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**Anders Behring Breivik.
A case study of a far-right terrorist – a lone wolf
(Part II)**

Abstract

In the second part of the article on the case of Anders Behring Breivik, the author answers the questions of whether the attack could have been prevented and what impact it had on public sentiment, the nature of the changes to internal security policy in Norway and the performance of the country's security services. In addition, he analyses Breivik's actions in terms of whether he meets the criteria of a lone wolf terrorist, as well as describing terrorist attacks prepared or carried out by his imitators.

Keywords:

active shooter,
manifesto,
imitators,
lone wolf,
terrorist

In the first part of the article, the author presented a profile and a short biography of Anders Breivik. It shows that severely disturbed family ties had a major influence on the formation of his personality. The emotional deprivation, narcissism and misogyny that characterised Breivik became the source of his inner transformation. This, combined with a sense of social alienation, the influence of computer games and far-right ideology, led him to commit crimes on an unprecedented scale. With his actions, Breivik wanted to stimulate the national and Christian consciousness

of modern Europeans, or at least he thought he would be able to do so. His actions were to become the inspiration for further heroes, purging Europe of Islamists and supporters of multiculturalism and liberalism. In order to get his message across to the largest possible audience, the bomber published a manifesto of more than 1,500 pages on the internet, in which he described his motivations and goals. Breivik prepared the attack meticulously, with determination, fitting the definition of a lone wolf terrorist (active shooter). These preparations culminated in two attacks carried out on 22 July 2011. One of them took place in Oslo. The detonation of explosives in front of the residence of the Prime Minister of Norway, a politician of the left-wing Labour Party, left eight people dead. The second attack was carried out on the island of Utøya, where the party's youth camp was being held. Breivik shot 67 people there and contributed to the deaths of two others - one fell off a cliff and the other drowned.

Consequences of the terrorist attack of 22 July 2011

In the aftermath of the attack carried out by Breivik, four themes ran through the media reports and publications on the events. These stemmed, it should be emphasised, from the peculiarities of Norway as a state and the nature of its society. One focused on the perpetrator, the second on the police's conduct on the critical day, the third on the justice system that Anders Breivik faced, and the fourth focused on the public's perception of the attack. The limited volume of the article does not allow for a thorough analysis of all four elements, but in the author's opinion a brief discussion of three of them is necessary in order to move on to a description of the perpetrator as a case of a far-right lone-wolf terrorist.

Shortly after the attack, there was much criticism of the police and other institutions in the country. In August 2012, a ten-member committee chaired by Alexandra Bech Gjørvi, which had investigated the circumstances of the attack and the actions of the services at the request of the parliament and the prime minister, completed its work. The committee prepared a detailed report¹, clearly indicating that the attack on 22 July could have been prevented by effectively implementing the security procedures

¹ *Rapport fra 22. juli-kommisjonen* (Eng. Report from the 22nd of July Committee), <https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/bb3dc76229c64735b4f6eb4dbfcd8bfe8/no/pdfs/nou201220120014000dddpdfs.pdf> [accessed: 16 VIII 2016].

already in place. A much quicker police response to protect the people gathered at Utøi and the application of many more security measures that were available but ignored would have been possible. The document was 482 pages long and contained six parts. The last one formulated the most important conclusions and 31 recommendations for the future. Significant was the finding that the Police Security Service (Politiets sikkerhetstjeneste, PST, in Norway) could have detected Breivik's actions as early as seven months before the assassination had it reacted to information from customs officials signalling a suspicious purchase of chemicals in Poland. By failing to react to these reports, the would-be assassin was not included in the list of people whose activities should have been monitored. His online activity was also not tracked, an activity that indicated progressive radicalisation. The report recommended limiting the availability of semi-automatic weapons and, in some cases, banning their sale altogether, introducing stricter controls on weapons and the sale of chemical substances, penalising terrorist training and participation, amending data protection legislation, improving the activities of police forces in terms of the implementation of procedures, the exchange of information and the organisation of work. The need to put a helicopter at the disposal of the anti-terrorist squad was also pointed out². Following the publication of the report, Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg said he deeply regretted the mistakes made and took responsibility for what happened, but refrained from approving the resignation of ministers. Norwegian police chief Øystein Mæland said he accepted the main findings of the report. He added that it is a difficult read for those who did their best on that day. But it is most difficult for those who heard that their loved ones could have been saved if the police had reacted better and more efficiently. On 16 August 2012, Mæland resigned as he felt that his continued service was impossible due to a lack of trust from Justice Minister Grete Faremo and other members of the government³.

It should be noted that in Norway, due to the low terrorist threat, the counter-radicalisation plan was minimalist in nature. It drew on experiences with the far right, which had committed violence in the 1990s. The Norwegians adapted elements of the 'Exit' programme, designed to

² 22 July (Gjorv) Commission Report: Recommendations. Preliminary English Version of Selected Chapters, Oslo 2012, <https://famous-trials.com/breivik/2578-22-july-gjorv-commission-report-summary-in-english> [accessed: 16 VIII 2016].

³ PAP, *Norweska policja bez szefa* (Eng. Norwegian police without a chief), TVP Info, 16 VIII 2012, <https://www.tvp.info/8276676/norweska-policja-bez-szefa> [accessed: 17 VIII 2012].

help radicalised individuals leave neo-Nazi groups. At the time, a wide range of measures were developed to combat neo-Nazis, weaken their recruitment capacity and encourage members of extremist groups to leave them. In 2003, the Norwegian police organised a six-week operation against the far-right group Vigrid⁴. The hard work of police officers interviewing radicalised young people produced excellent results. More than half of the young people left Vigrid. By 2010, neo-Nazi structures had disintegrated and the violence inspired by this ideology had disappeared. Breivik was motivated by a right-wing, nationalist ideology, but not in the neo-Nazi edition. In December 2010, a new project to prevent radicalisation was presented in Norway. It consisted of compiling and describing long-term activities in this area. It was inspired by similar programmes in the UK, Denmark and the Netherlands, but adapted to Norwegian needs. The programme involved inter-ministerial cooperation between different ministries, with the participation of the PST and the police, and addressed all types of extremism. Its main element was the so-called reinforcement conversations, conducted with young people by police representatives⁵.

Anders Breivik as a lone wolf escaped the attention of the security services. After the 22 July 2011 attack, the de-radicalisation programme no longer fulfilled the hopes placed in it. The activity of radicals on the right side of the political scene increased and their activities were subjected to closer monitoring. In 2019, however, their numbers were much smaller than in neighbouring Sweden or Denmark⁶. On the other hand, Salafists from the organisations Islam Net and Profetens Ummah have become more active. According to the Islamic Council of Norway, only 56 per cent of the approximately 200,000 Muslims are registered. The remainder do not

⁴ In Norse mythology, Vigrid is the name of the place where the battle of the gods took place.

⁵ B. Pasamonik, *Deradykalizacja „po skandynawsku”* (Eng. Deradicalisation “the Scandinavian way”), in: *Zderadykalizować radykała* (Eng. De-radicalise the radical), K. Górak-Sosnowska (ed.), Warszawa 2018, pp. 146–147.

