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Fat cats brought up on Fukuyama and Lyotard ... or post-modernity in “Gazeta Polska”

Abstract

This article consists of three parts. In the first one the author presents the key concepts describing postmodernity with the focus on the works of Francois Lyotard. The crisis of narrations of the Polish society after 1989 is described in the second chapter. The last part of the text provides “Gazeta Polska’s” discourse analysis from the point of view of the narration of postmodernity.

Keywords: post-modernity, post-modernism, narration, tradition, “Gazeta Polska”.

Tłuste koły wychowane na Fukuyamie i Lyotardzie... czyli ponowoczesność w „Gazecie Polskiej”

Streszczenie

Niniejszy artykuł składa się z trzech części. Pierwsza z nich to próba zdefiniowania ponowoczesności, przede wszystkim w kontekście myśli Jeana-Francois Lyotarda. Drugą poświęcono kryzysowi narracji, który dotknął społeczeństwo polskie po przemianie ustrojowej w 1989 roku. W trzeciej analizom poddano dyskurs prasowy „Gazety Polskiej”, właśnie pod kątem opowieści o ponowoczesności.

Słowa kluczowe: ponowoczesność, postmodernizm, narracja, tradycja, „Gazeta Polska”.

Introduction

The purpose of this study is the verification of the methods applied to present post-modern thought in “Gazeta Polska”. A qualitative analysis of selected texts is used in an attempt to confirm a hypothesis that the newspaper rhetorically uses postmodernism in its ideological campaign. The research material consists of articles published in 2013–2016. The key to the selection of the interpreted publications was the presence of direct references to post-modernity, understood as a social and cultural formation.

The basic philosophical context are the ideas of Francis Lyotard. The crisis of the grand narratives announced by the French philosopher at the end of 1970s seems controversial for the publicists of the analysed magazine. While on the one hand they defy Lyotard's diagnosis on the other – create their own narration about the crisis of values for which they blame postmodernist thinkers.

Post-modernity as the end of history

In 1979, the French philosopher Jean François Lyotard published his most famous book, *The postmodern condition. A report on knowledge*¹. Although the title, and, in particular, its second part, suggested a scientific appraisal based on specialist results of research and expert opinions, in reality this is rather a philosophical treatise, “an individual manifesto of post-modernism”, whose most important catchphrase became the fall of grand narratives announced by Lyotard. These grand narratives are stories which were to shape the modern way of understanding reality and to tidy up common history.² They constitute a certain axis, a schema, thanks to which one can embrace and justify the history and development of society. They legitimise and combine in one whole smaller stories, locating the development of particular fields in a greater order, whose bonding element is a common aim. The context for these stories is precisely the conviction about the existence of some final point, which will change the countenance of the whole of humanity. In *The postmodern condition*, Lyotard singles out two grand narratives. Both have a metaphysical nature.

The first of these is a freedom story. This narration tells a revolutionary history of the emancipation of metaphysically understood people, for whom science is one of the means to achieve freedom. The crowning achievement of this journey is freedom expressing itself in the full access to education and participation in democratic power.

The second master narrative is the so-called speculative story, in which in the centre of interest is the Spirit in his striving for self-knowledge. One of the symptoms of this tendency is the multiplication, in the age of modernity, of the number of discoveries and inventions. The speculative tale is a way of learning the truth but also a guideline which sanctions the appropriateness of these efforts. It is precisely this which defines and legitimises the method and the aim of the work of scientists – and its direct interpretation ought to be the queen of sciences.

Philosophy must restore unity to learning, which has been scattered into separate sciences in laboratories and in preuniversity education; it can only achieve this in a language game

¹ F.-J. Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition. A Report on Knowledge*, trans. G. Bennington, B. Massumi [in:] *Theory and History of Literature*, Vol. 10, Manchester University Press, Manchester 1984.

