ⓘ http://orcid.org/ 0000-0002-3676-792X

ELŻBIETA TABAKOWSKA
Professor Emerita
Jagiellonian University in Krakow

*Translated by Anna Partyka-Sitek (Big Little Talks)*

# Subject and Object in the Space of the Word: Roman Ingarden and Cognitive Linguistics

Podmiot i przedmiot w przestrzeni słowa: Roman Ingarden i kognitywiści

**Abstrakt:** Śledząc prace powstające w nurcie kognitywistycznych rozważań o języku, trudno nie zauważyć wyraźnych powiązań z tezami psychologii *Gestalt*, co dostrzegają badacze początków i rozwoju kognitywistycznej teorii języka. Odkrywcy nieznanych kart z dziejów językoznawstwa kognitywnego nie wymieniają jednak wśród jego prekursorów Romana Ingardena. Tymczasem wiele z podstawowych tez kognitywnej teorii języka i gramatyki można odnaleźć w myśli Ingardena, zwłaszcza w książce *O poznawaniu dzieła literackiego* (*The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art)*, wydanej w 1937 roku, a więc dokładnie pół wieku przed rokiem 1987 – *annus mirabilis* językoznawstwa kognitywnego, w którym ukazały się przełomowe prace jego amerykańskich ojców założycieli. Przedmiotem dociekań Ingardena jest „literatura", podczas gdy Langacker i zwolennicy jego teorii zajmują się „nie-literaturą" – tekstem i dyskursem jako elementami codziennej komunikacji. Zarówno (węższa) estetyczna koncepcja Ingardena, jak i (szersza) językoznawcza koncepcja Langackera, Lakoffa czy Talmy'ego opierają się na fundamentalnej opozycji między podejściem obiektywistycznym i subiektywistycznym. Uderzająca jest też zbieżność w patrzeniu na kształt, jaki język przyjmuje w wypowiedzi, nieuchronnie związanej ze świadomością i aktywnością umysłową jej twórcy – podmiotu percepcji, konceptualizacji i ekspresji. Szersza znajomość fenomenologicznej myśli Ingardena mogłaby wzbogacić rozważania teoretyków językoznawstwa kognitywnego o filozoficzne podstawy, a ich poszukiwania językowych wyznaczników „potocznej literackości" zyskałyby walor w postaci fenomenologicznego aspektu użycia języka.

**Słowa kluczowe:** intencjonalność, językoznawstwo kognitywne, konkretyzacja, miejsca niedookreślenia, niedookreśloność, obiektywizm, obrazowanie, przestrzenie mentalne, psychologia postaci (*Gestalt*), subiektywizm

**Abstract:** Works written in the cognitivist vein have been clearly inspired by and connected with Gestalt psychology – a fact recognized by scholars who describe the beginnings and sub-

sequent development of cognitive theories of language. However, the discoverers of hidden aspects of the history of Cognitive Linguistics hardly ever put on their lists of forerunners the name of Roman Ingarden. And yet many of fundamental principles that underlie cognitivist theories of language and grammar can be found in Ingarden's writings, notably in his *The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art*, first published in 1937 – exactly half a century before the year 1987, the *annus mirabilis* of Cognitive Linguistics, when its founding fathers published their groundbreaking monographs. Ingarden wrote about "literature", while Langacker and his followers focus upon "non-literature", i.e. text and discourse as elements of everyday communication. But both the (narrower) aesthetic concepts of Ingarden and the wider (linguistic) notions of Langacker, Lakoff or Talmy are based upon the fundamental opposition between the objectivist and the subjectivist approach. Most striking is the convergence of their view upon the shape of language as it occurs in verbal expression, inevitably connected with consciousness and mental activity of the producer: a cognizant subject of perception, conceptualization and expression. Deeper knowledge of Ingarden's phenomenological thought might enrich cognitivist reflection on language and by taking account of phenomenological aspects of language use promote the search for markers of "everyday literariness".

## I. Langacker

In the search for roots of the cognitivist theory of language, commonly known today as Cognitive Linguistics, researchers tend to turn to writings in the field of cognitive psychology from the second part of the 20th century. It is a demonstrably correct approach: for example the research by an American psychologist Eleanor Rosch (1977), focusing on the way the processes of categorization work, remains to this day a pillar of the radial category theory and prototype theory-based cognitive semantics, one which recognizes the primacy the cognitive processes of human mind have in creating, acquiring and using languages (Lakoff 1987; Langacker 1987, 2008).

Other inspirations and borrowings abound, Gestalt psychology being an exceptionally rich source of groundbreaking ideas for Cognitive Linguistics; almost all concepts vital for the cognitivist theory of natural language essentially have a form of gestalts, and at the very core of the model of Cognitive Grammar created by Ronald W. Langacker lie the main principles of gestaltism. The fundamental thesis of Gestalt psychology is famously the statement that human mind comprehends individual external stimuli, especially the visual ones, as wholes, rather than sums of respective parts. The basic process of such "merging" is arranging and organizing impressions, and one of the most important criteria is the similarity of connected elements. It comes as no surprise then that a theory of language description formulated with respect to basic cognitive processes of human mind must draw on similar premises. What also seems obvious is that the said premises will be reflected in the plane of an expression: the structure of an utterance.