⁶ The Norwegian branches of the Nordic Resistance Movement and Soldiers of Odin and the Norwegian Defence League are active. An important role in communication, exchange of experiences and promotion of anti-immigration and anti-Muslim ideology is played by the online forum Nordisk. See: T. Bjørge, *Right-Wing Extremism in Norway: Changes and Challenges*, Center for Research on Extremism, 25 II 2019, <https://www.sv.uio.no/c-rex/english/news-and-events/right-now/2019/right-wing-extremism-in-norway.html> [accessed: 27 II 2019].

attend mosques or have secularised and adopted the Norwegian lifestyle⁷. In addition, between 2015 and 2016, during the period of the increased influx of immigrants, Muslim-Norwegian non-governmental organisations (NGOs) were established, promoting the principles of humanism and seeking a common platform of values with Norwegians⁸. After 2011, PST began to monitor more closely than before the activities and narrative of Nadjmuddin Faraj Ahmed - the notorious mullah Krekar, founder of the Ansar al-Islam organisation in Iraq - and the Norwegian justice system stopped treating him leniently. In 2012, he was sentenced to five years in prison for making death threats against Norwegian politicians who demanded his deportation to Iraq. He was released from prison in January 2015 and was re-arrested the following year and released a few months later. In July 2019, he was arrested in connection with a 12-year prison sentence handed down in absentia by a Bolzano court and deported to Italy the following March⁹.

Norway has an extremely liberal justice system with a strong emphasis on rehabilitating the convicted person rather than punishing them. Extremists are seen as inherently good people who have temporarily gone astray and should therefore be given a chance to improve¹⁰. This strategy also applies to the perpetrators of the most serious crimes. The aim is not so much to rehabilitate the derailed individual as to reform him. Paradoxically, the more serious the crime, the more special treatment the perpetrator receives. He is provided with a multi-room cell with a bathroom, access to a gym, TV, computer and many other amenities. It is not uncommon for him to receive more attention than those in need but enjoying their freedom¹¹. The Breivik case highlighted this anomaly in

⁷ M. Czarnecki, *Skandynawia halal. Islam w krainie białych nocy* (Eng. Scandinavia halal. Islam in the land of white nights), Warszawa 2019, p. 122; *Muzułmanie w Norwegii* (Eng. Muslims in Norway), Rita Kubylis Consulting, 4 VI 2021, <https://rkconsulting.com.pl/2021/06/04/hello-world/> [accessed: 6 VI 2021].

⁸ N. Witoszek, *Najlepszy kraj na świecie* (Eng. The best country in the world), Wołowiec 2021, p. 156.

⁹ AFP, *Norway jails controversial Iraqi preacher*, France24, 17 VII 2019, <https://www.france24.com/en/20190717-norway-jails-controversial-iraqi-preacher> [accessed: 18 VII 2019]; AFP, *Norway extradites Islamist preacher to Italy*, France24, 26 III 2020, <https://www.france24.com/en/20200326-norway-extradites-islamist-preacher-to-italy> [accessed: 27 III 2020].

¹⁰ B. Pasamonik, *Deradykalizacja „po skandynawsku”...*, p. 147.

¹¹ Norway is considered one of the safest countries in the world. Only one in five prisoners is a repeat offender. In 2011, 69 out of 100,000 Norwegians were in luxury prisons. In the USA

the way the Norwegian justice system thinks and acts. In the case of this perpetrator, it was also morally reprehensible, as more care was shown to a multiple killer than to his victims. While their loved ones have to live with a sense of loss and suffering, the mass murderer was able to sue the state that allegedly violated his human rights. The violation of these rights would allegedly be the banning of conversations and contacts with others (and thus preventing the convict from preaching criminal ideas)¹². In April 2016, the Norwegian authorities lost a lawsuit brought by Breivik, who accused them of inhumane treatment. The court ruled that keeping the convict in solitary confinement (three-room cell, computer, weight training equipment) was inhumane treatment. According to the judiciary, this is contrary to Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which states: No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In contrast, the court rejected the claimant's complaint about the lack of respect for his private life, which was allegedly reflected in the monitoring of his correspondence by prison staff. The terrorist was awarded damages of 331,000 kroner (approximately PLN 155,000)¹³. Breivik used the trial to deliver an ideological tirade. He left the courtroom after exchanging handshakes with the judge.

The verdict was appealed by both sides. The Norwegian government argued that Breivik was being treated humanely and that separating him from other prisoners was for security reasons. According to the Norwegian state, there was a fear of contact between Breivik and others with extreme views. It was argued that the prisoner has access to video games in prison, can watch TV and is provided with physical exercise. The prisoner complained not only about the isolation and control of his correspondence, but also about the quality of the prison food and the need to use plastic cutlery. Before the higher court, he requested permission to receive visitors. He argued that he wanted to start a family. In a judgment published on 1 March

and the UK, more than half of convicts reoffend, and the number of inmates is several times higher than in Norway. From a social point of view, it is important that the punishment is effective, not large or small. Cf. J. Żakowski, *Czas popatrzeć w lustro* (Eng. Time to look in the mirror), *Wyborcza.pl*, 25 VII 2011, <https://wyborcza.pl/7,7598,10003298,czas-popatrzec-w-lustro.html> [accessed: 27 VII 2011].

¹² N. Witoszek, *Najlepszy kraj...*, p. 162.

¹³ PAP, *Narzekal na zimną kawę i starą konsolę. Breivik wygrał proces* (Eng. He complained about cold coffee and an old game console. Breivik won the trial), *TVP Info*, 20 IV 2016, <https://www.tvp.info/24974655/anders-breivik-wygral-proces-przeciwno-norwegii> [accessed: 21 IV 2016].

2017, the Court of Appeal stressed that strict measures were necessary for security reasons. Isolating the convict from other prisoners was indicated as appropriate. It emphasised that the convict's general mental health and behaviour had not changed significantly since he started serving his sentence¹⁴. In the same year, Breivik changed his identity to Fjotolf Hansen.

After the lifting of the ban on access to the site of the Oslo bombing, people started to bring flowers, candles and national flags there, which they attached to the security barriers set up by the police. They attached condolence cards to them (about 15,000 in total). Their subsequent analysis showed how the public perceived the attack. In terms of content, the statements mentioned can be broadly divided into three groups: 1. The attack made no sense and could not be rationally understood. It was a manifestation of madness and therefore does not force a discussion about the idea of multiculturalism. 2. The assault was directed against the state, which is democratically governed, and therefore against the entire political class. 3. The personification of the state and the nation (the use of phrases such as mother Norway, blow to the heart, the nation weeps over its children, we hug you, motherland) and thus the complete depoliticisation of the descriptive language. The marginality of other messages is evidenced by the fact that only two condolence cards mentioned the word 'fascism'. There was also an incidental mention of the assassin's involvement in a secret Masonic lodge or his brief membership of the Progress Party. This narrative was framed by the words of Prime Minister Stoltenberg, who in a television interview broadcast on the second day after the attack stressed that the lesson to be learned from the attacks must be (...) *to use language more carefully so that it is not hateful and chauvinistic, because (...) Norwegian virtues such as openness and democracy were the target of the attack*¹⁵. Few politicians and journalists explicitly pointed to the Progress Party as

¹⁴ PAP, *Breivik przegrał w procesie wytoczonym państwu. Wyrok liczy 55 stron* (Eng. Breivik lost in a lawsuit brought against the state. The verdict is 55 pages long), RMF, 1 III 2017, https://www.rmf24.pl/fakty/swiat/news-breivik-przegral-w-procesie-wytoczonym-panstwu-wyrok-liczy-5,nId,2361487#utm_source=www.rmf24.pl&utm_medium=relatedBottom&utm_campaign=2404525&crp_state=1 [accessed: 2 III 2017].

