

Counter-intelligence in anti-terrorist operations

Essay on relations

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Game

Many years ago, during a lecture on the sociology of internal security, I was asked by students to answer the question: what are the special services? This apparent attempt by the sociology students to systematise their knowledge provoked a lively discussion. I asked them to try to provide an answer themselves. All the definitions turned out to be more or less accurate. Almost every time, the word “secret” or a synonym thereof - “classified” - appeared. The most difficult part was trying to include operational activities (which, unlike the special services, are after all described in detail in legislation) in the definition, as the sheer number of services with powers to do so is impressive. I remembered an interesting statement that “special” are such services as the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau or the State Protection Service, because (note!) they “specialise” in fighting corruption or protecting the authorities. Another definition does not mention services with investigative powers (Central Anti-Corruption Bureau, Internal Security Agency). The argument? *Because they are simply police services.* However, the most interesting thing in one definition was

the exclusion of the Foreign Intelligence Agency, the Military Intelligence Service and the Military Counterintelligence Service from the catalogue of special services. It has been argued that these are not special services, but intelligence services (this point of view is also prevalent in the literature¹).

Just when it seemed that the group was reaching an agreement on a definition, someone questioned one of the elements of the proposal under discussion. The more inquisitive looked for other meanings of the words making up the definition, and those with better scientific skills wondered whether it could not also be applied to other elements of the state security system and beyond. One student asked: *Why only states? And can't a criminal organisation or a large corporation have its own secret service?* The final result of the work did not fully satisfy everyone, but for all that, everyone learned and understood what special services are.

Over the years, I have encouraged this game for both students at universities and officers in training. The discussion has always gone the same way and ended with the same conundrums. For fortunately, there are equally wise definitions in wise textbooks by wise professionals, which wise lecturers demand from wise (!) listeners.

Signboard

The history of secret, special, intelligence and similar services is as old as the history of the organisation of people into close-knit social groups. Historians, however, find it difficult to reconstruct the process of formation and operation of such services in ancient Egypt, the Roman or Macedonian Empires, or in Poland in the times of the Piasts or Jagiellons. This is probably because, for example, the noble Chancellor Mikołaj Trąba, the right hand of King Władysław Jagiełło, when he set up intelligence services, did not give them such names as the Crown Intelligence Agency, the Excellent Royal Counterintelligence Service or the Bureau for Exceptional and Special Monarchical Tasks. Instead, in the twentieth century, services of all kinds entered the heyday of signboards. Agencies, services, bureaus. Intelligence, counterintelligence, security. Special, exceptional,

¹ See: R. Faligot, R. Kauffer, *Śłużby specjalne. Historia wywiadu i kontrwywiadu na świecie* (Eng. Special Services. A history of intelligence and counterintelligence in the world), Warszawa 2006; Z. Siemiątkowski, A. Zięba, *Śłużby specjalne we współczesnym państwie*, (Special services in the modern state), Warszawa 2016.

extraordinary. Nowadays, it takes longer to come up with a good name and logo than it does to draft a piece of legislation creating a service. And there are countless services.

In many countries, colleges of services - like professional parliaments - are being set up with marshals as coordinators at a very high level. It has come to the point where heads of service make foreign visits and hold talks, sometimes bypassing foreign ministers. The change of service chief is a news event and by the time he enters his office for the first time, his CV can already be seen in the media. The secret services are no longer secret, but mainstream. Gone are the days when, for example, an “office supplies warehouse manager” would enter a discreet meeting with a head of state through the back door and provide reliable intelligence.

Basis for operation

Let us consider further (absolutely not of a definitional nature!) that the essence of special services is specialised or operational activities focused on a specific phenomenon (e.g. Central Anti-Corruption Bureau, State Protection Service), and the essence of intelligence services is the acquisition of information and exerting influence in a covert manner (e.g. Foreign Intelligence Agency, Military Intelligence Service, Internal Security Agency, Military Counterintelligence Service). Therefore, the question should be asked, where to place anti-terrorist activities in this system? Unfortunately, there is no clear answer to this question, and it is related to two elements. The first is the strategic objective that the state sets for itself in relation to anti-terrorist activities, and the second is the main location of the anti-terrorist division. If the state’s strategic objective is to arrest members of a terrorist group and the operations are concentrated in the police, then of course the anti-terrorist division will be a police service. If the state’s strategic objective is to take control of a terrorist group and activities are concentrated in counter-intelligence, then the anti-terrorist division will be an intelligence service. If, on the other hand, the strategic objective is to dismantle a terrorist group and activities are concentrated in a separate service dedicated to this task, the anti-terrorist division will be a special service.