Visual perception, the key area of interest of *Gestalt* psychology, plays a major part in Cognitive Grammar. Although Langacker cautions against equating elements of his model with facets of visual perception (2008, 55), it is impossible to

miss the analogies between the two. Terms constituting the instruments of Cognitive Grammar verge on being terminological borrowings, and parameters of Langacker's *imagery* find their equivalents in respective principles of gestaltism. The most basic parameter, the *Figure/Ground alignment*, described as conceptual relationship between profile and base, corresponds with gestaltism's most important principle, one claiming that people perceive objects in sight as diversified system of foreground and backgrounds. The said diversification is reflected is Langacker's model of grammar in the form of syntactic structures as the opposition between *trajector* and *landmark* and stands e.g. for distribution of subjects and objects in a sentence.

Additionally, cognitive linguists remark on the existence of linguistic correlates of the psychological concept of *salience*, a property because of which the description of items which are positioned in the foreground and are perceived as more pronounced will be more detailed and shall include a greater number of features in comparison to the objects placed in the background by the author of the utterance. The linguists working in the cognitive vein point to structures analogous to this one both on the level of lexicon and syntax.

Yet another principle, known as the principle of *proximity*, states that elements placed close to one another are perceived as related and belonging to the same group. As analysis of such languages as English shows (which nonetheless can pertain to e.g. Polish), such groups of objects are frequently described with collective nouns (cf. Langacker, *passim)* in the singular form.

The idea of *contour,* one of the instruments of Cognitive Grammar, is quite closely related to Gestalt psychology deliberations. Contour is a semantic property attributed to objects seen as separate regions in (physical or abstract) space occupied by sets of elements (physical or abstract) and combined into conceptual wholes, be it thanks to a difference between the given configuration and its surroundings, or the inner structure of the configuration, meaning the perceived linkages between the individual elements. When considered within Cognitive Grammar, the conceptual contour relates to concepts expressed by countable nouns and verbs in the perfective aspect (cf. Langacker 1987, 4.1.2.) Bounding, a process of giving objects more or less abstract contours in spaces in which they exist, is prompted by the structure of objects in the physical world (e.g. the term "cherry" has a spatial contour as opposed to "cherry juice"; the concept expressed by the verb "read" in the past tense has a temporal contour in contrast to the concept associated with the form "was reading"). The process of bounding can find its equivalent in Gestalt psychology in the principle of reification according to which "the eye recognizes disparate shapes as <belonging> to a single shape, […] complete three-dimensional shape is seen, where in actuality no such thing is drawn" (Wikipedia 2024). A fragment of a brief overview of Gestalt principles found on the Internet could easily be taken for a quote from *Cognitive Grammar: A Basic Introduction* by Langacker: "Ideally an object has an outline, but this is not always true […]. When there is no outline, we use both the closeness and separation of shapes contained within the item to help spot the larger shape" (Changing Minds n.d.; cf. Langacker 1987, 196).

One of very important elements of cognitivist theory of grammar is a thesis claiming that vantage points and the perspective visible as a consequence of their choice are distinct for different observers, the effect being various representations pertaining to the given object, be it subject, visual or language oriented. For Langacker the vantage point constitutes the basic parameter of linguistic scene construction – *imagery*. In gestaltism it refers to multistability, a potential existence of (two) different ways of interpreting an object resulting mostly from a shift in the Figure/Ground alignment, as an effect of which the figure starts being viewed as the background, and the background as the figure. Although to my knowledge no Cognitive Grammar theorists make direct references to multistability, linguistic realization of such a modification in the structure of an utterance can easily be found in the cognitive descriptions of alternate construals (Langacker 1995, 99; example 13a).

Analogies between Gestalt psychology and Cognitive Linguistics are easily noticeable on the level of lexicon and morphosyntax. What seems even more interesting however is tracking the ways in which they correspond to each other on higher levels of systems organization. A significant, albeit quite a lone one in the matter, is the voice of a German linguist Andreas Hölzl, who in the works from the first part of the 20th century finds foreshadowing of the elements present in the future theories of cognitive linguists: conceptual metaphor (Asch 1955 vs. Lakoff 1987; Hölzl 2020, 2), image schemas (Lewin 1936 vs. Langacker *passim*), force dynamics (Lewin 1936 vs. Lakoff 1987 vs. Fauconnier 1985; Talmy 1988; Hölzl 2020, 3), mental spaces and conceptual integration (Arnheim 2011 vs. Fauconnier 1985, Fauconnier, Turner 2003; Hölzl 2020, 4).

Hölzl concludes his overview of the forerunners of Cognitive Linguistics with a sentiment that "a general reevaluation of the origins of Cognitive Linguistics is long overdue" (2020, 5). A step in that direction is a recently published article "Roman Ingarden's Theory of the Literary Work of Art: a Cognitive Grammar Reassessment" (Kardela et al. 2023) whose authors ponder over Ingarden's theory of places of indeterminacy in the context of the principle of *grouping*, described in one of the newer versions of Cognitive Grammar (Langacker 2016).