¹⁵ For: A. Kozicki, *Władze cywilne wobec ataków terrorystycznych w Norwegii w 2011 r. Przywództwo, zasoby kulturowe i język politycznego opisu* (Eng. Civilian authorities in the face of the 2011 terrorist attacks in Norway. Leadership, cultural resources and the language of political description), in: *Reagowanie na zamachy terrorystyczne. Wybrane zagadnienia* (Eng. Responding to terrorist attacks. Selected issues), J. Stelmach (ed.), Warszawa 2016, p. 111.

the culprit of the events, but the mainstream public statements were nevertheless those calling for an increased emphasis on integration, multiculturalism, diversity, openness, democracy and tolerance. An alarmist (a term used by Mette Wiggen, a researcher on the far right) poll report was published in the media, which showed that up to 40 per cent of Norwegians did not wish to live door to door with Somalis and 30 per cent with Arabs. It should be noted, however, that Norwegians do not like racial discrimination, but neither do black jobseekers. The degree of social pressure to pursue an inclusive policy was evidenced by the consensus view of the columnists of the main conservative weekly *Morgenbladet*. In their view, it was wrong to honour Norway's national heroes by naming oil rigs in the North Sea after them, six months before Breivik's attack. An unprecedented event was when the Prime Minister visited a mosque and gave a speech there about creating a community ignorant of religious, racial, gender and class differences. In the days that followed, there was already talk of assimilation, i.e. adopting the Norwegian way of life. This lifestyle, however, was to be not the old ethnocentric Norwegianness, but its modern variant - an attitude of openness. This was expressed at a memorial service in Oslo led by the Bishop. Representatives of all religions and non-believers were invited to the mass. Rabbis and imams were most likely absent¹⁶.

One year after the attacks, Trond Henry Blattmann, chairman of the support group for victims and their families, who lost a son at Utøya, expressed the opinion that Norway had not visibly increased security or restricted public access to government institutions and people in them. Instead, proposals for legal changes have been made, including strengthening protection for senior politicians and centres of power. Laws were also drafted to tighten security measures in centres for the mentally ill, especially dangerous ones. Thorough control of the Internet was also considered¹⁷. The largest chains of shops selling music CDs, films and computer games, i.e. Coop Norge and Platekompaniet, withdrew the entire range of violent games from the market. This was a reaction to the news that Breivik regularly played 'World of Warcraft'¹⁸. There have also been

¹⁶ A. Kozicki, *Władze cywilne...*, pp. 112–113.

¹⁷ A. Bylica, *Norwegia rok po zamachach* (Eng. Norway one year after the attacks), "e-Terroryzm. pl" 2012, no. 9, p. 7.

¹⁸ PAP, *Gry komputerowe na cenzurowanym w Norwegii. To przez Breivika* (Eng. Computer games under censure in Norway. It's because of Breivik), "Newsweek Polska", 30 VII 2011,

changes in the attitudes displayed by young people, who have shown an increase in social engagement. There has been a 40 per cent increase in the number of people signing up to the Labour Party youth group, whose members were targeted in the Utøya attack. More people also joined the youth branches of other parties, including the Progress Party, which, after a drop in popularity following the 22 July tragedy and its historic defeat in the local elections in autumn 2011, recovered a year later and could count on the support of 22.8 per cent of voters. The public had forgotten the close links between the party's rhetoric and Breivik's ideology. In addition, 40 per cent of Norwegians were in favour of a more restrictive migration policy¹⁹. After the elections in September 2013, the Progress Party, which had traditionally called for restrictions on immigration, entered a centre-right government and toned down its rhetoric, asserting a commitment to Christian and humanist values, low taxes and higher education. It also reassured the electorate that Norway was and would remain a 'regime of goodness' (with a built-in safety valve). The Progress Party elites adopted a more cooperative attitude and showed a greater willingness to dialogue than in the past, becoming part of the process of building consensus and compromise²⁰. An expression of the new government's maintenance of left-wing policies was Norway's acceptance of as many as 31,000 asylum applications in 2015²¹. Thus, Breivik did not achieve the ideological goal of his attack. He failed to mobilise the far right into an anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim uprising. Not only did he fail to get the public to adopt his way of thinking, he actually turned them against him. Instead of showing rage and hatred towards strangers, people organised rose processions and ceremonies of solidarity with the victims. The founding traditions of Norway shone through in the reactions to the terrorist attack: reason, pragmatism,

<https://www.newsweek.pl/swiat/gry-komputerowe-zakazy-w-norwegii-przez-zamach-breivika/ds7bv55> [accessed: 15 II 2017].

¹⁹ PAP, *Norwegia: była partia Breivika rośnie w siłę. „Kraj się nie zmienił”* (Eng. Norway: Breivik's former party is growing in strength. "The country has not changed"), "Wprost", 22 VII 2012, <https://www.wprost.pl/swiat/335084/norwegia-byla-partia-breivika-rosnie-w-sile-kraj-sie-nie-zmien.html> [accessed: 23 VII 2012].

²⁰ N. Witoszek, *Najlepszy kraj...*, p. 149.

²¹ *Skandynawia ochładza stosunek do uchodźców* (Eng. Scandinavia cools its attitude to refugees), "Biuletyn Migracyjny" 2016, no. 54, <http://biuletynmigracyjny.uw.edu.pl/54-czerwiec-2016/skandynawia-ochladza-stosunek-do-uchodzcow> [accessed: 22 XI 2016].

moderation and an unwavering belief in the human capacity to cooperate²². At the same time, it should be remembered that the people of Norway show respect for the institutions of the state and that the authorities there are highly trusted. This is a phenomenon rarely seen in the rest of Europe. Norwegians, apart from the families and friends of the victims, were mostly relieved by Breivik's sentence of 21 years in prison, with the possibility of his imprisonment being extended for further years.

