The Pope's Two Bodies: A Note on Medieval Juridical Theology

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Abstract

In the preface to his 1957 book The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology, Ernst Kantorowicz gives us an *excusatio non petita* for the absence of a chapter on the duplication of bodies in ecclesiastical offices. He claims that in his book 'in an indirect fashion, the ecclesiastical side of the problem has not been neglected.' By highlighting the need to address the 'ecclesiastical side' of medieval bodily duplications Kantorowicz both admits the latter's importance and risks obscuring its genealogical priority over its 'secular' counterpart. The task of this note is to underline the priority of 'ecclesiastical' over 'secular' medieval duplications, to rescue both of them from the retrospective projection of the Schmittian notion of political theology, and to recontextualize their historical cultural milieu as juridical theology. Such a re-contextualization may allow us to throw some light on a vastly unappreciated theoretical watershed in European culture.

Keywords: political theology, ecclesiology, juridical theology, Christianity

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1. INTRODUCTION

In the preface to his 1957 book The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology, Ernst Kantorowicz gives us an *excusatio non petita*[1] for the absence of a chapter on the duplication of bodies in ecclesiastical offices. He claims that in his book 'in an indirect fashion, the ecclesiastical side of the problem has not been neglected.'[2]

By highlighting the need to address the 'ecclesiastical side' of medieval bodily duplications Kantorowicz both admits the latter's importance and risks obscuring its genealogical priority over its 'secular' counterpart. The task of this note is to underline the priority of 'ecclesiastical' over 'secular' medieval duplications, to rescue both of them from the retrospective projection of the Schmittian notion of political theology, and to recontextualize their historical cultural milieu as juridical theology. Such a recontextualization may allow us to throw some light on a vastly unappreciated theoretical watershed in European culture.

2. THE MYSTICAL BODY

Kantorowicz locates the evidence of the image of the king's two bodies 'in the fourth year of Queen Elizabeth,'[3] namely, *anno domini* 1561.[4] However, he soon recalls the link between this duplication and the long-standing image of the state as a body. Moreover, he admits that the notion that 'the Church, and Christian society in general, was "a *corpus mysticum* the head of which is Christ," has been transferred by the jurists from the theological sphere to that of the state the head of which is the king".'[5]

1 Unsolicited excuse. All translations are mine if not otherwise specified.
2 Kantorowicz, *The King's Two Bodies* xxi.
3 *Ibid*. 7.
4 The text of Plowden's *Reports* (212) specifies 'on the Eve of *St. Andrew* the Apostle,' that is, November 30. The reign of Queen Elizabeth I began on November 17, 1558.
5 Kantorowicz, *The King's Two Bodies* 16.

Nevertheless, Kantorowicz also quotes the text (ca. 1100) of the so-called Norman Anonymous, 'one of the staunchest defenders of the spiritual essence of a Christ-like kingship,'[6] as a retrospective hint to a previous (and 'still in bloom'[7]) process of 'clericalization of the royal office.'[8] Kantorowicz invites us to disregard the fact that the Anonymous recognizes not only each Biblical king but also each Biblical high-priest as 'a *twin person*.'[9] He also mentions that the Anonymous assures us that bishops and kings 'are both gods and anointed by spirit of adoption.'[10] We may notice that a few pages before, Kantorowicz himself recalls that right at the same time the dual status of bishops as temporal and ecclesiastical authorities is legally acknowledged in England with the religious and juridical consultancy of Ivo of Chartres.[11]

The late-eleventh-century controversy on the double allegiance of English bishops to kings and popes is indeed the horizon of the Anonymous' work. This is why he insists on the plurality of roles not only of kings and bishops, but also of the pope himself: 'Such a man is in fact not simple, but multiple, and having many persons.'[12]

Whilst Kantorowicz concedes that the Anonymous' pamphlets 'had no practical effects on the age in which they were written,'[13] he portrays these texts as the glorification of a bygone age. Yet we may suspect that casting the Anonymous as a nostalgic of the glorious imperial past is mostly a retrospective projection of the later practice of glorification of kings.

Kantorowicz rightly mentions '[t]he victory of the revolutionary Reform Papacy in the wake of the Investiture Struggle and the rise of the clerical empire under papal guidance, which monopolized the spiritual

6 *Ibid*. 45.
7 *Ibid*.
8 *Ibid*.
9 '[*G*]*emina* (...) *persona*.' *Ibid*. 46.
10 '[*S*]*unt et dii et christi per adoptionis spiritum*.' *Ibid*. 52 n 21.
11 See *ibid*. 44.
12 '*Talis quippe non simplex est, sed multiplex et plures habens personas*.' In Norman Anonymous, *Tract 1*, in Cambridge, Corpus Christi College, MS 415 5r.
13 Kantorowicz, *The King's Two Bodies* 60.

strata and turned them into a sacerdotal domain.'[14] Yet I would question Kantorowicz's claim that the Papal victory 'negated all efforts to continue or renew that king-priestly pattern of liturgical kingship which the Anonymous so fiercely defended.'[15]

On the contrary, I would underline that the Papal revolutionaries[16] were the first to consequently theorize in religious and juridical terms the subordination of public powers to principles (in their case, religious ones) and their upholders, namely, the new hierarchically structured clergy. It is in the course of the radical renovation of the structure of the Church that the traditional image of the mystical body of Christ was revived as the notion of the Church's mystical body.

Henri De Lubac traces this passage to a twelfth-century text by Gregory of Bergamo. Bishop Gregory explains that 'the body of Christ, which is the Church (...) is intimated just mystically and sacramentally.'[17] However, the probably first written formulation of the new definition is in Master Simon's mid-twelfth-century treatise *De Sacramentis*: 'the mystical body of Christ, that is, the Church.'[18]

Kantorowicz actually acknowledges that it is in the duality of the mystical body of Christ that 'we seem to have found the precise precedent of the "King's Two Bodies".'[19] Moreover, as Kantorowicz himself observes, the duality of the medieval mystical body of Christ is not simply identical to the traditional orthodox dual nature of Christ, that is, divine and human. Here the distinction constructs an individual and a collective body.

In Christian texts, the image of the collective body may be traced to Paul's first letter to the Corinthians: 'Now you are the body of Christ, and

14 *Ibid*.

15 *Ibid*.

16 The notion of 'Papal Revolution' is developed by Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy in his 1938 study *Out of Revolution: Autobiography of Western Man*.

17 '[*C*]*orpus Christi, quod est Ecclesia* (...) *mystice solummodo vel sacramentaliter intimatur*.' In Gregory of Bergamo, *Tractatus de veritate corporis Christi* 19. Quoted in De Lubac, *Corpus mysticum* 103, modified translation.

18 '[*M*]*ysticum Christi corpus, id est Ecclesia*.' In Maitre Simon et son groupe, *De Sacramentis* 27.

19 Kantorowicz, *The King's Two Bodies* 199.

limbs among other parts.'[20] We may notice that in Paul's time the collective body of his fellow πνευματικοι[21] [*pneumatikoi*], spirituals is just a tiny and scattered portion of the whole social body of the inhabitants of the Roman empire. Paul thus constructs the Christian body more as a community of faith than as a community of fact. Moreover, Paul orders this collective body – possibly after a description by Isaiah[22] – according to a series of hierarchical distribution of organs: 'the head of all man is Christ, the head of woman is man, and the head of Christ is god.'[23]

The Reformed theologian Adolf Harnack surmises that in the third century Pope Callistus somewhat twists the Pauline image by depicting the Church as a '*corpus permixtum*,'[24] that is, an intermixed body. Yet if we may believe Hippolytus' text in reproach of Callistus, the latter only resorts to the biblical image of the ark to depict the variety of Christians as including 'dogs, and wolves, and ravens, and all things clean and unclean.'[25] For sure, in the following century Hilary of Poitiers points out that 'the body of the Church is one, not mixed up (*permixtum*) in a kind of confusion of bodies.'[26]

20 Ὑμεῖς δέ ἐστε σῶμα Χριστοῦ καὶ μέλη ἐκ μέρους [*Hymeis de este sōma Khristou kai melē ek merous*], Paul, *I Corinthians* 12.27 (Nestle-Aland). Jerome translates as '*vos autem estis corpus Christi et membra de membro*.'

21 Paul, *Galatians* 6.1 (Nestle-Aland). Paul ignores the word 'Christians.'

22 תאמנו לא כי תאמינו אם לא רמליהו בן־ שמרון וראש שמרון אפרים וראש [*wə-rōš 'ep̄-ra-yim šō-mə-rō-wn wə-rōš šō-mə-rō-wn ben- rə-mal-yā-hū im lō ṯa-'ă-mî-nū kî lō ṯê-'ā-mê-nū*], the head of Ephraim is Samaria, the head of Samaria is Remaliah's son, if you will not support you will not be supported.' In Isaiah 7.9.

23 παντὸς ἀνδρὸς ἡ κεφαλὴ ὁ Χριστός ἐστιν, κεφαλὴ δὲ γυναικὸς ὁ ἀνήρ, κεφαλὴ δὲ τοῦ Χριστοῦ ὁ θεός [*pantos andros hē kephalē ho Khristos estin, kephalē de gynaikos ho anēr, kephalē de tou Khristou ho theos*]. In Paul, *I Corinthians* 11.3 (Nestle-Aland). Jerome translates as '*omnis viri caput Christus est caput autem mulieris vir caput vero Christi Deus*.'

24 Harnack, *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte I*, 372. In the first volume, Harnack does not give any direct reference for the phrase '*corpus permixtum*'; in the third volume (115), he recovers the phrase with a hint to Augustine's '*permixta ecclesia*,' mixed church in *De Doctrina Christiana* 3.32.

25 κύνες καὶ λύκοι καὶ κόρακες καὶ πάντα τὰ καθαρὰ καὶ ἀκάθαρτα [*kynes kai lykoi kai korakes kai panta ta kathara kai akatharta*]. In Hippolytus, *Refutatio omnium haeresium* 9.12.23. Also previously ascribed to Origen in *Patrologia Graeca* (hereinafter *PG*) 16 3009-3468, 3386.

26 '[*U*]*num ecclesiae corpus est, non quadam corporum confusione permixtum*.' In Hilary of Poitiers, *Tractatus super psalmos* 121.5, in *Patrologia Latina* (hereinafter *PL*) 9 231-908, 662.