Two phases can be distinguished in the development of the theory of Cognitive Linguistics and Cognitive Grammar. The first phase, initiated by Ronald Langacker's monumental monograph in 1987 (Langacker 1987), saw formalization of the theoretical overview; Langacker's book presents integrated descriptions of language structures as meaning-bearing continuum of lexicon, morphology and syntax. Research from this period was born out of cognitivists' radical opposition to what was then mainstream linguistics: generative theory of language based on the principles of modularity, compositionality, and autonomy of syntax. The second phase, beginning of which can be traced back to research on conceptual metaphor and construction of the foundation for conceptual integration theory (Lakoff 1987; Fauconnier, Turner 2003) is a time of interdisciplinary synthesis and of growing interest in the processes of processing (linguistic) information, the importance of context and structure of discourse. It comes as no surprise then that it is this stage that brings the cognitivist theory of language and of grammar

closer to the phenomenological aesthetic theory of structure and cognition of the literary work of art.

The researchers working in the cognitive vein and representing the "second phase", while observing the rule of embedding language structures within context as a fundamental one, underline the importance of *substrate*, a context without explicit boundaries which includes the knowledge of background and the circumstances of the utterance. As an effect of discourse that evolves in time, they describe the process of meaning negotiation. In the research on cognitive processes an interactivity postulate appears, accompanied by a stipulation that interactivity of linguistic expressions is an element of meaning of an utterance even when it is not directly indicated and remains implied only. It is worth reminding of a significant difference: in linguistic analyses, especially the ones concerning discourse, interactivity is understood as a mutual relationship between the interlocutors, constituting a basis for meaning negotiation. In more broadly understood cognitive studies however it is the interactions between language and the cognitive process that are studied (cf. e.g. Spivey 2023).

When following the newer research written in the cognitivist vein, one cannot help but notice that there still appear clear connections to theses from Gestalt psychology, especially the principles of *closure* and *continuity*. The term *closure* refers as we know to tendency of the mind to eliminate conceptual gaps, so as to create a coherent whole. Langacker's *bounding* (cf. above) is a process of conceptual "closing up" of a region containing elements characterized by conceptual *continuity* in physical, temporal or abstract space (Langacker 1987, 200). On higher organization levels such "closing up" would probably mean complementing conceptual metonymies. Cognitivists believe metonymy to be an obligatory and indispensable feature of each and every expression, a claim repeated by linguists studying language within this theory (Langacker 2009; Radden, Kovecses 2007), indicated by the very father of general semantics, Alfred Korzybski (Korzybski 1933), and finally underlined by the authors of canonical research on conceptual metonymy (cf. e.g. Barcelona 2000). In real-life situations the participants of (speech) communication acts very rarely receive information that could be deemed as (nearly) complete, which makes it necessary for them to fill the gaps as mind dictates it, using to that end the aforementioned conceptual substrate. Taking substrate into consideration in various aspects allows to solve problems which could not be tackled if the expressions in question were examined in isolation, whereas the principle of closure itself determines the process in which the metonymical information is "closed up". As we said, in contrast to previous theories Cognitive Linguistics does not think metonymy a linguistics ornament fit for poetry only, but rather sees it as a phenomenon of conceptual nature, a fundamental cognitive process moulding the relationship between users of natural languages and the reality surrounding them, which additionally enables cognitive insight into the world thanks to selection and hierarchization of stimuli.

## II. Ingarden

The discoverers of hidden aspects of the history of Cognitive Linguistics hardly ever put on their lists of forerunners the name of Roman Ingarden; the aforementioned research (Kardela et al. 2023) is a valuable exception. And yet many of the fundamental principles that underlie cognitivist theories of language and grammar can be found in Ingarden's writings, notably in his *The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art (Ingarden 1973a)*, first published in 1937 – exactly half a century before the year 1987, the *annus mirabilis* of Cognitive Linguistics, when its founding fathers and creators of the cognitivist theory of language and model of Cognitive Grammar published their groundbreaking monographs (Langacker 1987; Lakoff 1987). As we know, 6 years before in 1931 (in Lviv), the first edition of Ingarden's monograph *The Literary Work of Art* (Ingarden 1973b) appeared, being an introduction of sorts to his upcoming reflections. Attempting to satisfy, as least to an extent, Andreas Hölzl's postulate according to which "a general reevaluation of the origins of Cognitive Linguistics is long overdue", let us try and find in both of these volumes if not "the beginnings" then certainly insightful flashes of intuition and announcements of things to come.

Roman Ingarden was neither a cognitivist nor a linguist. He was also not a psychologist. A literary scholar and a philosopher, a distinguished representative of Polish phenomenology, in his research on literary work of art he concentrated on the aesthetic dimension of literary work, trying to reconcile the objectivist and subjectivist approach. In the former the focus lies on the intentional object which for Ingarden was the literary work, in the latter on the subject getting to know the work of art and their "aesthetic experience" as an aftermath of the encounter. Objectivism (*obiectivus* = pertaining to the object) assumes that the object of cognition exists outside of the subject getting to know it and independently from it, whereas subjectivism (*subiectivus* = subjective) presumes that cognition depends on the structure of the cognizing subject and on the context within which this process takes place. Both of these approaches can be found, *mutatis mutandis*, in the opposition postulated by theoreticians of Cognitive Linguistics between objectification (a process as a result of which the author of the expression performs a dual role of a subject and an object of conceptualization) and subjectification (a process in which the author of the expression is given only the role of a subject). It is my opinion that the relationship between the subject and the object acts as an axis of analogy between Ingarden's thought and the ideas Cognitive Linguistics theoreticians put forward.