Polls conducted by Kantar ten years after the attacks show, among other things, that according to around 75 per cent of respondents, the attacks of 22 July 2011 were perpetrated by an unbalanced and fanatical young man motivated by right-wing extremism. His action was directed against democracy. According to those surveyed, the state had dealt well with the aftermath of the attacks, and they had increased concern for the basic values of Norwegian society. Right-wing supporters believed that Breivik was prompted to attack by left-wing policies pursuing multiculturalism. This view was expressed by around 25 per cent of respondents - supporters of the Progress Party and, above all, opponents of immigration to Norway. The distribution of responses regarding remembrance of the attacks and sympathy for the victims and their families also depended on political affiliation. Regardless of political option, however, trust in the government and parliament remained high. The narrative of their representatives on the events of ten years ago was received unreservedly by the public. Respondents also felt that the sentence handed down to Breivik should not raise objections to the justice system. The analysis of the survey data also showed a growing polarisation between supporters of the left and the right, which may deepen in the next few years, especially as the far-right narrative has more clout. The divisions in the Norwegian political scene may in future make it more difficult to maintain the sense of unity and harmony in society for which Norway is famous²³. Other studies have shown that the collective memory of the 22 July 2011 tragedy is declining - in 2013, 13 per cent of the public remembered it, in 2020 only 1 per cent. - In the same period, there was also an increase from 55 per cent to 80 per cent in the number of people who rarely or never thought about the event.

²² N. Witoszek, *Najlepszy kraj...*, p. 159.

²³ Ø.B. Solheim, A.R. Jupskås, *Consensus or Conflict? A Survey Analysis of How Norwegians Interpret the July 22, 2011 Attacks a Decade Later*, "Perspectives on Terrorism" 2021, vol. 15, no. 3, pp. 121-123, <https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/binaries/content/assets/customsites/perspectives-on-terrorism/2021/issue-3/solheim-and-jupskas.pdf> [accessed: 4 II 2022].

The result of this research may come as a surprise, as there is a belief that three factors associated with terrorist attacks have a lasting impact on society. These are: severity, response and innovation²⁴. Undoubtedly, these three factors characterise the 22 July attack, but the results of the sociological research do not indicate that it has had a lasting impact on the collective memory of Norwegians.

Anders Breivik as a lone wolf

Breivik is a classic case of a lone wolf terrorist. He has all the characteristics of one: he radicalised himself, he planned and carried out the terrorist operation on his own, he had no operational or personal relationships with specific terrorist organisations, and in his manifesto he formulated a goal of action with a political connotation²⁵. He also had a deep sense of mission, which in his eyes justified the violence. Some researchers have referred to Breivik as an active shooter. They have pointed out that terrorist actions carried out by such individuals most often end in their death, either by suicide or as a result of a confrontation with security forces. Mental illness, anxiety, psychological trauma, feelings of loneliness and isolation, depression, chronic severe stress, unmet needs, desire to punish other people, fear of punishment are identified as factors shaping the personality of this type of perpetrator²⁶. Breivik belongs to this group of lone gunmen who survived his attack. The terrorist did not plan his death, but already at the stage of preparing for the attack he took this possibility into account. He feared that he would be killed in the process of constructing the bomb, and

²⁴ T. Bjørgo, A.R. Jupskås, *The Long-Term Impacts of Attacks: The Case of the July 22, 2011 Attacks in Norway*, „Perspectives on Terrorism” 2021, vol. 15, no. 3, p. 4, <https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/binaries/content/assets/customsites/perspectives-on-terrorism/2021/issue-3/bjorgo-and-jupskas.pdf> [accessed: 4 II 2022].

²⁵ A. Wejksznier, *Globalna sieć Al-Kaidy. Nowe Państwo Islamskie* (Eng. Al-Qaeda’s global network. The new Islamic State), Warszawa 2017, p. 245; the same, *Samotne wilki kalifatu? Państwo Islamskie i indywidualny terroryzm dżihadystyczny w Europie Zachodniej* (Eng. Lone wolves of the caliphate? The Islamic State and individual jihadist terrorism in Western Europe), Warszawa 2018, p. 37.

²⁶ A. Korolewski, „Active shooter” – jedna z metod wykorzystywanych przez terrorystów (Eng. “Active shooter” - one of the methods used by terrorists), in: *Reagowanie na zamachy terrorystyczne. Wybrane zagadnienia* (Eng. Responding to terrorist attacks. Selected issues), J. Stelmach (ed.), Warszawa 2016, p. 88.

tried to take into account a number of likely scenarios for how the situation might unfold. His complex, labour-intensive and difficult plan of attack was well thought out, perfectly prepared and largely executed. Breivik did nothing that went beyond this plan or was inexpedient. He tried to keep his emotions in check and this emotional coolness and perfectionism set him apart as a lone wolf. Even in terms of the technical issues involved in constructing the bomb, he had no one to advise him. His advisor was the Internet. Then there is the problem of authority. Breivik was inspired by the views of right-wing extremists active online, but he placed himself above them all in his criminal actions. He killed one person after another on Utøya (while filming everything at the same time) and waited for the police to arrive, before calmly handing himself over to the Delta officers. He knew that they would not use weapons against someone who voluntarily surrendered. He was also aware that the death penalty does not exist in Norway. He therefore could not have wanted it²⁷.

Anders Breivik used the courtroom to articulate his ideology in a half-hour speech, summarising what he had included in his manifesto (the trial ran from 16 April to 24 August 2012). He wanted, he claimed, to save his nation from cultural Marxism and Muslim immigrants. However, they were not the target of his attack, but the left-wing government of Norway and members of the youth branch of the ruling left-wing party, because it was the policies it pursued that led, in his view, to the presence of thousands of Muslims in a Christian country. He wanted to be remembered as a fighter against Marxism, Islamic invasion and multiculturalism. He argued that Christians were being persecuted and that indigenous Norwegians had become a minority in their own country. He complained about a biased media favouring multiculturalism. He said that Europe was ruled by Marxists and supporters of multiculturalism. As in the manifesto, he accused Muslims of shedding blood, referring to the terrorist attacks - in Madrid (11 March 2004) and in London (7 July 2005). He argued that aggressive cultures such as Islam would grow as expansively as cancer. He also compared himself with Indian chiefs Sitting Bull and Black Horse (who fought against whites in the Wild West in the second half of the 19th century), who he claimed were heroes, not terrorists. Breivik argued that the dropping of the atomic bomb on Japan was just as violent as his attacks, but was due to good

²⁷ E. Czykwin, *Anders Breivik. Między dumą a wstydem* (Eng. Anders Breivik. Between pride and shame), Warszawa 2019, pp. 229–230.

intentions. He explained that people who call him an evil man do not understand the difference between evil and brutality. For the first time, he apologised for his actions. In the television broadcast of the trial, Breivik saw an opportunity to implement the second instalment of his plan. He did not want to appear as a person who was ashamed, but as a man proud of his achievements. So when entering the courtroom, he would place his right hand over his heart and then raise it upright with a clenched fist in a salute that he felt symbolised strength and honour. To this day, he has shown no sympathy either for the victims or their families. He only showed emotion at the screening of his own film of the Utøya attack. He addressed his apology only to the families of the accidental victims - passers-by in the centre of Oslo who were killed by the explosion. In doing so, he distinguished them from activists from the Labour Party youth camp, whom he had previously compared to the Hitlerjugend. In his view, they were not innocent children, but naive and indoctrinated activists. He admitted that when shooting at Utøya, he chose those who looked more left-wing than others. Earlier in the trial, however, he said that he had hoped that none of the 564 people on the island would survive. Those who were not reached by bullets were expected to drown, escaping the gunshots. He praised his crime, describing it as the most showboating political attack after the World War II. He assured that he would do it again. He asked to be acquitted because he had allegedly saved Norway from civil war²⁸.