² CF: P. Kozielski, *Retoryczny post, czyli wielka kariera pewnego przedrostrka*, „Media, Biznes, Kultura” 2017, Vol. 2, p. 165–180.

that links the sciences together as moments in the becoming of spirit, in other words, which links them in a rational narration, or rather metanarration.³

The twentieth century, however, and the 1940s in particular, brought a change. Narration turned out to be not only incoherent but also simply unnecessary. The philosophical foundation which was to synthesise particular directions of research lost its *raison d'être*. The story was not only unable to justify science but also was not able to find justification in itself. In the striving to find cognition, the practical application of science became more important. The partial aims, their practical strength and the possibility of direct application became a sufficient legitimisation for themselves.

The 'crisis' of scientific knowledge, signs of which have been accumulating since the end of the nineteenth century, is not born of a chance proliferation of sciences, itself an effect of progress in technology and the expansion of capitalism. It rather represents an internal erosion of the legitimacy principle of knowledge. There is erosion at work inside the speculative game and, by loosening the weave of the encyclopaedic net in which each science was to find its place, it eventually sets them free.⁴

In his later works Lyotard points to the Holocaust as the critical moment, deconstructing whatever kind of justification of the metanarrative. The modern project ends in genocide.⁵

In the face of the enormity of the Nazi crime, Lyotard asks the question about the credibility of grand narratives. Their limit does not signify, however, the total end of justifying stories since there exists a network of smaller tales, which, moving in different directions, criss-cross sometimes and create particular narrations of history. Post-modernity begins at the crossroads at which there is no longer a main road, there is also no journey's aim, or even a need to designate one. Humanity travels many independent paths, on which particular points are marked by the criterion of usefulness and the success connected with progress in a given field. What is not clear to the end, however, is what this success signifies, and in which direction progress should go, and whether it is at all possible.⁶

In a way the answer to the last of these questions is given by the essay published in 1989 by Francis Fukuyama, who, after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, announced the end of history. Although in reality he starts from completely different premises, and history in his essay is above all the theory of the organisation of society, he comes to conclusions which to a certain degree correspond to the thoughts of Lyotard.⁷

³ *Ibidem*, p. 33.

⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 39.

⁵ J.-F. Lyotard, *The postmodern explained to children: correspondence, 1982–1985*, (trans.) J. Pefanis, M. Thomas, University of Minnesota Press, Minnesota 1992, p. 31.

⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 31.

⁷ Przemysław Czapliński offers an interesting comparison of Lyotard and Fukuyama's ideas: "[...] the two most influential depictions of the new period; Lyotard and Fukuyama predicted that the two heroes of modernity: Faust who pursued the truth, and Prometheus – the father of the emancipation movement – would leave the scene. Thus, The two grand narratives of the modern European culture – speculative and libertarian – would come to an end

In his opinion, history has attained its limit, “that is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalisation of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government”.⁸

Jean Baudrillard saw the end of history differently – in his concept there is no room for “democratic fulfilment, as Fukuyama has it”.⁹ Democracy as we know it has little in common with the original idea. The authority of the people is a fiction. Successive rackets and scandals in reality are not intended to unmask infringements of the law but simply to consolidate the false conviction about its ubiquity. In any case, Demos himself, relishing “[...] democracy of social standing, the democracy of the TV, the car and the stereo”¹⁰ seems not to be interested in revealing the truth. On the other hand, the deluge of media messages and their intensified exposition deprives people of the possibility of interpreting events. Violence still exists, events still ‘happen’, but history has become deprived of meaning and the final dimension. Events do not trigger any consequences, since they occur too quickly.¹¹

Post-modernity and the matter of Poland

In 2009, Przemysław Czapliński published his book *Polska do wymiany. Późna nowoczesność i nasze wielkie narracje* [Poland up for exchange. Late post-modernity and our grand narratives], in which he analysed contemporary Polish literature in the context of the concept of great stories. My interpretative idea is similar – on this occasion, however, the Polish national weekly, “Gazeta Polska”, will serve as research material.

