

## THE CYPRIOT KINGS UNDER ASSYRIAN AND PERSIAN RULE (EIGHTH TO FOURTH CENTURY BC): CENTRE AND PERIPHERY IN A RELATIONSHIP OF SUZERAINTY<sup>1</sup>

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For Andreas Mehl, with deep gratitude

**Abstract:** At the end of the eighth century, Cyprus came under Assyrian control. For the following four centuries, the Cypriot monarchs were confronted with the power of the Near Eastern empires. This essay focuses on the relations between the Cypriot kings and the Near Eastern Great Kings from the eighth to the fourth century BC. To understand these relations, two theoretical concepts are applied: the centre-periphery model and the concept of suzerainty. From the central perspective of the Assyrian and Persian empires, Cyprus was situated on the western periphery. Therefore, the local governing traditions were respected by the Assyrian and Persian masters, as long as the petty kings fulfilled their duties by paying tributes and providing military support when requested to do so. The personal relationship between the Cypriot kings and their masters can best be described as one of suzerainty, where the rulers submitted to a superior ruler, but still retained some autonomy. This relationship was far from being stable, which could lead to manifold misunderstandings between centre and periphery. In this essay, the ways in which suzerainty worked are discussed using several examples of the relations between Cypriot kings and their masters.

**Key words:** Assyria, Persia, Cyprus, Cypriot kings.

At the end of the fourth century BC, all the Cypriot kingdoms vanished during the wars of Alexander's successors Ptolemy and Antigonos, who struggled for control of the island. Pumayyaton, king of Kition, was executed, and Praxippus of Lapithus and Stasioecus of Marion were arrested by Ptolemy. On Ptolemy's orders, the city of Marion on the northern coast of the island was completely wiped out and the population resettled

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at Paphos.<sup>2</sup> The royal family of Paphos came to a dramatic end: Ptolemy ordered Nicocles of Paphos to commit suicide because he had secretly negotiated with Antigonos; when Nicocles was dead, his wife Axiothea killed herself and their daughters. The king's brothers and their wives followed them to their deaths, burning down the palace.<sup>3</sup> By 306 BC, all Cypriot kingdoms had ceased to exist.

Before the successors' wars, Cyprus had been divided into small kingdoms for several centuries, their number varying between seven and twelve. Since the island lies in the Eastern Mediterranean near the Levantine coast, its kingdoms came under Assyrian domination in the eighth and seventh century, it was most likely under Egyptian influence in the sixth century, and formed part of the Persian empire from about 525 to 332 BC.<sup>4</sup> Although Cyprus was dominated by foreign powers for at least four centuries, the Cypriot petty kings managed not only to retain their monarchic status but, in the case of Evagoras I of Salamis (ca. 435–374/373 BC), even to practise a dynamic foreign policy. It was only in the years following Alexander's death that the existence of the kingdoms was threatened, until Ptolemy abolished them and integrated the whole island into his empire.

How did the Cypriot kings manage to survive and maintain their status under ever-changing masters? How can we define their relationship with the supreme monarchs? What status and scope of action could they retain under foreign rule? Which effect did this situation have on the relations between the kingdoms on the island, and how did they, in turn, affect it? Why was Ptolemy not willing to accept their existence any longer?

I will approach these questions from two angles. First, I will show that the relations between the Cypriot petty kings and their Near Eastern masters can best be explained by the concept of suzerainty. This concept describes an unequal relationship between a superior monarch and a subordinate king. In such a relationship, the scope of autonomy left to the subordinate depended on his superior's possibilities of exerting his power and was therefore variable. The vague nature of this relationship of suzerainty could therefore lead to misunderstandings between superior and subordinate. Second, I will apply the model of centre and periphery to the Assyrian and Persian empires in order to assess the position of the Cypriot petty kings in these empires. Rule in the Near Eastern empires varied according to the distance of the subjects from the centre. In the peripheral regions, far away from the centre of the empires, the Great Kings often resorted to forms of local government in which the rulers retained their royal status and a certain autonomy, which was, however, far from clearly defined. The centre-periphery model also allows us to

<sup>2</sup> Diod. 19.79.4.


<sup>3</sup> Diod. 20.21.1–3. Some scholars connect the story of the collective suicide with Nicocreon of Salamis instead of Nicocles of Paphos, because in the summary of Diodorus' twentieth book, the text reads Nicocreon. Karageorghis even interprets a tumulus (no. 77) he has found near Salamis as a cenotaph for the royal family: Karageorghis 1969, 151–164, esp. 163–164; 1973, 128–202, esp. 201–202. However, the remark in Diodorus' summary is obviously wrong, since it speaks of "NicoCreon of Paphos," thereby connecting the wrong royal name with the city of Paphos. The text in Chapter 21 mentions Nicocles of Paphos throughout, which must be correct. Polyaeus (8.48) also reports the story, connecting it with Nicocles, but without indication of the kingdom. The question has been covered thoroughly and conclusively by Gesche 1974, 103–113.

<sup>4</sup> Already Strabon (14.6.1f., C681f.) emphasises the geographical situation of the island near Egypt, Phoenicia and Syria.

understand the final abolishment of the Cypriot kingdoms as a result of the changing conditions after Alexander's death.<sup>5</sup>

After a short outline of Cyprus' political landscape and the ethnic structures in Archaic and Classical times, I will focus on three major events in the eighth to the fourth century BC: the submission to Assyria in the late eighth century, the Cypriot revolt of 498 BC and the Cypriot War in the early fourth century. All three events are well attested in the sources (at least compared to other periods of the island's history) and throw light on the relations between the Cypriot kings and their masters from different perspectives. In the outlook at the end, I will explain the changing position of the island in the international political constellation that finally led to the abolishment of the kingdoms under Ptolemy.

## 1. Cyprus from the eighth to the fourth century: the political landscape and the ethnic structures on the island



Map of Cyprus, drafted by Athos Agapiou; used by permission of the Palaepaphos Urban Landscape Project

<sup>5</sup> Both concepts are further developed in my habilitation on the Cypriot Kingdoms from the eighth to the fourth century BC: Körner 2016b (forthcoming).

The political landscape of Cyprus in the period between the eighth and the fourth century is marked by the coexistence of several kingdoms. This political fragmentation may be a result of the island's geography: due to the many mountains and hills, communication in the early Iron Age was much easier by sea than by land. The western part of the island is dominated by the Troodos Mountains, with their rich copper deposits. In the northeast lies the Kyrenia mountain range. The Mesaoria plain stretches south of the Kyrenia range and opens to the bay of Famagusta on the east coast. Further to the south, the Mesaoria plain is followed by a landscape of lower mountains and hills. Therefore, the kingdoms in the eastern part of the island, like Salamis and Kition, were able to encompass larger territories.<sup>6</sup>

Cyprus was rich in natural resources. Of the greatest importance were the copper deposits in the Troodos Mountains and its foothills, necessary for the production of bronze. The mountains were also covered by large forests, whose wood was used as timber for ships. For the kingdoms, access to the copper mines as well as to the sea harbours was of central importance for their economic development.<sup>7</sup> The fact that the copper deposits were not concentrated at one or two points but lay dispersed around the Troodos Mountains further contributed to the existence of several kingdoms.<sup>8</sup>

Between the eighth and the fourth century BC, the number of kingdoms decreased as a result of the inner conflicts on the island, which led to the disappearance of several monarchies. The inland kingdoms Idalion and Tamassus, for instance, were annexed by Kition during the fifth century because of their wealth in copper.<sup>9</sup> The political entities which I will deal with in this essay were Salamis in the east, Kition (today Larnaca), Amathous and Kourion on the southern coast, Paphos (today Kouklia), the location of the most important sanctuary of Aphrodite in the southwest of the island, and Marion (today Polis), Soli and Lapithus on the northern coast.

In Archaic and Classical times, there were several linguistic groups.<sup>10</sup> The majority of the island's inhabitants spoke Greek. Greek presence is attested in Cyprus since the eleventh century BC.<sup>11</sup> The Greek-speaking population wrote in a local syllabary which they had adapted from the local Bronze Age Cypro-Minoan (CM) script.<sup>12</sup> The Greek al-

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<sup>6</sup> Geography of the island: Karageorghis 1982b, 12–14; Bekker-Nielsen 2004, 46–49. Infrastructure and communication: Bekker-Nielsen 2004, 48–49, 101–104; Rabe 2010, 43.

<sup>7</sup> Bekker-Nielsen 2004, 58–60; Matthäus 2000, 91–92; Hadjisavvas 2003, 99; Constantinou 2010, 23–26; Mehl 2011, 209; Iacovou 2012, 58–59; Kassianidou 2012a, 76; 2012b, 232–234.

