

RECENT TRENDS IN RELIGIOUS ADHERENCE AND PRACTICE AMONG MUSLIMS IN THE NETHERLANDS, AND AMSTERDAM IN PARTICULAR

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Abstract: In the last 60 years, the number of Muslims in the Netherlands has increased considerably from 300 to more than 827,000. Immigration, in particular from Turkey and Morocco, was the main cause. In the same time period, Dutch society was secularising to a large extent. About 60% of the Dutch population is no longer affiliated with a religion.

This paper focus on two questions. Is the Muslim population secularising as well? Is a Muslim religious identity hindering integration in, or identification with, (secular or Christian) Dutch society? To answer these questions, the results of recent surveys, both on the national and on the local (Amsterdam) level, have been analysed after considering existing theories on secularisation and immigrant integration. The results show that after initial indications of secularisation, there is no secularisation among Muslims of Turkish and Moroccan origin in the last decade; mosque attendance by the second generation has actually increased. Existing theories on secularisation, such as the classical secularisation paradigm and market theories can not explain these developments, perhaps with the exception of the theory of existential security. Also assimilation theories do not prove to be valid. It appears that there is a continuing religious vitality among these immigrant groups as a consequence of socialisation in immigrant families and communities with relatively strong intra-group ties. Also the possibility of a kind of “reactive religiosity” in confrontation with an increasing public hostility towards Islam cannot be excluded.

Concerning the second research question, there proved to be a positive correlation between religious identification (with Islam) and ethno-national identification (with the country of origin), which could hinder integration in, and identification with, Dutch national society. However, it does not hinder identification with the local (Amsterdam) society, which is relatively strong and functions as a “bridging identity” with the national society.

Keywords: Muslims, religious adherence and practice, the Netherlands, Amsterdam

Introduction

Very recently, the Dutch columnist of Turkish origin Ebru Umar published a column in the Dutch daily newspaper Metro (July 19th, 2013) about her holiday stay in Turkey. She complained that she was awakened every morning at 4 o'clock by "the whining of the mosque" in her neighbourhood and further referred to the prophet Mohammed as "that dead fellow." In response she received more than 2,000 tweets from young Dutch Muslims of Turkish origin with the most terrible threats and curses. That surprised her very much, because all the tweets were placed by young persons who were born and went to school in the Netherlands, and were fully integrated and not of the "djellaba or burka type" according to the attached photos. How is it possible – she asked herself – that these young people, who grew up in a very secularised society, where tolerance and freedom of speech are important values, still react in the way they did.

This incident touches two more general questions: first, the question, whether Muslims living in a very secularised society such as the Netherlands are secularising as well; and second, whether a Muslim religious identity is hindering identification with Dutch society.

Since the 1960s, the Netherlands has been the scene of two contrasting developments: ongoing secularisation on the one hand and growing religious diversity on the other, including a growing number of Muslims (Knippenberg 2005, 2009). At this moment, more than 60% of the Dutch population is not affiliated with

a religion and only about 35% adhere to one of the Christian churches. In contrast, the number of Muslims has grown from 300 in 1947 to about 825,000 in 2007. That is about 5% of the country's population. Most of the Muslims (almost 600,000) are first and second generation immigrants from Turkey and Morocco who have settled in the Netherlands from the 1960s onwards, first as *gastarbeiders* (guest labourers), and in the 1980s and 1990s followed by their families (Table 1). About 33,000 Muslims came from the former colony of Surinam, which became independent in 1975, and more recently, 167,000 Muslims came as refugees from other non-Western countries such as Afghanistan, Somalia, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, Egypt, and Tunisia. Only

Table 1. Number of Muslims in the Netherlands by origin, 2007/2008

Morocco	296,000
Turkey	285,000
Surinam	33,000
Afghanistan	31,000
Iraq	27,000
Somalia	20,000
Other non-Western countries	80,000
Western countries	40,000
Netherlands	13,000
Total	825,000

Source: Van Herten 2009.

13,000 Muslims are native Dutch, including third generation immigrants from Turkey and Morocco (Van Herten 2009).