Does such an assignment matter? From the perspective of scientific and journalistic studies² it certainly does, but in terms of the direct execution of tasks it is not an issue that would preoccupy the minds of officers and soldiers of anti-terrorist divisions.

Relations

Anti-terrorist divisions often have their roots in counter-intelligence divisions, and in some countries they are still located there. In other models, the burden of performing tasks in this area falls mainly on the shoulders of the police services. In both cases, each service has something to say about terrorist threats. Accordingly, coordination points, such as the Counter-Terrorism Centre of the Internal Security Agency, have been established over the years. Analysing the solutions adopted (here, the extensive analyses available, among others, in the journal “Terrorism - studies, analyses, prevention”), one may be tempted to make the banal but correct statement that the measure that determines the best solution is its effectiveness. Attempts to implement any of the external models in one’s own backyard may prove to be flawed, as it is above all the appropriateness of the solutions to the system in place that can produce results.

Let us return to the relationship between the anti-terrorist division and the counter-intelligence division. It should be noted that the forms and methods of action developed in counter-intelligence in the counter-terrorist division had to be modified. Although they have elements in common, their actions are determined by the nature of the threats that each division has to face and, above all, by the objective guiding them. For example, terrorist activities always aim to culminate in an attack, while espionage activities generally do not have a climax. Therefore, in the counter-intelligence division, the so-called race against time is an occasional occurrence, but it is a permanent feature of work in the anti-terrorist division. The latter will aim to dismantle the group in order to prevent an attack, while the counter-intelligence division will want to use the identified group for disinformation for as long as possible. Such examples could of course be multiplied, but this one is particularly illustrative.

² See. S. Sabataj, *Byłem szefem Mosadu* (Eng. I was the head of Mossad), Wrocław 2020; *Dwie dekady walki z terroryzmem* (Eng. Two decades of fighting terrorism), P. Piasecka, K. Maniszewska, R. Borkowski (sci. eds.), Warszawa 2022.

Cooperation between the divisions seems indispensable, but is it frequent? The counter-intelligence division primarily fights attempts to influence, and the anti-terrorist division fights attempts to subvert. So they have different motives and operate in different environments, which makes them not at all drawn towards each other. Unless there is a situation where foreign intelligence services support or even create a terrorist group. Then there is undoubtedly scope for cooperation between the verticals, although this may be difficult due to the divergence of objectives.

By definition, the counter-intelligence division's adversary is another state, the anti-terrorist division's adversary is a terrorist group. This has a huge impact on the range of consequences of their actions. The consequences of the counter-intelligence division's actions are always international, while the consequences of the anti-terrorist division's actions are mainly related to the internal security of the state.

Another issue is the initiation of the detection process. The counter-intelligence division focuses on information access points and decision-making centres, places that are particularly vulnerable to espionage activity. This includes people with access to information, key decision-makers, institutions relevant to the decision-making process, government, parliament, ministries, business people. The anti-terrorist division, on the other hand, focuses on direct access to objects of importance. The problem is that this will occasionally involve critical infrastructure, rarely state facilities, and most often soft, public targets. Unlike the anti-terrorist division, counter-intelligence always knows where to look.

An essential part of the work of both divisions is analytics, but this is of a different nature for each. The counter-intelligence division focuses on analysing what has already happened and why it happened, while the anti-terrorist division focuses on what, where and how it might happen. While in the former case the analysis of the consequences of events and how they can be exploited is most important, in the latter the analysis is about the potential damage to be prevented.

Case I – Germany

In 2020, it was revealed in Hesse that the authors of threatening letters to politicians supporting a liberal approach to the refugee issue were people with access to police archives. The letters were signed “NSU 2.0”, a reference

to a German far-right terrorist group called Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund (NSU), which was active between 2000 and 2011. The group carried out ten racially motivated murders and numerous bomb attacks that left many people seriously injured. The victims were immigrants living in Germany.

During the same period, as a result of internal police action in North Rhine-Westphalia, a group of around 30 police officers active on Nazi internet forums were unmasked and, in addition, many items associated with Nazi symbolism were found in their possession. Similar situations occurred in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Saxony-Anhalt and Saxony³.