<sup>8</sup> Iacovou (2013b, 31–32) shows that the “three ‘special ingredients’” (32) of the ideal Cypriot political entity were access to a copper mine, a harbour for the export trade, especially of the copper, and enough fertile soil for the people of the kingdom.

<sup>9</sup> Iacovou 2002, 75–80.

<sup>10</sup> The question remains whether these three linguistic groups can be understood as ethnic groups – Iacovou (2013a, 134) warns of the “trap of assuming *a priori* that these three linguistic terms – Greek, Phoenician and Eteocypriot – represent ethnic identities: they do not. The three languages did not match three different cultures.” The question is covered more extensively in my habilitation (Körner 2016b).

<sup>11</sup> The oldest written testimony is the so-called Opheltas-spit (no. 16) from tomb 49 in Paphos, dating to the Cypro-Geometric (CG) period I 1050–950 BC. The inscription ICS 18g (= Egetmeyer 2010, 879) has the name Opheltas in the Genitive in Cypriot syllabary (*o-pe-le-ta-u*): cf. Collombier 1991, 426–427; Baurain 1991, 407–409; Palaima 1991, 451–454; Masson 1994, 33–36; Duhoux 2012, 71–73 with note 3.

<sup>12</sup> Baurain 1991, 421–422; Iacovou 2001, 90–91; 2008, 233–234; 2013a, 136; Powell 2002, 240.

phabet made its appearance later, and came to be the dominant script only in Hellenistic times.<sup>13</sup>

Some inscriptions in the Cypriot syllabary still cannot be translated. They seem to have been written in an unknown language (or several languages). They therefore attest the existence of another linguistic group. Since their members also made use of the local syllabary derived from the Bronze Age Cypro-Minoan script, they are usually identified as an autochthonous population, called Eteocypriots (a modern term not attested in antiquity).<sup>14</sup> Their inscriptions were found mainly in Amathous, which was autochthonous, according to Pseudo-Skylax.<sup>15</sup> The third group, which had settled on the island since the ninth century, were the Phoenicians.<sup>16</sup> Kition was ruled by a Phoenician dynasty, which lasted from the fifth century at the latest to the end of the city kingdoms.<sup>17</sup>

These three groups did not live independently of each other. Phoenician inscriptions are found all over the island, and Eteocypriot texts are not confined to Amathus.<sup>18</sup> Some inscriptions are bilingual, written in Phoenician and Greek, which testifies to the fact that in some places the groups lived together and interacted with each other.<sup>19</sup> There are no indications of “ethnic tensions” between the groups. As we shall see, the inner conflicts on the island resulted rather from power politics and the expansion of some of its kingdoms, especially Salamis and Kition.

## **2. The Cypriot kings under Assyrian domination (seventh-sixth century BC) and the concept of suzerainty in a centre-periphery model**

The Cypriot kingdoms are mentioned for the first time in several Assyrian inscriptions, dating from 708 to 667 BC. In inscriptions from 708 BC, the Assyrian Great King Sargon II (721–705 BC) prides himself on having subdued seven kings of Iadnana (the name for Cyprus in the Assyrian texts<sup>20</sup>). The best preserved version is found in the so-called Display-Inscription:

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<sup>13</sup> Egetmeyer 2010, 18.

<sup>14</sup> Masson, in: ICS, 85–87; Iacovou 2008, 252.

<sup>15</sup> Ps.–Skylax 103: Ἀμαθοῦς, ἀυτόχθονές εἰσιν (“Amathous: they are aborigines,” translated by G.J. Shipley). Eteocypriot inscriptions from Amathous: ICS 190; 192–196 = Egetmeyer 2010, 580–583, no. 1, 3–14.

<sup>16</sup> The oldest known Phoenician inscription found in Cyprus is usually dated to around 900 BC: Masson/Szyncer 1972, 13–20; see also Honeyman 1939, 106–108, no. 8. The existence of older written testimonies for Phoenician presence in Cyprus is uncertain: Reyes 1994, 18–21.

<sup>17</sup> Phoenician presence at Kition is well documented by at least 156 inscriptions in their language: Yon 2004, 169–204, no. 1001–1156.

<sup>18</sup> Reyes 1994, 22.

<sup>19</sup> Bilingual texts were found in the two inland cities which were annexed in the fifth century by the Phoenician dynasty of Kition, Idalion (two inscriptions: ICS 220 = Egetmeyer 2010, 636–637, no. 4; 642, no. 25) and Tamassus (two inscriptions: ICS 215–216 = Egetmeyer 2010, 812–814, no. 2). Further bilingual texts come from Kourion (one inscription: ICS 183k = Egetmeyer 2010, 673, no. 20), Marion (one coin: ICS 168 = Egetmeyer 2010, 715–716, no. 111 = Masson/Szyncer 1972, 79–81), Paphos (one coin: Egetmeyer 2010, 783, no. 250) and Salamis (one inscription: ICS, 315, no. 3 = Egetmeyer 2010, 790, no. 6 = Masson/Szyncer 1972, 125–127); see also Egetmeyer 2010, 19.

<sup>20</sup> For the name see Luckenbill 1926, 273; Fuchs 1994, 440; Mayer 1996, 463; Iacovou 2001, 91.

And seven kings of Ia', a district of Iatnana (Cyprus) whose distant abodes are situated a seven days' journey in the sea of the setting sun, and the name of whose land, since the far-off days of the moon-god's time (era), not one of the kings, my fathers who (ruled) Assyria and Babylonia, had heard, (these kings) heard from afar, in the midst of the sea, of the deeds which I was performing in Chaldea and the Hittite-land, their hearts were rent, fear fell upon them, gold, silver, furniture of maple(?) and boxwood, of the workmanship of their land they brought before me in Babylon, and they kissed my feet.<sup>21</sup>

Neither the kings nor the kingdoms are mentioned by name. The number "seven," which appears for the kings as well as for the distance from the mainland to Iadnana, seems to be symbolic and should not be taken at face value.<sup>22</sup> According to the texts, the Cypriot kings first approached Sargon and submitted to him. In Sargon's Annals, we learn more about the causes of the submission. Unfortunately, the crucial passage is mutilated:

7 kings of Ia', a district of Atnana, whose distant abodes are situated a seven days' journey in the sea of the setting sun, who since days of old to the kings ..... Together ..... Their gifts they withheld ..... their heavy gifts they brought and came to make submission ..... my (trustworthy) official, who is fearless in battle, with my royal host, I dispatched to have vengeance on(?) him (or avenge him?) ..... the might of the hosts of Assur's troops, they heard (var., saw) and, at the mention of my name, ..... gold, silver, utensils of maple and boxwood, of the workmanship of their land, they brought to Babylon, into my presence, and [as Assyrians(?)] I counted them.<sup>23</sup>

Apparently, the seven kings had refused to pay tribute and had to be subdued again. Andreas Fuchs proposes an emendation of the text in lines 394f. and 397f., according to which the Cypriot kings would have stopped paying their tribute to the king of another land. This other king would have subsequently called Sargon for help. After the success of the Assyrian general, the Cypriot kings would have resumed their tribute.<sup>24</sup> Unfortunately, it does not become clear whether this king was also a Cypriot petty king or if he came from another region. According to Na'aman, the superior king could have been Shilta of Tyre.<sup>25</sup> If this is the case, then this particular Phoenician king could have acted as an intermediate authority between the Assyrian Great King and the Cypriot monarchs.

<sup>21</sup> *Display Inscription*, ll. 145–149, translated by Luckenbill 1926, 36, §70; see also Fuchs 1994, 232–233 with German translation p. 352. The same account is found in several other inscriptions of Sargon: see Luckenbill 1926, 40–41, §80; 45–46, §92; 51, §99; 102–103, §187.

<sup>22</sup> Gjerstad 1948, 449–450; Reyes 1994, 23; Radner 2010, 438.

<sup>23</sup> *Annals*, ll. 393–398; translated by Luckenbill 1926, 22, §44.

<sup>24</sup> Fuchs 1994, 175–177 with translation on p. 337. He reads the end of the passage as "und ich rechnete sie zu XXX," XXX being the "Name eines Landstriches oder Volks auf Zypern, dessen Fürst [...] um die Wafenhilfe der Assyrer ersucht und auch bekommt [sic]. Die sieben Könige von Jā', wohl Aufständische, gegen die sich die Aktion richtet, ergeben sich noch vor dem Kampf und werden diesem Land oder Volk wieder unterstellt" (Fuchs 1994, 177, note 387).