Ingarden wrote about "literature", while Langacker and his followers focus upon "non-literature", i.e. text and discourse as elements of everyday communication. Most striking is the convergence of their view upon the shape of language as it occurs in verbal expression, inevitably connected with consciousness and mental activity of the producer: a cognizant subject of perception, conceptualization and expression. As per Ingarden's definition, work of art is an intentional object, called into existence as a result of active involvement of mind. It seems that intentionality understood in this way, even though not explicitly voiced, can be

applied to the "non-literary" expressions analysed by the linguists carrying out the research within the scope Langacker set out. Blurring the line between "literature" and "non-literature", believed to be a feature of postmodernism (cf. e.g. Mitosek 1999) which could lead to scientifically undesired relativism, while in fact can call into question some aspects of literary theory analyses, broadens the horizons from the linguistic point of view. Since the theory of cognition of literary work of art can be applied to structure of every (complex) linguistic expression, it grants "the literary work of art" a special case status and allows for examination of most striking differences, mostly quantity-wise. A text deemed "literary" would therefore be filled with a greater number of unconventional metaphors, unconventionalized extensions of grammatical rules, cases of conceptual metonymies and so on. Looked at from this perspective, Ingarden's considerations would gain the status of statements on linguistic expressions as intentional objects "in general", and would be undertaken from the position of a cognitive scientist.

Similarly to the creator of Cognitive Grammar, Ingarden presumes language to be action-oriented, to reflect human activities. In Langacker's Cognitive Grammar this thesis translates into a postulate according to which two universal grammatical categories of schematic meaning exist, "nouns" and "verbs". Calling for an analogically dichotomous division Ingarden talks about "names" (broadening this traditional linguistic category in such a way that it almost overlaps with Langacker's category of objects-nouns, cf. Ingarden 1973b, 63 and ff.; Langacker 2023, 12) and about "finite verbs" which he defines analogically to Langacker's events – verbs in the finite form (Ingarden 1973b, 75 and ff.; Langacker 2023, 12). Just like Langacker, Ingarden defines grammatical categories according to semantic-pragmatic criteria and assumes that "a formal content that is often found in nominal word meanings also appears in a <verb>" (1973b, 76) and also that "it is possible to use the finite verb in the nominal function" (1973b, 77, footnote 2). That is, after all, one of the main – and most controversial – claims of Cognitive Grammar; the fragment concerning the semantic status of elements belonging to both categories reads as if it was not penned by Ingarden, but typed by Langacker: "the difference between nominal and verbal word meanings will appear […] if one observes that each finite verb, taken in isolation, has a meaning that is complementation-requiring (<dependent> in the Husserlian sense), whereas, at the very least, there can be independent nominal word meanings" (Ingarden 1973b, 82).

Examples of Ingarden's postulates resonating in Langacker's model of grammar abound. What seems especially perceptive are the philosopher's observations concerning "higher meaning units" (Ingarden 1973b, 94), i.e. Langacker's grammatical constructions (see below), for example the semantics of Polish nominative and accusative cases as vehicles of specific semantic functions. As per Ingarden's analysis, the nominative case expresses the perceiving subject, whereas the accusative case signals loss of semantic autonomy of a referent (of a noun) while retaining the status of "a carrier of properties" (Ingarden 1973b, 94).

What seems most interesting in this context are the juxtapositions occurring on the level of higher strata of (literary) text organisation. According to Ingarden's theory, a work of art has a multi-stratal structure in which the author distinguished:

"a) the stratum of verbal sounds and phonetic formations and phenomena of a higher order;

b) the stratum of semantic units: of sentence meanings and the meanings of whole groups of sentences;

c) the stratum of schematized aspects, in which objects of various kinds portrayed in the work come to appearance; and

d) the stratum of the objectivities portrayed in the [pure] intentional states of affairs projected by the [meanings of] sentences [within the literary work]" (Ingarden 1973a, 12).

Ingarden adds temporal parameter to the list of these layers: "In addition to its stratified structure, the literary work is distinguished by an ordered sequence of its parts […] Consequently, the work possesses a peculiar quasi-temporal <extension> from beginning to end, as well as certain properties of composition which arise from this <extension>" (1973a, 12). He additionally assign the literary work with "<two dimensions>: the one is which the total stock of all the strata extends simultaneously and the second, in which the parts succeed one another" (Ingarden 1973a, 12). That is, *mutatis mutandis,* Langacker's differentiation between *conceived time* and *processing time*, namely time understood as an object or/ and as a medium of conceptualization (cf. e.g. Langacker 1987, 4.3.1; 1991, 78). One may notice this division appears also in Ingarden's reasoning pertaining to "time perspective" (1973b, 233–243). He postulates the necessity to distinguish "the <objective> time of the real world" from "represented time" (in the literary work), but also from "concrete intuitively apprehendable intersubjective time in which we all live collectively" and finally from "strictly subjective time" (Ingarden 1973b, 233–234). Phenomenologically speaking, it is a distinction a bit more nuanced than Langacker's dichotomy. When considered in respect to the shape of linguistic expressions it allows Ingarden a subtle description of semantics of such occasional time adverbs as "now", "before" or "after". The analysis of the expression "now" conducted in categories of "real time and represented time (intersubjective or subjective)" (Ingarden 1973b, 235) is something that many professional cognitive linguists could boast.