In the thirteenth century, when Aquinas reads Paul he conflates the two mystical bodies of Christ and the Church into one person: 'Christ and the Church *is* a mystical person.'[27] On this regard, Kantorowicz recovers Rudolph Sohm's uncharitable pun, which may be rendered in English as '[t]he *corpus Christi* has been changed into a corporation of Christ.'[28]

3. *UNIVERSITAS*

Sohm is possibly right in highlighting the juridical content of Aquinas' theological statement. However, the medieval expansion of the notion of *persona*/person owes most to the renowned canonist Pope Innocent IV, who shortly before Aquinas declares that 'in the matter of corporation (*universitatis*) the collective is figured as a person.'[29] This is the probably earliest predecessor to the later juridical notion of *persona ficta*, artificial person, which underlies the modern legal notion of corporation.

Of course, the translation of the word *universitas* as 'corporation' *prima facie* emphasizes the semantic closeness of the Latin term to the later legal notion. In order to counterbalance this inevitable retrospective projection, we may retrace the trajectory of the very term *universitas* and its semantic transformations, which may then help us to enrich the semantic range of the corresponding English word 'corporation' too.

If we consider extant sources, the word *universitas* emerges in or after 45 BCE,[30] when Cicero translates into Latin part of Plato's dia-

[27] '*Christus et Ecclesia est una persona mystica*,' in Aquinas, *Super epistolam ad Colossenses lectura* 1.6, my italics. However, Aquinas immediately gives order to this conflation by adding '*cuius caput est Christus, corpus omnes iusti*,' whose head is Christ, the body all the righteous.

[28] '*Aus dem Körper Christi hat sich die Kirche in eine Körperschaft Christi verwandelt*.' In Sohm, *Das altkatholische Kirchenrecht* 582.

[29] '[C]*ollegium in causa universitatis fingatur una persona*.' In Innocent IV, *Commentaria super libros quinque Decretalium* 2.20.57 (fol. 270v).

[30] In the opening of the text, Cicero uses the perfect tense of the verb *esse* (to be) in relation to a Nigidius, probably the scholar Nigidius Figulus who, according to Jerome's translation of Eusebius, dies in 45 BCE.

logue *Timaeus*. He renders with the possible neologism *universitatis*[31] the Greek expression τοῦ παντὸς[32] [*tou pantos*], 'of the whole,' which is a shortened form of the double Platonic image ὁ (...) πᾶς οὐρανὸς ἢ κόσμος[33] [*ho* (...) *pas ouranos ē kosmos*], 'all heaven or *kosmos*.'

In the previous sentence, I left the word *kosmos* untranslated in order to underline its innovative use by the Platonic character Timaeus. Whilst since the Homeric narrations the word *kosmos* stands for 'order,'[34] Timaeus uses it to name the object of this order, namely, the world itself. Plato is certainly aware that Timaeus is also literally giving birth to the universe,[35] as he makes him minimize his feat immediately after, by adding: 'or if it [all heaven or *kosmos*] wishes to be named otherwise, let us name it in that way.'[36]

Whilst Cicero is hardly aware of Plato's semantic innovation, he gives it two morphological expressions: the existent Latin word *mundus* for the Platonic Greek *kosmos* as 'the world,' and the neologism *universitas* for the Platonic 'all heaven or *kosmos*,' that is, the totality of the universe. It may be noticed that the same Cicero applies the word *universitas* also to more limited subjects. For example, in *De Natura Deorum* he uses it to name 'the whole (*universitatem*) of mankind.'[37]

[31] Cicero, *Timaeus* 2.6. Cicero here uses the word *universitas* in the genitive case *universitatis*.

[32] Plato, *Timaeus* 28c.

[33] *Ibid*. 28b. Cicero (*Timaeus* 2.4) translates the phrase as '[*o*]*mne igitur caelum sive mundus*.' We may notice that both words *kosmos* and *mundus* mean also 'adornment,' and both Plato and Cicero play on this double sense.

[34] See, for example, Homer, *Iliad* 2.214.

[35] *Per contra*, Diogenes Laertius (6.48) writes that Favorinus credits Pythagoras for this feat: καὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν πρῶτον ὀνομάσαι κόσμον καὶ τὴν γῆν στρογγύλην [*kai ton ouranon prōton onomasai kosmon kai tēn gēn stroggylēn*] [Pythagoras] (was) the first to call the heaven *kosmon* and the earth spherical. Then Diogenes adds: ὡς δὲ Θεόφραστος, Παρμενίδην: ὡς δὲ Ζήνων, Ἡσίοδον [*hōs de Theophrastos, Parmenidēn: hōs de Zēnōn, Hesiodon*] yet Theophrastus (says it was) Parmenides, and Zeno, Hesiod. Diogenes here uses the word *kosmos* in the accusative case *kosmon*. However, regardless of their reliability, neither Diogenes' supposed sources nor the texts that quote them are extant.

[36] ἢ καὶ ἄλλο ὅτι ποτὲ ὀνομαζόμενος μάλιστ' ἂν δέχοιτο, τοῦθ' ἡμῖν ὠνομάσθω [*ē kai allo hoti pote onomazomenos malist' an dekhoito, touth' hēmin ōnomasthō*]. In Plato, *Timaeus* 28b.

[37] '[*U*]*niversitatem generis humani*.' In Cicero, *De Natura Deorum* 2.65 (164).

After Cicero, the word *universitas* first reappears in legal texts in three late-first-century fragments by Javolenus Priscus.[38] However, only in the second half of the second century does Gaius refer the term *universitas* to specifically human subjects. This occurs in the text of the *Institutes*, where Gaius makes a distinction between public and private *res*/things: 'those which are public appear to be among the goods of no one; for they are believed to be of the very totality (of citizens).'[39]

Yet the use of the English term 'totality' for the Latin word *universitas* may risk obscuring the latter's operative root. Cicero derives the abstract noun *universitas* from the adjective *universus*, which expresses the action of *vertere*/turn a plurality into *unus*/one.

This action of composition is still vividly alive in the third-century BCE prose of Plautus, where a wolf has been waiting for the dogs to fall asleep because 'he wanted to carry off the whole (*uniuersum*) entire flock.'[40] I would suggest that nowadays we might still recover the operational character of the adjective *universus* by constructing a totality as the result of an operation of totalization.

4. THE BODY POLITIC

Operations of totalization that allow the semantic shift from individual to collective bodies are actually at work well before the Middle Ages. For example, Livy insists that only law can transform a human multitude into the single body of the people.[41] In other words, Livy

[38] See D 19.2.51; D 31.10; D 41.3.23.

[39] '*Quae publicae sunt nullius uidentur in bonis esse; ipsius enim uniuersitatis esse creduntur.*' In Gaius, *Institutes* 2.11.

[40] '[*G*]*regem uniuersum voluit totum avortere*.' In Plautus, *Trinummus* 1.2.134.

[41] '[*R*]*ebus divinis rite perpetratis vocataque ad concilium multitudine, quae coalescere in populi unius corpus nulla re praeterquam legibus poterat, iura dedit*.' After duly accomplishing the divine things and after calling together the multitude, which nothing else but laws could unite into a single body politic, he (Romulus) gave it laws. In Livy 1.8.

understands the body of the law as the condition for the construction of the body politic.[42]

On the contrary, unlike Livy medieval juridical theologians follow Paul and construct the collective body of the Church as an already given entity. In this case, each faithful integrates the pre-existing mystical body of Christ and the Church. It is not surprising that later on, in early modern times, when Hobbes reconstructs the body politic on a national basis, he cannot resort to the medieval theological and immediately cosmopolitan grounding. His notion of a social contract that produces the collective body is more akin to the Livian construction, which, as we will see, Bartolus and Baldus somewhat revive for the body politic of medieval self-governing cities.

We may recall that the very image of the body politic is a Greek legacy. In the sixth century BCE, the poet Theognis writes: 'the city is pregnant.'[43] In the following century, Solon describes unrighteous leaders as 'a wound that comes inevitable to all cities.'[44] The metaphor of the body of the city, which we may consider the predecessor to our notion of 'body politic,' then appears in a speech by Hyperides[45] in the fourth century BCE.

5. THE *DICTATUS PAPAE*

In modern times, the image of the body politic is often associated with the notion of social contract. This notion is somewhat adumbrated in a series of late eleventh-century writings by supporters of the Papal Revolution such as Bruno of Merseburg and Manegold of Lautenbach. In Manegold's 1085 book dedicated to the archbishop of Salzburg

42 '*The felowshippe that came in to this lande with Brute, willynge to be vnite and made a body pollitike callid a reawme, hauynge an hed to gouerne it*.' In Fortescue [1475], *The Governance of England* 112 (Plummer 1885).

43 *κύει πόλις* [*kuei polis*]. In Theognis 1.11.2 39.

44 πάσῃ πόλει ἔρχεται ἕλκος ἄφυκτον [*pasē polei erkhetai helkos aphykton*]. In Solon 4.17.

45 ἀλλ' ἤδη ἐπ' αὐτῶι τῶι σώματι τῆς πόλεως δῶρα εἰλήφασι, [*all'ēdē ep'autōi tōi sōmati tēs poleōs dōra eilēphasi*], but they have now accepted bribes against the very body of the city. In Hyperides, *Against Demosthenes*, fragment 6 col 25 line 24.

Gebhardt, a pact (*pactum*[46]) is affirmed to ground the relation between the people and the king. If the king breaks the pact, he may be deposed.

We may notice that ten years before, in 1075, the eventual deposition of the king is already entrusted to the hands of the pope. The last article of Gregory VII's *Dictatus papae*, that is, literally, the pope's dictation, states that '[h]e [the pope] may absolve subjects from their fealty to wicked men.'[47]

The seventh article of the *Dictatus* is even more explicit about papal prerogatives, as it states that '[i]t may be permitted to him [the pope] to depose emperors.'[48] We can see why the *Dictatus papae* may be understood as the veritable manifesto of the Papal Revolution. In this case, the anachronistic term 'manifesto'[49] is meant to mark the novelty of the Papal text: the pope lists arguments not only as justifications for powers already in place, but also as an anticipation in writing of powers to be.

In other words, in the *Dictatus papae* Gregory VII – born Hildebrand of Soana – claims that he *qua* pope is allowed to exert a series of mostly unprecedented[50] powers. It is worth noticing that he gives these powers a juridical shape. Right after the first article, which claims that god is the only founder of the Roman Church,[51] the second article casts the text as a legal declaration by stating '[t]hat only the Roman pontiff is defined universal as a legal entitlement (*iure*).'[52]

It may be objected that in medieval times the Latin word *ius* loses its connection with Roman custom as the grounding of law. A reversal

46 Manegold of Lautenbach, *Ad Gebehardum Liber* 365.

47 '*Quod a fidelitate iniquorum subiectos potest absolvere*.' In Gregory VII, *Dictatus papae* XXVII, in *PL* 148 407-408, 408.

48 '*Quod illi liceat imperatores deponere*.' *Ibid*. XII, 408.