In 2020, an entire company in the Bundeswehr's elite anti-terrorist unit called Kommando Spezialkräfte (KSK) was also disbanded for, among other things, displaying fascist salutes. The number of cases of ideologically influenced individuals in this unit was several times higher than in other units of the German army⁴.

It was estimated that in 2020 there were around 600 soldiers in the Bundeswehr who were supporters of the organisation Reichsbürger (Reich Citizens), which denied the existence of the Federal Republic of Germany and its organs. They openly threatened acts of terror. Their views were based on right-wing extremism, racism and anti-Semitism⁵. The movement had around 20,000 supporters within Germany (!). In 2020, its activities were outlawed. Between 2016 and 2021, more than 1,000 gun ownership permits were revoked for members and former members of the organisation. Around 1,200 of them were classified as right-wing extremists.

The subject of the Reich Citizens organisation resurfaced when, on 7 December 2022, more than 25 people were arrested in Germany as part of a large-scale anti-terrorist operation. Most of the detainees were linked to the organisation. They planned to overthrow the existing state order and seize power by means of a coup d'état. To begin with, they intended to capture the Reichstag and Bundestag parliamentary centres and sabotage

³ *Ein Beamter machte stehend auf zwei Dienstwagen den Hitlergruß* (Eng. A civil servant made the Hitler salute while standing on two official cars), "Die Welt", 30 XII 2020.

⁴ *Hitlergruß und fliegende Schweineköpfe* (Eng. Hitler salute and flying pig heads), "Die Zeit", 17 VI 2017.

⁵ K. Benhold, *Germany Disbands Special Forces Group Tainted by Far-Right Extremists*, "The New York Times", 1 VII 2020.

the power grids. The new authorities were to be led by Prince Heinrich XIII Reuss.

The conspiracy involved representatives from various walks of life, including from the world of politics, the media and business⁶. Also in this case, several Bundeswehr soldiers were detained, including again commandos from the special unit KSK⁷. Arrests were made in Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, Hesse, Lower Saxony, Saxony, Thuringia and Berlin. Facilities in Brandenburg, North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate and Saarland were also searched. These included more than 140 flats, offices, warehouses and the barracks of the special forces command in Calw, Baden-Württemberg. The suspects had amassed weapons, explosives and considerable cash.

Commentary

Every citizen has the right to his or her own opinions. However, he cannot break the law in connection with them, especially an officer and a soldier. It is obvious! The service also makes much higher demands in this respect. There is a limit to this freedom of thought that is difficult to accept if crossed, and that is the promotion of fascism. This ideology has not only been completely discredited, it has also been banned by law, which is not often the case with ideologies as such. As such, the situation (especially as it relates to Germany) is of considerable concern and gives food for thought in the context of similar threats, which can, after all, emerge in the services of other countries and go undetected for a long time. What has happened and is happening in this regard in Germany should be a warning that other services, also in Poland, should take advantage of. Of course, this is not limited to fascism. Racism, communism, radical religious movements or homophobia or simple partisanship, for example, can be just as dangerous. In a “healthy” service there is only room for the state, the law and honesty. It is obvious! Just that and that much.

No service functions outside society. Social, political, economic and ideological tensions are always more or less reflected within the security system, or rather among the people who make it up. Of course, the smaller

⁶ *Gefährliche Mischung* (Eng. Dangerous mixture), “Tagesschau”, 8 XII 2022.

⁷ *Ibid.*

the scale of this phenomenon, the better, but it would be a bad thing if it did not occur at all. The people who make up the system - officers, soldiers, civil servants - are not allowed, because of their views, to take actions aimed at illegally interfering with the state system they guard. Nor do they have the right to serve any party or ideology.

The dissolution by the Germans of part of an elite special unit is not enough. Any service where the influence of ideology appears should be completely disbanded, because this means that for years no one has recognised the threat or, worse, identified it but failed to react. In both cases, this is embarrassing for the service. A unit like KSK loses its unwritten status of "elitism" immediately after such an incident and forever.

But what if this problem concerns police structures? Neither the police nor the army can be disbanded in any country. However, it is necessary to build up their structures and personnel resources with the greatest care. At present, it is easier, for example, to punish a police officer for breaking traffic rules than for promoting a discredited ideology or homophobic or racist behaviour. This does not bode well.