Breivik gave his testimony calmly and logically. What was striking was the freedom with which he incorporated anti-immigrant, far-right content into his own doctrine of fighting multiculturalism, setting it in the reality of the crusade against Islam and invoking Norse mythology. He claimed to be a Templar and a defender of the white race. He hoped that his manifesto would become the bible of ultranationalists across Europe. He tried to play the role of defender of Western civilisation before the court. During the trial, he referred to the work of Peter Mangs, calling him with acclaim the greatest opposition figure in Scandinavia before 22 July 2011²⁹. He described how, in 2002, he had met other Templars in London

²⁸ J. Pawlicki, *Świat według Breivika* (Eng. The world according to Breivik), "Gazeta Wyborcza", 18 IV 2012; the same, *Piekło Andersa Breivika* (Eng. Anders Breivik's hell), "Gazeta Wyborcza", 24 IV 2012.

²⁹ Between 2003 and 2010, Peter Mangs searched for dark-skinned immigrants, whom he shot at from a concealed position, usually after nightfall. His area of operation was Malmö. He intensified his activities in October 2009 after shooting a 20-year-old dark-skinned woman

who appeared in fancy uniforms and white gloves. He claimed that two years later he was in the Baltics, where he attended training courses with leaders of other Templar cells. Prosecutor Inga Bejer Engh consistently and factually verified the content of Breivik's statements, contrasting facts with his made-up stories. These included his education, his assertions about the number of books he had read on economic issues, his successful business activities. Unfortunately, the accused was unable to name the title of any of the books he had read, and finally confessed that he had gleaned most of his allegedly extensive knowledge not only of economics, but also of religion and history from Wikipedia. Prosecutor Engh showed that his businesses were loss-making, with the exception of one that produced and sold fake diplomas. Breivik also had to admit that there was no European network of the Knights Templar, and that he himself had not taken any courses in the organisation. In the crossfire of questions from prosecutor Engh and second accuser Svein Holden, Breivik was exposed as a liar, a loser with a big ego and a man full of complexes³⁰.

Before Breivik stood trial, he was subjected to a psychiatric examination. In a first expert report drawn up in December 2011, the experts concluded that he was suffering from paranoid schizophrenia and therefore could not be tried. The assassin absolutely disagreed with this opinion. He considered himself to be a person of full mental capacity. This was demonstrated by a second expert opinion, in which he was declared sane.

who was sitting in a car parked near a mosque. A 21-year-old man sitting next to her was also injured. In the year since that incident, Mangs has shot at more than a dozen people, wounding 13 of them. His list of targets included prominent Swedes whom he considered to be Jews and friends of Israel. During the trial against Mangs, prosecutors, who charged him with three murders and 13 attempted murders, argued that the defendant was obsessed with guns and hated immigrants. Mangs was inspired by John Ausonius, who terrorised immigrants in Stockholm for racist reasons in the early 1990s. Ausonius was captured after nearly a year of searching and sentenced to life imprisonment for murder and nine counts of attempted murder. Peter Mangs, John Ausonius and Anders Breivik were lone wolves and harboured a hatred of multicultural society. Unlike Breivik, Mangs had received psychiatric care in the past, then tried to destroy medical records. Mangs was an active member of a shooting association and was therefore granted gun permits and access to weapons. He was sentenced to life imprisonment in November 2012. See: M. Gardell, *Urban Terror: The Case of Lone Wolf Peter Mangs*, "Terrorism and Political Violence" 2018, vol. 30, no. 5, pp. 793–811, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09546553.2018.1444796> [accessed: 4 II 2022].

³⁰ K. Kęciek, *Prokurator miażdży Breivika* (Eng. Prosecutor crushes Breivik), "Przegląd", May 2012, <https://www.tygodnikprzegląd.pl/prokurator-miazdzy-breivika/> [accessed: 20 V 2012].

This was relied upon by the court, which on 24 August 2012 pronounced the highest sentence in Norway, sentencing the bomber to 21 years in prison. In doing so, the court reserved the right to extend the sentence indefinitely if the convict continued to be perceived as a danger to society. After ten years, the prisoner could apply for early release, which he did on 18 January 2022. Breivik was satisfied with the sentence. He was keen to be found sane. He decided not to appeal the verdict, especially as, he explained, it would legitimise a court he did not recognise³¹.

The European media tried to avoid referring to Breivik as a terrorist. For the French press, he was usually the 'author of the massacre' on the island of Utøya. The German and Anglo-Saxon media used the term 'mass murderer', which was supposed to imply the commission of many murders, but without a political context. However, Breivik's act was a terrorist act in its pure form and it did not matter that this could valorise the perpetrator and his crime. During the ongoing trial, the myth of the self-appointed defender of 'white Europe' was only partially destroyed. During his imprisonment, Breivik received a plethora of letters containing expressions of support not only for his ideology, but also for the acts he committed. Many of these included marriage proposals. It was estimated that Breivik had around 15,000 supporters in Norway alone. On 6 June 2012, Eivind Berge, an extremist blogger who encouraged the killing of police officers as collaborators, was arrested. In turn, Norwegian neo-Nazis grouped in the Nordfront organisation distributed propaganda leaflets in Bergen in support of the 22 July bomber, and there were clashes between neo-Nazis and anti-racists in Trondheim. Breivik was also able to influence the psyche of the prison guards. There was a fear that they would fall victim to Stockholm syndrome, even though they were often replaced. This was reported by, among others, the My Norway portal³². Breivik's place of confinement was also initially changed, and he was moved several times between Ila and Skien prisons. The convict had two faces. On the one hand, he was polite, gracious and friendly, while on the other, he was preoccupied with his mission and talked incessantly about how he saw the world order.

³¹ E. Czykwin, *Anders Breivik...*, p. 171.

³² A. Kajka, *Stróże więzienni są wykończeni pilnowaniem Breivika* (Eng. Prison guards are exhausted from guarding Breivik), *MojaNorwegia*, 14 XI 2014, <https://www.mojanorwegia.pl/zycie-w-norwegii/stroze-wiezienni-sa-wykonczeni-pilnowaniem-breivika-8947.html> [accessed: 15 XI 2014].