Large cities, Amsterdam in particular, are the scene where both developments (growing Islam and secularisation) are the most manifest. What are the consequences of these confrontations? Are Muslims secularising? Is a Muslim religious identity hindering integration in, or identification with, (secular or Christian) Dutch society?

In this paper, I will delve into these questions using data from recent national and local (Amsterdam) surveys. First, I shall provide some theoretical considerations.

Theoretical considerations

According to the classical secularisation paradigm (Wilson 1969, 1982, 1998; Bruce 2002, 2011), secularisation is connected with modernisation, be it growing rationality (Weber) or functional differentiation (Durkheim). However, this paradigm was developed concerning the secularisation of Western European countries that were dominated by the Christian religion and its churches. Consequently, secularisation was equivalent to the declining importance of the Christian religion on the societal, institutional, and individual levels (Dobbelaere 1981).

Supporters of market theories of religion also based their ideas on empirical research among different Christian churches and sects, predominantly in the United States (Stark, Brainbridge 1985, 1987; Stark, Iannaccone 1994; Finke, Guest, Stark 1996; Finke, Stark 1998; Stark 1999; Stark, Finke 2000). They assume a more or less stable demand for religious “products” and explain differences in churchgoing and religiosity by differences in the supply side of the religious market. A strong regulation of the religious market (for instance in the case of a state church that by its monopoly prohibits the freedom of choice of individuals) and little differentiation on the supply side (that is, no competition between religious “firms”) should conduce secularisation.

A third line of theoretical thinking about religious change emphasizes that religion itself is changing using concepts such as the privatising or individualising of religion (Luckmann 1967; Hervieu-Léger 1993; Davie 1994, 2000) or sees even a radical transformation of traditional religion into post-Christian spirituality or the New Age movement (Hanegraaff 1996; Heelas 1996; Heelas, Woodhead 2005; Houtman, Aupers 2007, 2008). But, again, it is all about Christianity, not about Islam.

The only theory that incorporates all religions was formulated by Norris & Inglehart (2004). In their worldwide analysis of differences in religiosity, they developed their theory of existential security. Growing up in a society with a large amount of insecurity would lead to a relatively high level of religiosity and vice-versa.

The relatively high level of secularisation in the modern Western European welfare states can thus be explained by the relatively high level of existential security.

Applying these theories to Muslims living in the Netherlands, what could be expected? According to the classical secularisation paradigm, one could expect a decline of religiosity dependent of the length of the stay in the Netherlands. Second generation immigrants, for example, would then be less religious than first generation immigrants.

What could be expected on the basis of market theories is less clear. On the one hand, there is a growing diversity within the religious domain as a whole, which would have a positive influence on religious adherence and practice. But, on the other hand, only a small part of it is relevant to Muslims of a specific ethnicity. In practice, there is less competition between, for instance, Turkish or Moroccan mosques, which would have a negative effect on religiosity. A growing number of mosques could influence religiosity positively.

Individualisation or privatisation would cause growing heterogeneity, varying between indifference or liberal attitudes to fundamentalism; and in general declining institutional religion and mosque attendance.

According to the existential security theory, one might expect a growing religiosity in the first (relatively uncertain) phase of settlement, followed by declining religiosity when security is growing.

Apart from theories on religious change, migration theories could be relevant. In general, three kinds of theories should be mentioned (Alba, Nee 2003; Entzinger, Dorleijn 2008; Fleischmann, Phalet 2012). First, theories which suppose a kind of assimilation in the host society over time and over multiple generations. In highly secularised societies such as the Netherlands, assimilation would conduce to a declining importance of religion. Second, theories which suppose a continuing religious vitality among immigrant groups as a consequence of socialisation in immigrant families and communities with relatively strong intra-group ties. Third, theories which suppose a kind of reactive religiosity as a consequence of real or perceived discrimination on the basis of religion or public hostility towards Islam or Muslims by the host society.

Available data

The data stem from different surveys. The national data are derived from a recent overview on Muslims in the Netherlands produced by the Netherlands Institute for Social Research based on different representative national surveys (Maliepaard, Gijssberts 2012). The data on Amsterdam stem from the *Burgermonitor*, regular surveys carried out by the *Dienst Onderzoek en Statistiek* of the municipality of Amsterdam,

a local survey on second generation immigrants of Turkish and Moroccan immigrants in the age group 18–30 (Van der Welle 2011), and *The Integration of the European Second Generation Research Project*, which included data on Amsterdam and Rotterdam, and several other large European cities (Crul, Schneider, Lelie 2012).