Protection of classified information

The internal security of the services and the related counter-intelligence activities are often controversial and are also negatively perceived by the officers themselves. Few people like to have someone looking at their hands while they are working. However, this must not have any impact on the execution of tasks - internal counter-intelligence activities are a necessity and an indispensable part of threat prevention. The appearance in the service of persons susceptible to dangerous ideologies, corrupt, prone to breaking the law, disposed to political parties will always have a destructive effect on the service, and on many levels.

In this context, it is important to mention the relationship between the counterintelligence division and the protection of classified information division. The interaction of the two is a necessity, as the latter is the one that performs the most extensive personnel checks and has the greatest knowledge of officers and soldiers. It is the one that issues the decisive document for an officer and soldier to enter the high-risk group, the security clearance. Anyone given access to classified information automatically has to be subjected to greater oversight and vetting. It is a mistake to think that

a security clearance is a certificate of honesty and integrity. It is a document that increases the risk to the system because another person is allowed access. The very name of the document therefore seems inappropriate.

The work of the protection of classified information division must not end with the issuing of a certificate, but should begin with it. It is precisely in this respect that cooperation is essential with the counter-intelligence division, which, with the issuing of each clearance, has more threats to verify. Within the security of the service, the functional organisational arrangements and relationships of the protection of classified information, counter-intelligence and internal security divisions are the most important element of a properly functioning system.

The specifics of the operation, and especially the consequences of an error (assassination), generate the need for internal measures also in the anti-terrorist division. As it too will be subject to verification by the system, there is a need to develop its internal mechanisms accordingly.

Systemic solutions

“Systemic solutions are the foundation for the efficient functioning of the state security apparatus. Precise definition of the scope of responsibility between the elements of the system is an essential condition for effective operation”. In how many studies can one find such phrases. They are so obvious that justifying them could offend many specialists, which I wish to avoid. However, it is also worth talking about systemic disparities. Let us look from this angle at the involvement of the services in the various areas of the state security system:

- a) government protection – State Protection Service,
- b) border protection – Border Guard,
- c) organized crime – Police,
- d) intelligence – Foreign Intelligence Agency, Military Intelligence Service,
- e) counter-intelligence – Internal Security Agency, Military Counter-intelligence Service,
- f) corruption – Central Anti-Corruption Bureau, Military Counterintelligence Service, Police, Border Guard, Internal Security Agency, Military Police,

- g) terrorism – Internal Security Agency, Military Counterintelligence Service, Foreign Intelligence Agency, Military Intelligence Service, State Protection Service, Police, Border Guard, National Revenue Administration, Military Police.

This is only a brief overview, but it shows where, according to the Polish system, the greatest threats to the state lie. One might be tempted to conclude that since terrorism is such a great threat (like corruption), a specialised anti-terrorist service (e.g. such as the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau in the area of corruption) should have been established long ago. Is it really?

In mid-2022, the Norwegian Security Police (Politiets Sikkerhetstjeneste, PST) decided on personnel transfers within the service. A group of officers from the counter-terrorist division were transferred to the counter-intelligence division. There are many indications that measures have also been taken in other services to shift the main burden of involvement, as is evident from the analysis of press material and interviews with specialists from other countries. However, this does not mean that the need for efficient anti-terrorist divisions has diminished, as terrorism is invariably doing well. Counter-intelligence threats, on the other hand, are even ‘better’, which is why it is necessary to react. The natural fluctuation of personnel between these divisions is proving to be a necessity, but can also be a bonding factor between the internal structures of the services and an element of in-service training.

In October 2022, a US Senate committee concluded that the National Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC), part of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, should become a separate national counter-intelligence unit from the existing structure. It would thus take over the FBI’s counter-intelligence role. In the United States, a multiplicity of services is the order of the day.

Case II – Afghanistan

Humam Khalil al-Balawi was a Jordanian doctor born in Kuwait. He became associated with extreme Islamist groups operating in Turkey, where he ran his practice and lived with his wife and children. In 2007, he was detained by Jordanian special forces, who decided to ‘turn’ the terrorist and send him to Afghanistan. The Jordanians worked closely with the US CIA. Al-

Balawi's goal was to help infiltrate Al-Qaeda. In 2009, he was invited to a meeting at the CIA base at Camp Chapman in Khost province. Upon arrival, he detonated the explosives he was wearing, killing many people. It was one of the worst 'reversals' of agents in history.