<sup>25</sup> Na'aman 1998, 243–244; Na'aman (2001, 359–360) translates the passage: "Shilṭa [of] Tyre [pays] tax? ... to] Assyr[ia. (And seven kin]gs of the [land] of Ia', a district [of the land of Adnana], who are situated a journey of seven days away in the middle of the sea of the setting sun [and their locations are dista]nt, who since old days, to his? [...] together s[topped the[ir presents (and)] withhold [their tributes. And Shilṭa bro]ught his heavy tribute, and to suppress the ho[st] of ...] he ap[plied to me for military aid]. I sent my officer, who is fearless in battle, with my royal guard, to avenge him, [and ... they cros]sed'. (When) they saw the strong troops of Ashur, at the mention of my name they became afraid and their arms collapsed. They brought to Babylon, into my presence, gold, silver, ut[ensils of ebony and boxwood, the manufacture] of their land, and [to ...] I entrusted [them]."

According to Sargon's inscriptions, the Cypriot kings submitted to the Assyrian king. Their duty consisted of paying tributes of precious material. Withholding these tributes was regarded as a hostile act vis-à-vis the Great King and was punished – or at least the subordinates were threatened with punishment.

Under Sargon's successor Sennacherib, Lulî, king of Tyre, came into conflict with the Assyrian Great King in 701 BC and therefore had to flee to Cyprus, where he died.<sup>26</sup> He must have felt safe in Cyprus. Perhaps, he settled in a kingdom which had not submitted to Sargon. (It is not clear whether the "seven" kings controlled the whole island.) Another explanation would be that the subordination of Cyprus had ended with Sargon's death. This would imply that the relationships between the petty kings and their superior monarch had to be renewed upon the death of one of the partners. An inscription by Sennacherib's successor Esarhaddon, which mentions another submission of the Cypriot kings, suggests that this is the case:

The kings of the midst of the sea, all of them, from Iadanana, (which is) Javan, as far as Nusisi (Knossos), submitted at my feet.<sup>27</sup>

The most explicit Assyrian inscriptions concerning Cyprus are two lists, dating to 673 and 667 BC respectively. The first one is from the reign of the Assyrian king Esarhaddon. While building his palace in Nineveh, he received help from his subjects. The inscription lists twenty-two kings, among them ten kings from Iadnana:

Ekishtura, king of Edi'al, Pilâgura, king of Kitrusi, Kîsu, king of Sillûa, Itûandar, king of Pappa, Erêsu, king of Sillu, Damasu, king of Kurî, Atmesu, king of Tamesu, Damûsi, king of Karti-hadasti, Unasagusu, king of Lidir, Bususu, king of Nurê.<sup>28</sup>

The same ten names, with minor orthographical variations, appear again in a list of Assurbanipal's, mentioning the military aid his subjects provided when attacking Egypt in 667 BC:

Ekishtura, king of Edi'li, Pilâgurâ, king of Kitrusi, Kîsu, king of Silûa, Ituandar, king of Pappa, Erîsu, king of Sillu, Damasu, king of Kurî, Admesu, king of Tamesu, Damûsu, king of Karti-hadasti, Unasagusu, king of Lidir, Bususu, king of Nurê.<sup>29</sup>

The ten kings and their kingdoms are identical in both lists.<sup>30</sup> Most of the names can be identified: Idalion (Edi'al/Edi'li), Chytroi (Kitrusi), Paphos (Pappa), Kourion (Kurî), Tamassos (Tamesu), Ledra (Lidir). Silûa/Sillûa and Sillu must be Salamis and Soloi,

<sup>26</sup> *Bull inscription from Nineveh F1*: "In my third campaign I went against the Hittite land, Lulî, king of Sidon – my terrifying splendour overcame him, and from Tyre he fled to Cyprus in the midst of the sea, and died." (Luckenbill 1924, 68–69, §18); *Bull inscription F2*: "And Lulî, king of Sidon, was afraid to fight me (lit.: feared my battle) and fled to Cyprus, which is in the midst of the sea, and there sought a refuge. In that land, in terror of the weapons of Assur, my lord, he died." (Luckenbill 1924, 77, §17–19). Lulî is often identified with Eloulaïos of Tyre, mentioned by Flavius Josephus (*Ant. Jud.* 9.14.2 [283–287]) who cites Menandros of Ephesus as his source. See also Mayer 1996, 476–477; Frahm 1997, 10–11, 66.

<sup>27</sup> *Assur-Babel E*, ll. 10–11: Borger 1956, 86, §57; translated by Luckenbill 1926, 274, §710; Nusisi could also be a mistake for Tarsisi (Tarshish).

<sup>28</sup> *Ninive A*, V 63–72: Borger 1956, 60; translated by Luckenbill 1926, 266, §690.

<sup>29</sup> *Cylinder C*, Col. I, ll. 36–45; Streck 1916, 2: 141; translated by Luckenbill 1926, 341, §876.

<sup>30</sup> Nevertheless, Assurbanipal's list cannot be a simple copy of Esarhaddon's, since there are differences not only in the orthography, but also in the names of the other twelve kings, not from Iadnana: Elayi 1983, 47; Reyes 1994, 59–60.

although it is not clear which is which. The only names which cannot be identified are Karti-hadasti (Phoenician for “new town”) and Nurê.<sup>31</sup>

Of course, the Assyrian inscriptions concerning Cyprus and its kingdoms represent the viewpoint of the Great King and serve his self-representation. They nevertheless contain valuable insights into the relationship between the superior monarch and his subordinate kings and illustrate five important points. First, the Cypriot kings had to pay tribute to the Assyrian Great King (perhaps also to an intermediate authority, as Sargon’s Annals suggest). Second, they had to deliver building material for the construction of palaces. Third, they were obliged to send military aid. Fourth, this relationship probably had to be renewed when one of the partners died. On the other hand, they retained a certain autonomy. Therefore, a Phoenician king pursued by the Assyrian Great king could find refuge in Cyprus.

Taken together, the information from the Assyrian sources sheds light on the relationship between the Cypriot monarchs and the Great King. For a better understanding of this relationship, the diverse forms of rule applied by the Assyrian kings have to be taken into consideration. Assyrian rule could take on various degrees of intensity, from direct subjugation to looser forms of dependency. The farther away from the centre of the empire, the more difficult it became for the Great King to control the subjugated regions.<sup>32</sup> From the perspective of the Assyrian monarch, Iadnana-Cyprus was situated on the periphery. Assyrian domination therefore had to rely on local rulers, especially since Cyprus, being an island, was not within reach of the land-based Assyrian army.

The Cypriot monarchs therefore retained their position and still had wide-ranging autonomy, especially regarding domestic affairs but also foreign policy, as long as it did not interfere with the interests of the Assyrian empire. They only had to pay tributes and provide military aid when asked to do so.<sup>33</sup> Their relationship with the Assyrian Great Kings can best be explained in terms of “suzerainty.”<sup>34</sup> This concept denotes a “binding agreement between a king or suzerain and a lesser king, the suzerain’s vassal,”<sup>35</sup> and describes a relationship between a stronger, superior ruler and a weaker subordinate. Suzerainty treaties were a common feature of Near Eastern politics at least since the Hittites.<sup>36</sup> A number of Assyrian treaties survive, although unfortunately none with

<sup>31</sup> Lipiński 1991, 58–64. Concerning Karti-hadasti and Nurê, there is a heated debate over whether they could be Kition, Amathous or Marion. The discussion is summarised in Iacovou 2008, 257–259. The question cannot be solved.

<sup>32</sup> Elayi (1978, 34) distinguishes several different forms of control in the Assyrian empire. See also Elayi 1983, 45, 57; 1986, 131; Cançik-Kirschbaum 2008, 60, 113; Sommer 2008, 83; Mehl 2009, 61.

<sup>33</sup> There are no traces of Assyrian garrisons or a governor on the island: Reyes 1994, 52–53; Iacovou 2008, 259; Radner 2010, 435, 438. Lipiński’s (1991, 63) assumption of an “Assyrian king’s representative” in Kition cannot be confirmed by the evidence.

<sup>34</sup> The term was first proposed by Mehl (2009, 202). The model of “suzerainty” for the relationship between the Cypriot rulers and their superior monarchs is further developed in my habilitation: Körner 2016b.

<sup>35</sup> Coogan 2012, 435; see also Mendenhall 1954, 52. Coogan (2012, 101) distinguishes two forms of treaties, “a parity treaty, in which the two parties are equals, and a suzerainty treaty, in which one party, the suzerain, is superior to the other, the vassal, to use medieval terms.” The Assyrian term for the suzerainty treaties is *adē*: Wiseman 1958, 3.

