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    <front>
                        
                        <journal-meta>
            <issn>1689-927X</issn>
                                </journal-meta>
        <article-meta>
            <title-group>
                                    <article-title>O pewnym wyjątku, który stał się regułą</article-title>
                                    <article-title>About the Exception That Became a Rule</article-title>
                            </title-group>

                        <contrib-group>
                                                            <contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="no">
                            <name>
                                <surname>Balcerak</surname>
                                <given-names>Paweł </given-names>
                            </name>
                            <role>author</role>
                                                                                                                                    <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/>
                                                                                        <xref ref-type="corresp" rid="cor-1"/>
                        </contrib>
                                                </contrib-group>

                                                                                        <aff id="aff-1">
                    <institution-wrap>
                        <institution>Uniwersytet Rzeszowski</institution>
                                                    <institution-id institution-id-type="ROR">03pfsnq21</institution-id>
                                            </institution-wrap>
                </aff>
                            
            <author-notes>
                                    <corresp id="cor-1">Correspondence to: Paweł  Balcerak <email></email></corresp>
                            </author-notes>

                            <pub-date date-type="pub" publication-format="electronic" iso-8601-date="2011-12-15">
                    <day>15</day>
                    <month>12</month>
                    <year>2011</year>
                </pub-date>
            
            <volume>Tom 4</volume>
            <issue>2010</issue>
                        <fpage>19</fpage>
                                    <lpage>24</lpage>
            
            <permissions>
                <copyright-statement>Copyright &#x00A9; 2011</copyright-statement>
                                    <copyright-year>2011</copyright-year>
                            </permissions>

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    <back>
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</article>