Commentary

The events surrounding Khalil al-Balawi made it perfectly clear that even the most sophisticated verification systems do not provide certainty. In the operation of both anti-terrorist and counter-intelligence divisions, working with personal sources of information is of fundamental importance. It is this type of activity that brings positive results, but at the same time involves the greatest risks. Despite multi-level checks of the source, i.e. the person they will be working with, it is impossible to avoid the risk of deconspiration, disinformation or simply failure. In the work with sources carried out by the counter-terrorist divisions, it is necessary to draw on the experience of the 'big brother', i.e. counter-intelligence, despite the different specifics of work in these two divisions.

Permeation

The question is to what extent the counter-intelligence and anti-terrorist divisions should operate in parallel and to what extent they should intermingle. This problem can be discussed using three areas of service activity as an example. The first is counter-intelligence activity focusing on counteracting interference of external entities (state - foreign services, and private - corporations or criminal groups) in the structure of the state (political, economic, security). The second sphere, closely related to the first, is activities aimed at countering interference in the services themselves. There is also a third sphere that seems somewhat neglected - counteracting the emergence within the services of phenomena and groups whose views and goals are contrary to the legal order or may have a negative impact on the functioning of the democratic state.

While the participation of the counter-intelligence division in the first two activities is not in doubt, it seems that in many structures the activities in the third area have been ceded to the internal security cells. This model,

one could say: the classic model, is obviously not a bad solution. However, the question remains of the saturation of activities and the purpose of their implementation. In most cases, internal security cells are based on police-type activities - suspicion of a crime, collection of evidence, criminalisation. However, it is worth remembering that more benefits than a quick closure of the case are provided by properly conducted counter-intelligence activities and active prevention.

In the case of the anti-terrorist division, the situation is quite different. It never targets its own structure and leaves these issues to the internal security cells. Neglecting this element can entail very negative consequences and a serious threat to state security.

Case III – Sweden

In November 2022, the trial of Iranian-born brothers, 42-year-old Peyman Kia and 25-year-old Payam Kia, who worked for the Russian military intelligence service GRU for many years, began in Sweden. The brothers came to Sweden as children in the 1980s. They obtained citizenship in 1994. Payam studied at the police academy, but dropped out after the first semester.

The older brother Peyman studied at Uppsala University, after which he joined the customs service. He then worked for more than three years in the Swedish Security Police (Swedish: Säkerhetspolisen, SÄPO). In 2011 he moved to the military intelligence service MUST (Swedish: Militära underrättelse- och säkerhetstjänsten). He performed tasks in the top-secret Office of Special Intelligence (Swedish: Kontoret för särskild inhämtning, KSI), which recruits spies outside Sweden. He then returned to the SÄPO. The next stage of his career was as head of the security department at the Swedish Food Agency. He was probably spying for the GRU from 2011 onwards and involved Payam, who became a liaison officer. The brothers were arrested in 2021 after a nearly six-year investigation.

In the past, Swedish services did not employ people born in 'hostile' countries, for fear that they might be vulnerable to recruitment by their home authorities or their allies. Several other countries in the region still follow this policy, but Sweden has in recent years softened its approach to this problem.

Commentary

The Swedish case triggered a discussion about the recruitment process in the services. Particularly noteworthy were the voices that foreigners should not be admitted to them. Two things are worth emphasising at this point. Firstly, the Kia brothers were not foreigners, but Swedish citizens. Secondly, an analysis of the work of the Swedish services shows that there were many Swedes born in Sweden working for the Russians at the same time. Thus, it was not the Iranian roots of the Kias that became an issue, but their individual characteristics and the decisions they alone made. However, the most important conclusion that emerges from the analysis of this case is the diagnosed weakness of the internal security of the Swedish services, which is admitted by those involved themselves. They have learned from the incident, by no means restricting access to the service for Swedes born in other countries. They have strengthened the internal security system and counterintelligence. For this reason, among others, they are one of the best services in Europe, which, in the Russian direction, remains without doubt among the leaders in counter-intelligence activities, and with leaders it is worth cooperating.

Recruitment

Not the system, not the equipment, not the facilities, but the person. Every good service, whether it is an anti-terrorist department or counter-intelligence, must focus on selecting the best possible personnel. In the age of the progressive digitalisation of life and the integration of modern technical solutions into the work of the services, the obvious principle that the strength and efficiency of a service is determined by the team of people it has managed to recruit and properly prepare may be overlooked.

