: no. 88; cf. also Xen., *Hiero*, 4.4.

[42]   Recalling the later treatment of the Thebans by King Alexander after capturing the city in 335–334 BC; cf. also Thuc. 7.71.7 and especially 7.85–87.

The first of them appears at 15.8 and concerns the episode of the victory of the Abderites over the invading army of the Thracian Triballians; this was a typical victory of the defenders who fought after making "their dispositions for battle" (παράταξιν ποιησάμενοι; cf. note 8, above),[43] while the enemy, conversely, presented a "large and warlike horde" (πλῆθος πολὺ καὶ μάχιμον); the result was formulated by Aeneas in a more affectionless tone, recalling the language known from funerary orations: the former "won a fine victory" (κάλλιστον ἔργον εἰργάσαντο).

Of the second case, that of 16.4, mention was already made above: it narrates the organizing of ἄλλη βοήθεια, when the invaders ravage the defenders' land. Leaving aside the details of the operation, one meets the interesting phrase that the enemies "march from the outset with their strongest forces at the ready (τὸ ἰσχυρότατον αὐτῶν ἐν τάξει ἄγουσι), expecting an attack 'to be launched' against them and primed to repel it." Here some modern controversy arose as to what to do with the phrase τὸ ἰσχυρότατον ἐν τάξει. D. Whitehead (1990: 141) suspected peltasts here, on the grounds that they are described in the next § 5. Such an interpretation seems to be unconvincing, however: here τὸ ἰσχυρότατον must mean heavy infantry, rather than light-armed troops (cf. 16.7), as it is Aeneas himself who concedes that such a force looked forward to a pitched battle (προσδεχόμενοί τινας ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτοὺς <ἰέναι> καὶ ἑτοίμως ἔχοντες ἀμύνεσθαι). For my purposes, the importance of the phrase again relies on the author's vocabulary, as he is simply thinking along traditional lines, regarding infantry militiamen as "the strongest" part of each army.

The third passage, at 16.11, is even more revealing. It concerns a case where the plundering of the territory is already advanced, and native forces have failed to prevent it. The writer advises managing a false pursuit of the retreating enemy, employing only small forces. The main task of recapturing booty from the plunderers who are withdrawing slowly and making dinner is put down on the ἄλλο δὲ πλῆθος ("the main body"). Here Aeneas is more precise: he adds that a section of this main army, reaching the borders along unknown roads, is ἀξιόχρεος δύναμις (μετὰ ἀξιοχρέου δυνάμεως). The passage is hardly easy to explain. It seems to be a rhetorical pleonasm, so Whitehead (1990: 63) renders it as "the main body – a considerable one;" earlier on, Hunter and Handford (1927: 35) understood it as "the main army, in full strength," while Oldfather (2001: 83) took it to signify the "army as a whole, in considerable strength." But what in this context does the Ionic adjective ἀξιόχρεος (Hunter/Handford 1927: lxiv) mean? As *LSJ⁹* (*s.v.*, 171) explains it, the primary meaning is "worthy" (Herodotus, 5.65: ἀξιόχρεα ἀπηγήσιος), "worthy of a thing," "noteworthy" – again as in Herodotus, 5.111 (ὑπὸ ἀξιοχρέου καὶ ἀποθανεῖν). It would be justified to say that Aeneas perhaps made an evaluation here, stressing that in the whole army *its* most valuable part should be excelled (cf. Beekes 2010: 111) – to be sure he stops to indicate what part was at stake, yet given the nature of the military operation and the author's other laudatory remarks in the treatise, there remains litle room for doubt that hoplite forces were meant – what's more, it may also be supposed that ἄλλο δὲ πλῆθος was purportedly contrasted in this sentence to the best part of the army – ἀξιόχρεος δύναμις.[44]

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[43]   Oldfather (2001) renders the phrase as: "formed in a battle array."

[44]   The sentiment connected with heavy armed infantrymen has left a clear mark in later military literature, the so-called *Tactica*. In the three standard treatises, by Asclepiodotus (*Tact.* 1.2), Aelian (*Tact.* 2.6), and Arrian (*Tact.* 3.1–2), the traditional division into hoplites, light-armed and peltasts is retained.

The last significant example of Aeneas' traditional outlook is found at 27.9. Here the soldiers in the army of the Spartan harmost Euphratas are called "more worthwhile men" (τῶν πουδαιοτέρων ἀνδρῶν) and "of the interior sort" (τῶν δὲ φαύλων).[45] Scholars speculate as to what the basis for such an evaluation was. Hunter and Handford (1927: 191) maintained that the Spartan hoplites experienced such a fear; Whitehead (1990: 176) cites the opinion of M. Cary, who believed they were mercenaries. Be that as it may, one thing cannot escape the notice of the modern reader: again Aeneas did not hesitate to employ a strong vocabulary, albeit it is not wholly clear if he was thinking in social or purely military terms (Whitehead 1990: 176). However, following Oldfather's interpretation (2001: 141: "more respectable soldiers – one of baser sort"), it would again be tempting to suppose that at the heart of such military contrast lay the author's civic sympathies.[46]