This periodical has existed on the Polish market since 1993 and, since 2005, its editor-in-chief has been Tomasz Sakiewicz. The current print-run of the publication amounts to 102,701 copies (June 2018). The programme line of the periodical clearly corresponds with the programme of the political party which won the elections in 2015 – Prawo i Sprawiedliwość [Law and Justice].

The key to the selection of interpreted publications is the presence of direct references to post-modernity, understood as a social and cultural formation. It can, therefore, be established that, as in Czapliński’s work, in the centre of my attention there can be found narrations about society in the time of the crisis of grand narratives.¹²

– P. Czapliński, *Polska do wymiany. Późna nowoczesność i nasze wielkie narracje*, Wydawnictwo W.A.B., Warszawa 2009, p. 14.

⁸ F. Fukuyama, *The End of History?*, „The National Interest”, Summer 1989, No. 16, p. 3.

⁹ J. Baudrillard, *The Intelligence of Evil or the Lucidity Pact* (trans.) C. Turner, Biddles Ltd, King’s Lynn 2005, p. 119.

¹⁰ J. Baudrillard, *The Consumer Society Myths and Structures*, (trans.) C Turner, Redwood Books, Trowbridge, Wiltshire 1999, p. 50.

¹¹ J. Baudrillard, *Simulacra and simulation*, (trans.) S. Glaser, The University Michigan Press, Michigan 1994, p. 47.

¹² Cf.: P. Czapliński, *Polska do wymiany. Późna nowoczesność i nasze wielkie narracje*, Wydawnictwo W.A.B., Warszawa 2009, p. 14–15.

The systemic change of the 1990s enforced a revision of fundamental questions. The society until that time had been homogeneous and consolidated around the concept of solidarity, the battle for freedom, the idea of a national state. An additional bonding element was the politically and socially committed Catholic Church. The guarantee of a common identity then were the uniting stories, among which a particular place was occupied by the mutated but still present Messianism.¹³ The turn of the millennia, however, brought to Poland a great crisis of narration. The myth of freedom collided with the brutal reality of capitalism during this period of transformation. The idea of progress melted away in the torrent of civilizational goods, whose fundamental aim became the supply of consumptional pleasure.

The 21st century brought also a revision of local uniting narrations – I am thinking here of the questions connected with the attitude of Poles during the Second World War, the Communist era, the myth of the Solidarity Independent Self-governing Trade Union and the fundamentals and legitimacy of liberal democracy. This uncertainty and the lack of support gave birth to a longing for the period of a unified and partly safe community. The basis for its functioning should have been its own narration. A narration in which there was no place for interpretation or divergence. “Gazeta Polska”¹⁴, like the literature of the 1990s analysed by Czaplinski, seeks salvation in tradition. Evil is post-modern, the only possible defence is a return to conservative values, which are to overcome the nihilism of the West.¹⁵

Among the ‘defence army’ were the Republic, patriarchalism, religiousness [...], a goods-and-exchange economy and an efficient army. [...] On the other hand, extinction is brought about by the emancipation of various minorities, the principle of political correctness taken to extremes and capital freely crossing borders.¹⁶

It is worth paying attention here to the fact that the opposite to the impending post-modernity is in reality modern institutions, which, paradoxically, are treated as an element of a traditional, conservative world-view.¹⁷

The quintessence of such an approach is the programme line of the analysed weekly, which, in accordance with the Club Card of “Gazeta Polska” is expressed by: “Attention to the national interest, the sovereignty of the state, the propagation of patriotism. The construction of the state and society on the basis of traditional values emanating from the Christian culture.”¹⁸

¹³ M. Janion, *Mesjanizm to przekleństwo. List Marii Janion do Kongresu Kultury*, <http://wyborcza.pl/7,75410,20813344,mesjanizm-to-przekleństwo-list-marii-janion-do-kongresu-kultury.html> (accessed: 25.11.2016).

¹⁴ Hereinafter referred to as GP.

¹⁵ S. Baskerville, *Odpowiedź na nihilizm Zachodu*, GP 2015, No. 49.