There is absolute discretion and autonomy in the world of services when it comes to recruitment and training. Moreover, every few years they modify their recruitment systems and reform their training programmes. This is, of course, the right direction, provided it is the result of an analysis of the experience and needs of the service in question. If, on the other hand, it is the result of some kind of fashion or copying foreign solutions, then it results in a lowering of the value of cadres. There is nothing wrong with this discretion, provided that the best possible results are achieved. This is why recruitment and training processes are such important and

sensitive stages. Evaluation comes with results, and these have to wait. Unless modifications and reforms are introduced too often. It is then difficult to verify what had a decisive influence on the final results.

Given the contemporary conditions of service work, two elements are worth analysing. The first is psychological testing and the second is active recruitment. Psychological testing is undoubtedly the Achilles' heel of the recruitment process. While other elements of the process have clear indicators of suitability or unsuitability for the service (e.g. education, health, criminal record, language skills, fitness), the results of psychological examinations and the conclusions drawn from them depend on the psychologist conducting the examination. Psychology is not an exact science, and the ability to assess candidates can vary as much as psychologists can vary. There is no service that has never once rejected an excellent candidate on examination or never accepted one who was a total failure. And all this just on the basis of a psychologist's opinion.

Active recruitment are activities in which the service openly seeks candidates. Nowadays, the services advertise with posters at bus stops, talks at universities, stands at job fairs. Apparently "such are these times". What a challenge such a method of recruitment poses to counter-intelligence! A self-respecting intelligence service would be happy to install itself at such a stall or university chat to type out people to work on, such as those who have been talking to the recruiter or the recruiter himself for the longest time. This method of recruitment has undoubtedly increased the involvement of the counter-intelligence division. The anti-terrorist division is exempt from such involvement. Where have those days gone when the service looked for a candidate and only after vetting did it undertake an interview and possibly further steps, the days when a candidate applied for the service, silently hoping that "maybe they will call"... The labour market (for that is now what the area of candidate sourcing is called) is forcing actions that are rather associated with the recruitment of a boys band. What quality is being created by this in the service? Adequate to the quality of recruitment. This is probably why, for example, there are cases of people resigning from the service after the entry level course. Such candidates prove to be particularly troublesome for the counter-intelligence division. They acquire knowledge, get to know people inside the service and... leave it quickly, leaving with such knowledge outside.

Training is inextricably linked to recruitment. To illustrate this, one could say that admitting an excellent mathematician to the Academy of Fine

Arts would be as misguided as admitting an excellent painter to the Faculty of Physics and Astronomy. Successful recruitment is the foundation of effective training. It is worth asking ourselves, then, where the so-called basic training should end, and where the counter-intelligence and anti-terrorist divisions should begin the process of shaping an officer or soldier to perform tasks. Moreover, there are forms and methods of action that are the same in the work of the different divisions. Taking into account the specifics described earlier, one can risk saying that the training process should be common, extended by optional classes for candidates for service in the different divisions. This is both possible and necessary, as the delegation of tasks is supposed to result from the current needs of the service, and these, as the Norwegian case described earlier shows, can change.

Opponents

Finally, in order to understand who the verticals in question come to face, it is necessary to briefly characterise their opponents. The counter-intelligence division will have as its opponent a foreign intelligence service, i.e. a criminal group with a powerful background. Why criminal? Because if intelligence is to carry out covert operations outside its own country, it will be operating there illegally under the laws of other countries. Such a group has a state with all its apparatus and resources behind it, which makes it a serious adversary.

The anti-terrorist division will be fighting a terrorist group, i.e. a group operating outside the law, without such a background as intelligence. However, the situation only apparently looks a little better, as the direction of counteraction will be much more diffuse. This still leaves the most dangerous variant, in which the terrorist group is supported by intelligence, with all its resources, which is another element forcing close cooperation between the two divisions.

Summary

After the Madrid attack, I was sent to Madrid - for lessons learned. After the attack in London, I was sent to London - for lessons learned. After

the attack in Baghdad, I was sent to Baghdad - for lessons learned. After the coup in Kabul I was sent to Kabul - for lessons learned. It is always good to know more or to listen more to those who know. I hope that we will continue to draw conclusions from events outside Poland, so that they never happen in Poland.

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The contents of the essay are the result of the author's experience of serving the Polish anti-terrorist community and represent his personal views.

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