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Husserl – consciousness as a system anticipating the further course of experience

Husserl – świadomość jako system antycypujący dalszy
bieg doświadczenia

Summary

Consciousness, according to one of Husserl's characteristics, is also a system of potential moments outlined in advance. How does consciousness gain this competence? Answering the question, subsequent conditioning aspects are taken into account: (1.) the inner time consciousness that determinates the temporal structure of the word-experience (*Welterfahrung*) and the world consciousness (*Weltbewusstsein*), (2.) the network of types. The two aspects of consciousness make possible and determinate cognitive styles of present and future course of experience. The closing remarks (3.) concern the nature of types and their role as cognitive structures that integrate common knowledge with scientific knowledge. Types combined into wider structures types define the further course of experience. Ultimately, they define the scope of practical possibilities, purposes and interests of the subject, an open horizon of possible closer specification.

Keywords: The inner time consciousness, types, the object as the optimum, elementary concepts.

Streszczenie

W jednym z określeń, Husserl charakteryzuje świadomość jako systemem potencjalnych momentów wyznaczających bieg przyszłego doświadczenia. W jaki sposób świadomość zdobywa tę kompetencję? Odpowiadając na pytanie, biorę pod uwagę kolejne aspekty: (1.) wewnętrzną świadomość czasu, która określa strukturę

czasową doświadczenia świata (*Welterfahrung*) i świadomość świata (*Weltbewusstsein*), (2.) sieć typów, reprezentacji. Te dwa aspekty świadomości umożliwiają i determinują style poznawcze obecnego i przyszłego przebiegu doświadczenia. Uwagi końcowe (3.) dotyczą natury typów i ich roli jako struktur poznawczych, które integrują potoczną wiedzę z wiedzą naukową. Typy połączone w szersze struktury określają dalszy, przeszły przebieg doświadczenia. Ostatecznie definiują zakres praktycznych możliwości, cele i zainteresowania podmiotu, otwarty horyzont możliwego dookreślenia przedmiotów doświadczenia.

Słowa kluczowe: Wewnętrzna świadomość czasu, typy, przedmiot jako optimum, abstrahowanie elementarnych pojęć.

Husserl, in his later writings, described consciousness as a “system of intentional functions”, or a “system of intentional operations”¹. The approach to consciousness as a system allows a better understanding of this complex unity, which is consciousness, the very basis of its extraordinary effectiveness, fragile autonomy and relative independence from the systems in which it is placed. Stephan Strasser expressed Husserl’s goal aptly: “If consciousness reaches full clarity with regard to its immanent causality (*Leistungen*) and its intrinsic rights, its transcendence cannot be contrasted as essentially mysterious”². Consciousness, according to one of Husserl’s characteristics, is also a system of potential moments outlined in advance³. How does consciousness gain this competence? Answering the

¹ E. Husserl, “Nachwort zu meinen Ideen”, in: *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Phänomenologische Forschung*, t.1, Halle/Saale 1930. Hua V. The correlate of the system is a coherent and characterized by regularities world.

² S. Strasser, *Welt im Widerspruch, Gedanken zu einer Phänomenologie als ethischer Fundamentalphilosophie*, Dordrecht, Boston, London 1991, 144.

³ E. Husserl, *Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge*. Hrs. S. Strasser, Den Haag 1963, §19. Hua I.

question, I take into account subsequent conditioning aspects: (1.) the inner time consciousness that determinates the temporal structure of the word-experience (*Welterfahrung*) and the world consciousness (*Weltbewusstsein*), (2.) the network of types. The two aspects of consciousness make possible and determinate cognitive styles of present and future course of experience. The closing remarks (3.) concern the nature of types and their role as cognitive structures that integrate common knowledge with scientific knowledge.

1. *The temporal structure of the word-experience*

The condition of the competence of anticipating the way of experiencing objects and the course of future experience is the work of assimilating apperception (*assimilierende Apperzeption*). The unity of consciousness is the result of the synthesis of the inner time-consciousness, which activates the flow of the stream of consciousness⁴. This synthesis is a general form of coexistence and succession (connection) of all experiences, a form for passive synthesis, producing the consciousness of the object. Thanks to this, it is possible to retain and then later access experiences, formation of identifiable, distinguished and ordered according to time, complexes of experiences.