¹⁶ P. Czaplinski, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 41–43.

¹⁸ *Karta Klubów „Gazety Polskiej”*, <http://www.klubygp.pl/karta-klubow-gp/> (accessed: 20.06.2018).

Post-modernism in “Gazeta Polska”

The terminological chaos connected with the definition and differentiation of modernism, post-modernism and post-modernity has appeared in scientific discourse many times. An interesting attempt to redefine post-modernity was undertaken by Wojciech Klimczyk, who, above all in the context of the thoughts of Francis Lyotard, considers it as a culture of stillness. The Polish sociologist also draws attention to the vagueness and banalisation of this term, which has become a platitude in the discourse on the subject of contemporary culture. This is significant inasmuch as it is precisely this application that is so characteristic of the Polish weekly that interests us. As Klimczyk notices, “One can often read about post-modernity in the columns of the daily press and could obtain the impression that this is a buzzword just like capitalism, democracy or liberalism”¹⁹. The editors of “Gazeta Polska” seem to have full awareness of this, though the categories mentioned by Klimczyk seem to have above all a rhetorical value, as signs of a certain ideology. Their original sense seems to be secondary with respect to the connotated meanings, which allow them to manipulate the emotions of the readers. In this way, the question about the origins of the terms themselves, their aspect or even the field which they concern is irrelevant.

What is post-modernism? A reading of the “Gazeta Polska” publication gives a clear answer: post-modernism is evil. The word itself (or, more properly, various forms of its lexeme) during the period of three years (01.11.2013–23.11.2016) appeared in the columns of the weekly only 34 times in 26 editions and the lexeme was almost always placed in a negative context and meant post-modernity (only in a few cases did it appear as the name of a tendency in art and without any further connotations). On the other hand, the word “post-modernity” appeared only four times, including twice in the titles of publications referred to by journalists.

Both terms are above all identified with relativism and nihilism. The authors of the features are sub-consciously trying to oppose the detotalisation of the undermining coherency and universal character of grand narratives as described by Agnes Heller.²⁰

As a philosophical term, post-modernism does not require further explanations, having become a key-word, a symbol of a rotten and fundamentally false ideology, represented by compromised (to the GP editors) philosophers and “lying chorus leaders from the post-modern parochial narrow-minded”²¹, whose hidden aim was to propagate Communist ideas and a deconstruction of the conception of a national state. An equally important feature of post-modernism is its anti-Christian nature. “With their persistent work, philosophers, politicians and occultists have led to their dissemination in the XXth century in the philosophy of post-modernism, questioning the classical

¹⁹ W. Klimczyk, *Metanarracja mobilizacji. Ponowoczesność jako bezruch?*, “Diametros” 2013, No. 37, p. 51.

²⁰ A. Heller, *Eseje o nowoczesności*, (trans.) J. Hudzik, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika, Toruń 2012, p. 125–155.

²¹ M. Wolski, *Pożegnanie z monopolem*, GP 2013, No. 17.

categories of good, truth and beauty.”²² In this group, there can also be found Michel Foucault “who in his youth covered himself in shame by his membership of the French Communist Party”²³. An even worse example was set by Zygmunt Bauman, who, on the pages of “Gazeta Polska”, is presented as a retired Stalinist²⁴, the life-partner of Bierut’s daughter and a criminal a major in the Internal Security Corps and the head of the 2nd Department of the Politburo of the Internal Security Corps²⁵. It should come as no surprise that, according to the GP journalists, post-modernism is the only tool in the hands of the leftist elite, who, under the ideological cover of philosophy, are above all interested in the consolidation of the existing state of things.²⁶ In this place, the category of stillness suggested by Klimczyk almost pushes forward by itself. This stillness, however, is not the effect of philosophical reflection or of mankind being lost in the surrounding reality. Here, it has an absolutely fundamental meaning – it means the warding off of changes. This is an element of a perverse strategy, depending on the propagation of lethargy and discouragement. In reality, the elites are secretly whispering the Faustian “Linger a while!”