When describing a literary work from temporal perspective, Ingarden writes that "the events in which the represented objects take part are by their very essence temporal and, moreover, are represented as consecutive or simultaneous. Hence, a temporal order is established among them" (1973b, 233). This also could well be a direct quote from Langacker's writings. As his reflections on temporal perspective progress, Ingarden foreshadows what Langacker calls "temporal iconicity", "a natural tendency for conceived time and processing time to be coaligned, such that the order in which events are conceived as occurring dovetails with the order in which they are conceptualized and described" (Langacker 2008, 79). Langacker hints at the possibility of a change, of diverging from "the order of occurrence" in a sentence (2008, 79), pointing to grammatical means (in English e.g.

*Present Perfect* tense) with help of which an author can achieve such an effect. Finding analogues grammatical means in the Polish language would be a valuable illustration of Ingarden's insightful remarks indeed. It is worth mentioning one of the previous attempts to describe the meaning of time phenomenologically "as flux of perceptual intake in the here-and-now (present), and as stored and reactivated intake that is now-and-given-but-not-here (past)" (Paprotté 1988, 486). Ingarden in turn writes about represented time: "we remain grounded in the given *present* and look back into the past *from there*. We can, however, *step back,* as it were, into a specific time moment in the past and from there […] recollect past events or experiences" (1973b, 239).

Yet another interesting convergence between Ingarden and Langacker can be found in their analysis of, to use the former's words, "appearance of represented objectivities" (Ingarden 1973b, 282). Ingarden differentiates between two dimensions; in the first "we see a nearly continuous occurring; in the second, however, there is only a loose succession of momentary situations, of *turning points*" (1973b, 283). What one sees in Langacker's thinking is an opposition between perfective and imperfective structures, in English expressed through, respectively, continuous tenses and simple tenses (cf. e.g. Langacker 2009, 5.2.). Ingarden comments on this type of opposition by quoting Jerzy Kuryłowicz who stated that "aorist captures the past in one fell swoop, as if in a way that is point-oriented and distanced from the present. Imperfect tense on the other hand does it as if <linearly> presenting processes and events taking place in the past in the entire course of it happening" (Ingarden 1960, 308–309, footnote 3, transl. APS). Opposition between continuous and momentary appearance of represented objects is something described by Ingarden in the context of compression of represented time; it retains conceptual continuity despite point-like structure in a process in which "aspects […] are torn, as it were, from the continua which they are transitory phases and […] follow upon one another in sudden leaps" (Ingarden 1973b, 283). It is exactly this trait of temporal course of events in represented time that is "one of the essential features of literary expressionism" according to Ingarden (1973b, 283); arguably that would be also Langacker's point of view had his analyses included multi-sentenced texts, especially literary ones.

In Cognitive Grammar the difference between continuity and discreteness of events taking place in (inter)subjective represented time is described as an effect of scanning of perceived scenes: *summary scanning* underlies conceptualization in which all aspects of the perceived scene seem simultaneous, while *sequential scanning* assesses events unfolding through time and undergoing consecutive transformations. The way in which scanning of perceived scenes occurs obviously results in specific counterparts on the expression plane. And so beings described by countable nouns constitute conceptual wholes, sums of perceived aspects; so do perfective verbs, which present consecutive phases of processes "telescopically" briefly. Verbal description of an object in turn, due to linear nature of natural languages, requires an analogue of sequential scanning, similarly to a description of a process occurring as a progression of successive phases. Thanks to these two distinct processes of information processing the creators of Cognitive Grammar

are enabled to justify the conceptual basis for differences between specific grammatical structures.

Ingarden's conception saw organic "internal relationship between strata" and therefore also a structural "unity of the entire literary work" (Ingarden 1960, 359, transl. APS) as resulting from features of each individual structural stratum of literary work of art. In this context it seems instinctual to compare two first strata of Ingarden's model with the cognitivist definition of language as an inventory of semantic, phonological and symbolic structures. Phonology, Ingarden's "stratum of verbal sounds", in Cognitive Grammar is just as "meaningful" as semantics or syntax. A symbolic structure is defined as bipolar, consisting of (motivated) connection of semantic and phonological pole and is inscribed into the continuum of lexical and grammatical entities (Langacker 1987, 76 et seq.). Grammar studies "the syntagmatic combination of morphemes and larger expressions to form progressively more elaborate symbolic structures. These structures are called grammatical constructions. Constructions are therefore symbolically complex, in the sense of containing two or more symbolic structures as components. There is no fundamental distinction between morphological and syntactic constructions, which are fully parallel in all immediately relevant respects" (Langacker 1987, 82).