Husserl introduced the terms: praimpression, retention and protention to explain the continuity of time, the connection between the passing and the coming “now”, as well as the identity of object. Describing the structure of interrelationship of successive phases of experiences, thanks to which one can be aware of an identical object, he emphasizes that the passage of the present into the past and the passage of the future into the present cannot be a momentary flash: it has as a certain

⁴ E. Husserl, *Analysen zur passiven Synthesis. Aus Vorlesungs und Forschungsmanuskripten (1918-1926)*. Hrs. M. Fleischer, 1966, p. 128. Hua XI.

continuity, a span, which is not a stable duration, but a stream. In the flow of the stream there are two intentionalities interwoven. The first, transversal (*Querintentionalität*) is directed at an object and constitutes a reliable time of its duration and change in time. The second, longitudinal (*Längsintentionalität*) organizes flow of phases, and contains a flowing point “now”, a phase of actuality and a series of phases that will immediately become actual, and also phases not yet actual. Longitudinal intentionality unites the two phases of the flow into one. What manifests itself at the moment of actuality of the flow are the past phases of the flow in the series of retention moments of this flow of consciousness. Retention is responsible for the consciousness of the past and in contrast to the recollection, it is the primordial form of consciousness – the instantaneous consciousness of the past phase.

Current awareness is at the every moment of the flow a recapitulation of the previous phases. The series: protention-praimpression-retention is a modification of the previous series and therefore the current consciousness is both retentive and protentive. Retention is a former protention, and not only a retentive modification of the praimpression; the past phase is to pass, becomes more and more past, so the incoming phase to be filled – that which has already been announced has a chance to become present. The two phases: the first one that constitutes the smooth passage of the phases and the second one that is to be filled up differently in terms of the content. The protention is characterized by a constant tendency to fulfill (*Erfüllung*), the retention to lose fullness (*Entföhlung*); whereas the present “now” is the moment of maximum fullness, a point in the whole stream, which draws its meaning from its immediate surroundings. Praimpression, retention and protention – the present, the past and the future form the consciousness of temporal objects. All presence becomes a “living” presence, a certain climax, an uplift in a clash of opposing “tendencies” to “growing” and “disappearing” of presence;

thanks to it consciousness gains – albeit in various ways – the possibility of referring to what is “not yet” and “no longer” present⁵.

The consciousness as a self-conscious system

The synthesis gives to all consciousness experiences a permanent existence in time. Thanks to it, experiences are temporally ordered – they have their beginning and end in time, and simultaneous and successive experiences appear within the unlimited horizon of immanent time. These “primordial forms of time consciousness”, in which time differences are constituted, create the consciousness as a self-conscious system. Experiences are linked in such a way that the difference between them is preserved and at the same time the unity of the system is maintained: the actualizing experience is transformed by the retention and protential phases (*Entgegenwärtigung*) in such a way that in this transformation, with the simultaneous passing of experiences, the irreversibility and order of experiences in time as well as the persistence of consciousness as a whole are ensured. Correlatively, consciousness becomes the consciousness of the coherent world of experience and all its aspects – the general form of coexistence and succession (connection) of all conscious objectivity.

The sensual fields

Conscious life takes place in the form of synthesis, that is to say, each experience occurs in the living present, receives its temporal place in the stream of experiences. The current experience is joined by the retention consciousness, i.e. it passes

⁵ “Now”, “before”, “after”, reflect the characteristics of the already constituted time, while the pure flow has neither temporal nor objective features. For this reason, Husserl placed at the source of time a special type of consciousness – a fluid, living presence.

as the same which has only just been given and then what has just been given passes on with a similar regularity still further on. In this way, the foundations are laid for the constitution of identical, lasting objects. As the experience passes by, it enters the “background of sedimentary contrasts”, awakens its horizon backwards, which defines the sense of the present experience. The inner time consciousness determines the temporal structure of the sensual fields: sound, touch, visual, etc. the sequence and coexistence of sensual dates. Something resembles something, something points to something other and at the same time contrasts with what is not similar. Red patches are cut off on a white surface because associations form the unity of a sensual field and allow red patches and white surface to be visually related to each other, but different (heterogeneous) to the field of acoustic sensations. The laws of association: similarity, contrast and contiguity determine the ways in which the dates are separated from the background and also the relations in which the sensual fields remain to each other (visual to acoustic, etc.). Before an object is placed at the centre of an objectifying gaze, it is already pre-given through structured sensory fields (*Sinnesfeld*). Dates or groups of them, separating themselves from the field, awaken (*Weckung*) the Self, which captures the object in its type and properties.