Western Europe is full of ‚fat cats‘ brought up on Fukuyama and Lyotard who, at the level of EU ministries, are concerned only with making sure that ‚it will be as it is‘, with maintaining the status quo and, at the same time, with not allowing (theoretically and practically) any changes on the ideological, social and systemic levels.²⁷

Such a conception of post-modernism has the hallmarks, as defined by Karl Popper, of a conspiracy theory. Journalists are constantly convincing us that “[...] the explanation of social phenomena depends on indicating people or groups interested in the appearance of a particular phenomenon (often this is a hidden interest which first has to be revealed) and planning and plotting with the aim of achieving its realisation”²⁸.

Although the name of William S. Lind has not been mentioned once in the period researched, his conception of “cultural Marxism” is ubiquitous in this publication.²⁹ The issues raised by philosophers: relativism, the sense of being lost, the lack of continuity, according to the GP’s feature-writers, constitute an element in the battle for the maintenance of domination.

“Soft-totalitarian political correctness, making it impossible today to understand the world, and to oppose evil”³⁰ seems to be an elegant screen in the process of creating

²² R. Tekieli, *Daddy, papa and me*, GP 2014, No. 2.

²³ W. Wencel, *Prawda – rozdział II*, GP 2011, No. 14.

²⁴ W. Wencel, *Trzy lekcje historii*, GP 2013, No. 27.

²⁵ B. Urbankowski, *Poćwiartować Baumana albo...*, GP 2013, No. 28.

²⁶ W. Wencel, *Trzy lekcje historii*, GP 2013, No. 27.

²⁷ W. Mucha, *Sztorm na „archipelagu zadowolonych”*, GP 2016, No. 1.

²⁸ K. Popper, *W poszukiwaniu lepszego świata. Wykłady i rozprawy z trzydziestu lat*, Ethos, Warszawa 1992, p. 98.

²⁹ W.S. Lind, *Political Correctness: A Short History of an Ideology*, http://www.nationalists.org/pdf/political_correctness_a_short_history_of_an_ideology.pdf (accessed: 20.06.2018).

³⁰ M. Wolski, *Cywilizacja Rozumu*, GP 2016, No. 29.

“avatars or people-clones, convinced about their own exceptionability, identical in their multifariousness and living only in the present.”³¹

As Wojciech Mucha convinces us, this project has not been successful in Poland. The post-Communist authorities could not cope with the opposition of society, which salvaged a thousand-year-long culture. The end of history has never occurred here and it never will, either in Fukuyama’s version (even if just because liberal democracy within the framework of the European Union is far from the ideal and also because it cannot cope with the challenges of the contemporary – threats from Russia or Islamic terrorism) or in Lyotard’s (because of the still strong national and historical narrations and the Catholic religion).³² In this place, it is worth drawing attention to the dates of publication of these texts. The above-mentioned feature was published in January 2016, and the direct context for the author’s deliberations was the electoral success of Prawo i Sprawiedliwość and the announced change of policy towards the European Union. This latter point arouses particular emotions among the newspaper’s journalists. “For we managed to appropriate «Europeanism» for the leftist values associated with the cultural revolution, gender and post-modernist relativism and promoted by Prof. Bauman.”³³

Post-modernism threatens the family. “The ideologues of genderism have commenced a massed attack on playschools, schools and universities”.³⁴

In place of the liquidated traditional family and marriage, the ideologues of leftist feminism want to introduce «non-normative family practices». That is, homosexual, polyamorous, incestuous, sadomasochistic and other unions practised by persons with sexual disorders, described by the common name «queer» [Translator’s note: In Polish, “odmieniec” = “misfit”].³⁵

Here, it is worth drawing attention once again to the connection between such a narration of paranoid stylistics (this time defined by Richard Hofstadter) and its tendency to describe the lascivious sexual practices of the alleged enemy:

[...] the sexual freedom often attributed to the enemy, his lack of moral inhibition, his possession of especially effective techniques for fulfilling his desires, give exponents of the paranoid style an opportunity to project and express unacknowledgeable aspects of their own psychological concerns.³⁶

The community has been being eaten away by the same disease for a long time and it is trying to destroy the healthy tissue of the Polish nation. This epidemic has a global reach and the only antidote to it is a national state resistant to the cultural

³¹ W. Mucha, *Sztorm na „archipelagu zadowolonych”*, GP 2016, No. 1.