Breivik's imitators

Anders Breivik ushered in a new kind of terrorist threat not only in Europe, but also worldwide, and had a major impact on the activities of the secret services and police of EU countries. After 11 September 2001, the interest of the services in political extremism declined in favour of the threat from radical Islam. The fight against Al-Qaeda and its affiliated organisations came to the fore. However, the activities of Islamic extremists increasingly drew the attention of the right side of the political scene, nationalist organisations, journalists and independent authors. Their narrative provoked a fierce reaction from the left and NGOs defending the policy of multiculturalism, even though it had failed, as had the integration policy pursued previously. Substantive criticism of Islamic radicalism has also been consistently fought against, being seen as a manifestation of Islamophobia, racism and hatred. This attitude of politicians and the pro-government media must have triggered the emergence of anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim organisations, some of which did not shy away from brutal violence. Examples include the German Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund (National Socialist Underground) or the English Defence League in the UK. Breivik and his attitude in court have aroused a great deal of interest among terrorism experts, secret services and psychologists. The latter have begun to emphasise the need to profile those at risk of radicalisation and to counter extremist violence. Deradicalisation programmes have been revisited in Norway, Denmark and Germany, and other countries have proceeded, with varying degrees of success, to introduce them. At EU level, the Radicalisation Awareness Network was established in 2011.

The Norwegian services highlighted several distinctive elements of Breivik's activity that needed to be analysed. The conclusions drawn from this would provide an agenda for counter-terrorism activities. First and foremost, the need to monitor all extremist content - both political and religious - in cyberspace was emphasised. Publications containing terms, symbolism or descriptions of rituals that may indicate a transformation of the author's personality or his radicalisation (in Breivik's case, this included calling himself a Templar) should be of interest. Such terms and the context of their use should inspire preventive action. Since the internet provides anonymity and does not expose one to social stigma, the services should have the ability to efficiently analyse the information exchanged in cyberspace and the content hidden in it. Another important conclusion came from assessing the attitude of Fjordman, Breivik's mentor, who was in

Cairo on 11 September 2001 and was shocked to see young people cheering in the streets of the Egyptian capital for the attack on the US. The subsequent violent content that Fjordman posted on the internet may provide a clue as to how to solve similar problems without resorting to violence. It was also pointed out, with reference to other cases of active shooters, the need for a swift and decisive response from the anti-terrorist services, with whom active shooters refuse to negotiate and commit suicide³³.

Despite all these recommendations, it was predicted that sooner or later Breivik would find imitators fascinated by his crime. One of them turned out to be Brunon Kwiecień, a researcher at the University of Agriculture in Kraków, a chemist with a doctorate and a pyrotechnician by hobby. He formed a four-person group, which included two undercover ABW officers ('Operation Eligiusz'). The aim of the group was to attack the Sejm during its December 2012 session with the participation of the President and Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland, devoted to work on the draft budget. To carry out the attack, Kwiecień wanted to use a specially prepared SKOT armoured personnel carrier loaded with 4 tonnes of ammonium nitrate-based explosives. On 9 November 2012, he was arrested and charged with preparing a terrorist attack. Kwiecień acted from nationalist, xenophobic and anti-Semitic motives. He considered those in power to be alien. In his posts on internet forums, where he appeared under the nickname "borazol", he appealed to users who wanted to change something in the country by deed, to get in touch with him. He believed that Poland needed a radical clean-up. This appeal was answered by the Internal Security Agency, which put two young officers into contact with him. Kwiecień wrote that it was possible to avoid the mistakes made by Breivik, who had parked his car incorrectly in Oslo and had prepared an explosive charge that was too small, so that the scale of the damage was limited³⁴. During the investigation into Kwiecień, only a small amount of explosives were found, despite the fact that he had ordered a large amount of ammonium nitrate. In contrast, more than a dozen illegally possessed firearms and more than 1,100 rounds of ammunition were discovered in the premises searched. Kwiecień

³³ M. Ranstorp, "Lone Wolf Terrorism". *The Case of Anders Breivik*, "Sicherheit und Frieden" 2013, vol. 31, no. 2, p. 92, https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/10.5771/0175-274x-2013-2-87.pdf?download_full_pdf=1 [accessed: 11 XII 2016].

³⁴ W. Czuchnowski, *Operacja Brunon K.* (Eng. Operation Brunon K), "Gazeta Wyborcza", 21 XI 2012; M. Kozubał, I. Kacprzak, *Chemik zafascynowany Breivikiem* (Eng. Chemist fascinated by Breivik), "Rzeczpospolita", 21 XI 2012.

travelled to Belgium for the weapons, as the police in Poland refused to issue him with a permit. There was also no armoured personnel carrier³⁵. Before the court, he only admitted to organising training courses on explosives. On 1 December 2015, the Regional Court of Kraków sentenced Kwiecień to 13 years' imprisonment. Following an appeal in April 2017, the court reduced the prison sentence to nine years. The following April, the Supreme Court dismissed the cassation. Kwiecień died in prison in August 2019³⁶.

In November 2012, the famous US think tank Strategic Forecasting Inc. (Stratfor) published an analysis entitled *Mimicking Breivik in Poland*. Its author Ben West highlighted the purely technical issues of Kwiecień's preparations for the attack. The analyst noted that the Kraków lecturer was, by virtue of his education, much better prepared to carry out the attack than Breivik. He questioned the amount of explosive used for the test detonation visible in the video made by Kwiecień. The explosion shown must have been caused by a much smaller amount of explosives than the Polish investigators maintained. West pointed out the obvious mistakes that Kwiecień had made. In his view, he could have been a great 'bomber', but as a terrorist he was not well prepared. Despite trying to eliminate Breivik's mistakes, the Pole behaved very carelessly. The Norwegian took care to keep the plot secret, meanwhile, Kwiecień bragged about his ability to construct explosives and propagated his ideology, which made him suspicious. The Stratfor employee had no doubt that more terrorists would learn from the thwarted action of the Polish chemist. For this is a kind of relay of generations³⁷.

On 22 July 2016, the fifth anniversary of the attacks carried out by Breivik, a shooting took place at the McDonald's restaurant and Olympia-Einkaufszentrum shopping mall in Munich, killing nine people and wounding 37. The perpetrator was 18-year-old Ali Sonboly from a family of Iranian immigrants in Germany, who was fascinated by Breivik's crimes

³⁵ A. Szulc, *Niewidoczność. Portret zamachowca* (Eng. Invisibility. Portrait of an attacker), "Newsweek" 2012, no. 48, p. 15.

³⁶ *Nie żyje Brunon Kwiecień. Był skazany za organizowanie zamachu na Sejm* (Eng. Brunon Kwiecień is dead. He was convicted of organising an attack on the Sejm), Wirtualna Polska, 6 VIII 2019, <https://wiadomosci.wp.pl/nie-zyje-brunon-kwiecien-byl-skazany-za-organizowanie-zamachu-na-sejm-6410664238418049a> [accessed: 7 VIII 2019].

³⁷ B. West., *Mimicking Breivik in Poland*, Stratfor, 29 XI 2012, <https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/mimicking-breivik-poland> [accessed: 3 XII 2012].

and school shootings in the United States. Two months before the attack, he had changed his name from Ali to David and converted to Christianity. He most likely wanted to break with his Islamic identity. Sonboly, using a Glock calibre 9 mm pistol, first opened fire in a McDonald's located in the aforementioned mall. He chose people with dark skin, who might be from the Middle East. He killed most of his victims in this very restaurant. After carrying out the attack, the terrorist fled the scene to a residential area, where he hid in the bicycle storage room of one of the blocks of flats. At 8.25 pm, he came out in front of the police officers and, in front of them, committed suicide by shooting himself in the head with a pistol³⁸.