Drive intentionality

Husserl points out different sources of stimulation depending on the intensity of contrast, preferred sensual feelings and instinctive, impulsive preferences. Thanks to associations, sensory data are cut off from a homogeneous background, shapes and contours are distinguished, sounds gain intensity etc. Associations form the sphere of impressions, the experiential present; they create affective unity and multiplicity, conditioning the constitution of objectivity. The roots of association are sensual feelings, instinct and drive. They are the primordial

form of a conscious intention, aspiration, evaluation, etc. Drive intentionality is the source of empty representations and intentions of drives; their content is intended for the purpose of satisfying the drive. Associative connections make order and unity of consciousness. Thanks to them it is not a chaos but a unity, a field of possible experience. Theory of associative connections is a continuation of the theory of inner time consciousness.

Reflective and pre-reflective experience of the world

The structure of experience that directs the course of perception and determinates the constancy of reference to the object and the creation of its conceptual representation is characterized as horizontal. The life-world makes itself present through horizons. The world is experienced in two manners: reflective, thematic and to a certain extend intuitive and pre-reflective, pre-thematic and pre-intuitive⁶. Behind the life-world there lies the world-consciousness as ground (*Boden*) for all modalities. There can be distinguished the following horizons: 1. internal – in the case of an object its grasped properties refer to further explication, refers beyond itself to other sides or aspects of the same object; 2. external – a set of possible perceptions of objects laying in the background of current perception, the background against which an object is given; 3. understandable world horizon – infinite totality, to which each

⁶ The first manner of the word-experience (*Welterfahrung*) is related to the world horizon understood as the *wherein* and the *whereto* of experience. While the second manner – the world consciousness (*Weltbewusstsein*), is related to world as horizon (*Welt als Horizont*) understood as the *wherefrom* of experience. Geniusas points at ambiguity of the expression “*Welthorizont*”, which can be interpreted as: horizon of the world and world as horizon. S. Geniusas, *The Origins of the Horizon in Husserl’s Phenomenology*, Dordrecht 2012, p. 179.

external horizon refers⁷. There are three major features of the world: uniqueness (*Einzigkeit*), unity (*Einheit*) and harmony within experiences (*Einstimmigkeit*)⁸. The internal horizon is implied by the external horizon of certain type of objects in the background that subject can turn to; they are given to consciousness as real objects in the spatial-time horizon of reality, already anticipated, typically known. Their outlined sense is ready for thematic, explicating perception, active dealing with, grasping etc.

The body-proper

The external horizon is founded on the temporal retention-protention structure of experience and also in the body-proper enabling the practical “I can” (*ich-kann*) and “I do” (*ich-tue*). For the cognitive efficiency of consciousness, the body has a special function. Given in an external perception the body is a physical thing, filled with sensual qualities; given in an internal perception it is a field, a carrier of sensations. The subject experiences the body in kinesthetic consciousness – his own feeling and movement. The body moves at will, explores and experiences. Every object is perceived in relation to its orientation towards the body, not only an object that actually appears, but any object that is supposed to appear. The body is the zero point of all orientations, the central “here”, in relation to which everything else is “there”, i.e. in relation to the body the surrounding objects are experienced as being

⁷ E. Husserl, *Phänomenologische Psychologie. Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1925*. Hrg. W. Biemel. 1962, p. 96. Hua IX.

⁸ R. Wolton, “The worldhood of the word and the wordly character of objects in Husserl”, in: *Advancing Phenomenology: Essays in Honor of Lester Embree* (pp. 139-155). Ed. T. Nenon and P. Blosser. Dordrecht: Springer 2010, p. 142. Uniqueness characterizes the world as universal horizon and also its thematization in a world representation, unity means totality connected by a form, harmony concerns temporality.

placed close, far, to the right, to the left, etc. It is a system of places where impression data can appear. Kinesthetic impressions are connected with impressions presenting objects and features of external objects. The body contributes to the constitution of the spatial world. In this sense, it is the link between consciousness and the world.