The different samples and different ways of questioning make it difficult to compare the results of all these surveys. Nevertheless, it will be possible to discern trends and draw meaningful conclusions. I will start with an overview of some characteristics of Muslims living in the Netherlands.

Muslims in the Netherlands

Not all immigrants from Muslim countries regard themselves as Muslim. Table 2 shows that there are significant differences dependent on the country of origin. Almost all immigrants of Moroccan, Turkish and Somali background regard themselves as Muslim. Two thirds of the immigrants from Iran and more than one third of the refugees from Iraq, on the other hand, do not identify themselves in that way.

In general, religion plays a very important role in the lives of Dutch Muslims; Muslims of Moroccan and Somali background in particular. They identify strongly with their religion and a majority of Turkish and Moroccan Muslims agree with the statement that it is wrong for a daughter to marry someone from a different religion.

Table 2. Religious adherence, practice, and attitudes among Muslims in the Netherlands by origin, 2009/2011 (percentages)

	Turkish	Moroccan	Afghan	Iraqi	Iranian	Somali
Total ethnic group:						
Regards self as Muslim	94	97	85	61	34	93
Only Muslims:						
visits mosque at least once a week	42	44	13	10	5	36
prays five times a day	27	76	23	38	15	69
wears headscarf (women)	48	64	21	38	13	80
religion is an important part of who I am	85	95	82	77	63	93
it is wrong for a daughter to marry someone from a different religion	64	76	47	42	15	43

Source: Maliepaard, Gijsberts 2012, 14.

Religious practice is less strong. Only a minority attend a mosque at least once a week: 36–44% of Muslims of Moroccan, Turkish and Somali background, 10–13% of Muslims of Afghan and Iraqi background and only 5% of Muslims from Iran. Most Muslims do not pray five times a day. There appears to be a significant difference between Muslims of Moroccan and Somali background on the one hand and other Muslims on the other hand. Two thirds to three quarters of Moroccan and Somali Muslims pray five times every day, whereas that proportion of other Muslims varies from only 15% of Iranian Muslims to 38% of Iraqi Muslims. Comparable differences were found as far as headscarves are concerned. The majority of Muslim women of Somali and Moroccan origin, but only a small minority of Iranian Muslim women, are wearing headscarves (Maliepaard, Gijsberts 2012, 179–181).

In all aspects of religious identity and practice, Iranians are the least religious. Probably this has to do with selective migration: migrants from Iran are to some extent an elite group, well-educated and less religious. Part of the group fled their country of origin precisely for religious reasons. Maybe also a lack of Iranian mosques in the Netherlands plays a role. Unfortunately, there are no data available on the number of mosques for this ethnic group (*Ibidem*).

Of the two main groups of Muslims, those of Turkish and Moroccan origin, Moroccan Muslims are the most religious, both in identity and practice. The different role of religion in the countries of origin could probably explain this difference. In Morocco, Islam is a state religion with the Moroccan king as the religious leader. In Turkey, state and religion are formally separated. Although the influence of religion on state affairs is growing since Erdogan and his AK party came to power, Turkey still is a secular state, that, for instance, forbids female civil servants to wear headscarves in public (Van der Welle 2011, 94–95; Maliepaard, Gijsberts 2012, 180–181).

The high levels of religious attachment among immigrants of Moroccan and Turkish origin provide already an indication that there is no strong secularisation among these groups. That becomes more clear, when data at different time-cuts are analysed (based on Maliepaard, Gijsberts 2012, 116–135). Such data for other groups of Muslims are not available.

Table 3. First and second generation immigrants of Turkish and Moroccan origin who regard themselves as Muslim, 1998–2011 (percentages)

	1998	2004	2011
Turks	94	90	95
Moroccans	98	94	97

Source: Maliepaard, Gijsberts 2012, 117–118.