In February 2019, 49-year-old Christopher Paul Hasson, a white supremacist who was planning a Breivik-style attack, was arrested in the United States. To this end, he had been stockpiling weapons and ammunition since 2017, gathering information on the targets of future assassinations, who were to be Democratic Party politicians and journalists. He analysed the likelihood of individuals being killed by creating a special hit list spreadsheet. He studied letters and manifestos left by multiple killers, including Breivik's manifesto. The fanatic also planned to use biological weapons, including the Spanish flu virus, sausage venom (botulinum) and anthrax, to poison food. In preparation for the series of attacks, he deployed weapons, ammunition, food and military uniforms in five different locations. He also purchased three houses to serve as bases for the attacks. Hasson was arrested on 15 February 2019 in the car park of the Coast Guard Headquarters in Washington DC (he was an officer in the service). Seven rifles, two shotguns, four pistols, two revolvers and two silencers, as well as magazines and ammunition, were found in his home. The following year he was sentenced to 13 years' imprisonment for illegal possession of weapons and drugs. He was not charged with preparing a terrorist attack, although the prosecutor had no doubts about this, as there was ample evidence to support it³⁹.

³⁸ B.T. Wieliński, *Atak szaleńca, nie kalifatu* (Eng. An attack by a madman, not a caliphate), "Gazeta Wyborcza", 25 VII 2016.

³⁹ M. Choi, *Coast Guard officer accused of plotting to kill Democrats, journalists*, Politico, 20 II 2019, <https://www.politico.com/story/2019/02/20/coast-guard-officer-domestic-terror-1176806> [accessed: 21 II 2019]; R. Kalvapalle, *U.S. Coast Guard lieutenant allegedly plotted mass terror attack targeting Democrats, journalists*, Global News, 20 II 2019, <https://globalnews.ca/news/4980961/christopher-hasson-coast-guard-terrorist-plot/> [accessed: 21 II 2019].

On 15 March 2019, a radicalised 28-year-old Australian man, Brenton Tarrant, carried out two attacks on Muslims praying in mosques in the New Zealand city of Christchurch. First, at around 2.45 pm, he entered the Al-Nur mosque, where he fired at random people with an automatic weapon. When he ran out of ammunition, he left the building to change weapons in a car parked nearby. He returned to the mosque and fired shots at victims showing signs of life. Forty-eight people were killed. He broadcast this massacre live on Facebook. He then proceeded to the Linwood mosque, where he started shooting at around 4 pm. A total of 51 people were killed and 50 injured in this double attack. The perpetrator was apprehended by the police. He had placed political slogans and the names of specific individuals and historical figures, including Polish Crown Hetman Feliks Kazimierz Potocki, on his rifle magazines. He fought under the command of King Jan III Sobieski at the Battle of Vienna in 1683, and this date also appeared on the assassin's weapon. On the barrel of the rifle, the assassin had engraved Breivik's name. In 2017, Tarrant visited numerous European countries, including Poland. Inspired by Norway, he also left his manifesto with an anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim message entitled: *The Great Replacement. Towards a new Society. We march ever forwards*⁴⁰. In it, he called for, among other things, the killing of Muslims in Western Europe, as well as the killing of some politicians with pro-immigrant attitudes, including Angela Merkel. He wanted representatives of non-white races and followers of Islam to leave the lands of Western civilisation. In August 2020, Tarrant was sentenced to life imprisonment, without the possibility of seeking early release. This was the first such sentence in New Zealand's judicial history⁴¹.

On 27 April 2019, John Timothy Earnest, aged 19, fired semi-automatic rifle shots at worshippers of Judaism gathered at a synagogue in Poway, California. The attack resulted in the death of one woman (who died in hospital), who shielded the rabbi from the bullets with her own body, and

⁴⁰ B. Tarrant, *The Great Replacement*, https://img-prod.ilfoglio.it/userUpload/The_Great_Replacementconvertito.pdf [accessed: 15 III 2020].

⁴¹ *Zamachowiec z Nowej Zelandii był w Polsce. Nowe fakty* (Eng. The attacker from New Zealand was in Poland. New facts), *Wirtualna Polska*, 19 III 2019, <https://wiadomosci.wp.pl/zamachowiec-z-nowej-zelandii-byl-w-polsce-nowe-fakty-6361066902677121a> [accessed: 20 III 2019]. PAP, *Zamordował ponad 50 osób. Zamachowiec z Christchurch usłyszał wyrok* (Eng. He murdered more than 50 people. Christchurch attacker heard his sentence), *TVP Info*, 27 VIII 2020, <https://www.tvp.info/49585889/nowa-zelandia-zamachowiec-z-christchurch-brenton-tarrant-skazany-na-dozywocie-wieszwiecej> [accessed: 27 VIII 2020].

three other people were wounded. There would certainly have been more victims had it not been for the reaction of a Coast Guard officer present at the synagogue, who used shots to force the attacker to flee. He was apprehended about 3.5 km from the scene after a phone call to the police informing them of his location. It turned out that he had been questioned a month earlier. Earnest was suspected of setting fire to a mosque in San Diego. However, due to lack of evidence, he was left at large. He was the author of a manifesto posted just before the attack on 8chan⁴². In it, he expressed his anti-Semitic and racist views, stating that the Jews were preparing for the meticulously planned genocide of the white race. In the letter, he cited Brenton Tarrant and the ‘work’ of Robert Bowers, the perpetrator of the attack on the Pittsburgh synagogue on 27 October 2018. (11 people were killed and six injured in the attack). He claimed to have been inspired to act by figures such as Jesus, Paul the Apostle, Martin Luther, Adolf Hitler, among others. He also condemned President Donald Trump as a pro-Zionist traitor. At the end of September 2021. Earnest was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole⁴³.

On 3 August 2019, a massacre took place in El-Paso, Texas, near the border with Mexico. Its perpetrator was 21-year-old Patrick Crusius, who had travelled to El-Paso from the town of Allen, 1,000 km away. In a Walmart supermarket filled with people, he shot 23 people with an AK-47 rifle and wounded more than 20. The perpetrator later admitted that he tried to choose primarily people of Hispanic appearance as victims. And he, following the example of the aforementioned terrorists, left a manifesto published on 8chan. In the five-page document, entitled *The Inconvenient Truth*, he referred directly to Tarrant’s aforementioned manifesto. He illuminated the political and economic reasons for his act, explained why he had chosen such a weapon, and projected the public reaction his act would provoke. He spoke negatively about minorities living

⁴² T. Lavin, *The San Diego shooter’s manifesto is a modern form of an old lie about Jews*, “The Washington Post”, 29 IV 2019, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/04/29/san-diego-shooters-manifesto-is-modern-form-an-old-lie-about-jews/> [accessed: 12 II 2020].