49 The English word 'manifesto' is an early modern borrowing from a Renaissance Italian term. It appears in Brent's 1620 translation of Sarpi's *History of the Council of Trent*. However, the *Dictatus papae* only performs its role of manifesto within the Papal Curia, as it is never published.

50 These claims are actually understood as a restoration of the natural order. Burke will notice the repetition of the pattern in the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen.

51 '*Quod Romana ecclesia a solo Domino sit fundata*.' In Gregory VII, *Dictatus papae* XII, 408.

52 *Quod solus Romanus pontifex iure dicatur universalis*.' *Ibid*. II, 407. Hildebrand here uses the word *ius* in the ablative case *iure*.

of roles is under way, and in the thirteenth century this change is codified by Aquinas: 'law (*lex*) is not, properly speaking, the same as right (*ius*), but a kind of guide to right.'[53] Nevertheless, even if considered from this ultimately derivative position, the notion of *ius* as legal entitlement clearly expresses Hildebrand's intention of constructing papal authority in reaffirmed legal terms.

In the text of the *Dictatus papae*, this legal vocabulary ostensibly overlaps with the religious one, as when in article nineteen Hildebrand claims '[t]hat he himself may be judged by no one.'[54] The text also articulates legal and religious interventions in a proactive way. Article seven claims that '[f]or him [the pope] alone is lawful, according to the needs of the time, to make new laws, to assemble together new congregations, to make an abbey of a canonry, and, on the other hand, to divide a rich bishopric and unite the poor ones.'[55]

More in general, the juridico-religious lexicon ends up meeting the demand produced by Anselm of Canterbury's innovative approach to religious discourse on the basis of logical reasoning.[56] In the hands of Gratian,[57] and ultimately, Abelard,[58] the integration of logic into religious discourses produces the invention of theology as we know it.

6. *THEOLOGIA*

We may observe that when Langland first writes around 1370 the word 'theologie,'[59] this new English term has a sense very close to Hooker's

[53] '[*L*]*ex non est ipsum ius, proprie loquendo, sed aliqualis ratio iuris*.' In Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* 2-2 q 57 a 1 ad 2.

[54] '*Quod a nemine ipse iudicare debeat*.' In Gregory VII, *Dictatus papae* XIX, 408.

[55] '*Quod illi soli licet pro temporis necessitate novas leges condere, novas plebes congregare, de canonica abatiam facere et e contra, divitem episcopatum dividere et inopes unire*.' *Ibid*. VII, 408.

[56] See Anselm of Canterbury, *Monologion* and *Proslogion*.

[57] See Gratian, *Concordia Discordantium Canonum*.

[58] See Abelard, *Sic et non*, Prologue.

[59] Langland, *Piers Plowman* A 2.79 (Kane).

later definition of 'science of thinges diuine.'[60] Yet, only in the thirteenth century the scholastic *Summae* sanction the addition of such a new layer of sense,[61] as it were, to the long semantic trajectory of the Latin word *theologia*, whose previous portion we may need to recapitulate.

In dealing with *theologia*/theology's trajectory, we may take advantage of the suggestion of the Catholic theologian Louis Bouyer:

> We would have spared ourselves, in this field as in many others, many useless words, if we had begun by perusing the texts, *all the texts*, where the word appears in antiquity, by seeking, *according to the context and not according to a priori theories*, the sense that it is given there.[62]

Of course, for reasons of space only a meaningful sample of the occurrences of the Latin noun *theologia*/theology will be produced here. Moreover, it would be worth recalling the emergence of its Greek predecessor: in the fourth century BCE, the Platonic character Socrates possibly first[63] uses the Greek word θεολογία[64] [*theologia*], which he understands as the (proper) discourse about the gods.

Only three centuries later does Varro probably coin the Latin loanword *theologia*. As most of Varro's work is unfortunately lost, we need to resort to a second-century text by Tertullian, who is possibly the first Christian author to use the word *theologia*. He addresses non-Christians about their gods:

60 Hooker, *Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie* 146 [1593].

61 See notes 101 and 102.

62 '*On se serait épargné, en ce domaine comme en beaucoup d'autres, bien des paroles inutiles, si l'on avait commencé par dépouiller les textes, tous les textes, où le mot paraît dans l'antiquité, en cherchant, d'après le contexte et non d'après des théories a priori, le sens qu'il y reçoit*.' In Bouyer, "Mystique": Essai sur l'histoire d'un mot 4. Though Bouyer deals with the word 'mystic,' as he himself remarks his considerations apply to many other cases (if not all).

63 Both Apollonius Dyscolus and the Suda lexicon ascribe to the sixth-century BCE writer Pherecydes of Syros a *theologia*. The Suda also mentions a work with the more likely title of *Theogonia* or *Theokrasia*. See Apollonius Dyscolus, *De pronomine* 82c; Suda, entry 'Pherecydes.'

64 Plato, *Republic* 2.379a.

> Wishing to rely on your own commentaries, which you have drawn out of every kind of theology of yours (...), I have chosen as a synthesis the work of Varro (...). Now, if I ask this one [Varro] who originated the gods, he points to either the philosophers, the peoples or the poets. For he differentiated the ranking of the gods as a threefold variety: one being natural, which the philosophers keep handling; another mythic, which is discussed among the poets; the third, the gentile, which peoples have adopted each one for themselves.[65]

In the same century, the Greek word θεολογια/*theologia*/theology presumably first appears in a Christian text when Athenagoras of Athens uses it to contemptuously describe to Emperor Marcus Aurelius the Greek and Roman stories about the gods.[66] A few decades later, Clement of Alexandria repeats in writing Athenagoras' gesture.[67] Yet in the same text he also commends the Stoic Cleanthes for his 'truthful theology,'[68] as opposed to the 'poetical theogony'[69] of traditional Greek narrations. As an example, Clement quotes Cleanthes' list of the characteristics of the Good:

> [O]rdered, just, pious, dutiful, self-ruling, useful, beautiful, right, severe, without pretence, expedient ever, fearless, griefless, helpful, soothing pain, well-pleasing, advantageous, steadfast, loved, esteemed, consistent, [* * *] renowned, not puffed up, careful, gentle, strong, enduring, blameless, ever persisting.[70]

65 '*Quare secundum uestros commentarios, quos ex omni theologiae genere recepistis, gradum conferens* (...)*, elegi ad compendium Varronis opera* (...)*. Hunc si interrogem, qui insinuatores deorum, aut philosophos designat aut populos aut poetas. Triplici enim genere deorum censum distinxit: unum esse physicum, quod philosophi retractant; aliud mythicum, quod inter poetas volutatur; tertium gentile, quod populi sibi quique adoptaverunt*.' In Tertullian, *Ad nationes* 2.1.8, in *PL* 1 559-608, 587.

66 See Athenagoras, *Legatio sive Supplicatio pro Christianis* 20.

67 For example, Clement blames Orpheus for his τῶν εἰδώλων τὴν θεολογίαν [*tōn eidōlōn tēn theologian*], theology of idols. In Clement of Alexandria, *Protrepticus*, in *PG* 8 49-246, 181.

68 θεολογίαν δὲ ἀληθινὴν [*theologian de alēthinēn*]. *Ibid*. 178.

69 θεογονίαν ποιητικήν [*theogonian poiētikēn*]. *Ibid*.

70 τεταγμένον, δίκαιον, ὅσιον, εὐσεβές, κρατοῦν ἑαυτοῦ, χρήσιμον, καλόν, δέον, αὐστηρόν, αὐθέκαστον, ἀεὶ συμφέρον, ἄφοβον, ἄλυπον, λυσιτελές, ἀνώδυνον,

In the following century, the word *theologia*/theology is not even mentioned once in Rufinus' Latin translation of Origen's fundamental treatise *On first principles*.[71] Neither does the Greek word θεολογια/*theologia*/theology appear in the Greek surviving portions of the text.[72] We may observe that Origen draws 'from no other source than from the very words and teaching of Christ,'[73] who as 'the Word of God, was in Moses and the prophets'[74] too. Nonetheless, he produces the first Christian 'single body (of text)'[75] that programmatically adds to scriptural materials those obtained 'from the enquiry on the consequences of these materials and from adherence to what is right.'[76]

In the fourth century, the Latin author Marius Victorinus identifies the cognition of *theologia*/theology as that one 'of god and Christ.'[77] In turn, the Christian Greek writers Basil of Caesarea and Gregory of Nazianzus recover part of the original Greek version of *On first principles* within a collation of Origen's texts, which are mainly concerned with the task 'of reading and understanding'[78] the scriptures.

We may notice that in their further writings Basil of Caesarea and Gregory of Nazianzus, together with Gregory of Nyssa, do not confine themselves to the interpretation of biblical evidence: following in the steps of Origen, they also keep using philosophical terms within Christian religious discourse, especially to deal with Trinitarian

ὠφέλιμον, εὐάρεστον, ἀσφαλές, φίλον, ἔντιμον, ὁμολογούμενον, [* * *] εὐκλεές, ἄτυφον, ἐπιμελές, πρᾶον, σφοδρόν, χρονιζόμενον, ἄμεμπτον, ἀεὶ διαμένον. [*tetragmenon, dikaion, hosion, eusebes, kratoun heautou, khrēsimon, kalon, deon, austēron, authekaston, aei sympheron, aphobon, alypon, lysiteles, anōdinon, ōphelimon, euareston, asphales, philon, entimon, omologoumenon,* [* * *] *euklees, atyphon, epimeles, praon, sphodron, khronizomenon, amempton, aei diamenon*]. *Ibid.*

71 No complete text of Περί ἄρχων [*Peri arkhōn*], On first principles, survived the two anti-Origenist posthumous persecutions. We only have a complete Latin version, which was probably slightly modified by Rufinus though.

72 See Origen, *Philocalia*.

73 '*Non aliunde quam ab ipsis verbis Christi doctrinaque*.' In Origen, *ΠΕΡΙ ΑΡΧΩΝ* (trans. Rufinus), in *PL* 11 115-414, 115.

74 '*Dei Verbum in Moyse atque prophetis erat*.' *Ibid*.

75 '[*U*]*num* (...) *corpus*.' *Ibid*. 121.

76 '[*E*]*x consequentiae ipsius indagine ac recti tenore*.' *Ibid*.

77 '[*D*]*ei et Christi*.' In Victorinus, *In epistulam Pauli ad Ephesios* 1, *Praefatio*.