Table 3 shows that the proportion of first and second generation immigrants of Turkish and Moroccan origin that calls themselves Muslim is remarkably stable over time and has fluctuated between 98 and 90%. There is no general trend of secularisation in the sense of diminishing religious adherence. Between 1998 and 2004, the proportion

of Muslims declined somewhat, but between 2004 and 2011 that proportion was increasing once again. During the period 1998–2011, the proportion of Muslims of Moroccan origin was somewhat higher than that of Muslims of Turkish origin.

As far as mosque attendance is concerned, the situation is more complicated and differs between Muslims of Turkish and Moroccan origin. Table 4 shows the percentage of Muslims who never or almost never visit a mosque. The proportion of Turkish Muslims who never visit a mosque increased between 1998 and 2004 and declined somewhat thereafter, ending in 2011 at a level of 20–22%, which is twice the level in 1998. There are no significant differences between the first and second generation.

Table 4. Percentage of Muslims of Turkish and Moroccan origin in the Netherlands who (almost) never visit a mosque by generation, 1998–2011

	1998	2004	2011
First generation Turks	11	26	20
Second generation Turks	11	28	22
First generation Moroccans	27	43	19
Second generation Moroccans	54	31	24

Source: Maliepaard, Gijsberts 2012, 119–120.

Muslims of Moroccan origin follow a different pattern. Although the proportion that never visits a mosque in 2011 was comparable with that of Turkish Muslims, they come from a far higher level in the preceding period with large differences between the first and the second generation. In 1998, 54% of the second generation and 27% of the first generation of Moroccan Muslims never visited a mosque. However, this large difference almost disappeared in the period that followed. Mosque attendance by the first generation diminished between 1998 and 2004 but increased significantly between 2004 and 2011. The second generation saw a continuing declining proportion that never attends a mosque. In 2011, a small difference remained: 24% of the second and 19% of the first generation never visited a mosque.

Table 5 illustrates the other side of the spectrum of mosque attendance: the proportion of Muslims who visit a mosque on a weekly basis, which in 2011 was about twice the proportion that never visits a mosque. Following an initially declining trend, the first generation of both Turkish and Moroccan Muslims who attend the mosque weekly increased again after 2004. The proportion of the second generation

of Turkish and Moroccan Muslims who visit a mosque weekly shows a remarkable increase from 9% of Moroccan Muslims and 23% of Turkish Muslims to about one third of both groups in 2011.

Table 5. Percentage of Muslims of Turkish and Moroccan origin in the Netherlands who attend a mosque once a week or more, 1998–2011

	1998	2004	2011
First generation Turks	46	32	45
Second generation Turks	23	25	35
First generation Moroccans	40	34	46
Second generation Moroccans	9	31	33

Source: Maliepaard, Gijberts 2012, 120–123.

Combining the data in Tables 4 and 5, we may conclude that as far as mosque attendance is concerned, there is no secularisation of Muslims of Turkish and Moroccan origin in the Netherlands in the period 1998–2011. The second generation of Moroccan Muslims actually visits a mosque more often. Within the second generation of Turkish Muslims, the differences have become more significant: both the proportion that never attends a mosque and the proportion that attends on a weekly basis increased. Perhaps this could indicate a kind of individualisation. In summary, the second generation of both ethnic groups attends a mosque less often than the first generation.

Finally, there is a significant gender difference. In contrast to what is happening among Christians, women of both groups are visiting the mosque far less frequently than men. Undoubtedly, this has to do with the fact that according to the rules of Islam, visiting a mosque is an obligation for men, but not for women (Douwes, De Koning, Bender 2005).

So far, there appears to be no clear support for the secularisation paradigm as far as Islam is concerned. In addition, the assimilation hypothesis does not hold. Islam in the Netherlands shows a remarkable vitality.

Are there indications that a kind of reactive religious identification has occurred? In general, a substantial part of the Muslims living in the Netherlands feel that the Dutch are too negative in their attitudes with respect to Islam – Muslims with a Moroccan or Turkish background in particular. Table 6 shows that 80% of Moroccan and 63% of Turkish Muslims agree with that statement. However, when analysing at

the individual level whether Muslims of Turkish and Moroccan background who had experienced significant discrimination, also had a relatively strong religious identification, there proved to be no correlation (Maliepaard, Gijsberts 2012, 154–159).