⁴³ PAP, *Wszedł do synagogi i zaczął strzelać. Władze: napastnik działał sam* (Eng. He entered a synagogue and started shooting. Authorities: the attacker acted alone), TVN 24, 29 IV 2019, <https://tvn24.pl/swiat/usa-atak-na-synagoge-wladze-sprawca-dzialal-sam-ra931407-2303539> [accessed: 29 IV 2019]; “*Tchórz, zwierzę, potwór*”. *Niedoszłe ofiary nie miały litości dla 22-latka* (Eng. ‘Coward, animal, monster’. The would-be victims had no mercy for the 22-year-old), 1 X 2021, <https://www.o2.pl/informacje/tchorz-zwierze-potwor-niedoszle-ofiary-nie-mialy-litosci-dla-22-latka-6689158638774912a> [accessed: 2 X 2021].

in the United States, argued for the superiority of people with white skin, and expressed concern about illegal immigration, the multiculturalism of Western civilisation and environmental degradation. According to him, the American lifestyle, which is also pursued by Latinos residing in the USA, contributes to its destruction. He cited the claim that the Democratic Party in the States is seeking to increase the number of Hispanic immigrants in order to broaden its electorate. He also expressed his opposition to corporations employing immigrants and his belief that his action would provoke a social reaction resulting in millions of Latinos returning to their home countries⁴⁴.

On 10 August 2019, Philip Manshaus, aged 21, opened fire on people gathered at a mosque in Baerum, a suburb of Oslo. He did not seriously injure anyone as he was immediately overpowered by a retired Pakistani Air Force officer. Before carrying out the attack, he killed his 17-year-old half-sister, Chinese-born Johanna Zhangjia Ihle-Hansen. Manshaus posted racist content online and made references to Hitler's ideology, and cited Breivik as a role model. In one post, he called Breivik, Tarrant, Earnest and Crusius heroes. In June 2020, he was sentenced to 21 years in prison. By court decision, he is to spend a minimum of 14 years in prison. After this time he can apply for early release⁴⁵.

On 19 February 2020, Tobias Rathjen, aged 43, associated with the extreme right, in the German city of Hanau, killed nine people and injured six others in two attacks on Turkish bars. All the victims were of immigrant origin. He first fired a dozen shots at the Midnight water pipe smoking shop, then drove his car about 2.5 km and opened fire at the Arena Bar & Cafe before returning home, killing his mother and committing suicide. A few days before the attack, he posted a nearly hour-long video on YouTube. In it, Rathjen fantasised that the US is under the control of secret societies and that there are underground military bases where the devil is worshipped and children are abused and killed. He appealed to US citizens to wake up and resist this. The terrorist also left a 24-page letter-

⁴⁴ P. Crusius, *The Inconvenient Truth*, August 2019, <https://randallpacker.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/The-Inconvenient-Truth.pdf> [accessed: 20 XII 2019].

⁴⁵ *Norwegia: Philip Manshaus skazany na 21 lat pozbawienia wolności* (Eng. Norway: Philip Manshaus sentenced to 21 years imprisonment), Interia, 11 VI 2020, <https://wydarzenia.interia.pl/zagranica/news-norwegia-philip-manshaus-skazany-na-21-lat-pozbawienia-wolno,nId,4548675> [accessed: 12 VI 2020].

manifesto also indicating his paranoid disorder⁴⁶. In it, he wrote, among other things, that already as a child he felt watched by other people and that as an adult he suffered many insults. He explained that he had met a female friend during his studies, but at some point he began to suspect her parents of monitoring him. He accused his father of the same actions. In addition, two secret service officers were alleged to have convinced his father's employer to dismiss him from his job. The secret service was also blamed for his inability to find a wife. In the manifesto, Rathjen stated that he had complained to the public prosecutor's office in Hanau and to the Federal Public Prosecutor's Office in Karlsruhe about being under the control of a secret organisation. He also argued that it was the United States that carried out the attacks of 11 September 2001, and that humanity is being fooled by a very small elite with secret knowledge. American citizens should wake up and fight the forces of evil. He called for the total annihilation of peoples living in more than 20 countries from Morocco to the Philippines (Muslim countries and Israel), as he considered most races and cultures destructive, especially Islam.

Conclusions

In February 2022, the Telemark County Court in southern Norway did not approve Anders Breivik's early conditional release from prison because, according to a psychiatrist's opinion, there is still a serious risk that he will use violence in the future. The court's decision is part of the debatable and constantly raised view that it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to deradicalise extremists. Although this view applies to Islamic radicals,

⁴⁶ *Sprawca strzelaniny w Hanau pozostawił po sobie list i nagrania wideo. Chciał "oczyszczyć" Niemcy* (Eng. The perpetrator of the shootings in Hanau left behind a letter and videos. He wanted to 'purify' Germany), *Gazeta.pl*, 20 II 2020, <https://wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/wiadomosci/7,114881,25714454,sprawca-strzelaniny-w-hanau-pozostawil-po-sobie-list-i-nagrania.html> [accessed: 20 II 2020]; N. Bogucka, *Niemcy. Zamach w Hanau. 35-latka o polskich korzeniach była w ciąży* (Eng. Germany. Attack in Hanau. A 35-year-old woman with Polish roots was pregnant), 21 II 2020, <https://www.o2.pl/artykul/niemcy-zamach-w-hanau-35-latka-o-polskich-korzeniach-byla-w-ciazy-6481089085019777a> [accessed: 22 II 2020]; F. Jansen, S. Lemkemeyer, *Was über den Täter von Hanau bekannt ist* (Eng. What is known about the perpetrator from Hanau), "Der Tagesspiegel", 21 II 2020, <https://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/wer-war-tobias-rathjen-was-ueber-den-taeter-von-hanau-bekannt-ist/25566016.html> [accessed: 22 II 2020].

it should be extended to the entire spectrum of religious and political extremism. Opponents of this view refer to the achievements of the Scandinavian countries and Germany, which pioneered the implementation of deradicalisation programmes called 'Exit' for members of neo-Nazi groups and motorbike gangs. In the case of Breivik and his followers, however, we are dealing with lone wolves who cannot be identified in the preparation phase of an attack until they share their plans or post their message or manifesto on social media. A person can be stopped from using violence, but the views within them will remain. This is because it is impossible to remove ideas from people's consciousness unless self-radicalisation occurs. This is why it is important to constantly monitor the web and social media for the propagation of radical content. On the other hand, one should not forget the sources that influence the consciousness formation of right-wing extremists. In many European countries, it is the unequal treatment of indigenous citizens and Muslim immigrants, the application of an appeasement policy, i.e. concessions and privileges, towards followers of Islam. Among other things, it involves granting special rights to Muslims at the expense of other communities and silencing critics of such policies (political correctness). This special status in many cases exempts Muslims from complying with norms whose violation by other members of the community is threatened by sanctions. Such practices are disliked by a large part of the societies of the host countries, they exacerbate public sentiment and motivate right-wing groups and individuals (lone wolves)⁴⁷.

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⁴⁷ Conclusions to the article as a whole have been published in its first part. See: K. Izak, *Anders Behring Breivik. A case study of a far-right terrorist - a lone wolf (Part I)*, "Terroryzm - studia, analizy, prewencja" 2022, no. 2, pp. 280–314.

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