78 τῆς ἀναγνώσεως καὶ νοήσεως [*tēs anagnōseōs kai noēseōs*]. In Origen, *Philocalia* 1.8.

issues. However, in his oration *On theology* Gregory of Nazianzus reaffirms with the Platonic character Timaeus that 'apprehending God (is) difficult, expressing (him) impossible.'[79]

In the fifth century, Augustine too recalls Varro's three kinds of theology.[80] Shortly after, drawing on Plotinus' speculation, the Neoplatonic Proclus constructs what he calls a 'Platonic theology'[81] in the shape of an ordered discourse on the gods as derived from the One. Following Plutarch of Athens, he even reads the Platonic dialogue *Parmenides* as a seminal dialectical confrontation between five affirmations and four negations of the existence of the One.[82]

Moreover, Proclus pushes further the Platonic Parmenides' use of negation about the One: 'if no discourse belongs to it, it is evident that neither (does) negation.'[83] Proclus' negative approach to the One is to have a wide indirect influence on Christian religious writing through a sixth-century elusive author, who hides himself behind the first-century Paul's convert Dionysius the Areopagite.

In dealing with 'the cause of all,'[84] the pseudo-Dionysius displays for us an impressive list of *apophaseis*/denials:

> It is neither soul nor mind, nor does it possess imagination, conviction, speech, or understanding. Nor is it speech nor understanding, nor is it spoken nor understood. It is neither number nor order, nor greatness nor smallness, nor equality nor inequality, nor similarity nor dissimilarity. It is neither immovable, nor moves, nor is it at rest. It neither has power nor is power, nor light. It neither lives nor is it life. It is neither being, nor is it eternity nor time. It cannot be grasped by the understanding since it

[79] Θεὸν νοῆσαι μὲν, χαλεπόν· φράσαι δὲ, ἀδύνατον [*Theon noēsai men, khalepon; phrasai de, adynaton*]. In Gregory of Nazianzus, *Oration 28*, in *PG* 36 25-72, 29. See Plato, *Timaeus* 28c.

[80] See Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* 6.5.

[81] See Proclus, *Platonic Theology*.

[82] *Ibid*. 1.10.

[83] εἰ δὲ μηδείς ἐστιν ἐκείνου λόγος, δῆλον ὡς οὐδὲ ἀπόφασις [*ei de mēdeis estin ekeinou logos, dēlon hos oude apophasis*]. *Ibid*. 2.10.

[84] πάντων αἰτία [*pantōn aitia*]. In Pseudo-Dionysius, *De mystica theologia* 1.3, in *PG* 3 997-1048, 1000.

> is neither knowledge nor truth. It is not kingship nor wisdom. It is neither one nor oneness, nor divinity nor goodness. Nor is it a spirit, in the sense in which we understand that term. It is neither sonship nor fatherhood and it is nothing known to us or to any other being. It is neither one of the non-beings nor of beings. Existing beings do not know it as it actually is and it does not know them as they are. There is neither speaking of it, nor name nor knowledge of it. It is neither darkness nor light, nor error nor truth.[85]

However, the pseudo-Dionysus also warns: 'we should not conclude that denials are simply the opposites of affirmations, but rather that it [the cause of all] is considerably prior in regard to privations (*sterēseis*), exceeding all removals and postulations.'[86] Hence, the apophatic theology that the pseudo-Dionysius consequently builds on Proclus'

[85] οὔτε ψυχή ἐστιν οὔτε νοῦς, οὔτε φαντασίαν ἢ δόξαν ἢ λόγον ἢ νόησιν ἔχει· οὐδὲ λόγος ἐστὶν οὔτε νόησις, οὔτε λέγεται οὔτε νοεῖται· οὔτε ἀριθμός ἐστιν οὔτε τάξις, οὔτε μέγεθος οὔτε σμικρότης, οὔτε ἰσότης οὔτε ἀνισότης, οὔτε ὁμοιότης ἢ ἀνομοιότης· οὔτε ἕστηκεν οὔτε κινεῖται οὔτε ἡσυχίαν ἄγει· οὐδὲ ἔχει δύναμιν οὔτε δύναμίς ἐστιν οὔτε φῶς· οὔτε ζῇ οὔτε ζωή ἐστιν· οὔτε οὐσία ἐστὶν οὔτε αἰὼν οὔτε χρόνος· οὐδὲ ἐπαφή ἐστιν αὐτῆς νοητὴ οὔτε ἐπιστήμη, οὔτε ἀλήθειά ἐστιν οὔτε βασιλεία οὔτε σοφία, οὔτε ἓν οὔτε ἑνότης, οὔτε θεότης ἢ ἀγαθότης· οὐδὲ πνεῦμά ἐστιν, ὡς ἡμᾶς εἰδέναι, οὔτε υἱότης οὔτε πατρότης οὔτε ἄλλο τι τῶν ἡμῖν ἢ ἄλλῳ τινὶ τῶν ὄντων συνεγνωσμένων· οὐδέ τι τῶν οὐκ ὄντων, οὐδέ τι τῶν ὄντων ἐστίν, οὔτε τὰ ὄντα αὐτὴν γινώσκει, ᾗ αὐτή ἐστιν, οὔτε αὐτὴ γινώσκει τὰ ὄντα, ᾗ ὄντα ἐστίν· οὔτε λόγος αὐτῆς ἐστιν οὔτε ὄνομα οὔτε γνῶσις· οὔτε σκότος ἐστὶν οὔτε φῶς, οὔτε πλάνη οὔτε ἀλήθεια [*oute psykhē estin oute nous, oute phantasian ē doxan ē logon ē noēsin ekhei; oude logos estin oute noēsis, oute legetai oute noeitai; oute arithmos estin oute taxis, oute megethos oute smikrotēs, oute isotēs oute anisotēs, oute homoiotēs ē anomoiotēs; oute hestēken oute kineitai oute hēsukhian agei; oude ekhei dynamin oute dynamis estin oute phōs; oute zē oute zōē estin; oute ousia estin oute aiōn oute khronos; oude epaphē estin autēs noētē oute epistēmē, oute alētheia estin oute basileia oute sophia, oute hen oute henotēs, oute theotēs ē agathotēs; oude pneuma estin, hōs hēmas eidenai, oute huiotēs oute patrotēs oute allo ti tōn hēmin ē allō tini tōn ontōn sunegnōsmenōn; oude ti tōn ouk ontōn, oude ti tōn ontōn estin, oute ta onta autēn ginōskei, hē autē estin, oute autē ginōskei ta onta, hē onta estin; oute logos autēs estin oute onoma oute gnōsis; oute skotos estin oute phōs, oute planē oute alētheia*]. *Ibid*. 5, 1045-1048.

[86] μὴ οἴεσθαι τὰς ἀποφάσεις ἀντικειμένας εἶναι ταῖς καταφάσεσιν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ πρότερον αὐτὴν ὑπὲρ τὰς στερήσεις εἶναι τὴν ὑπὲρ πᾶσαν καὶ ἀφαίρεσιν καὶ θέσιν [*mē oiesthai tas apophaseis antikeimenas einai tais kataphasesin, alla poly proteron autēn hyper tas sterēseis einai tēn hyper pasan kai aphairesin kai thesin*]. *Ibid*. 1.2, 1000.

work relies more on excess than negation, because the cause of all is 'beyond all.'[87]

As to the Islamic world, in the ninth century an Arabic paraphrase of part of Plotinus' Enneads, along with Porphyry's commentary, appears with the title ثيولوجيا أرسطو [*Thuyulujiya Arisṭū*], the theology of Aristotle. The author is possibly the Christian Syrian Ibn Na'ima al-Himsi. On the contrary, two centuries later, when the Persian Ibn Sīnā (who is mostly known in Europe as Avicenna) produces a systematic reordering of Aristotle's Metaphysics, he resorts to the term الإلهيات [88] [*al-ilahiyat*], divine matters.

Christian theology emerges as a discipline shortly after in the wake of Anselm's theorization, which even includes several demonstrations of god's existence.[89] In the following century, Abelard produces a momentous shift in the interpretation of religious texts with his approach of systematic harmonization. Abelard's new theology programmatically deploys reasoning tools to compose the various stances expressed by authoritative religious authors, thus overcoming 'our imbecility'[90] that mistakes them as contradictory.

Actually, this approach is already at work[91] a few decades before Abelard's seminal treatise *Sic et non* in the eleventh-century polemical tracts of another Papal revolutionary, the monk Bernold of Constance.

87 ἐπέκεινα τῶν ὅλων [*epekeina tōn holōn*]. *Ibid*. 5. This sentence, which closes the text, echoes the Platonic Socrates' positioning of the Good ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας [*epekeina tēs ousias*], beyond essence. In Plato, *Republic* 6.509b.

88 See Ibn Sīnā, *Kitab al-Shifa* (The book of healing).

89 See Anselm, *Monologion* and *Proslogion*.

90 '*Ad nostram itaque recurrentes imbecillitatem nobis potius gratiam in intelligendo deesse quam eis in scribendo defuisse credamus*,' thus with our imbecility in mind, let us believe that we lack felicity in understanding rather than they in writing. In Abelard, *Sic et Non*, Prologue, in *PL* 178 1339-1610, 1339. However, in the same prologue Abelard admits that the words of the Fathers may be sometimes derived '*ex opinione magis quam ex veritate*,' more from opinion than truth. *Ibid*. 1344. We may notice that Origen already pleads not to modify the alleged solecisms in the text of the scriptures. See Origen, *Philocalia* 8 (from the commentary on Hosea).

91 Martin Grabmann traces back the composing approach to Gerbert of Aurillac and even to the Byzantine Photius. See Grabmann, *Die Geschichte der Scholastischen Methode*, 213 on and 113 on, respectively. We may recall that both authors get directly in contact with Islamic texts and juridical practices.

Anticipating Abelard's line of reasoning, Bernold describes as 'a great insult to the holy Spirit himself'[92] the interpretation of the texts that the latter inspired the Fathers to write 'as if (they were) contrary.'[93] Bernold also amazingly invokes *qua* interpreter the need to historically contextualize his sources: 'Also the consideration of times, places, or persons, often provides us with a competent understanding.'[94]

On the contrary, other champions of the Papal Revolution, such as Peter Damian and Bernard of Clairvaux, are horrified by the display of a plurality of views, even if this plurality is made dialectically converge towards a reconfirmed unity of sense. Whilst Peter Damian sarcastically invites dialectical authors 'to decline God [too] in the plural,'[95] Bernard of Clairvaux defines Abelard's new theology as *Stultilogia*,[96] that is, 'Stupidology.'

7. REVOLUTIONARY JURIDICAL THEOLOGY

We may perceive more than an echo of previous theoretical clashes in Etienne Tempier's 1277 formulation, which singles out as heretical 219 propositions for pitting reason against faith 'as if (*quasi*) they were two contrary truths.'[97] One of the unnamed authors who are targeted by Bishop Etienne's condemnation is the main proponent of the dialectical (or better, Scholastic) method, namely, Aquinas.