The body as a zero point of orientation, like the consciousness that constitutes time, are the conditions of the constitution of the life-world in its space-time definitions, and not certain “here” and “now” that can be located in time and space. Consciousness of an identical object is mediated by the movements of the body. Its identity has a temporal character in and through time, in and through apparent and real change, in and through relations spatial or causal with other objects, in and through various valuations, uses and so forth⁹. Objects, states of affairs, values, goals, etc., are always experienced against a certain background, in a certain vaguely conscious horizon of an undefined reality, a horizon of the world. Husserl described its most developed structures with the concepts of *typics* and *types*.

2. *The fundamental structure of the consciousness of the world*

The embodied consciousness is responsible for the pre-reflective knowledge, the “assimilation” of the world and its objects, the passive aspect of experience. The fundamental structure of the consciousness of the world (the world as the horizon of experience of individual realities) consists of preliminary knowledge (*Möglichkeit*) and the possibility of its enrichment (*Ver-möglichkeit*), it is the structure of knowledge and igno-

⁹ J. J. Drummond, “The Structure of Intentionality”, in: *The New Husserl: A Critical Reader*, ed. D. Welton, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003, p. 81.

rance. Within it, i.e. depending on it, further differences between knowledge and ignorance are formed. The horizontal structure of experience determines the initial knowledge of each individual object of experience: its type is determined within this structure and also the possibility of enrichment, gradual explication and acquiring new characteristics in the progress of experience. This possibility of anticipation is a “modus of originally founding cognitive activities and original intentions, and thus a modus of intentionality [...]”¹⁰. The possibility of gradual enrichment of the characteristics and correlative new definitions of the object are open. In the stream of world experience, in a concretely full world consciousness, the subject can direct his intentions at the object as an optimum, which motivates further course of experience.

*The world and its objects are experienced
as ordered into types*

We anticipate the occurrence of an object and its features, referring to the horizon of past experiences of similar objects. In the subsequent experience we expect its presence¹¹. The more often anticipation is confirmed, the stronger it is and becomes a habit that determinates the way of experiencing and initial knowledge of the object. Due to the fact that something similar evokes something else that is similar, a type is being created. In general every object (also immanent), refers to a certain structure defined by the law, according to which it could be given to other *modi* of consciousness, outlined by the typics. The experience of things as if “in advance” has its own *a priori* designation as characterized by a certain typics, which directs

¹⁰ E. Husserl, *Erfahrung Und Urteil. Untersuchungen zur Genealogie der Logik*. Hrg. L. Eley. Hamburg 1985, § 8. EU.

¹¹ E. Husserl, *Analysen zur passiven Synthesis. Aus Vorlesungs und Forschungsmanuskripten (1918-1926)*. Hrs. M. Fleischer, 1966, p. 185. Hua XI.

(anticipates) the course of its experience. The type of things is determined within this structure. Thanks to typics, the world and its objects are experienced as ordered into types: “Things are experienced as a tree, bush, animal; snake, bird, more specifically, fir, linden, elderberry, dog, adder, swallow, sparrow, etc.”¹².

Types (models, patterns, mental representations) are created in a series of homogeneous experiences, on the basis of previous experiences (*Erfahrungsniederschläge*) and from this moment on they lead a synthetic process of determining the characteristics, direct our ordinary thinking and action. Each new individual is already preliminarily known, because it evokes what is similar, because it is already captured according to its type in the horizon of the possible experience and with appropriate indications of similarity. It has, as it were, “from above” (*Vorgriff*) predicted types of property not yet experienced, but already awaited. The reference to the type by which it is captured in advance may remain non-thematic, “passively constituted”. Experience (initial situation) shows whether, for example, a given property is exemplified or not. Therefore, when we see e.g. a cat, we immediately anticipate its possible ways of behavior, the way it moves, eats, plays, and so on. “Consciousness is the horizon of typical pre-acquaintance in which every object is pre-given¹³”.