Is the continuing religiosity of Muslims in the Netherlands hindering integration with Dutch society? A nuanced answer is due here. On the one hand, second generation Moroccan and Turkish Muslims, born in the Netherlands have a better command of the Dutch language and higher educational levels than the first generation, and are generally better integrated with Dutch society. Nevertheless, this second generation shows a continuing or even increasing religiosity. So, religious identification with Islam appears to be no obstacle for integration with Dutch society.

On the other hand, there is a correlation between religious and ethnic identification. Non-Muslims identify much more with the Netherlands than do Muslims (Table 7). And the more religious the Muslims are, the more they feel connected with their country of origin and the less with the Netherlands (Table 8). This correlation is stronger among Muslims of Moroccan origin than Turkish origin. Almost none of the Turkish Muslims feel themselves Dutch and also the group that feels more Dutch than Turkish is very small. Ethno-national identification is also corre-

Table 6. Percentage of Muslims in the Netherlands who agree with the statement that “the Dutch are too negative in their attitude with respect to Islam” by origin, 2009/2011

Moroccans	80
Turks	63
Iranians	56
Afghans	48
Iraqis	45
Somalis	40

Source: Maliepaard, Gijsberts 2012, 151.

Table 7. Ethno-national identification of first and second immigrants of Turkish and Moroccan origin in the Netherlands by religion, 2011 (percentages)

Ethno-national identification	Muslims	Non-Muslims
Dutch	0	15
More Dutch than Turkish/Moroccan	4	34
Equally Dutch and Turkish/Moroccan	26	28
More Turkish/Moroccan than Dutch	44	15
Turkish/Moroccan	26	8
Total	100	100

Source: Maliepaard, Gijsberts 2012, 140.

Table 8. Ethno-national identification of Muslims of Turkish and Moroccan origin by religious identification, 2011 (percentages)

Ethno-national identification	Turkish		Moroccan	
	Religious identification		Religious identification	
	Weak	Strong	Weak	Strong
Dutch	0	0	2	0
More Dutch than Turkish/Moroccan	6	2	13	3
Equally Dutch and Turkish/Moroccan	22	19	45	28
More Turkish/Moroccan than Dutch	47	45	28	45
Turkish/Moroccan	25	34	12	23
Total	100	100	100	100

Source: Maliepaard, Gijsberts 2012, 143.

lated with religious practices measured by mosque attendance, participating in the Ramadan, eating Halal and praying (Maliepaard, Gijsberts 2012, 144).

Muslims in Amsterdam

The data which have been presented so far are representative of the Netherlands as a whole. This section will now focus on the situation in Amsterdam, the largest city in the Netherlands, and together with Rotterdam, with the highest concentration of Muslims of all Dutch municipalities (Schmeets 2009, 130–131). Based on the *Burgermonitor*, already in 2000, Amsterdam was home to 15% Muslims (Table 9). This is three times the proportion of Muslims in the Dutch population as a whole. After 2001, however, that proportion declined sharply, perhaps because a large number of Muslims were anxious to manifest themselves as Muslims in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 9/11. In 2003, only 10% of the population were counted as Muslim. Since then, the proportion has increased again to 13% of the Amsterdam population in 2010.

Table 9 also shows that in the same time period the proportion of Christians gradually declined from 21 to 18% of the Amsterdam population. The established churches (Roman Catholic Church and Protestant Church in the Netherlands) in particular lost ground. The more charismatic Pentecostal and Evangelical branches of Protestantism, which are both popular among Christian immigrants, gained some new members. The proportion of residents that feel affiliated with Buddhism tripled, which could indicate a growing popularity of post-Christian spirituality.

Amsterdam residents with a Moroccan background include the highest proportion of the religiously affiliated (88% in 2010); in addition, 82% of residents with a Turkish background feel affiliated with a religion (Table 10). These proportions are lower than the proportions we saw for the Netherlands as a whole, where 97% of Moroccans and 94% of Turks regard themselves as Muslim. But, the kind of questioning was not exactly the same, and the figures are therefore not quite comparable. Nevertheless, also based on other surveys in Amsterdam, it is probable that the religious adherence of Turks and Moroccans is lower in Amsterdam than in the country as a whole. More interesting is that between 2000 and 2010, the religious affiliation of Turks and Moroccans did not diminish. Religious affiliation among Turks actually increased during this time period.