<sup>36</sup> Korošec 1931, 36, 66; Beckman 1996, 1–2, 6–8, listing 33 Hittite suzerainty treaties.



a Cypriot monarch.<sup>37</sup> The suzerainty treaties expired with the death of one partner, and had to be renewed.<sup>38</sup> This may explain why Lulî was safe in Cyprus in the first years of Sennacherib.

This relationship of suzerainty had advantages for both sides. The Cypriot kings could come to terms with the Assyrian empire, which had been growing stronger in the decades before and expanding its power as far as the Levantine coast. It is important to note that, according to Sargon, the seven monarchs of Iadnana first appealed to the Assyrian king. The Levantine coast was of crucial economic importance to the Cypriot kingdoms and, consequently, the monarchs had to come to terms with the Assyrian empire, once it expanded to the coast. The relationship of suzerainty therefore allowed the Cypriot monarchs to retain their autonomy while keeping access to the Levantine coast and its ports. Commerce and tribute went hand in hand.<sup>39</sup> On the other hand, the Assyrian kings had direct access to the island's copper as well as to timber from the Troodos Mountains. However, this relationship of suzerainty between a superior monarch and subordinate rulers was also left very open to interpretation. Except for tributes and the obligation to provide military aid, not much was fixed in the treaties. The degree of autonomy of the subordinate ruler could vary, depending on the power of the superior monarch.<sup>40</sup> A petty king could therefore try to test the limits of the relations and expand his scope of action, while on the other side, the Great King could play off his subordinates against one another in a strategy of divide and rule (*divide et impera*), thereby securing his control of the periphery. The problems and sometimes misunderstandings resulting from the unclear conditions of the suzerainty relationship manifested themselves in the Cypriot revolt of 498 BC as well as in the Cypriot War of 380 to 370 BC against Persia.

### 3. The Cypriot Revolt 498/497 BC

At the end of the sixth century BC, the Cypriot kings again had to submit to another power. The Persian Empire had experienced an unparalleled rise under Cyrus the Great. According to Herodotus, the Cypriot kings delivered ships for Cambyses in his Egyptian campaign in 525 BC, thereby fulfilling their duty of military support.<sup>41</sup> Apparently, the Cypriot rulers had submitted to Persia and accepted the new master. Typically of a relationship of "suzerainty," they were certainly able to retain their inner autonomy, which is proven by their right to mint coins in their own names.

The sources do not report how the relations between the Cypriot monarchs and Persia developed in the first decades of Persian supremacy. In the year 498 BC, a revolt broke

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<sup>37</sup> See for example Parpola/Watanabe 1988, 8–13, no. 2; 24–27, no. 5; 28–58, no. 6 (the famous loyalty treaty of Esarhaddon) = Coogan 2013, 104–105, no. 49; 105–106, no. 50; 106–108, no. 51 (abridged).

<sup>38</sup> Cançik-Kirschbaum 2008, 60.

<sup>39</sup> Radner 2004, 155–157; she considers the tributes as "Eintrittsgebühr in den assyrischen Markt" (p. 157); see also Iacovou 2008, 250; Radner 2010, 438–440.

<sup>40</sup> Parpola/Watanabe, 1988, xvi: "Situations arose in which the Assyrian ruler too was forced (or saw it as advantageous) to make concessions in order to obtain an agreement he desired. The extent of the concessions he was ready to make was of course directly related to the bargaining power of the other contracting party."

<sup>41</sup> Hdt. 3.19.3. See Watkin 1987, 160; Wiesehöfer 1990, 243.

out on the island, coinciding with the uprising of the Ionian poleis against Darius. The relations had obviously deteriorated. But what were the exact reasons for the uprising? And how can the concept of suzerainty contribute to a better understanding of the causes of the revolt?

The Swedish archaeologist Einar Gjerstad sees the causes of the revolt in an atmosphere of growing discontent on the island, resulting from reforms in the administration of the Persian Empire, initiated by Darius.<sup>42</sup> According to Herodotus, Cyprus was in the fifth satrapy, together with Phoenicia and Palestine. The whole satrapy had to pay a tribute of 350 talents.<sup>43</sup> Gjerstad suggests that with the reform, Cyprus came under strict financial control, and as a result the kings lost some of their autonomy. Also, the revolt was seen as a result of ethnic (sometimes referred to as “national”) tensions and conflicts between the Greeks on the one side and the Persians on the other side, the Phoenicians being some sort of accomplices of the Persians on the island.<sup>44</sup>

This interpretation of the Cypriot revolt is highly problematic. Not only is the term “national” anachronistic when applied to antiquity.<sup>45</sup> It is also a perspective that lacks confirmation in the sources dealing with the revolt, especially the main source, Herodotus. Also, there are no indications that the Greeks and Phoenicians on the island were living in a general state of disharmony.<sup>46</sup>

For the causes of the revolt, we must turn to Herodotus’ account of the Cypriot revolt<sup>47</sup>: in Salamis, Gorgos reigns as king. His brother Onesilos tries to persuade him to join the Ionian revolt, but Gorgos remains loyal to the Persian Great King. Consequently, his brother seizes power in Salamis and subsequently expels Gorgos. The dethroned Salaminian king then turns to Darius for help. While Darius assembles an army to invade Cyprus, Onesilos seeks help from the other kings of the island. He manages to persuade them to join the revolt with the exception of Amathus. Onesilos also calls on the Ionians for help, and they send ships. Their combined forces clash with the Persian army under Artybios at Salamis, where a great battle takes place; the Cypriots fighting on the land, the Ionians at sea. During the battle, Stasanor, king of Kourion, decides to change sides and joins the Persians. The Salaminian war-chariots follow him. The remainder of the

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<sup>42</sup> Gjerstad 1948, 475; Karageorghis 1982a, 69–70. Hdt. 3.89–95; see 3.89.1: Ποιήσας δὲ ταῦτα ἐν Πέρσῃσι ἀρχὰς κατεστήσατο εἴκοσι, τὰς αὐτοὶ καλέουσι σατραπείας· καταστήσας δὲ τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ ἄρχοντας ἐπιστήσας ἐτάξατο φόρους οἱ προσίεναι κατὰ ἔθνεά τε καὶ πρὸς τοῖσι ἔθνεσι τοὺς πλησιοχώρους προστάσσων, καὶ ὑπερβαίνων τοὺς προσεχέας τὰ ἑκαστέρῳ ἄλλοισι ἄλλα ἔθνεα νέμων “Having done these things in Persia, he (Darius) divided his dominions into twenty provinces, which they call satrapies; and having divided his dominions and appointed governors, he instructed each people to pay him tribute, consolidating neighboring peoples and distributing outlying peoples among different provinces, passing over those adjoining.” (translated by A.D. Godley). There has been intense debate concerning this reform and the question of its authenticity; see Cook 1983, 77–82; Calmeyer 1990, 109–117; Jacobs 1994, 93–96; Briant 1996, 956–957; Debord 1999, 72–82; Zournatzi 2005, 47–48.

<sup>43</sup> Hdt. 3.91.1.

<sup>44</sup> Hill 1940, 117; Gjerstad 1948, 475; Karageorghis 1982a, 60: “national antagonisms”; 1982b, 152, 155; 2002, 214; Stylianou, 1992, 421–425; Tuplin 1996, 76–79.

<sup>45</sup> See Hobsbawm 1992, 9–12, 14–15; Wehler 2004, 7, 16–26.

<sup>46</sup> See for example Seibert 1976, 3–5; Boardman 2001, 12.

<sup>47</sup> Hdt. 5.104–116.

Cypriot forces are defeated. While the Ionians sail back home, the Persians reconquer the island, besieging some of the cities, such as Soli.<sup>48</sup>

Compared to the Assyrian inscriptions of the seventh and sixth centuries, Herodotus' account is a different kind of source. While the inscriptions represent contemporary statements of the Assyrian kings directly involved in the relationships with their subject kings, Herodotus' work is an account and analysis of the Persian wars and their causes, seen from a Greek perspective and published several decades after the events. The Cypriot episode had to serve a literary purpose in Herodotus' work. Therefore, it is important to see its context in the whole of the work: before relating the Cypriot events, Herodotus describes the conflicts in Ionia. He closes his account of the Cypriot revolt with the remark that, after a year of freedom, the Cypriots were enslaved again.<sup>49</sup> In the chapters that follow, Herodotus treats the suppression of the Ionian revolt. In his account, therefore, the Cypriot events foreshadow the defeat of the Ionians.