This concepts appears in newer versions of Langacker's model of grammar as the term of *baseline* (Langacker 2016, 2023), whereas in Ingarden's deliberations represented objects "themselves require for their own constitution the first nominal projection of the same objectivities as they were <at the beginning>" (Ingarden 1973b, 190). The said "beginning" conditions the creation of higher levels of text organization, defined by Ingarden's strata c) and d). Schematized aspects "constitute the skeleton of the concrete aspects" (Ingarden 1973b, 263), as the literary work is a schematic formation. That is turn means that "at least some of its strata, especially the objective stratum, contain a series of <places of indeterminacy>" (Ingarden 1973a, 50). According to Ingarden "we find such a place of indeterminacy wherever it is impossible, on the basis of the sentences in the work, to say whether a certain object or objective situation has a certain attribute" (1973a, 50). It is Langacker's belief that such an indeterminacy is an inherent property of grammar of natural languages and correspondingly all texts and discourses created in them. "Precise, determinate connections between specific elements represent a special and perhaps unusual case", writes Langacker. "It is more common for there to be some vagueness or indeterminacy in regard to either the elements participating in grammatical relationships or the specific nature of their connection" (Langacker 2009, 41). In other words, grammar is in its very nature metonymic, hence indeterminacy is a property shared by all expressions. Once more it turns out that Ingarden's thoughts concerning literary work superimpose on Langacker's reflections about "language in general". For both of the researchers the existence of places of indeterminacy, and theretofore metonymy, does not stem from imperfections of language usage, be it in literary work or in everyday speech, but is simply necessary. "With the finite number of sentences and – respectively – words comprising the literary work one cannot conclusively

and fully determine the infinite multitude of properties and states of individual portrayed objectivities (Ingarden 1936, 177, transl. APS). In yet another fragment we can read "however many determinations of a given object are apprehended up to a given moment, there are *always* other determinations still to be apprehended" (Ingarden 1973b, 247). On the plane of linguistic expression the inability to achieve full cognition signifies the impossibility to say everything that could be said about a given object (which is one of the principles of general semantics by Alfred Korzybski; cf. Korzybski 1933, *passim*; Kaczmarek 2016, 217).

    In both of Ingarden's monographs devoted to literary work he contemplates the relationship between literary work as intentional object and the readers, whose job is to reconstruct the represented world (in the literary work). The represented objectivities existing in the represented world occupy space which is neither "real world space, which is unique" (Ingarden 1973b, 222) nor "<imaginational space> which essentially belongs to every intuitive imagining of extensive objects" (Ingarden 1973b, 223); it is even not "orientational space" devoid of any reference to "perceiving subject" (Ingarden 1973b, 222–223). It is similar to "perceptible orientational space" (Ingarden 1973b, 223) known to us from everyday experience. The prerequisite to orient space means that the beginning of the reference system lies in the perceiving subject. The orienting is intersubjective as it is associated with general human understanding of the space in the (real) world. In non-literary narrations the centre of orientation (the beginning of reference system) lies usually inside the represented world, whereas in literary work Ingarden distinguishes other cases known to literature theoreticians (third-person narration, authorial narration) (1973b, 230–231). Looking for linguistic indicators of reference point orientation Langacker talks about the category of vantage point (a term, nota bene, also used by Ingarden in the Polish version of the text: 1960, 287; sadly lost in translation in Ingarden 1973b – translator's note) and about perspective, two of which constitute foreground parameters (Langacker's *dimensions*) of alternative scene construction (Langacker's *alternate construal*). The very creation of represented spaces (in non-literary narration) is the essence and raison d'être of the conceptual blending theory, that is mental spaces (Fauconnier 1985; Turner 1998). To present it in detail would mean going beyond the scope of this essay; one must do with just a reminder that conceptual integration theory describes the meaning creation process as consecutive acts of blending (amalgamation) of elements bound by meaning (on the level of conceptualization) in different mental spaces (according to classic definition "small conceptual packets constructed as we think and talk, for purposes of local understanding and action" (Fauconnier, Turner 2002, 102), which leads to creation of new meanings (known as emergent structures). Ingarden stated that "while reading literary work <sentence after sentence> and carrying out in each phase the previously described, complex operations which provide us with relevant parts of all the strata of the literary work, the only thing that is directly and vividly present is the part of the text currently being read; admittedly the other ones (previous ones or the upcoming ones) do not disappear entirely from the scope of our awareness yet they are not vividly present unless appropriate actions on our part are performed" (1936, 184, transl.

APS). That is almost a complete definition of mental space; as was already said, in cognitivist theory of language "conceptual packets are created <on-line> during thought process or discourse in order to grant mutual understanding to interlocutors and bring about desired actions" (Tabakowska 2010, 596, transl. APS).