In sharp contrast with these Muslim figures, only 21% of the native Dutch in Amsterdam feel affiliated with a religion. Since this proportion was 25% in 2000, we may conclude, that secularisation among the native Dutch is still continuing.

Table 11 tells us something about the mosque attendance of Turkish and Moroccan Muslims in Amsterdam, compared with national data. About 38% of the Turkish and Moroccan Muslims in Amsterdam attend a mosque once a week or more. Older men are overrepresented, while women are underrepresented. That proportion is a little smaller than that in the Netherlands as a whole, where 42% of Turkish Muslims and 44% of Moroccan Muslims do the same. A bigger difference concerns the proportion that seldom or never visit a mosque: about 39% in Amsterdam versus 22% of Turkish and 20% of Moroccan Muslims nationwide. In that sense, mosque attendance of Muslims

Table 9. Religious affiliation of the Amsterdam population, 2000–2010 (percentages)

	2000	2005	2010
Christian	21	19	18
including:			
Roman Catholic	11	9	9
Protestant Church NL	6	6	4
Other Protestant	6	4	7
Islam	15	11	13
Buddhism	1	2	3
Judaism	1	1	2
Hinduism	1	2	1
No religion	59	65	61
Total	100	100	100

Source: Burgermonitor Gemeente Amsterdam, Dienst Onderzoek en Statistiek 2000–2010.

Table 10. Percentage of the Amsterdam population that regards itself affiliated with a religion, by origin, 2000–2010

	2000	2010
Moroccan	88	88
Turkish	73	82
Dutch	25	21

Source: Burgermonitor Gemeente Amsterdam, Dienst Onderzoek en Statistiek, 2000 and 2010.

Table 11. Mosque attendance of Muslims of Turkish and Moroccan origin in Amsterdam (2010) and the Netherlands as a whole (2011)

	Amsterdam	Netherlands	Netherlands
	Turkish/Moroccan	Turkish	Moroccan
Once a week or more	38	42	44
Once a month	15	12	12
A few times a year	8	24	24
Seldom or never	39	22	20

Source: Burgermonitor gemeente Amsterdam 2010, Dienst Onderzoek en Statistiek; Maliepaard, Gijsberts 2012, 72.

in Amsterdam is not only less frequent, but also more polarised compared with the Netherlands as a whole.

Table 12 informs us about recent trends in the mosque attendance of Turkish and Moroccan Muslims by generation. The Amsterdam data are derived from local surveys in 2002 and 2010. The national data come from surveys performed in 1998, 2004 and 2011. Recorded is the proportion that attends a mosque once a week or more. Both in Amsterdam and the Netherlands as a whole, the first generation attends mosque more frequently than the second generation. After 2002, there is a trend in

Table 12. Percentage of Muslims of Turkish and Moroccan origin who attend a mosque once a week or more by generation, Amsterdam and the Netherlands, 1998–2011

	1998	2002/2004	2010/2011
First generation Turks and Moroccans, Amsterdam	–	38	39
Second generation Turks and Moroccans, Amsterdam	–	–	–
First generation Turks, Netherlands	46	32	45
Second generation Turks, Netherlands	23	25	35
First generation Moroccans, Netherlands	40	34	46
Second generation Moroccans, Netherlands	9	31	33

Source: Burgermonitor gemeente Amsterdam, Dienst Onderzoek en Statistiek; Maliepaard, Gijsberts 2012, 120–122.

both generations of increasing weekly mosque attendance, both in Amsterdam and in the Netherlands as a whole, but this trend is less strong in Amsterdam. Finally, the recent growth in the mosque attendance of the second generation in particular is remarkable.