Despite the literary function of the Cypriot episode in Herodotus' work, he provides some information regarding the relations of the Cypriot rulers to the Persian Great King and to each other. The starting point of the revolt was an inner conflict in the ruling house of Salamis. Herodotus does not mention "ethnic" tensions; he does not even seem to be aware of the existence of several linguistic or ethnic groups on the island.<sup>50</sup> If his claim that all kingdoms except Amathus joined in the revolt is correct, then the Phoenician Kition also fought on Salamis' side against the Persians.<sup>51</sup>

In Herodotus' account, the Cypriot kings act according to their own interests. Onesilos wants to seize power and is able to do so by expelling his brother; Gorgos seeks help from Darius; the king of Amathus stays loyal to the Persian side; Stesenor of Kourion reckons his chances for success higher under Persian domination and therefore changes sides, followed by the chariot warriors of Salamis. The Cypriot kings are easily divided, even within the same ruling house.

All aspects of Herodotus' account suggest that the conflict is best seen in the light of the concept of "suzerainty": Being under Persian supremacy, the Cypriot kings were still rulers of their own kingdoms, and followed their own interests on the island, undisturbed by the Great King as long as his power was not questioned. The enmities between the Cypriot kings gave the Persian king the opportunity to intervene, and formed part of his *divide-et-impera* concept. This is what happened once Onesilos seized the throne: when he deprived Gorgos of his power, the latter looked to his superior monarch for help. Once the Persian Great King threatened an invasion, Onesilos had to seek allies. It was only at this point that the Ionians came into play. Therefore, we should rather speak of a genuine Cypriot uprising than of the effects of the Ionian revolt on Cyprus.

<sup>48</sup> Hdt. 5.115. A siege ramp, dating from the early fifth century, has been excavated at Paphos: Maier/Karageorghis 1984, 192–203; Maier 2008, 63–97.

<sup>49</sup> Hdt. 5.116: "Κύπριοι μὲν δὴ ἐνιαυτὸν ἐλευθεροὶ γινόμενοι αὐτὶς ἐκ νέης κατεδεδούλωντο": "So the Cypriots, after winning freedom for a year, were enslaved once more" (translated by A. D. Godley).

<sup>50</sup> Herodotus mentions that Phoenicians were part of the Persian fleet during the Cypriot revolt (5.108.2; 109.1–2; 112.1); nevertheless, he never speaks of a conflict between Greeks and Phoenicians, nor says that the Phoenicians in the Persian fleet came from the island.

<sup>51</sup> Maier 1985, 39; Wiesehöfer 1990, 244. Of course, the Phoenician dynasty may have come to power in Kition only after the revolt: Iacovou 2008, 263. Nevertheless, Kition was a Phoenician city from Archaic times, as shown by the overwhelming amount of Phoenician inscriptions: Yon 2004, 169–204.

The Cypriot revolt therefore resulted from inner conflicts in the ruling house of Salamis. Nowhere do the sources indicate conflicts between the linguistic groups living on the island as causing the uprising. That Onesilos found allies on the island so easily suggests that there was indeed widespread discontent with Persian supremacy, perhaps resulting from the obligation to pay tribute. Nevertheless, the conflicts that soon broke out again between the Cypriot kings indicate that there was no “national” resentment against the Persians. Rather, inner conflicts between the Cypriot monarchs were a constant of Cyprus’s history and resulted from the island’s political fragmentation. Of course, these inner-Cypriot conflicts influenced relations with the superior monarch, who must have welcomed them since they helped him control the petty kings. The Persian king only intervened in the periphery when absolutely necessary.<sup>52</sup> This was obviously the case in 498 BC, when Gorgos came to seek his help. With the Ionian uprising on the western periphery of Persian power, Darius could not tolerate the existence of another trouble spot, also given the fundamental strategic importance of Cyprus to Persian rule in the Eastern Mediterranean.

After the suppression of the revolt, the Persian king does not seem to have changed anything in his relations with the petty kings.<sup>53</sup> Gorgos was of course reinstated as king. Under Darius’ successor Xerxes, several Cypriot kings supplied and commanded ships for his fleet, thereby fulfilling their duties of military support.<sup>54</sup> Suzerainty was once again restored.

#### 4. The Cypriot War: Evagoras I of Salamis and the Persians (fourth century BC)

In the early fourth century BC, the Cypriot War broke out between Evagoras I of Salamis (ca. 435–374/373 BC) and the Persian Great King Artaxerxes II. Lasting about ten years (ca. 391–380 BC), it constitutes the greatest conflict to have ever occurred between a Cypriot petty king and his superior monarch. Obviously, something in the relationship of suzerainty between Evagoras and Artaxerxes had gone terribly wrong.

Fortunately, several sources dealing with Evagoras have survived. He is praised as an ideal monarch in Isocrates’ posthumous speech *Evagoras* (no. 9). His war against Artaxerxes II is mentioned in the contemporary works by Theopompus of Chios and Ephorus of Kyme. Both works survive only in fragments, but Diodorus’ account of the Cypriot War draws mainly on Ephorus.<sup>55</sup> Therefore, we are able to reconstruct the relations be-

<sup>52</sup> Petit 1991, 163–164.

<sup>53</sup> Some scholars assume that the Persians installed new dynasties in Kition, Marion and Lapithos as loyal followers of the Persian Empire. But the evidence is far from clear (see Maier 1985, 34–36; Zournatzi 2005, 38–39; Seibert 1976, 20–23), and even if there were new dynasties, nothing suggests that the Persians favoured the Phoenicians. Even more problematic is the attempt to correlate archaeological evidence like the palace of Vouni with the political events (esp. Gjerstad 1948, 453–454); see the critical arguments of Maier 1985, 36–37; Reyes 1994, 92–94; Wiesehöfer 1990, 244–245; Zournatzi 2005, 40–41.

<sup>54</sup> Hdt. 7.90; 98; 195; Diod. 11.3.7.

<sup>55</sup> Reid 1974, 134; Stylianou 1998, 147.

tween Evagoras I and Artaxerxes II at least in parts, and this allows us to understand how a relationship of suzerainty worked under duress.

In what follows, I will focus on the relationship and the resulting conflict between Evagoras and Artaxerxes. What were the reasons for this conflict? What were the aims of the two parties?

The first point of interest is Evagoras' rise to power. Salamis had been reigned until the first half of the fifth century by a Greek dynasty, claiming descent from the Trojan hero Teucros. Then a Phoenician (whose name is not mentioned in the sources) seized power in the city, only to be dethroned later by another usurper, Abdemon of Tyre (according to Diodorus) or Abdymon/Audymon of Kition (according to Theopompus). Before 411 BC, Evagoras was able to rise to the throne of Salamis. He claimed descent from the dynasty of the Teucrids:

In Cyprus Evagoras of Salamis, who was of most noble birth, since he was descended from the founders of the city, but had previously been banished because of some factional quarrels and had later returned in company with a small group, drove out Abdemon of Tyre, who was lord of the city and a friend of the King of the Persians.<sup>56</sup>

Salamis had faced three changes of power in less than fifty years, all under Persian supremacy. Nevertheless, the Persian kings never intervened, not even when Abdemon, labelled the Great King's friend by Diodorus, was overthrown by Evagoras. Obviously, the Great King considered all three coups d'état as part of the kingdom's internal autonomy.

For the following two decades, the sources do not mention any conflict between Evagoras and the Great King.<sup>57</sup> Together with the Athenian Conon, Evagoras supported Artaxerxes II against the Spartans and supplied ships for the Persian fleet which won the battle at Cnidus 394 BC.<sup>58</sup> The only hint at problems which arose may be found in a fragment of Ctesias which survives in Photius' summary. Ctesias claims to have mediated between Evagoras, Conon and Artaxerxes, and Evagoras had to pay the tribute. Perhaps the Salaminian king had interrupted the payments. Unfortunately, Photius' synopsis is too short to provide any details on the subject.<sup>59</sup>

Open conflict only broke out when, according to Diodorus, Evagoras subjugated the whole island with the exception of Soli, Amathus and Kition:

[...] When he took control of the city, Evagoras was at first king only of Salamis, the largest and strongest of the cities of Cyprus; but when he soon acquired great resources and mobilized an army, he set out to make the whole island his own. Some of the cities he subdued by force and others he won over by persuasion. While he easily gained control of the other cities, the peoples of Amathus,

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<sup>56</sup> Diod. 14.98.1, translated by C.H. Oldfather: "Κατὰ δὲ τὴν Κύπρον Εὐαγόρας ὁ Σαλαμίνιος, ὃς ἦν μὲν εὐγενέστατος, τῶν γὰρ κτισάντων τὴν πόλιν ἦν ἀπόγονος, πεφευγὼς δ' ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν χρόνοις διὰ τινὰς στάσεις, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα κατελθὼν μετ' ὀλίγων, τὸν μὲν δυναστεύοντα τῆς πόλεως Ἀβδήμονα τὸν Τύρσιον ἐξέβαλε, φίλον ὄντα τοῦ Περσῶν βασιλέως." Cf. Theopomp, *FGrHist* 115, F 103; Isocr. 9.14; 26; 30–32. Date of Evagoras' coming to power: Spyridakis 1935, 44–45; Costa 1974, 42.