The process of typification

Types allow for the functioning of the sense of object regardless of the existence of the object, regardless of whether we are actually directing towards it. Types determine the cognitive styles of the possible objects of experience – the course of future experience. The function of typification is an *a priori* con-

¹² EU §83.

¹³ EU, p. 172.

dition of the constitution of the lived world and its cohesion¹⁴. It takes place at different levels of generality. It can gradually be limited to, for example, an animal, its numerous species and genera, etc. It allows to move from noticing something to recognizing an animal, a dog, the German Shepherd, dark, restless, similar to neighbour's dog, and so on. An initial observation is the actualization of the most general type, according to what is given and then narrowing it down till recognizing the right type. The dynamic process of typification is accompanied by the appearance of new features of the object. It is only in this context that individuation and any operation on individuals becomes possible.

The game space (*Spielraum*) in which typification takes place, determination of the type of object, its type, properties, *resp.* the formation of the ways of its experience, is subject to change. It is not fully determined, because the type is characterized by a certain "span". This means that different experiences can meet the expectations set by the same type, just as different colors can meet the expectation that the surface will have a certain color. There are also no clearly defined ways of presentation, the object can be seen from different points of view, distances, etc. The following regularity can be observed: the content of the type becomes concrete, enriched (expanded) – the type is divided into subtypes or impoverishes (narrows), depending on whether the experience (anticipation) confirms or undermines it, questions it. More and more precise definition leads to the determination of the type of individual object, more and more undefined to "something in general" (*Etwas-überhaupt*), i.e. the external (world) horizon. "Any special typology, the typology of certain special realities (and their arrangements) includes a holistic typology that belongs to the

¹⁴ D. Lohmar, "Husserl's Type and Kant's Schemata: Systematic Reasons for Their Correlation or Identity", [in] *The New Husserl. A Critical Reader*. Ed. D. Welton, Indiana University Press 2003, p. 106.

whole world horizon in its infinity”¹⁵. The equivalent of the full consciousness of the world, the sense of the “world” is the experienced world, and of the types – individual kinds, species and specific objects.

The perception of things

The input of the typification process is clearly visible in the perception of things. A thing is always perceived from one point of view, from a certain perspective – its perception is inadequate. But it is precisely this co-conscious imperfection (incompleteness) in the presentation that intentionally points to the possibility of replacing the current perception by a continuum of possible perceptions. Alternative perceptions belong to the horizon of things, and its ambiguity is the essence of its indefiniteness. The reference to type limits the aforementioned ambiguities and inadequacies, which means that in the “stream of experience of the world” the subject can direct his intention at the object as the optimum, which motivates the further course of the inquiry, enables anticipation in the form of a leading target “image” (*eines Leitbildes*) in a specific, ordered scale of possible variations. This is why the process of perception is not an arbitrary exemplification of meaning (concept or any content of experience), but one that systematically determines the contexts of his experience.

Let us consider an example. I recall a morning walk with a dog. Selection of the topic “a morning walk with a dog” (noematic side) is at the same time an omission of co-present aspects, which I could also choose: the route, people encountered, weather conditions, etc. From the noetic side, this experience is a recollection. This topic “a morning walk with a dog”, indicated in the selection process, may also be available for other forms of consciousness – becoming an object of fantasy, desire,

¹⁵ EU § 8.

etc. Retention of experiences to be reproduced reinforces the selection already made, because the possibilities once selected intentionally motivate, make certain sequences of experiences proportionally more probable than others¹⁶. The future experience always leads back to the past. The research on memory has confirmed the presence of types. It explains the recollection images by referring to a certain scheme, composed of type and transformation. Also the uncertainties and memory gaps point to a certain anticipated *optimum* of a given recollection. Graduation and orientation towards a certain *optimum*, Husserl states, “[...] in general is a universal law of consciousness”¹⁷.

3. Types make it possible to anticipate the future experience of objects

Typification allows to capture individual objects as such and as elements of a finite group of similar objects at the same time. Husserl defines types as “empirical generalities”, which can be exemplified in different ways precisely because of their vagueness (ambiguity)¹⁸. Constituted types make it possible to anticipate, to run the future experience of objects within their scope. The style of presentation of the current object and its recollection. Types connected into wider structures – the networks – provide knowledge not only of the individual object or their group, but also general knowledge of the situation (*Gesamtkonfiguration*) in which the object is located and its immediate surroundings. In developing possible configurations of the situation, the decisive factor is the possibility of free movement and action of the subject, the practical “I can” (*ich-kann*) and “I do” (*ich-tue*). Also goals and interests of the subject that have not yet been clearly identified as norms or precepts.