The last question is that of the writer's interest in the problems concerning the army itself. Since the subject-matter of Aeneas' handbook is siege, battles and tactics remain essentially beyond his interest (n. 8, above), although no one can arbitrarily reject the possibility that the theme was treated by him in full in the lost treatises on *Preparations* (ἐν δὲ τῷ Παρασκευαστικῷ: 21.1; cf. 8.5), or in the *Encampment* (ἐν τῇ Στρατοπεδευτικῇ βίβλῳ: 21.2). Relying, however, on what remained, one must concede that besides the case of *hoplitai/politai* at 15.5, D. Barends (1955: 98) quotes only three other places where the noun ὁπλίται occurs in the text. If one realizes that the first cursorily refers to an old battlefield custom of the Cyreneaean citizens (16.15: *hoplitai en taksei genomenoi*), and the second (17.4) is Meineke's emendation ὁπλ<ί>των of MS' lesson τῶν προσαλισθέντων ὅπλων (not accepted by other scholars; cf. Barends 1955: 98; Bettalli 1990: 272), the last remaining instance is that from Chapter 16.7, where the MS reads τοὺς δ' ὁπλίτας ἀθρόους ἐν τάξει. There is also the participle ὁπλίζοντα (16.3), referring to a commander who must equip his men with "arms and armor" (Whitehead's 1990: 61–62 rendering; cf. Barends 1955: 98). A similar case constitutes the noun φάλαγξ, which is found in the text only one time (at 29.9: ὡς φάλαγξι γενομένου) in its technical sense of "battle formation" (see also Hunter/Handford 1927: 75). All the examples leave nothing but a plain impression: they are surprisingly few. But, as I have said above, although the theme of battle tactics is "essentially" absent from the book, only the above sketchy comments indicate that the theme was not omitted by the mercenary captain "totally." And it could not be, of course, as a crucial thing should be noted: although the presence of hoplites in a *polis* during a siege is by no means highlighted by Aeneas in a special way, reading the treatise shows that their usefulness still remained crucial in his days – in an objective sense, so to speak (Cartledge 1987: 43). Again, such a conviction comes from the fact that it was the hoplite "class,"[47] whose loyalty might guarantee a relative

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[45] Hunter/Handford 1927: 69: "best men" – "less valuable men."

[46] An analogy might be a passage from Thuc. 3.98.4; narrating the Athenian loss at Aegition in Aetolia, he adds that among the casualties there were about 120 hoplites whom he calls "the best men" (βέλτιστοι δὴ ἄνδρες ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τῷδε ἐκ τῆς Ἀθηναίων πόλεως διεφθάρησαν; cf. also 3.92.2; cf. generally Loraux 1975: 1 and 25); this term raises the controversy of who these men were (see Gomme 1956: 407–408). I believe the vocabulary is social, that is the main stress is laid on the fact that they were the citizens – the most valuable soldiers. The same way of thinking is in Aeneas. To put it briefly, he does not refer to the status of these men and in this sense his standpoint is "civic," so to speak.

[47] A term used by Ober 1996 and Raaflaub 1999.

protection of *polis*, men ready to defend its property behind the walls (cf. esp. 7.1; see Ducrey 1986: 61).[48] By the way, remembering that "the pitched-battle mentality" (see n. 9, above) is difficult to find in Aeneas, it is not wholly true that Aeneas is uninterested in the problems of an army during a campaign. The most visible case for this is that coming from Chapter 6.2, where he does discuss the emotions of the average rank-and-file soldier after the loss of a battle (cf. Lysias 16.15). The picture is particularly vivid and proves him to be a keen and insightful observer. In the same vein, like a forerunner of the modern "face of battle" approach, at 26.7–8 Aeneas devotes some perceptive remarks to the lack of spirit and courage among the soldiers, whose army suffered from losses (cf. Salazar 2000: 7). By the same token, it is clear that the author's attention frequently focuses on the more substantial problems with a civic army and its lack of experience (6.2: *apeiroi takseon kai polemou*; see note 35, above),[49] so the result is a wearisome monotony in his constant advice to keep order, both among the citizens within a *polis* (1.4; 1.5; 3.1; 3.4) and among those who went on campaign (1.5–7; 15.2–3).

To sum up, the perspective adopted by Aeneas in his treatise is thoroughly that of a citizen. He introduces himself to the reader as militiaman, fully conscious of the difficulties related to the *polis* amateur army, raised up on the eve of emergency. Above all, he was a realist, knowing perfectly well what difficulties faced a community under siege. This sense of reality pervades the treatise itself, but it cannot be confined to military matters only. It is also visible in the author's open recognition of communal values. In other words, Aeneas seems to have stood far from sophistic, "anthropological" approaches toward society, and in this respect he was not a disciple of the sophists. As a consequence, one may also claim that by no means should he be called a man whose attitude denounced the more "cosmopolitan" attitudes of the world of the Hellenistic kingdoms. Conversely – he should rather be listed among the men whose mentality and way of reasoning was inseparable from that of the dwellers of a small city.

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[48]   It is striking that Aeneas has surprisingly little to say about the cavalry. He evidently presupposes that not every *polis* maintains cavalry troops; if so, its role is supporting: cf. 6.6; 8.4; 26.4; cf. Xen., *Equit. mag.* 4.7–11; see Ducrey 1986: 102. By the way, this brings to mind the relatively higher evaluation of the service in infantry troops than in cavalry, cf. Lysias, 14.11; see Liers 1895: 88–89.

[49]   Sparta was an exception, see Xen., *Mem.* 3.9.2; Plut., *Pelop.* 23.4.

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