As we saw, Bernold and Abelard apply their method of concordance to authoritative religious texts. Aquinas not only widens the scope of

[92] '[*I*]*ipsi sancto Spiritui magnam injuriam*.' In Bernold of Constance, *De vitanda excommunicatorum communione*, in *PL* 148 1181-1218, 1214.

[93] '[*Q*]*uasi contraria*.' *Ibid*.

[94] '*Consideratio quoque temporum, locorum sive personarum, sæpe nobis competentem subministrat intellectum*.' *Ibid*. 1215.

[95] '*Deum pluraliter declinare*.' In Peter Damian, *De sancta simplicitate* 1, in *PL* 145 695-704, 695.

[96] '*Denique in primo limine Theologiae, vel potius Stultilogiae suae, fidem definit aestimationem*,' besides, at the very beginning of his Theology, or rather Stupidology, he defines the faith as an opinion. In Bernard of Clairvaux, *Epistula* 190, in *PL* 182 1053-1072, 1061.

[97] '[*Q*]*uasi sint duae contrariae veritates*.' In Tempier, *Epistola scripta a stephano episcopo parisiensi anno 1277*, in *La condamnation parisienne de 1277* 74.

the method, but he also uses it to produce his Christian recasting of the Aristotelian text. To this end, he follows his master Albert the Great and he lists two series of contrary arguments. Then he puts forth a third one, the objections to which he finally disproves.

Aquinas may derive this cascade structure through Albert from Ibn Sīnā. The Persian encyclopaedic writer recalls in his autobiography that before addressing the study of philosophy he gets acquainted with the discussing techniques of mid-Asian Islamic jurists, as he grows up in Bukhārā.[98]

More in general, we may also notice that in medieval times Islamic theologians and philosophers are grouped according to juridical schools, whose debates shape the whole intellectual horizon of the Muslim world.[99] In medieval Christian Europe, juridical knowledge never attains a similar consideration.[100] Yet beginning in the eleventh century the conflation of juridical and religious languages that takes place in the texts of the Papal revolutionaries, together with the adoption of the method of concordance, opens the way to a new intellectual horizon.

This major theoretical transformation is not limited to the emergence of the new theological discourse as an intellectual discipline, which Albert[101] and Aquinas[102] then theorize in the thirteenth centu-

98 Ibn Sīnā writes in his autobiography, Sirat al-shaykh al-ra'is: 'I had devoted myself to jurisprudence (...) I was a skillful questioner, having become acquainted with the methods of prosecution and the procedures of rebuttal in the manner which the practitioners of it [jurisprudence] follow. Then I began to read the Isagoge.' In Ibn Sīnā, *The Life of Ibn Sina* 21.

99 See, for example, Makdisi, *The Rise of Colleges*.

100 This consideration may be ascribed to the historical management of the normative power of the text of the Quran. As Makdisi writes, '[u]nlike Christianity, Islam has neither councils nor synods to determine orthodoxy. It has no clergy, no body of ecclesiastics convened to consider matters of doctrine, discipline, law or morals. The bounds of orthodoxy are determined on the basis of the consensus of doctors of the law.' *Ibid*. 106.

101 '[*T*]*heologia scientia religiosa est,* theology is religious science. In Albert the Great, *Summa de mirabili scientia Dei* 1 q 2 *solutio*, in *Opera Omnia* 31 12. We may observe that Albert opens his argument with an alleged definition of *theologia*/theology from Augustine's *De Trinitate*, where the word *theologia* does not even appear.

102 '[*Q*]*uaedam pars philosophiae dicitur theologia, sive scientia divina, ut patet per philosophum in VI Metaphys*.' A part of philosophy is called theology, or divine science, as it is set by the philosopher [Aristotle] in Metaphysics VI.' In Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* 1 q 1 art 1. Here Aquinas enrols in the ranks of faith Aristotle's notion of θεολογική [*theologikē*],

ry. Nor is further change only relative to the companion field of juridical teaching, where, as Harold Berman emphasizes, '[i]t was the twelfth-century scholastic technique of reconciling contradictions and deriving general concepts from rules and cases that first made it possible to coordinate and integrate the Roman law of Justinian.'[103]

A more radical change is exemplified by the text of the *Dictatus papae*, which anticipates, so to speak, the innovations to come via a double temporal shift. On the one side, the *Dictatus* makes these innovations appear as being already in place, by turning the claim of future settlements into statements of present fact. The new prerogatives of the pope are listed as a-temporal declarations in the same present tense in which the newly recovered Justinianic compilations of Roman law are mostly written.

On the other side, Hildebrand insists that he is not an innovator, but he is just restoring the ancient principles of the Church of the Fathers. He not only depicts the future as already present, but also as being nothing else than a re-affirmation of the past. This strategy is fully endorsed by Hildebrand's fellow revolutionaries, from the cardinals Humbert and Deusdedit to the bishops Bonizo of Sutri and Anselm of Lucca.

For example, Bishop Anselm incorporates in his revolutionary-leaning *Collectio canonum*, Collection of canons, portions of the Byzantine legal compilations together with themes of the *Dictatus*,[104] which he justifies with both authentic and spurious ancient religious sources as authorities. The same strategy is at work in the text of the *Proprie auctoritates apostolice sedis*,[105] The powers proper to the apostolic see, whose articles follow and integrate those of the *Dictatus*.

that is, 'the primary (science) and of separable and immutable things.' In Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1025a16.

103 Berman, *Law and Revolution* 9.

104 Already the contemporary chronicler Sigebert of Gembloux, a monk and a champion of the Imperial side, writes that Anselm's compilation endorses '*doctrinam Hildibrandi*,' Hildebrand's doctrine. In Sigebert of Gembloux, *Chronica* 1086, in *PL* 160 57-240, 223.

105 See Mordek, Proprie auctoritates apostolice sedis. Ein zweiter Dictatus papae Gregors VII?

The still unidentified author of *Proprie auctoritates*, who may well be Hildebrand himself, supports the statements already put forth in the *Dictatus* by conflating again the languages of religion and law and claiming as witness (*teste*) the council of Chalcedon and the popes Julius, Gregory, and Gelasius, as well as the cases of the popes Marcellinus and Dioscorus.[106]

More important, article 26 of *Proprie auctoritates* asserts that the pope 'can change sovereign powers (*regna*) just like Gregory, Stephan, and Adrian did.'[107] Here the author possibly hints (with a twist) at Theodosius' obituary by Ambrose. In this speech, the bishop of Milan claims the continuing presence of the dead emperor who 'did not abandon but changed the sovereign power (*regnum*).'[108] Ambrose's image of the persistence of Theodosius' power also after his death is meant as an endorsement of Theodosius' successors, namely, his children Arcadius and Honorius, then eighteen and ten years old.

The writer (perhaps Hildebrand) of *Proprie auctoritates* appears to ascribe the dead Emperor Theodosius' feat of changing sovereign power also to the three popes Gregory, Stephan, and Adrian. For sure, Hildebrand himself understands this feat in the widest possible sense. In his letter to Bishop Hermann of Metz he recalls the behaviours of the popes Julius, Gregory, and Gelasius as expressions of the power granted to Peter 'to open and close the doors of the kingdom of heaven to anyone he wanted.'[109]

In the letter to Bishop Hermann, Hildebrand also quotes Paul to the same effect: 'Don't you know that we will judge angels? How much more the secular things?'[110] Hence, whoever the author of *Proprie auc-*

[106] '[*T*]*este Calcedonensi concilio*,' art 1; '*ut de Marcellino constat*,' art 7; '*ut Dioscorus*,' art 8; '*teste papa Iulio*,' art 15; '*teste beato Gregorio*,' art 25; '*teste Clemente*,' art 26; '*Gelasio teste*,' art 28. *Ibid*. 126-131.

[107] '*Regna mutare potest ut Gregorius, Stephanus et Adrianus fecerunt*,' art. 26. *Ibid*. 131.

[108] '*regnum non deposuit, sed mutavit*.' In Ambrose, *De obitu Theodosii* 2, in *PL* 16 1447-1468, 1447.

[109] '[*A*]*perire et claudere januas regni coelestis quibus voluerit*.' In Gregory VII, Epistola 21 to Hermann of Metz, in *PL* 148 594-601, 595.

[110] '*Nescitis quia angelos iudicabimus? quanto magis saecularia?*' *Ibid*. See Paul, *1 Corinthians* 6.3.

toritates is, his listing of the faculty of *regnum mutare*/changing the sovereign power among the papal privileges is perfectly in line with the so-called 'Hildebrand's doctrine.'[111]

However, this very faculty to change the sovereign power is claimed in regard to the power of others: emperors and kings, that is, 'secular' powers. Hildebrand does not claim any transformation in the power that he himself holds *qua* Roman pontiff, though such a transformation is the core of the Papal Revolution. From our retrospective view, the Papal Revolution emerges and is erased at once by its advocates, as they strive to show their continuity of action with the past. To our eyes, this claimed continuity appears both as the source of legitimation of the revolution and its denial.

Why then use the anachronistic[112] word 'revolution' to define the strategic operations carried on by Hildebrand and his numerous followers? We may reconsider this definition in the light of two different points of view.

If observed, as previously recalled, from our contemporary perspective, Hildebrand's declarations seem not to do justice to his actions inasmuch as these declarations deliberately ignore their own novelty. On the contrary, if observed from Hildebrand's own past, his declarations breaks up with previous religious, legal, and political practices because they not only subordinate these practices to principles, but they also claim this subordination in order to legitimize practices that are yet to come.

As this prescriptive anticipation characterizes modern political declarations and manifestos, when reading the Dictatus both its innovative character and its extraordinary boldness escape our sight.[113] Of course, Hildebrand and his fellow revolutionaries do not invent anything new,

[111] See note 104.

[112] The Latin word *revolutio* is generally used to depict the revolving movement of heavenly bodies and, by extension, of time. Sometimes it also describes the transmigration of souls, as in Augustine. The sense of political radical change that we associate with the English word 'revolution' first emerges in the text of the fourteenth-century *Nuova cronica* (New chronicle) by Giovanni Villani, who gives it to the Tuscan word *revoluzione*.

[113] From this point of view, the Papal revolution shares the fate of many successful historical innovations, whose innovative character is obscured by these innovations' very success.

because this very approach to what we now call politics dates back to Plato.[114] Yet, unlike the Papal revolutionaries, Plato himself recalls the scarce success of his attempts to put it into practice.[115]

Between Plato and his possibly unwitting eleventh-century clerical epigones, only the successful example of the Islamic caliphate stands out. Nevertheless, the absolute primacy of the principles inscribed in the Quran over actual legal and political arrangements is not immediately mirrored in the legal and political primacy of the Islamic clergy, which generally – apart from recent cases[116] – does not hold political power in Islamic societies.