¹⁶ C. B. Christensen, “Sense, subject and horizon”, [in]: *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. LIII, 4, December 1993, p. 770.

¹⁷ Hua XI, p. 221.

¹⁸ EU § 81.

The interrelated contexts, “fields of experience”

Types are the most developed structures of pre-reflective consciousness, the background for the conscious act, they insert the act into a wider structure, place it in a certain experiential context and are therefore their binder. The interrelated contexts, “fields of experience”, form the unity of the individual stream of consciousness, a field of freedom of action for its centre – the Self¹⁹. In this broader context, the basic structure of thematic consciousness is created, which Husserl describes as a *noetic-noematic* correlation. It binds the *noesis* – constituting side of experience, to the *noema* – constituted side. “Noesis” refers to those features of the act (*reell*) by virtue of which it is directed to an object. The *noema* is the intentional correlate of the act: the object taken as it appears in experience or as the unit of meaning (sense). It is the meaning “directed to the world”, the objective sense and, at the same time, the pragmatic sense for the subject, who, thanks to it, is able to anticipate, to know the object of perception in advance. Orientation towards a certain *optimum* is also a condition for the possibility of combining perception and thinking, experience and concept, acts of various types and correlatively objects of different kinds.

The constitution of the concept

When we pay attention to the common feature of objects of a given type or a specific feature, we separate it from the individual object and notice its similarity to the features of other objects, then we obtain the generality of the concept. The generality of the concept is not limited to a certain num-

¹⁹ E. Husserl, *Ding und Raum. Vorlesungen 1907*. Hrs. U. Claesges, Den Haag 1973, p. 359. Hua XVI; E. Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch*. Hrs. K. Schumann, Den Haag 1976, p. 160. Hua III/1.

ber of experiences of similar objects and reaches the general core. In addition, genetical typification is earlier than generalization.

The constitution of the concept of “dog”

Husserl gives as an example the constitution of the concept of “dog”²⁰. The condition for its creation is a change of attitude from concrete to abstract. The transition from the “dog” type, i.e. the awareness that this dog is an element of a group of similar elements, defined by a set of characteristics and also a certain horizon of anticipation of further characteristics, to abstract awareness, in which each dog is like any other, and the open horizon of characteristics includes not only the characteristics of one or another specific dog, but also yet unknown characteristics of dogs in general. Changing the attitude, we do not treat the thematically perceived dog as an individual, but we create the concept of “dog”, imagining the dogs familiar to us from experience, or an open multitude of other dogs and we notice this general “dog” in it. It contains many empirical detailed concepts, which are an opportunity to constant enrichment of the concept. The change of attitude makes it possible to move from a simple representation of the object – resp. of knowledge about the object to a categorical representation. It allows to draw attention to the common properties of many objects and relations between them, as well as to the states of affairs. It makes it possible to draw attention to their common feature or a specific feature, to distinguish it from an individual object and to notice its similarity to the features of other objects. In this way the generality of the concept is obtained.

²⁰ EU. § 83.

Linguistic meanings

The main tools of conceptual presentations are linguistic meanings. Understanding linguistic meaning requires grasping the relationship between meaningful expression and meaning itself. “The meaning applies to various acts of meaning (logical representation to constitutive acts, logical proposition to acts of judging, logical conclusion to acts of reasoning) as red in specie to pieces of paper lying here which all have the same red. Each of them, among other constitutional moments (extent, shape and the like), has its own individual red, i.e. it is an individual case of this species of color, while red itself does not exist in real either in these pieces of paper or anywhere in the world; also not «in our thinking» as long as it belongs to the realm of being, the temporality realm”²¹. Linguistic meanings form a certain class of general objects or species.