Other local surveys also show that in Amsterdam young adults are attending mosque more frequently: the proportion of Turkish and Moroccan Muslims in the age group 18 to 29 who attend mosque at least once a week increased from 28% to 42% (Gemeente Amsterdam, Dienst Onderzoek en Statistiek). Especially between 2006 and 2010, there was a strong growth. Other studies confirm that religion has become more important in the lives of young Muslims of Turkish and Moroccan origin. In a 2007/2008 survey on second generation Turks and Moroccans in Amsterdam in the age group 18 to 30, 54% of Turkish and 65% of Moroccan respondents agreed that their religious beliefs have become even more important in recent years (Van der Welle 2011, 171).

A comparable survey of second generation Turks and Moroccans in Amsterdam and Rotterdam (in the age group 18–35) showed a strong religious identification of 80% of the Turks and 84% of the Moroccans (Table 13). Less than 10% of the Turks and Moroccans had a weak religious identification or no religious identification at all. In sharp contrast, we see that 65% of a comparable group of native Dutch respondents have a very weak or no religious identification. That identification is lower in Amsterdam than in Rotterdam. We saw already that in 2010 only 18% of the total Amsterdam population was affiliated with Christianity. In a representative sample of native Dutch young adults in Amsterdam (18 to 30 years old), only 7% were affiliated with a religion (2007/2008) (Van der Welle, Mamadouh 2008, 137).

Although the combined Amsterdam and Rotterdam survey among second generation Turks and Moroccans in the age group 18 to 35 was carried out at one point in time, we nevertheless can get an indication whether any secularisation has occurred

Table 13. Religious identification of second generation immigrants of Turkish and Moroccan origin in Amsterdam and Rotterdam in the age group 18–35, 2006/2007

	Turkish	Moroccan	Dutch
Not at all / (very) weak	8	6	65
Neither weak nor strong	12	9	13
(Very) strong	80	84	21
Total	100	100	100

Source: Groeneveld 2008, 109.

(Table 14). All the respondents were asked about their religious affiliation during their years of upbringing and about their current affiliation. Only 5% of Moroccans and Turks had secularised in the sense that they were raised with religion, but had no current religious affiliation. However, the opposite had also occurred; 5% of Turks and 2% of Moroccans were not raised with Islam, but were now affiliated with this religion. So, on balance, there was hardly any secularisation, which is in clear contrast with the comparable native Dutch group: 28% of this group was raised with religion, but was not affiliated with a religion anymore. Only 1% went in the opposite direction.

Table 14. Religious affiliation during the years of upbringing and current status of second generation immigrants of Turkish and Moroccan origin and native Dutch in the age group 18–35 in Amsterdam and Rotterdam, 2006/2007

During youth	Current	Turkish	Moroccan	Dutch
No	No	7	6	56
Yes	Yes	83	87	16
Yes	No	5	5	28
No	Yes	5	2	1

Source: Groeneveld 2008, 114.

Is the continuing religiosity of Muslims in these large cities hindering integration and identification with Dutch society? The results of the Amsterdam survey among second generation immigrants in the age group 18–30 show that there is a correlation between ethno-national identification with the country of origin and the importance of one's religion: the proportion of those who feel Moroccan or Turkish is higher among those who find religion important than among those who find religion not important (Table 15). However, the local context (in this case Amsterdam) appears to be more important than the national context of the Netherlands (Table 16). Note that Table 16 includes second generation immigrants from Surinam – of whom only about 8% are Muslim. These second generation immigrants feel more at home in Amsterdam than in the Netherlands as a whole. And there exists no (negative) correlation between that local identification with Amsterdam and their religious identification with Islam (Van der Welle 2011; Mamadouh, Van der Welle 2013).

Table 15. Importance of religion and ethno/national identification of second generation Muslims of Turkish and Moroccan origin (age group 18–30) in Amsterdam, 2007/2008 (percentages)

Importance of religion	Ethno-national identification with Turkey/Morocco	
	Feeling Turkish	Feeling Moroccan
Not important	77	83
Important	93	97

Source: Mamadouh, Van der Welle, 2013.