³² *Ibidem*.

³³ J. Lichocka, *Ostatni taki wynik PO*, GP 2014, No. 22.

³⁴ T. Terlikowski, *Złodzieje dzieci*, GP 2013, No. 50.

³⁵ R. Tekieli, *Queer znaczy odmieniec*, GP 2015, No. 5.

³⁶ R. Hofstadter, *The Paranoid Style in American Politics*, “Harper’s Magazine”, November 1964, p. 85.

influences from the demoralised European Union. “The example of the Institute for National Remembrance shows that the institutions created by the state are capable of leading Poles away from the post-modernistic gulags.”³⁷ What is more, we can be a model for the whole world.³⁸ Europe is lost and must wake itself from its lethargy,³⁹ because political correctness, behind which “gender ideology” is hiding, is capable of destroying even the most powerful powers.⁴⁰ Here, as an example, the GP journalists most often cite secular France and “ultra-left” Sweden, where, in the name of political correctness, thousands of refugees have been allowed onto the country’s territories.⁴¹ This same correctness does not allow not only the condemning of but also the commenting on the numerous cases of the refugees breaking the law, thus creating “totalitarian liberal states”⁴². On the other hand, in the name of a secular state, all examples of religiousness are attacked – (unfortunately) irrespective of the faith concerned. In this way, the GP journalists manage to combine the migration crisis with a leftist ideology and, what follows from this, with Marxism and post-modernism.

The journalists’ favourite discourse strategy is to present Poland as the last entrenchment of defence. This is a vision taken almost verbatim from “Nie-boska komedia” [“Non-divine comedy” by Zygmunt Krasiński]. A certain hope for the world is brought by the increasingly more numerous electoral successes of conservative parties but, until 2016, in GP publications there was a dominance of the image of Poland as a besieged state on whose shoulders rested the defence of Christian values.⁴³ As Robert Tekieli states, “Europe has been being destroyed for three centuries by successive heresies. From the Enlightenment to Post-modernism.”⁴⁴ The latter, however, seems to be especially dangerous, since it is aimed at the foundations of European order. That is why the journalist once again summons the readers: “[...] it is we who must defend Europe: create new saints through our prayers: a contemporary Augustine, Benedict, Thomas of Aquinas, Francis of Assisi... This is the road to the re-Christianisation of Europe and to the repulsion of the invasion.”⁴⁵

In the article cited above, just as in many other GP publications, the inspiration of the work of Samuel Huntington can clearly be seen, which, opposing itself to Fukuyama’s conception, states that politics in the future will be dominated by conflicts between great civilisations. The sources of these conflicts will, according to the American political

³⁷ W. Wencel, *Kultura jest kluczem*, GP 2013, No. 50.

³⁸ T. Sakiewicz, *Bierzmy odpowiedzialność za całą Europę*, GP 2016, No. 26.

³⁹ O. Doleśniak-Harczuk, *Europa budzi się z (lewackiego) letargu*, GP 2013, No. 44.

⁴⁰ Cf.: Kozielski P., *O chorobie Rzeczypospolitej, jaką jest propornograficzna seksedukacja – wprawka do analizy dyskursu prasowego „Gazety Polskiej”* [in:] „Ars Educandi” 2014, Vol. 9.

⁴¹ W. Wencel, *Procesor w czasie*, GP 2013, No. 7.

⁴² R. Tekieli, *Totalitarne państwo liberalne*, GP 2016, No. 1.

