%0 Journal Article
%T Vicarius regis. The Role Played by the Archbishop of Gniezno in the Elective King’s Absence
%A Lewandowska-Malec, Izabela
%J Cracow Studies of Constitutional and Legal History
%V Volume 3 (2010)
%N Volume 3
%P 89-98

%@ 2084-4115
%D 2011
%U https://ejournals.eu/en/journal/kshpp/article/vicarius-regis-rola-arcybiskupa-gnieznienskiego-pod-nieobecnosc-krola-elekcyjnego
%X The Archbishop of Gniezno who was the first senator of the Polish‐Lithuanian Republic, played one of the most significant roles in the State. His significance was due to this rights of vicarii regis that were granted to him as early as during the reign of Władysław Jagiełło. These rights were however not precisely formulated. The Archbishop of Gniezno performed the function of vicarious regis only sporadically, when this was indispensable. His position in this respect was subjected to legal regulations during the elective King’s era. The emergencies of the hour lead to the regulation of the Archbishop’s competence on occasion of Sigismund III’s trip abroad. Archbishop as Primate of Poland was authorized to call the Senate (but not the Seym) in order to receive the legations arriving in Poland (but only those arriving from Turkey, Tartar State or Muscovy). Also, if the State was threatened by an unexpected attack of the enemy the Archbishop could call the Senators to facilitate their joint proclaiming the third summons to arms addressed to levy in mass. According to the common belief, Primate Stanislaw Karnkowski exceeded his competence. Therefore in 1598, before the next trip of the monarch there was a tendency toward limiting his power to take the decisions unipersonally. The Archbishop however decidedly oppose the idea of limiting the power that he exercised in the King’s absence. The developments of the 1590s (organization of the assemblies of the nobles who protested against the poll‐tax) as well as those of 1593–94 and of 1598–99, testify to the emancipating efforts as made by the Primate in order to arrive at the specific political goals.