The abstracting of elementary concepts

Husserl presents in a descriptive way the emergence (abstracting) of elementary concepts: quality, intensity, place, time, etc., as well as relations and concepts based on them (plurality and unity, whole and part, equality, similarity, etc.). For example, the notion of plurality *in abstracto* is based on concrete pluralities, sets of specific objects. It is obtained in an act of abstraction, in which we omit the type of objects and capture the fact that there are many of them, that they are connected to each other into a multiplicity. The perceptual basis for symbolic representations are figural moments. Once we have disregarded the specific elements of the collection, we immediately notice the “crowd of people”, the “avenue of trees”, the “key of geese”, and so on. Figural moments replace the proper representation of the collection and give rise to a conceptual rep-

²¹ E. Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*, Zweiter Band. Hrs. U. Panzer, 1984, B101. Hua XIX.

resentation. Similarly, we obtain the concepts of something, unity and number. These are relational concepts, they relate not to the things themselves, but to the way in which we consider them. We obtain them by reflecting on acts whose content remains completely free, so that, like the acts themselves, these concepts exist as long as they are conceived. Husserl calls this kind of reflection ideation²². Elementary concepts are the most general and at the same time the most empty categories in terms of content. According to Husserl, mathematics is precisely an example of a system of such notions, using signs separated from any representations, and at the same time sensual signs, in which proper thinking has been replaced by symbolic representation²³.

Summary

One of the reasons why Husserl characterizes consciousness as a system of potential moments outlined in advance is the role that types plays in the systematic unity of consciousness. Types arise due to the processes of typification – acquisition and production of forms of cognition that express the dispositions and aims of the subject. It is a pre-conceptual skill or skills, which forms a system of subjective and basic processes and rules, a pre-reflective and pre-conceptual level of intentionality²⁴. No type can be understood apart from and inde-

²² E. Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologische Philosophie. Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie*. Hrs. D. K. Schumann. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976. Hua III/1, §3.

²³ E. Husserl, *Philosophie der Arithmetik. Mit ergänzenden Texten, (1890-1901)*. Hrs. L. Eley, 1970, p. 193. Hua XII.

²⁴ D. Lohmar emphasizes the function of auto-stimulation (*Selbstaffektion*) in the process of tipification and constitution of time in the inner time consciousness. D. Lohmar, “Über phantasmatische Selbstaffektion in der typisierenden Apperzeption und im inneren Zeitbewußtsein”. *Leitmotiv*, 3. 2003, p. 67-80.

pendent of others. Types combined into wider structures (networks) shape field of experience as a whole: due to them we spontaneously, without being aware, gain the level of every day experience and explicit conceptualization: houses, streets, cars, trees, etc., which can be filled and exemplified in a variety of ways. Types define the further, future course of experience. Ultimately, they define the scope of practical possibilities, purposes and interests of the subject, an open horizon of possible closer specification²⁵.

As relatively rigid schemes, they reproduce themselves in the typical situations that triggered them and do not require active attention. But as flexible they also adapt to new situations. They may differentiate or generalize in order to embrace more and more diverse circumstances. If the current experience cannot be smoothly harmonized within the existing types established as a result of previous experiences, it is marked as abnormal and may lead to their change and modification. Types change, gain new characteristics or lose their existing sets of characteristics, and the presentation styles of the object also change accordingly. What detracts from the established patterns, well established obviousness motivates the subject to think. What has been confirmed and harmoniously enters the course of actual experience updates the base of known types, patterns, models of situations and categories. Types are prescriptive because they are a consequence of the phases of the history of the system's development – types are subjective achievements. And at the same time constructed because they require a complex mental activities leading to an understanding of the new situation.

Types form the background and guideline for the perceptual and conceptual acts. Experience and thinking are insepara-

²⁵ Husserl describes this system of anticipations, intentions as a practical horizon of experience. E. Husserl, *Ding und Raum. Vorlesungen* 1907. Hrs. U. Claesges, Den Haag 1973. Hua XVI, p. 359.

ble from each other, mainly because experience is not a passive reception but a process of spontaneous typification. Spontaneous typification divides things according to noticeable differences, and science improves them through systematic and methodical experimentation. The broad context of the content of common knowledge in the continuous process of specification and definition of concepts, which takes place at the level of intersubjective experience – striving for the truth valid for everyone – integrates scientific knowledge with the whole cognitive structures. This is necessary because objects of science are not objects of experience.

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