<sup>57</sup> Costa 1974, 47.

<sup>58</sup> Isocr. 9.68; Diod. 14.39.1–2.

<sup>59</sup> Ctes., *Pers.* 72–74 (= *FGrH* 688, F 30) = Phot., *Bibl.* 72, p. 44b20–42.

Soli, and Citium resisted him with arms and dispatched ambassadors to Artaxerxes the King of the Persians to get his aid.<sup>60</sup>

Thus, it was the appeal for help by Amathus, Soli and Kition (dated by Diodorus in 391 BC) which started the “Cypriot War.”<sup>61</sup> Looking back on the first twenty years of his reign, Evagoras had obviously come to the conclusion that he had fulfilled his duties as vassal and that he was on good terms with the Great King, having supplied military aid, mediated Conon as admiral and resumed paying tribute. The Salaminian king therefore felt safe enough to start expansion on the island. On the other side, the kings of Amathus, Soli and Kition made use of their relationship with the Great King by appealing for help. The outbreak of the war therefore seems to result directly from the relationship of suzerainty in which the Cypriot kings found themselves. Just as in 498 BC, the petty kings could appeal to their sovereign. The superior monarch, on the other hand, used the individual relations which he maintained with the petty kings to play them off against each other. The war resulted from a misunderstanding of the concept of “suzerainty”: Evagoras must have seen himself as a loyal vassal to the Great King, and was consequently surprised by Artaxerxes’ reaction.

Diodorus’ account provides only the main lines of the Cypriot War.<sup>62</sup> What is of interest here is the way in which the relationship between the petty king and his Persian master developed and how the war was ended.

First, Artaxerxes ordered Autophradates and Hecatomnus, satraps of Lydia and Caria respectively, to invade Cyprus with an army. But Evagoras was able to come to terms with Hecatomnus, who, in the end, secretly supported the Salaminian king financially. Also, Evagoras was able to find allies in the Athenians, King Akoris of Egypt and an unknown Arabian monarch.<sup>63</sup>

In 386 BC, Artaxerxes and the Greeks made peace, the so-called “King’s Peace” or “Peace of Antalcidas.” Athens accepted that Cyprus lay in the sphere of interest of the Persian King:

King Artaxerxes thinks it just that the cities in Asia should belong to him, as well as Clazomenae and Cyprus among the islands, and that the other Greek cities, both small and great, should be left

<sup>60</sup> Diod. 14.98.1–2, translated by C. H. Oldfather: “[...] αὐτὸς δὲ τὴν πόλιν κατασχὼν τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐβασίλευσε τῆς Σαλαμίνας, μεγίστης οὔσης καὶ δυνατωτάτης τῶν ἐν Κύπρῳ πόλεων· ταχὺ δὲ χρημάτων πολλῶν εὐπορήσας καὶ δύναμιν προχειρισάμενος ἐπεχείρησεν ἅπασαν τὴν νῆσον σφετερίσασθαι. Τῶν δὲ πόλεων ἃς μὲν βίᾳ χειρωσάμενος, ἃς δὲ πειθοῖ προσλαβόμενος, τῶν μὲν ἄλλων πόλεων ταχὺ τὴν ἡγεμονίαν παρέλαβεν, Ἀμαθούσιοι δὲ καὶ Σόλιοι καὶ Κιτιεῖς ἀντέχοντες τῷ πολέμῳ πρέσβεις ἀπέστειλαν πρὸς Ἀρταξέρξην τὸν τῶν Περσῶν βασιλεῖα περὶ βοηθείας.” The resistance of Amathus, Soli and Kition is also confirmed by a fragment of Ephorus, *FGrHist* 70, F 76: “Ἀμαθούσιοι δὲ καὶ Σόλιοι καὶ Ὠτιεῖς ἀντέχοντες ἐτι τῷ πολέμῳ” (where Ὠτιεῖς has to be emended to Κιτιεῖς; Reid 1974, 125–127, 132–133).

<sup>61</sup> The term is used by Diodorus (15.9.2): “Κυπριακὸς πόλεμος.”

<sup>62</sup> Diod. 14.98.1–4; 14.110.5; 15.2–4; 15.8–9.2; 15.10–11. Besides Diodorus’ account there is also Photius’ short summary of Theopompus: Theopompus, *FGrHist* 115, F 103 (1; 4–11). The chronology of the Cypriot War is a much-debated subject, but not of importance for our purpose here. See especially the convincing analysis of Shrimpton 1991, 1–20; further Tuplin 1996, 9–15; Stylianou 1998, 152–154.

<sup>63</sup> Diod. 14.98.3–4; 15.2.3–4. The name of the Arabian king is not mentioned; the manuscripts read βαρβάρων, which is usually emended to Ἀράβων; Stylianou 1998, 160–161.

independent, except Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros; and these should belong, as of old, to the Athenians.<sup>64</sup>

Having settled the conflict with Sparta, Persia then launched a new attack on Cyprus: Artaxerxes sent Orontes and Tiribazos, satraps of Armenia and Lydia respectively, against Evagoras. After a defeat at Kition, Evagoras was besieged in Salamis. Although he slipped through the enemy's lines and proceeded to Akoris of Egypt, he could not find much help.<sup>65</sup> Tiribazos was therefore able to dictate the terms of peace:

Tiribazos, who held the supreme command, agreed to a settlement upon the conditions that Evagoras should withdraw from all the cities of Cyprus, that as king of Salamis alone he should pay the Persian King a fixed annual tribute, and that he should obey orders as slave to master. Although these were hard terms, Evagoras agreed to them all except that he refused to obey orders as slave to master, saying that he should be subject as king to king.<sup>66</sup>

However, Evagoras was saved by the growing tensions in the Persian army command. The relationship between Tiribazos and Orontes had become strained. Either Orontes (according to Diodorus) or Orontes and Evagoras together (according to Theopompus) intrigued against Tiribazos, denouncing him so that Artaxerxes recalled him to court.<sup>67</sup>

Orontes continued to wage the war, but Evagoras, having regained power, was able to resist. The Persian army, meanwhile, was demoralised by the conflict between its leaders. Orontes eventually had to make peace:

Evagoras, then, was surprisingly able to dispel the menace of capture, and agreed to peace on the conditions that he should be king of Salamis, pay the fixed tribute annually, and obey as a king the orders of the King.<sup>68</sup>

Obviously, the first negotiations had failed because of Tiribazos' terms of *ὡς δοῦλος δεσπότη* ("as slave to master"). Evagoras was not willing to accept this humiliating condition in the peace treaty. When he finally made peace, the terms were reformulated as *ὡς βασιλεὺς βασιλεῖ* ("as king to king"). Chaumont has proposed reading the term *δοῦλος* as equivalent to the Persian *bandakā*, used for satraps and high officials. According to her, Tiribazos tried to change the status of the Salaminian king and abolish the hereditary monarchy; the ruler of Salamis was henceforth to be appointed by the Persian Great King. Once the petty king died, the Persian king would be free to give the throne

<sup>64</sup> Xen., *hell.* 5.1.31, translated by C. L. Brownson: Ἀρταξέρξης βασιλεὺς νομίζει δίκαιον τὰς μὲν ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ πόλεις ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι καὶ τῶν νήσων Κλαζομενάς καὶ Κύπρον, τὰς δὲ ἄλλας Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις καὶ μικρὰς καὶ μεγάλας αὐτονόμους ἀφεῖναι πλὴν Λήμνου καὶ Ἴμβρου καὶ Σκύρου· ταύτας δὲ ὥσπερ τὸ ἀρχαῖον εἶναι Ἀθηναίων; see also Diod. 14.110.5.

<sup>65</sup> Diod. 15.2.1–2; 15.3–4; 15.8.1.