The way its creators intended it, conceptual integration theory is supposed to explain the process of creating new meanings (an example of which is metaphor); theory of literary work on the other hand is meant to describe the process of reconstruction of the world portrayed. The creators of cognitivist theory of language obviously notice the need to consider the features of the represented worlds. Langacker finds linguistic correlates of constructs called "virtual reality" in relation to "the world around us" (1999). Quarter of a century ago he wrote: "Language tends to be seen primarily as a device for reporting on the nature of the world around us. This view engenders the default assumption that linguistic expressions normally refer directly to actual individuals and actual relationships in which they participate. […] I suggest that departures from the direct description of ACTUALITY are ubiquitous and fundamental in language. Surprisingly much of our linguistic effort goes into the description of VIRTUAL entities" (Langacker 1999, 77, emphasis in original). 25 years later he already writes about "levels of reality". His definition of reality is now based on "human experience as reflected in language structure" (Langacker 2023, 12), and dependent on the level of complexity of linguistic expressions he differentiates between different organizational levels which he calls, just like Ingarden, *strata* (Langacker 2023, 12). The key to describe *propositions* is interactivity (discourse, negotiation of meaning), the basic theoretical construct being *propositional reality* differing for the speaker and the hearer, or being intersubjective (so comprising what is presumably shared for both members of the communication act) (Langacker 2023, 28). Langacker presents elements of English grammar which allow for conveying respective types of reality and for signalling the process of meaning negotiation (e.g. clausal negation, modal constructions, questions, complementation) but, *mutatis mutandis*, his deliberations revolve around (re)construction of the world portrayed, the (inter)subjective "linguistic image of the world" (cf. ethnolinguistic theory of linguistic image of the world, e.g Bartomiński 2009, as developed on the ground of cognitive studies). The material analysed by Langacker includes isolated complex sentences because of which the represented worlds are small and fragmentary. Ingarden looks further still. If only these two perspectives could be combined…

In Ingarden's theory "the world of represented objectivities" can always be accessed "through conceptual schema" (Ingarden 1960, 221, transl. APS), constructs analogues to schematic semantic structures present in Langacker's model of grammar. Ingarded also stated that "the represented objects […] do not lie isolated and alien alongside one another but, thanks to the manifold ontic connections, unite into a uniform ontic sphere" (1973b, 218); if transported onto a higher realm of abstraction they could well be Langacker's domains: "segments of the world", conceptually coherent but void of clear boundaries (Langacker 1987, *passim*; Ingarden 1960, 218–282). Schematicity which as per Ingarden's theory is granted to "the world of represented objects" as opposed to real objects (Ingarden

1960, 319, transl. APS), in Langacker's theory becomes a ubiquitous quality of every object of linguistic expression. Every text therefore is schematic, every text is indeterminate.

It is indeterminacy that in Ingarden's eyes is the most basic quality of every literary work of art, a quality thanks to which the possibilities for background-conditioned concretization in literary work are limitless. In concretizations of literary work therefore places of indeterminacy are "filled out", although not all and not always in the same way. In Cognitive Grammar the selection of these "fillings" – subjective or intersubjective – conditions the choice of specific structures in the process of structuring linguistic image: the elements deemed as "more important" (which can be suggested by e.g. word order in a sentence) have greater *salience*. This is exactly the type of salience that Ingarden wrote about: "in experiencing some of these aspects, the particularly characteristic [element] that expresses the entire essence of the thing <catches our eye>" (1973b, 282).

Concretization of literary work therefore is also "a schematic entity, albeit to a lesser degree than the literary work itself" (Ingarden 1936, 165–166, transl. APS); an entity from Langacker's model of grammar that has the same effect is *instantiation*, linguistic image of higher or smaller (but never highest in the absolute sense) level of detail. Langacker's considers instantiation to be one of levels of imagery, described through the metaphor of fine-grained and coarse-grained photographic image. His opposition between *schema* and *instantiation* is being reflected in Inarden's writing exactly as *concretization* of the literary work (it is worth noting that in Polish Ingarden's "concretization" and translation of Langacker's "instantiation" share the same name – "konkretyzacja"). For reasons stated above, in neither theory full instantiation/concretization is possible, just like it is not possible to reduce all types of instantiation/concretization to a common denominator. The only thing that makes mutual understanding between the sender (author) and the recipient (reader) possible is the presence of the "objective properties (existing in themselves and pertaining to the given object itself) of a perceived thing" (Ingarden 1973b, 263). On the other hand one cannot but admit the inherently subjective nature of instantiation/concretization. To avoid more or less radical relativism, both theories make use of the term "intersubjectivity" and the "objective" structure of common knowledge about the world which, in Ingarden's words, forces or imposes such and no other aspects (1973a, 60). The "forcing" in question is significantly conditioned by Aristotelian "nature of things" and pragmatic factors (environmental, historical, social, psychological ones), a fact underlined also by linguistic cognitivism keenly referring to the rule of using statistical methods to study intersubjectivity (in everyday language the principle of "forcing aspects" is included in e.g. the saying "when you hear hoofbeats, think horses, not zebras"). When writing about literary works which bring about certain aspects, therefore are not "lifeless", Ingarden states that "the reader is bound by the text to a much greater degree than in the case with works that are lifeless in this regard. He is under the power of the various sorts of aspects which are forced upon him; and, the more he succumbs to them, the more vividly, distinctly, and fully the portrayed world appears to him" (1973a, 61). This quote could easily be

mistaken for Langacker's words, just as could the statement that when confronted with indeterminacy "the reader becomes to a certain extent a co-creator of the literary work" (Ingarden 1936, 173, transl. APS)

Relations between literary work in "schematic formation", as such being "an intersubjective being on the one hand, and a monosubjective (individual) concept of the author and the recipient on the other", highlight the importance of "creative individuals". It is a matter discussed by Zygmunt Łempicki in his review (1938) of Ingarden's groundbreaking article (1936); Łempicki "translates" the shift from mono- to inter-subjectivism as objectification, to use "terminology from different philosophy", which means a process of creating or re-creating certain objects "to cognize them anew when they are created as <ready>, to intentionally transform them at times in this process of cognition and then to succumb to them in aesthetic perception, again in a rather receiving manner" (Łempicki in: Ingarden 1936, 175, all transl. from Łempicki by APS).