The Papal revolutionaries are thus the first body of intellectuals that successfully claims the right not only to advise but also to lead the whole collective body. In this consists the groundbreaking nature of the Papal Revolution.

Nevertheless, as we saw, the very Papal revolutionaries actively erase the innovative character of their actions, which they depict as a restoration of the natural divine order. According to their own construction, after Jesus' incarnation, which marks an absolute discontinuity in human history, this divine order appears confirmed by the continuity of the series of popes as god's representatives on earth.

Of course, the Papal revolutionaries not only affirm the continuity of the institution of the Church with the pope as its head: they also redirect the Church's institutional role by highlighting its legal and political power. It is precisely this operation of redirection that may qualify their action as revolutionary, because it anticipates in words a legal and political settlement yet to come.

As this operation of redirection is also hidden behind their claim to continuity, their action rather appears to our retrospective view as a revolution in denial, as it were. It is then worth noticing that in the current text the strong evocative power of the word 'revolution' is

[114] See especially the text of the Republic. In the Laws, Plato's view appears tempered by his novel consideration of expedience.

[115] See Plato, Seventh letter.

[116] The post-revolutionary Iranian regime and the self-proclaimed Isis caliphate are notable exceptions to the Islamic tradition, and they seem to follow in the step of clergy-led Christian theocracy.

put to work as an anachronistic narrative device in order to mark the emergence of a historical trajectory, which other social actors will only later associate with the word 'revolution.'

8. MYSTICAL BODIES

In the eleventh century, Hildebrand and his fellow revolutionaries claim a continuity of action with the previous occupants of the seat of Peter as leaders of the Christian community. In the following century, this continuity is given shape as the mystical body of the Church, of which the pope is the head.

Kantorowicz observes: 'Once the idea of a political community endowed with a "mystical" character had been articulated by the Church, the secular state was almost forced to follow the lead.'[117] In this case, it is rather Kantorowicz himself who seems forced to admit the long-term hegemonic[118] effect of the Papal Revolution.

For example, this hegemonic effect is still active in the fourteenth century, despite the fact that the cosmopolitan project of the Papal Revolution is reduced to a very down-to-earth European fiscal network centred in Avignon. At that time, neither the jurist Bartolus nor his pupil Baldus are forced to borrow the language tools of the Papal revolutionaries to produce the powerful images of the whole world as *universitas*, a corporate totality,[119] and of *populus*/people as a mystical body,[120] respectively.

[117] Kantorowicz, *The king's two bodies* 231-232.

[118] Whilst Gramsci elaborates the notion of hegemony to escape the Marxist reductionist dichotomy of structure versus superstructure, we may retrospectively understand this notion as a sort of partial anticipation of the Foucauldian claim of the inseparability of power and knowledge.

[119] '[*M*]*undus est universitas quaedam*, the world is a corporate totality. In Bartolus ad D.6.1.1.3 (fol. 180v). We may notice that Bartolus also distinguishes three kinds of *universitates*/corporate totalities: a big (*larga*) one, a province (*provincia*); a less big (*minus larga*) one, a city (*civitas*); and a smallest (*minima*) one, a castle (*castrum*) or a village (*villa*, *vicus*). In Bartolus, *Consilia* 1.189 (fol. 44r).

[120] See note 134.

Moreover, Baldus' *populus*/people is not necessarily related to any kingdom whatsoever, as it may populate a city-state such his hometown Perugia, which Bartolus boldly depicts as '*sibi princeps*,'[121] that is, its own emperor. Nor is a self-governing city such as Perugia understood by Bartolus as a sort of secular state. He rather twists the ancient Roman legal notion of *populus liber*,[122] free people, to justify the city's political autonomy within the borders of the empire.

The image of the mystical body is not a camouflage of a problem of continuity, as Kantorowicz contends,[123] but a narrative device, which expresses both the unity and the continuity of what we still call body politic. Baldus says it explicitly: 'the people does not die.'[124] The emergence of mystical bodies is less related to the diatribe about the eternity of the world[125] than to the construction of novel collective entities, which our language of conceptual abstractions now depicts as political institutions.

In the case of Baldus, his mystical body gives theoretical visibility to the well-established collective practices of the medieval city-state as a whole. In other words, his fourteenth-century juridico-theological language operates *post festum*, just like the Hegelian owl of Minerva. A similar aim of retrospective justification is shared by the Elizabethan crown lawyers who give shape to the image of the two bodies of the king.[126]

On the contrary, eleventh-century papal revolutionaries first construct in words the new hierarchized Church. Their theoretical effort is not limited to the traditional role of legitimation of current practices, but it performatively anticipates new juridical, theological, and political arrangements.

The mystical body of the Church thus emerges in the twelfth century within an already revolutionized horizon. Only in this sense we might say with Kantorowicz that '[p]ractice, as usual, preceded theory.'[127]

[121] Bartolus ad D.4.4.3 n.1 (fol. 139r).
[122] *Ibid*. For the position of a *populus liber* in the Byzantine collation, see D.49.15.7.
[123] See Kantorowicz, *The king's two bodies* 273.
[124] '[*P*]*opulus non moritur*.' In Baldus ad D.5.1.76 (fol. 284r).
[125] See Kantorowicz, *The king's two bodies* 273.
[126] See Plowden, *Commentaries or Reports* 213.
[127] Kantorowicz, *The king's two bodies* 273. Here Kantorowicz is considering the effect of the European rediscovery of Aristotelian thought via its Averroistic interpretations.

Yet the various practices of the twelfth-century renaissance[128] mostly follow the same pattern of recovery of the past that is claimed by the eleventh-century revolutionary Papal declarations. It is a revolutionary theory, or more precisely, a revolutionary writing practice that precedes, promotes, and endorses other innovative practices. Hildebrand's declarations are just an eloquent synthesis of the arguments with which he incessantly addresses the powerful in his vast epistolary.

However, Hildebrand does not indulge in metaphorical images, though he mentions at least once 'the body of the Church.'[129] Before him, it is his fellow revolutionary Cardinal Humbert who applies to this collective body the classical theme[130] of the uneven distribution of organs and functions:

> In the church, the clerical order is thus as distinguished as in the head the eyes, of which the Lord says: 'He that touches you, touches the pupil of my eye (*Zach*. II, 8).' The secular power is like the chest and arms, strong and ready to obey and defend the church. Then comes the common people like the lower members, equally subordinate and necessary to the ecclesiastical and the secular power alike.[131]

The twelfth-century addition of the adjective 'mystical' to the description of the community as a body then transfers to the public sphere of collectives an expression that both in previous Greek and Latin Christian texts is mostly related to the Eucharistic banquet.[132] In this novel use of its association with the word *corpus*/body, the adjective *mysticum*/

[128] This expression is popularized by Haskins in his eponymous book.

[129] '[C]*orpore Ecclesiae*.' In Gregory VII, Epistola XLVIII, in *PL* 148 327-329, 329.

[130] See, for example, Menenius Agrippa's speech in Livy 2.32.8-11.

[131] '*Est enim clericalis ordo in ecclesia praecipuus tanquam in capite oculi, de quo ait Dominus: "Qui tetigerit vos, tangit pupillam oculi mei (Zach. II, 8)." Est et laicali potestas tanquam pectus et brachia ad obediendum et defendendum Ecclesiam valida et exerta. Est deinde vulgus tanquam inferiora vel extrema membra ecclesiasticis et sæcularibus potestatibus pariter subditum et pernecessarium*.' In Humbertus de Silva Candida, *Adversus Simoniacos Libri Tres* 3.29, in *PL* 143 1007-1212, 1188.

[132] For the Greek phrase σῶμα μυστικὸν [*sōma mystikon*], see John Chrysostom, *De resurrectione mortuorum* 12, in *PG* 50 417-432, 432; Nilus, Epistolarum Liber II, CCXXXIII, in *PG* 79 320; Theodoretus, *De providentia,* oratio 5, in *PG* 83 623-644, 629. For the Latin

mystical brings to the notion of collectives the addition of another dimension.

Since the Fathers, the word *mysticum*/mystical hints to something that is not easily accessible, such as the mysterious nature of Jesus and the allegorical sense of obscure writings.[133] It is then not unexpected that the definition of the collective as a mystical body hints to a dimension the transcends the mere sum of its human constituents. In the case of the mystical body of the Church, this surplus is immediately granted by its connection to divine transcendence.

Baldus then reverses, as it were, the direction of this mystical addition, which is no longer the effect of a top-down derivation, but of a bottom-up construction: 'a people properly is not men [*sic*], but a gathering of men into a single mystical and abstractly (*abstractive*) taken body, whose sense has been discovered by human understanding.'[134] In other words, Baldus defines as 'mystical' what we would call the citizen body.

Kantorowicz dismissively comments: 'the designation *corpus mysticum* brought to the secular polity, as it were, a whiff of incense from another world.'[135] He does not realize that Baldus uses the juridico-theological language to operate an extraordinary reversal from top-down to bottom-up legitimation. More in general, Kantorowicz seems to undervalue the theoretical relevance of the elaboration of the very juridico-theological lexicon, which he describes as the effect of a sort of parallel development:

> [T]he notion of *corpus mysticum* was used synonymously with *corpus fictum*, *corpus imaginatum*, *corpus repraesentatum*, and the like – that is, as a description of the juristic person or corporation. The jurists, thereby, arrived, like the theologians, at a distinction between *corpus verum* – the

phrase *corpus mysticum*, see Rabanus Maurus, *De Clericorum Institutione* 1.33, in *PL* 107 293-420, 324.

133 See Bouyer, 'Mistique.' Unfortunately, in his rich genealogy the Catholic theologian downplays the influence of both Philo and Proclus on Christian authors.

134 '[*P*]*opulus proprie non est homines, sed hominum collectio in unum corpus misticum et abstractive sumptum, cuius significatio est inventa per intellectum*.' In Baldus ad C.7.53.5 (fol. 80r).

135 Kantorowicz, *The king's two bodies* 210.

tangible body of an individual person – and *corpus fictum*, the corporate collective which was intangible and existed only as a fiction of jurisprudence.

The dubious clear-cut distinction between jurists and theologians runs across the physical bodies of canonists such as, for example, the popes Innocent III and Innocent IV. But even if we take this distinction for granted, we cannot ignore that the synonymic use of the adjectives *mysticum*/mystical, *fictum*/fictive, *imaginatum*/imagined, and *repraesentatum*/represented in combination with the image of the body witnesses an extraordinarily productive theoretical effort. These bodies are not 'aberrations'[136] – as Gierke calls them – but a narrative step in the process of construction of collectives and institutions.