<sup>66</sup> Diod. 15.8.2–3, translated by C.H. Oldfather: Ὁ δὲ Τιρίβαζος τῶν ὄλων ἔχων τὴν ἡγεμονίαν ἔφησε συγχωρῆσαι τὴν σύλλυσιν, ἐὰν Εὐαγόρας ἐκχωρήσῃ πασῶν τῶν κατὰ τὴν Κύπρον πόλεων, αὐτῆς δὲ μόνῃς τῆς Σαλαμίνας βασιλεύων τελεῖ τῷ Περσῶν βασιλεῖ κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν φόρον ὀρισμένον καὶ ποιῇ τὸ προσταττόμενον ὡς δοῦλος δεσπότη. Ὁ δ' Εὐαγόρας, καίπερ βαρείας οὔσης τῆς αἰρέσεως, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πάντα συνεχώρει, τὸ δ' ὡς δοῦλον δεσπότη ποιεῖν τὸ προσταττόμενον ἀντέλεγεν, ἔφη δὲ αὐτὸν ὡς βασιλεῖα βασιλεῖ δεῖν ὑποτετάχθαι.

<sup>67</sup> Diod. 15.8.3–5; Theopomp, *FGrHist* 115, F 103 (9).

<sup>68</sup> Diod. 15.9.2, translated by C.H. Oldfather: ὁ μὲν οὖν Εὐαγόρας παραδόξως ἐξωσιούτο τὴν ἄλωσιν, καὶ συνέθετο τὴν εἰρήνην, ὥστε βασιλεύειν τῆς Σαλαμίνας καὶ τὸν ὀρισμένον διδόναι φόρον κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν καὶ ὑπακούειν ὡς βασιλεὺς βασιλεῖ προσταττόντι.

to anyone of his choice.<sup>69</sup> However, the idea is far from convincing. The Persian word *bandakā* expresses a close relationship with the Great King. Therefore, it could be used not only for satraps and Persian officials, but also for petty kings. It lacks any negative connotation in the Persian understanding.<sup>70</sup> Evagoras could be *bandakā* without giving up his inherited position.

The point of conflict therefore seems to have been a question of honour. Evagoras managed to keep his position, and the relationship of suzerainty between him and Artaxerxes remained unaltered. Evagoras' relationship with Artaxerxes must already have been that of "king to king" before the Cypriot War, since by the end of the hostilities, the Salaminian monarch was not in a position to negotiate his status.<sup>71</sup> The peace treaty restored the status quo from before the war.<sup>72</sup> That is exactly the content of Diodorus' account: Evagoras' kingdom was again reduced to Salamis; he had to give up the conquests he had made and resume paying tributes, but he remained king of Salamis.

## 5. Cyprus and Persia. Relations of suzerainty between periphery and centre

The Cypriot War had lasted for ten long years, which may seem surprising given the fact that Evagoras was the monarch only of a small kingdom. In the end, he lost the war but managed to keep his position. This can be explained by the many other fronts on which the Persian Great King had to fight. The war with Sparta ended only in 386 with the King's Peace. In 385, Persia started a large but ultimately unsuccessful campaign against Egypt, and Artaxerxes was also fighting the Cadusians in Media.

The events of the Cypriot War clearly show a picture similar to the Cypriot revolt a hundred years before: the Cypriot kings were acting and reacting according to their own interests, appealing to the Persian Great King whenever they felt the necessity to do so. Their relationship with the superior monarch was a personal one, and the latter was able to decide whom of his petty kings he wanted to support when conflicts broke out between them.

Evagoras' aims were dictated by the interests of the Salaminian kingdom. He was not the promoter of Hellenism as Isocrates shows him to be, but merely a monarch trying to expand his power on the island.<sup>73</sup> Salamis, located on the east coast of the island, was far

<sup>69</sup> Chaumont 1972, 187–188; followed by Stylianos 1992, 478; 1998, 180–181.

<sup>70</sup> Widengren 1969, 13–14, 21–32; Schmitt 1985, 419; Briant 1996, 335–337; Debord 1999, 27.

<sup>71</sup> Briant (1996, 672) rightly states that the peace treaty was not a success for Evagoras: "[...] au plan politique et stratégique, Évagoras a dû reculer sur toute la ligne, puisque les clauses de sa reddition lui interdisaient à l'avenir de reprendre son offensive contre les autres rois chypriotes qui seraient désormais les meilleurs alliés du Grand Roi dans l'île; comme ceux-ci, Évagoras devrait désormais obéir en tout aux autorités achéménides, et verser tribut et contingents navals."

<sup>72</sup> Mehl 2004, 17: "So the formal position of Euagoras after his defeat against the great king's army was still that of a ruling king in a system of power exercised indirectly by the ruler of the whole empire."

<sup>73</sup> See Maier 1985, 39: "His [sc. Euagoras'] foreign policy was, first and foremost, Salaminian power politics. [...] [policies in Cyprus] were dictated by the material interests of the kingdoms rather than by ideological motives"; Wiesehöfer 1990, 249.



away from the copper mines in the Troodos Mountains. The aim of Evagoras may have been to gain direct access to these deposits.<sup>74</sup> The Persian Great King, on the other hand, could not ignore the call for help from his other subordinate monarchs. Otherwise, he would have undermined his position as supreme ruler. Also, Cyprus was of major strategic importance in the Eastern Mediterranean,<sup>75</sup> especially since Artaxerxes was trying to regain Egypt.

In Evagoras, we are able to see how the relationship of suzerainty between a superior ruler and a petty king could change according to the power of the former. Evagoras made broad use of the freedom he believed he had. Having supplied ships for the Persian navy in the conflicts with Sparta in the 390s, and having resumed paying tributes, the Salaminian king apparently had the impression that he was fulfilling his duties as vassal. If we are to believe Ctesias, Evagoras was even negotiating with Artaxerxes II himself when he mediated the services of Conon for the Persian navy. The Salaminian king must have felt that he had a good relationship with the Great King and therefore would be given a free hand in Cyprus.<sup>76</sup> His access to power in Salamis may also have played a role in his considerations: when Evagoras overthrew Abdemon/Audymon, the friend of the former Great King, without having to face any consequences, he must have gained the impression that his actions were tolerated. This impression was strengthened by the fact that his relationship with the Persians remained untroubled in the twenty years of his reign before the outbreak of the Cypriot War. Evagoras must have felt safe, and he may have been right to do so. It was only after the appeal for help from Amathus, Kition and Soli that Artaxerxes finally decided to intervene.<sup>77</sup>

Until the times of Evagoras, another aspect had been relevant in the nature of the relationship between the Cypriot kings and their Near Eastern masters, from the Assyrians to the Persians. From the latter's perspective, the island lay far away on the periphery. The Neo-Assyrian and Persian empires were made up of numerous peoples and territories. The heterogeneous character of these enormous empires led their rulers to favour local administration whenever and wherever possible. Local traditions were respected. The Persian Empire was composed of an inner core, the centre, around which lay a garland of different political entities such as satrapies, dependant cities and petty kingdoms.<sup>78</sup> Especially the regions that lay far away from the centre enjoyed a large amount of autonomy.<sup>79</sup> Central power and local autonomy complemented each other in the governing

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<sup>74</sup> As Iacovou (2013b, 35) has shown, Salamis had followed a policy of expansion already earlier in order to gain access to the copper route through the Mesaoria.

<sup>75</sup> Diod. 14.98.3.

<sup>76</sup> Costa 1974, 56.

<sup>77</sup> Maier 1985, 39: "His rupture with the Great King seems in the last resort to have sprung from a wrong assessment of Persian policy: Artaxerxes' decision to support the Cypriot cities attacked by Euagoras [...] drove the Salaminian king to revolt."

<sup>78</sup> The term "centre" in this context has to be understood as "l'aristocratie perse unie autour du Grand Roi" (Briant 1987, 137).

<sup>79</sup> Briant 1987, 4–5; 1996, 90–91, 193–196; Tuplin 1987, 111–112; Jacobs 1994, 91; Debord 1999, 78. The proceedings of an Achaemenid history workshop from 1986 are aptly named "Centre and Periphery": Sancisi-Weerdenburg/Kuhrt 1990.

of the empire.<sup>80</sup> Therefore, the concept of suzerainty and the centre-periphery character of the Assyrian and Persian empires depended on each other. To put it simply, the relationship of suzerainty could change according to the distance between the centre of power and the vassal on the periphery, as well as to the various forms of local traditions in self-government.