⁴³ Cf.: P. Kozielski, *O wojnie naszej którą wiemy z Tuskiem, Unią i propornograficzną seksedukacją* [in:] A. Kalinowska-Żeleźnik, A. Lusińska, J. Mackiewicz (eds.), *Maski dziennikarstwa*, Bernardinum, Pelplin 2012, pp. 118–133.

⁴⁴ R. Tekieli, *Albo będą święci, albo męczennicy*, GP 2016, No. 38.

⁴⁵ *Ibidem*.

scientist, come from cultural and religious differences.⁴⁶ According to the journalists from “Gazeta Polska”, that time has just arrived.

Conclusion

The post-modernist vision of the end of history was officially rejected by the journalists of “Gazeta Polska”. Lyotard’s conception is fundamentally false and constitutes a tool for the furthering of defeatism. Both the speculative story and the freedom story can find their realisation in a Christianisation of Europe, which, following Poland’s model, can be reborn in the form of national states cooperating with each other. Liberal democracy is not a final point, as Fukuyama wanted. Particularly the second part of his formulation arouses controversy and suspicion. “The democracy which is usually described as liberal, together with the acceptance of the gender-queer ideology, takes on the features of a totalitarian state.”⁴⁷ The crisis of grand narratives seems to be a mystification, concealing in reality the crisis of liberal democracy as weakened by leftist ideology and numerous corruption scandals.⁴⁸ In Poland, successive governments of liberals strove for ever greater integration with the European Union, embracing a foreign and fundamentally false historical narrative.⁴⁹ Poles were blamed for crimes they had not committed and the “pedagogy of shame” was introduced.⁵⁰

Tradition was set against modernity, attempting to instil in Poland a new universal model of civilisation, or rather post-civilisation, realised through the destruction of identity, through the tearing away of people from their culture, tradition, family, community, even their own sex.⁵¹

That is why the history of Poland needs to be de-falsified (n.b. it might be surprising to see how frequent the appearance of the lexeme ‘false’ is – in the period researched, it appears in almost every edition of the periodical: in the three-year period, it was used almost a thousand times).

Unfortunately, “progress”⁵² also turns out to be illusory. This expression appears on the pages of “Gazeta Polska” almost exclusively in a negative context. This is made particularly evident in adjectival forms, where “progressive” stands in opposition to “traditional” and is used sarcastically – to describe the modern (or actually post-modern) life-style.

⁴⁶ S.P. Huntington, *The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order*, Simon & Schuster, New York 1996.

⁴⁷ R. Tekieli, *Queer naczy odmieniec*, GP 2015, No. 5.

⁴⁸ T. Panfil, *Bunt Komitetów, czyli jak wycięto listę krajową*, GP 2016, No. 22.

⁴⁹ M. Świrski, *Odpowiedzialność*, GP 2015, No. 2.

⁵⁰ J. Lilpop, *Pokłosie kłamstwa*, GP 2015, No. 38.

⁵¹ M. Wolski, *Zderzenie cywilizacji*, GP 2015, No. 44.

⁵² Here understood as civilisational development – without further description of a concrete field.

At the end, it is worth once again drawing attention to the rhetorical value of post-modernism. The world presented on the pages of "Gazeta Polska" is a world on the edge of catastrophe. Poland has found itself in the centre of a moral war. A war in which there are no truces or compromises. Each campaign requires appropriate rhetorical means. Post-modernism, gender and feminism are ready-made etiquettes, topoi intended to evoke images of moral decay and immorality. They are the most important ideographs of the publication and constitute an element of its constitutive rhetoric.⁵³ The category of the external enemy is an element sine qua non for the functioning of the periodical. In this role, there are the perfect protagonists, albeit not entirely identified: post-modernists and genderists – those "fat cats brought up on Fukuyama and Lyotard".

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⁵³ Cf.: M.C. McGee, *The "ideograph". A link between rhetoric and ideology*, "Quarterly Journal of Speech" 1980, No. 66, pp. 1–16.

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