Table 16. Identification with Amsterdam, the Netherlands, and the country of origin of second generation immigrants of Turkish, Moroccan and Surinam origin (age group 18–30) in Amsterdam, 2007/2008

Amsterdam or the Netherlands	Country of origin or the Netherlands				
	Origin only	More origin than NL	Origin and NL	More NL than origin	NL only
More Amsterdam than NL	55	61	47	32	60
Amsterdam and NL	13	23	43	59	27
More NL than Amsterdam	0	6	6	9	7
No Amsterdam, no NL	33	10	5	0	7
Total	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Van der Welle 2011, 244.

Conclusions

In conclusion, we may establish that in the Netherlands, even in Amsterdam itself, where the native Dutch population has been secularised to a very high level and still is secularising, the religious identity of Dutch Muslims has not declined in recent years, although religious adherence and practice were somewhat less significant in Amsterdam than in the Netherlands as a whole. Not all immigrants from Muslim countries consider themselves Muslim, but the religious adherence and practice of the two largest groups of immigrants, those of Turkish and Moroccan origin, has remained at a very high level or even increased somewhat recently. That is an unexpected outcome, in particular for the second generation, which was born and raised in the Netherlands. This religious stability of Muslim immigrants is not a specifically Dutch phenomenon. Comparing the religious identities of

second generation immigrants of Turkish origin in seven European cities, Phalet, Fleischmann & Stojčić (2012, 352) concluded that “religious stability is clearly the main comparative finding.”

Traditional theories on religious change, such as the classical secularisation paradigm or market theories cannot explain this development. These theories were formulated in order to explain developments in Christianity and are not applicable to Islam without due consideration. The existential security theory of Norris & Inglehart (2004) is a different case. Perhaps there is some relevance in it. One could, for instance, hypothesise that the recent economic crisis perhaps positively influenced the religiosity of Muslim immigrants who, in general, are in a relatively vulnerable economic position.

Looking at migration and integration theories, I identified three kinds of theoretical approaches: assimilation, religious vitality and reactive religiosity. Since assimilation would have caused secularisation, only the other two approaches could explain what is happening. Religious vitality by religious socialisation within immigrant families and communities certainly has played an important part. The social networks of immigrants of Turkish and Moroccan origin are dominated by members of their own ethnic and religious groups (Van der Welle 2011, 141; Maliepaard 2012). Comparing second generation immigrants of Turkish origin in four European capitals, Fleischmann & Phalet (2012, 333) reached the same conclusion: “religious socialisation has a strong impact on second-generation religiosity in all cities.”

The possibility of a kind of reactive religiosity is harder to establish, but cannot be excluded. Two thirds of Turks and 80% of Moroccans agree that the Dutch are too negative in their attitudes with respect to Islam. Although there was no correlation between experienced discrimination and religiosity at the individual level, it is possible that a growing public hostility against Islam has supported a kind of reactive religiosity (De Hart 2012, 169–170). The reactions to the events of 9/11, 2001 in the United States and other terrorist attacks by Muslims, the murder of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh by a Muslim fanatic, and the recent political success of Geert Wilders and his Freedom Party (PVV) characterised by an explicit anti-Islamic programme has increased the perception of Dutch hostility to a significant extent (Maliepaard 2012; Van der Valk 2012).

In general, a positive correlation exists between religious identification (with Islam) and ethno-national identification (with the country of origin). This could hinder integration with Dutch society. However, what exactly do we mean by Dutch society? Most Muslims in Amsterdam feel at home in its multi-cultural and cosmopolitan urban landscape and have a strong local identity, which is not correlated with their religious identity. Identification with local society functions as a “bridging identity” between their ethnic and religious roots on the one hand and Dutch society on the other (Van der Welle 2011). And this local urban society is becoming

what has been called a “majority-minority” city, which means that no ethnic group, including the native Dutch, has the majority of the population (Crul, Schneider, Lelie 2013). In 2012 only 49.5% of the Amsterdam population was native Dutch. Its other residents came from 178 different countries. The American anthropologist Steven Vertovic (2007) has described this enormous diversity as “super-diversity.” According to Crul, Schneider & Lelie (2013, 14), super-diversity should have consequences for the way we think about integration: “In a society where one group forms a clear majority, minorities are expected to adapt to the opinions and customs of the dominant group. If there is no longer an ethnic majority group, everyone will have to adapt to everyone else. Diversity will become the new norm. This will require one of the largest psychological shifts of our time.”

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