@article{95b11c25-54b1-418d-a0d7-90e131b27704,
author = {Jerzy Leszczyński},
title = {On some aporias of a normative theory of legal interpretation},
journal = {Principia},
volume = {2015},
number = {Volume 61-62},
year = {2016},
issn = {0867-5392},
pages = {41-54},keywords = {understanding of law; interpretation of law; normative theory of legal interpretation; cognitive assumptions of interpretation theory; rationality; dialogism},
abstract = {Constructing a normative theory of legal interpretation involves difficulties of various types. One problem is the adoption of certain cognitive assumptions concerning the choice of the legal articles that are subject to interpretation. Another difficulty is ascertaining what determines the rationality of the interpretive activities pursued in accordance with the proposed directives of interpretation. The third obstacle is the need to harmonise the theory of legal interpretation with the dialogical nature of understanding on one hand, and with the historicity of legal discourse on the other.},
doi = {10.4467/20843887PI.15.003.5532},
url = {https://ejournals.eu/en/journal/principia/article/o-pewnych-aporiach-normatywnej-teorii-wykladni-prawa}
}