9. *ABSTRACTIO*

We may notice that in the course of this process of construction medieval authors not only resort to traditional images such as that of the body: they also add neologisms such as the adverb *abstractive*, abstractly, which, as we saw, is part of Baldus' definition of people. This new word is particularly relevant inasmuch as it shows the emergence of the notion of abstraction, which also designates the basic element of the emergent textual alternative to traditional narrations.

We already briefly met the question and answer structure, which is a main element of this emergent textual form. However, before dealing in detail with this form and its abstract constituents, we may recall that the Latin word *abstractio*[137] first occurs in a fifth-century text possibly as a calque of the Greek word αφαιρεσις [*aphairesis*] and with the same sense of 'subtraction.' We may observe that the word *aphairesis* often appears in the Aristotelian text to describe the objects of mathematics

[136] '*Verirrungen*.' In Gierke [1881], *Das deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht* 3 550.

[137] '[A]*bstractio coniugis*,' the abduction of the spouse. In Dictys Cretensis, *Ephemeris belli Trojani* (trans. Septimius) 1.4.

as 'the things obtained by subtraction'[138] of all features but 'the amount and the continuous.'[139]

In the sixth century, Boethius renders in Latin Aristotle's phrase 'the things obtained by subtraction' as '*quae ex abstractione*.'[140] In the twelfth century, when the Aristotelian works on the structure of argument appear in Latin translation under the anachronistic label of 'logic,'[141] the sense of the word *abstractio* begins to shift. Alain de Lille writes that the divine essence is in each person of the trinity '*non per concretionem sed per abstractionem*,'[142] which we may render as 'not in a concrete but in an abstract way.'

By comparison, we may consider that, in the vastly influential[143] fourth-century Latin commentary to his translation of the Platonic dialogue *Timaeus*, Chalcidius contrasts the two interventions *modo concretionem*, that is, by aggregation, and *modo discretionem*, that is, by separation. Whilst Alain likewise contrasts addition with subtraction, the latter is used in the figurative sense of negation in apophatic religious discourse. Hence, when the adverb *abstractive*[144] appears in Alain's text, it qualifies the divine essence 'subtractively,' that is, negatively and abstractly at once.

In the thirteenth century, when Albert the Great writes of things that '*sumantur abstractive*,'[145] he means that 'they are taken abstractly,' that is, as abstract notions, as opposed to things taken *concretive*, concretely, i.e. singularly. However, the semantic link of the Latin term *abstractio* with the operation of subtraction only disappears with its

138 τὰ ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως [*ta ex aphaireseōs*]. In Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 11.1061a28-29.

139 τὸ ποσὸν καὶ συνεχές [*to poson kai synekhes*]. *Ibid*. 11.1061a33.

140 Boethius, *Posteriorum Analiticorum Aristotelis Interpretatio* 1.14.

141 Aristotle uses the word λογικός [*logikos*] in a different sense from the English word 'logic(al).' He means a formal approach, regardless of the specific content. See, for example, Aristotle, *Of the Generation of Animals* 747b.

142 Alan de Lille, *Summa 'Quoniam homines'* 1.8c.

143 We may notice that of the 140 extant manuscripts of Chalcidius' Timaeus and Commentary, 53 are produced in the twelfth century. See Somfai, The Eleventh-Century Shift in the Reception of Plato's "Timaeus" and Calcidius' "Commentary."

144 Alan de Lille, *Summa 'Quoniam homines'* 1.32.

145 Albertus Magnus, *Commentarii in primum librum Sententiarum*, dist 46 N art 13, *solutio*, in *Opera Omnia* 26 447.

medieval French translation as *abstraccion* in Nicole Oresme's 1370 rendering of Aristotle's *Nichomachean Ethics* from Robert Grosseteste's Latin version: '*les choses de mathématiques sont cogneües par abstraccion, ymaginacion et phantaisie*,'[146] the elements of mathematics are apprehended through abstraction, imagination, and phantasy.

In the meantime, as we saw, Baldus modulates, so to speak, the new absolute opposition between concreteness and abstraction by limiting the action of the novel abstractive operation to a specific collective body. The resulting mystical citizen body carves for itself a political space between the logical poles of the single human being and humaneness, and between the juridico-theological poles of the single Christian subject and her universal authorities, namely, the pope and the emperor.

Baldus' limited abstraction is to be revived in the seventeenth century by the Hobbesian 'Artificiall Man,'[147] whose composition as the body of the Leviathan state is to follow a similar but, unfortunately, only fictional bottom-up procedure. However, back to its medieval emergence, the polar opposition between concretion and abstraction may be seen as both an example and an index of the more general cultural transformation that is catalysed, as it were, by the Papal Revolution.

10. THE MEDIEVAL CONTENTUAL TURN

The medieval general transformation of European culture may be understood as a synergy of several processes. Among them, we already recalled the emergence of the new systematic discipline of theology from the traditional exegesis of biblical narrations. The new theological *Summae* follow a line of reasoning that, as we saw, is prefigured by Clement, timidly opened by Origen, used in the reverse by the pseudo-Dionysius, and openly pursued by Anselm and Abelard. The authors of the *Summae* – a word that literally means 'top points' – then reorganize the scriptural material under the rubric of main religious issues.

[146] Oresme (trans.), *Le Livre d'Ethique d'Aristote* 347.
[147] Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Introduction.

For example, in mid-twelfth century Peter Lombard recovers the distinction between things and signs that underlies Augustine's method of biblical interpretation.[148] The Lombard turns this distinction into the general criterion of classification of religious topics that structures the four books of his *Sententiae*, that is, literally, decisions.[149] In Peter's work, which is to become the most popular medieval textbook, things and signs are no longer hermeneutic but indexing tools, which are also further specified by various subcategories.

Moreover, this new systematic structure not only orders the text, but it is also redoubled in the likewise newly devised titles that precede each chapter. Peter himself is perfectly aware of the relevance of this addition, which he explicitly claims in the prologue as a reading tool, 'so that what is searched is met more easily.'[150]

However, chapter titles are just one aspect of the substantial reorganization of the written material that Illich characterizes as a 'scribal revolution.'[151] The latter's forerunners appear in the late seventh century, when Irish monks begin to insert spaces between written words in their copied manuscripts.[152] From the tenth century on, the Irish copying practice spreads in Europe. Scribes end up being charged with the production of self-standing written words, so that readers are relieved of the necessity to read aloud a string of written letters in order to single out each word from the auditory sequence. The vocal chords no longer set the speed of the emerging silent reading, which is free to follow the rhythm of the eye.

148 See Augustine, *De Doctrina Christiana*.

149 Quintilian (8.5.3) calls the authoritative statements of classical authors *sententiae* because of their resemblance to the decisions of public bodies. The Lombard applies the same term to Christian authors' assertions.

150 '*Ut autem quod quæritur facilius occurrat*.' In Peter Lombard, *Libri Quatuor Sententiarum*, *Prologus*, in *PL* 192 521-964, 522. The Lombard also previously points out that he adds titles '*ut non sit necesse quaerenti, librorum numerositatem evolvere*,' so that for him who searches it be not necessary to turn the pages of many volumes. We may notice that a novel temporalization begins to emerge through the Lombard's additions and their motivations, which construct an unprecedented scarcity of time.

151 Illich, *In the vineyard of the text* 116.

152 See Saenger, *Space Between Words*.

Reading is thus reconfigured as a different bodily motor activity. The reader may bypass the traditional slow, patient, and reiterated mumbling of the written sequences of *scriptura continua*/continuous writing, and he may 'look (at the book) for himself,'[153] as Hugh of Saint Victor writes around 1128.

Here the action of looking for oneself not only indicates the silent character of reading, but it also announces a reorientation of reading itself. The traditional reading activity as an incorporation of the book through the aural re-enactment of its written words is to become the perusal of the book's content.

We saw that just some twenty years after Hugh's *Didascalicon*, the Lombard facilitates the perusal of his writing by adding chapter titles to his *Sentences*. In the course of the same century, several other visual tools surface on the manuscript page to simplify the reader's access to the text. We may recall, among others, the insertion of the table of contents,[154] the highlighting of keywords in red, the introduction of quotation marks to single out quotes and the addition of the relative reference in the margin, the use of alphabetic indexing,[155] and a more accurate distribution of the text on the page.

We may notice that the English word 'text' derives through the medieval French word *tiste* and then *texte* from the Latin perfect participle *textus*, woven, which the Fathers also use in the figurative sense of the textual fabric of the Scriptures.[156] It is this later sense that at the be-

153 '[*P*]*er se inspicientis*.' In Hugh of Saint Victor, *Didascalicon* 3.8, in *PL* 176 739-838, 771.

154 A numbered list of contents already appears on the first page of the manuscript of the *Liber pantegni*, the latter word being a deformation of the Greek term παντεχνῆ [*pantekhnē*], all [medical] arts. Constantinus Africanus compiles it in Monte Cassino and he dedicates it to the abbot Desiderius before the latter becomes pope as Vittore III in 1086, after the death of Gregory VII in 1085. The work is a partial translation of كامل الصناعة الطبية كتاب [*Kitāb Kāmil aṣ-Ṣinā'a aṭ-Ṭibbiyya*], the complete book of the medical art, written by the Persian physician 'Ali ibn al-'Abbas al-Magusi in the tenth century.

155 We may notice that still in the thirteenth century Albert the Great apologizes to the readers for using the alphabetical order, because '*hunc modum non omnino sit philosophico*' this mode is not wholly philosophical. In Albert the Great, *De Animalibus* 22.1.1, in *Opera omnia* 12 433.

156 See, for example, Augustine, *De Doctrina Christiana* 2.39. The figurative bridge is possibly a locus in Quintilian, where he mentions Lysia's '*textum tenue atque rasum*,' fine and delicate texture (of speech). In Quintilian 9.4.17.

ginning of the twelfth century is rendered with the French loanword *tiste*.[157] However, already in the sixth century Boethius uses the word *textus*[158] also to describe the Aristotelian text.

The notion of text thus long predates the spreading of word spacing and the twelfth-century scribal revolution. Yet these transformations of the manuscript page reconfigure the text itself, which is no longer just a means for reactivating a speech but is becoming a tool for directly accessing a content. More than that, content shapes the text both as the object of an explicit interrogation – as in the case of the question and answer pattern – and as a structuring taxonomic order.

We saw that the question and answer pattern is applied first to the interpretation of religious and legal texts. Collations are then reordered according to content, from Gratian's canon law texts to the Lombard's theological sentences and Azo's civil laws.[159] The same content-oriented structure also characterizes the new treatises of logic[160] and medicine.[161]

We may say that the twelfth-century scribal revolution underlies a contentual[162] turn in European culture. The narrations of ancient *auctores*,[163] that is, the (mostly literary) authors of the European canon, are sidelined as major sources by the new content-based texts.