When writing about aesthetic perception Ingarden has a particular one in mind: reader's perception of a literary text as a work of art. Transposition of his theories onto the plane of linguistic expressions traditionally defined as "non-literary" seems to be a daunting task at best. And yet the rule, accepted by both the creators and promoters of linguistic cognitivism, stating that every conscious use of language is intentional thus is intrinsically connected with the subject of (per) ception allows for the traditional line between "literature" and "non-literature" to disappear. Cognitivists' "inclinations" towards "literaturization" of discourse (cf. e.g. Mitosek 1999), deemed as postmodern, usually apply to academic discourse (cf. e.g. Ulicka 2007); in the context of this essay it may be worth taking a closer look at the attempts to view literature (especially poetry) through the lens of cognitivist theory of language. One of pioneering works on this topic is Peter Stockwell's monograph *Cognitive Poetics: An Introduction* (2002/2020), already a classic. Ingarden's theory of operationalization of literariness underlined by Mitosek as achieved "by imparting a subject-object character of interaction to it" (1999, 85, transl. APS) is of course one of fundamental rules among cognitivists as well. To Ingarden the relationship between strata constituting the multistratal construction of literary work includes the sphere of a "meeting between a certain object and a certain subject who is experiencing it" (Ingarden 1970, 9, transl. APS). The abovementioned "experiencing" appears at times in linguists' deliberations about language of emotions and ways of expressing them (cf. e.g. Kovecses 2020). Emotions – especially the aesthetic ones – are not however the sole object of analyses. In cognitive poetics a breakthrough in this area was achieved by an American cognitivist and a scholar of poetry Margaret Freeman for whom experiencing "a poem as an icon" means simulation of an actual communion with the portrayed world (Freeman 2020). To frame Freeman's thesis into Ingarden's words, the reader of a poem is "dealing with a unique, live quasi-reality" (Ingarden 1973b, 277). Its "palpability, strict individuality, vibrancy, its <embodiment> of sorts" manifest themselves in actualization of text; "one should say that a special form of <imagining> exists, making these objects present" (Ingarden 1936, 185, transl. APS). "In active reading of literary work", writes Ingarden "we must

fake all of these changes in the represented world, petrify them and become witnesses of sorts of what is and what is happening in the world portrayed" (1936, 174, transl. APS) – speaking Margaret Freeman's language, it is a first step towards literary work becoming an icon of an experience.

When carefully reading Peter Stockwell's monograph (2002), a book that was groundbreaking at the time of its creation, one has no choice but to agree with Zofia Mitosek when she writes "as a matter of fact each modern notion concerning speech and literature is supported by something in Ingarden's writings" (1999, 89, transl. APS). And conversely. Cognitivist theory of language is no exception.

## III. Conclusions

The best summary of the reflections above will be a quote from the already mentioned text by Zofia Mitosek: "Ingarden's most important book *The Literary Work of Art* turned out to be a text concerning structures of all linguistic expressions" (1999, 85, transl. APS). This statement however has raison d'etre only in the context of cognitivist theory of language of today. As opposed to traditional structuralism, its main premise is that every expression/text is schematic and (inter) subjective, and each instantiation is by definition incomplete. Ingarden believed language to be subordinate to effects of cognition; Langacker writes that cognitive processes lie at the very core of it. Both researchers think the cognitive process takes place in interplay between the object and consciousness. Those studying Ingarden's writings praise him for the postulate of "schematic" character of literary work; schematicity of language structures is the cornerstone of Langacker's theory of language.

Ingarden's considerations circle around theory of language, not theory of grammar. And yet some of his statements read as if they were not penned by him, but typed by Langacker "we do remove, by the addition of […] attributive expressions, certain spots of indeterminacy; but an infinite number still remains to be removed. They would disappear only in an infinite series of determinations" (Ingarden 1973b, 249).

Even though they systematically dismissed sentential grammar, rarely did Langacker and his followers venture outside the realms of (English) (complex) sentence. The principle of interactivity prompts them however to enter more and more frequently onto the territory previously reserved for ill-defined "pragmatics"; newer texts concerned with Cognitive Grammar tend to show a growing interest in pragmatic circumstances of discourse (cf. e.g. Langacker 2016, 2023).

Ingarden writes that by performing the act of concretization, an effect of which is an aesthetic object, the recipient of the work of art enters quasi-reality – "virtual reality" from Langacker's texts. Aesthetic experience from Freeman's monograph is perhaps granted to – albeit to a lesser extent – empathic discourses of "average Joes". That would be yet another step on the road to postmodern "literaturization" of linguistic reflection. One might wonder whether intensity of "aesthetic experience" could not be of use to two groups: to literature theoreticians to operationalize "literariness", and to linguists to describe its determinants. It would

be worthwhile then for sure to familiarize oneself with Ingarden's writings. On the other hand, deeper knowledge of Ingarden's phenomenological thought might enrich cognitivist reflection with philosophical foundation, a lack of which has sometimes been pointed out by those criticizing cognitive approach in modern linguistics.

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