By mid-thirteenth century the neglect of the *auctores* (Homer, Claudian, Priscian, Persius, Donatus, and many more) is reproached in verse by John of Garland.[164] His fellow poet Henri d'Andeli even brings the

157 '[*L*]*es tistes*' are the precious books of scriptures, which are '[*b*]*ien engemmez de ametistes*,' well encrusted with amethysts. In Benedeit, *Le Voyage de Saint Brendan* 677-678.

158 See, for example, Boethius, *In librum Aristotelis Peri hermeneias commentarii* (2nd ed.) 2.7.

159 See Azo, *Summa Codicis*.

160 See, for example, Abelard, *Logica 'Ingredientibus'* (ca. 1120).

161 See note 154.

162 The English term 'contentual' is a modern rendering of the early modern German word *inhaltlich*. We may notice that the word *inhalt* from which the latter derives is translated by the brothers Grimm as '*summa*.' See Jacob Grimm & Wilhelm Grimm, *Deutsches Wörterbuch*.

163 Curtius remarks that for the entire Middle Ages the Latin *auctores*, from the translated Homer to Virgil and the grammarians, are considered as '*wissenschaftliche Autoritäten*,' scholarly authorities. In Curtius, *Europäische Literatur und Lateinisches Mittelalter* 1 65.

164 See John of Garland, *Morale scolarium* (1241).

auctores to the battlefield under the banner of Grammar against Logic and her champions, who include Plato and Aristotle. As the *auctores*' brave attempt is crushed, Henri cries in despair:

Qui veïst logicïenaus	If you had seen the logic writers
Comme ils tuoient autoriaus	How they slaughtered the *auctores*
Et fere ces destructïons	And they brought such a destruction
Sor cez gentilz constructïons!	Among those pleasant constructions![165]

Whilst this graphic image is probably the crudest description of the obliteration of the *auctores*' reference status, this is neither the first nor the last thrashing of literary writers in European history. We may recall that Plato gives expression to the first European contentual turn by inventing both a new notion of philosophy[166] and its allegedly ancient feud with poetry.[167] As Havelock shows, the Platonic Socrates's vicious attack on poetic art[168] is meant to legitimate Plato's novel philosophical discourse by discrediting the traditional authority of Homeric epic.[169]

However, the Platonic dismissal of poetry does not take hold, and Plato's pupil Aristotle restates the legitimacy of both poetry and poetical tropes.[170] Only in medieval times another contentual turn emerges in twelfth-century texts and then it shapes the curricula of thirteenth-century European universities, where students flock to appropriate the lucrative tools of logic, theology, law, and medicine.

165 Henri d'Andeli, *La Bataille des VII Ars*, in *Œuvres* 53, vv 274-277.
166 Plato, *Gorgias* 481d.
167 Plato, *Republic* 607b.
168 *Ibid*. 10.595a-608b.
169 See Havelock, *Preface to Plato*.
170 See Aristotle, *Rhetoric* and *Poetic*. However, Aristotle prioritizes the role of content over poetic expression in his classification of authors, as in the case of Empedocles. See Aristotle, *Poetic* 47b. We may notice that a late Neoplatonist author such as Macrobius even summons literary authors together with Neoplatonist philosophers in defence of Plato against Aristotelian philosophical objections. See Macrobius, *Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis* 2.15.2.

The new content-oriented education revolves around a network of generalizations. We previously followed the emergence of the novel notion of abstraction, which overlaps and generalizes the notion of species, as considered in relation to the individual. We may understand the new notion of abstraction, as well as those of object[171] and concept,[172] as both instances and indexes of the medieval proliferation of generalizations.

Moreover, borrowing from the language of modern logicians, we may say that the notion of abstraction – similarly to that of concept, and to an extent to that of object – is at once a first- and second-order generalization, inasmuch as it is both a specific generalization and a new definition of generalization as a logical class.

11. MODERN JURIDICAL THEOLOGY?

What we would now call logical abstractions do not replace images in their figurative use as generalizations. As we saw, the image of the body in its specific mystical quality produces the generalization of a collective that is more than the sum of its parts. If we may play with the then emerging logical language, we may say that the medieval image of the body – endowed with its new mystical character – keeps playing its role of concrete abstraction, as it were.

This concrete character gives the image of the body in its figurative use an immediacy that probably prompts its later use by Elizabethan jurists. For sure, Hobbes makes the most of this immediate concreteness also on his *Leviathan*'s frontispiece, which he plans with painstaking attention. In the rightly renowned engraving on the cover of the book,

171 See Dewan, "Objectum." Notes on the Invention of a Word.

172 Whilst the Latin perfect participle *conceptus* is long attested in its use as the adjective 'conceived,' since the early fourteenth century it is also construed as a noun and a logical notion, which we may translate as 'concept.' For example, in his 1323 *Summa Logicae* (1.13.34) Ockham writes: '*omne illud quod continetur sub hoc conceptu "animal rationale"*,' all that is contained under this concept 'rational animal.'

the head of the king stands above a body that is made with the bodies of the subjects.

Whilst Hobbes calls the Leviathan a '*Mortall God*,'[173] he does not bestow on its body a specifically mystical nature though. At any rate, the monster shares with its juridico-theological predecessors the same ontological structure. As Hobbes declares in his previous book *Elements of Law, Naturall and Politique*, 'that the people is a distinct body from him or them that have the sovereignty over them is an error.'[174]

We may observe that still in these seventeenth-century foundational texts of the modern political sphere the notion of secularization, which underlies Schmitt's construction of political theology,[175] is yet to play any significant role.[176] Of course, Hobbes and early modern authors at large definitely move their focus away from the poles of the medieval juridico-theological horizon, namely, universal and local powers, and they all converge towards the middle ground of the nation state. Nonetheless, not only the juridico-theological dimension is not abandoned, but from the sixteenth century on, it also substantiates the new claims of a right to rebellion[177] and then to revolution.[178] Hobbes himself translates the Greek term μεταβολή [*metabolē*], change, as 'revolution.'[179]

It is then no wonder that the first successful modern revolution, which occurs in seventeenth-century England, is fully inscribed within the juridico-theological framework. Even the radical Winstanley

173 Hobbes, *Leviathan* 2.17.

174 Hobbes, *Elements of Law, Naturall and Politique* 2.8.9.

175 See Schmitt, *Politische Theologie*.

176 Of course, Schmitt acknowledges Hobbes' medieval sources, but he also follows Harnack and anticipates Kantorowicz in a revealing genealogical inversion, when he writes that Hobbes '*gebrauchte diese ganz mittelalterlichen Begriffe, die zuerst dem deutschen Kaiser zustanden und diesem durch den Papst aus der Hand genommen*,' used these completely medieval concepts, which previously belonged to the German emperor and were taken out of his hands by the pope. In Schmitt, *Der Leviathan in der Staatslehre des Thomas Hobbes* 125.

177 See, for example, on the two sides of the religious divide, Mariana, *De rege et regis institutione*, and Beza, *De jure magistratuum*.

178 There is certainly no need to invoke a secularizing step when Locke depicts his so-called right to revolution as an 'appeal to Heaven.' In Locke, *Two Treatises on Government* 390.

179 Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War* (Hobbes' translation) 2.53.

relies on Christian scriptures not as mere narrations but as expressed divine law.[180]

Actually, also in more recent times novel lay scriptures, so to speak, play a remarkable role in the course of supposedly secularized revolutions, when renewed scholasticisms produce the sacralization, as it were, of reference texts.[181] In these cases, even Schmitt would probably agree that the revolutionaries' genealogical link with juridical theology is just more evident than the liberals' one.

12. EPILOGUE

Nowadays, a cursory review of our contemporary condition would detect a web of partly collaborating and partly conflicting powers, in which really existing democracies are just a portion of the global network of really existing principle-driven Platonic states. For sure, whilst the ubiquitous primacy of principles over practices and practitioners is no longer exclusively expressed in juridico-theological terms, it even seems to impartially ignore the religious versus secular divide. A 'secular' Market can be more exacting than a god whatsoever.

In other and more imaginative words, namely, those of Adam Smith, in the ancient world no 'invisible hand of Jupiter'[182] was needed to justify regular natural occurrences. Only 'more irregular events,' such as 'thunder and lightning (...) were ascribed to his favour, or his anger.'[183] On the contrary, the invisible hand of the Market, which for Smith is the hand of the Christian god, operates as a steady universal mechanism.

The erratic hand of Jupiter and the systematic hand of the Market are paradigmatic. They show that the enlightened Presbyterian Smith conceives of the Christian and then modern understanding of the stable

[180] See, for example, Winstanley, *The new laws of righteousness*.
[181] See, for example, Stalin, *Dialectical and Historical Materialism*; Zedong, *Quotations from Chairman Mao*.
[182] Smith, *History of Astronomy* 3.2, 25.
[183] *Ibid*.

and objective universal order as an improvement on the inadequate and subjective perspective of the ancients. However, regardless of his Christian and modern biases, in one thing Smith is certainly right: despite the efforts of Plato and his fellow philosophers, in most ancient Greek and Roman narrations neither divine powers nor their effects are unlimited.

On the contrary, we saw that since Clement Christian authors generally follow the philosophers in granting their god the unrestrained features of philosophical abstract notions.[184] In medieval times, monks first construct on this hyperbolical yardstick[185] their secluded society, and then they set out to spread their construction in the outer world. Even more than in the partial establishment of a really existing (Christian) Platonism, the enduring legacy of the Papal Revolution is in its successful affirmation of the Platonic pattern of the absolute priority of principles.

As previously recalled, the Papal Revolution then reveals itself as pregnant with mostly unexpected consequences, which, by jointly turning the world itself into a content, end up building the world as we know it. In our contemporary historical conjuncture, the perceived urge to steer the course of the events seems unable to embody a proportionate course of action. Reconsidering how the Papal Revolution both triggers and joins a series of processes that turn the page, as it were, of our history,[186] may, perhaps, support our effort to turn the page again.

184 We also noticed an apophatic undercurrent, whose representatives deem abstractions insufficient to describe god.

185 Actually, Benedict of Nursia knows well that he has to take account of human frailty.

186 According to Chenu, Southern, and to an extent Illich, the new page spans until the Reformation. I would suggest that the twelfth-century development of the technology of the book at large turns the long hegemonic wave of ancient culture into a contentual horizon that still surrounds and directs our global practices, as effect of the colonial Europeanization of the world. Yet this is matter for another work. See Chenu, L'Éveil de la conscience dans la civilisation médiévale; Southern, *The Making of the Middle Ages*; Illich, *In the Vineyard of the Text*.