During the fourth century, the western periphery must have appeared increasingly hard to control for the Persian central power, since its political development and dynamics were determined increasingly by numerous protagonists. Egypt, having gained independence at the close of the fifth century, was not willing to accept Persian domination again, and supported adversaries of the Achaemenid kings. The Phoenician petty king Tennes of Sidon started a revolt around 350 BC, and was joined not only by Nectanebos II of Egypt, but also by nine Cypriot kings.<sup>81</sup> The satraps of the western provinces also followed their own agendas. I will confine myself here to the satraps involved in the Cypriot War. Already at the beginning of the hostilities, Hecatomnus, satrap of Caria, had changed sides; his son Mausolus would become a powerful dynast in western Asia Minor. Orontes, satrap of Armenia, plotted against Tiribazus (possibly with the help of Evagoras). His further career is marked by several conflicts with Artaxerxes II and Artaxerxes III, but he was always able to win back the favour of his masters. Tiribazus, also satrap of Armenia, was less lucky: having regained the favour of Artaxerxes II after the Cypriot War, he later joined a conspiracy against the latter and was subsequently put to death.<sup>82</sup>

From this perspective, Evagoras I of Salamis was only part of an increasingly complicated political landscape becoming the centre of conflicts. The western periphery began to lose its peripheral status. This was to lead to a reversal of centre and periphery under Alexander's successors.

## 6. Aftermath: the inversion of centre and periphery and the end of the Cypriot kingdoms

In 332 BC, the Cypriot kings submitted to Alexander of Macedonia. As with Sargon in 708 BC or Kambyzes in 525 BC, they had become aware of the changing powers in the Near East, and came to an arrangement with the new strong man in good time.<sup>83</sup> But Al-

<sup>80</sup> Briant 1987, 1–2. In the context of the government of the Persian empire, the term “local autonomy” has to be understood as “das Recht der Untertanen, einen kleineren oder größeren Teil ihrer Belange selber zu regeln” (Frei 1996, 10). As Frei (1996, 35) has shown, the Persian government usually respected the decisions of the local governments, but tried to control them via “institutionalisierte Übergangsstellen vom lokalen zum zentralen System,” for example in the form of the satrapies. As we have seen, the existence of several local rulers in a competing system like the Cypriot petty kings also guaranteed the control of the latter.

<sup>81</sup> Diod. 16.41–42.

<sup>82</sup> Orontes und Mausolus: Diod. 15.90.3; 91.1; Tiribazus: Plut., *Artax.* 24.2; 27–30. This trend towards confident and autonomous behaviour of the western satraps culminated in a series of revolts usually known as “satrap’s revolt”: Diod. 15.90–93, with the profound historical commentary by Stylianou 1998, 522–548; further Briant 1996, 675–694; Debord 1999, 302–366.

<sup>83</sup> It was Alexander’s success at Issos in 333 which led the Cypriot kings to their decision: Arr., *Anab.* 2.20.3: καὶ οἱ τῆς Κύπρου βασιλεῖς ἐς τὴν Σιδῶνα κατέσχον ναυσὶν ἑκατὸν μάλιστα καὶ εἴκοσιν, ἐπειδὴ τὴν τε

alexander died in 323 BC, and his generals started a series of wars which finally led to the establishment of the Hellenistic kingdoms. The Cypriot kingdoms, which had existed for centuries, fell within a few years during the wars of the diadochs. It was Ptolemy who abolished the kingdoms, deposing the monarchs, killing several of them and integrating the island into his realm, as we have already seen. Why did he not wish to retain the well-established institution of petty kings on the island?

The reason for this radical rupture may be found in the centre-periphery model: from Assyrian to Persian times, Cyprus had been on the periphery, the centre of the larger empires being far away in Mesopotamia and Fars. From this perspective, it was only logical that the Great Kings allowed far-off regions to retain their local traditions and keep a certain amount of autonomy. But during the fourth century the western periphery of the Persian Empire, stretching from Asia Minor to Egypt, developed its own momentum. Not only Egypt, independent for several decades, but also the satraps in the service of the Great King had begun to follow their own agendas. Evagoras I of Salamis participated in this development and tried to widen the sphere of influence. As a result of this dynamic, the periphery began to lose its peripheral status.<sup>84</sup> In the wars of the diadochs, this development came to its logical end. The Eastern Mediterranean was no longer on the periphery, but had become the centre of the conflicts. Antigonos, Demetrius, Ptolemy, Seleucus, Lysimachus were all fighting in Asia Minor, Palestine, Egypt – and also in Cyprus. In the past, the existence of several Cypriot petty kings had secured the control of the island for the Persian Great King. But now, there was not only one great empire, but several powers competing for hegemony in the Eastern Mediterranean. Therefore, none of the pretenders could allow Cyprus to be ruled by several competing petty kings. As soon as a diadoch had found allies among the Cypriot kings, their rivals would join forces with another diadoch. While Nicocreon of Salamis was the main ally of Ptolemy, Nicocles of Paphos started negotiating secretly with Antigonos. This, finally, brought about his downfall, as we saw at the beginning. This mechanism is precisely described by Diodorus:

Ptolemy, however, who was master of the cities of Cyprus, on learning from certain persons that Nicocles, the king of Paphos, had secretly and privately formed an alliance with Antigonos, dispatched two of his friends, Argaeus and Callicrates, ordering them to slay Nicocles; for he was taking all precautions lest any others should hasten to shift allegiance when they saw that those were left unpunished who had previously rebelled (translated by R.M. Geer).<sup>85</sup>

Thus, it was only logical that the political fragmentation of the island had to be abolished. Cyprus had ceased to be on the periphery and had become one of the centres of political interest due to its strategic position in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Cypriot kings were no longer in the shadow of the Near Eastern empires, where they could retain

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ἦσαν τὴν κατ' Ἴσσον Δαρείου ἐπέθοντο καὶ ἡ Φοινίκη πᾶσα ἐχομένη ἤδη ὑπὸ Ἀλεξάνδρου ἐφόβει αὐτούς; “Soon afterwards the kings of Cyprus put in at Sidon with about 120 sail; they had learnt of Darius’ defeat at Issus, and were alarmed at the whole of Phoenicia being already in Alexander’s power.”

<sup>84</sup> This idea was already developed by Mehl 2004, 11–12, 20–21.

<sup>85</sup> Diod. 20.21.1: Πτολεμαῖος δὲ τῶν ἐν Κύπρῳ πόλεων κυριεύων, ἐπειδὴ τινῶν ἐπέθετο Νικοκλέα τὸν βασιλέα τῶν Παφίων ἐν ἀπορρήτοις ἰδίᾳ πρὸς Ἀντίγονον συντετεῖσθαι φιλίαν, ἐπεμψε τῶν φίλων Ἀργαῖον καὶ Καλλικράτην, προστάξας αὐτοῖς ἀνελεῖν τὸν Νικοκλέα· πάνυ γὰρ εὐλαβεῖτο μὴ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τινὲς ὀρμήσωσι πρὸς μεταβολήν, ὄρωντες ἀθώους γεγονότας τοὺς πρότερον ἀφρασηκότας.

their position and autonomy just by pledging their allegiance to the superior monarch in the form of tributes and ships. Suzerainty had come to its end.

## Conclusions. Suzerainty between centre and periphery

From the end of the eighth century to Alexander the Great, the Cypriot kings had to cope with the existence of powerful Near Eastern empires whose monarchs considered the island a part of their sphere of influence. The Cypriot kings submitted to the rulers of the Assyrian and later Persian empires.

The relationship between the petty kings and their masters can be described as a relationship of suzerainty. By submitting to the powerful monarchs, the Cypriot kings had to accept a certain loss of autonomy. They had to pay tributes and to supply armed forces when necessary, in the case of Cyprus mostly in the form of ships. The concept of suzerainty which left the petty kings in charge and respected local traditions was fitting for Cyprus since, from the perspective of the Assyrian and Persian Great Kings, the island was far out on the periphery. Every petty king seems to have had a personal relationship with the Great King, which allowed the superior monarch to decide when it came to conflicts between his subordinates. This *divide-et-impera* policy facilitated the surveillance of the island since the petty kings controlled each other.

On the other hand, the relationship of suzerainty left ample ground for interpretation. Except for tributes and military aid, not much seems to have been clearly fixed. The petty kings retained autonomy in their own realms, but also maintained their own foreign policy, as long as it did not collide with the interests of the superior monarch. These were naturally subject to change. Therefore, suzerainty could be interpreted in different ways which lead to misunderstandings and conflicts between the parties, as can best be seen in the Cypriot War of Evagoras I. The often imprecise character of the relationship of suzerainty helps to explain the vicissitudes in the development of the Cypriot kingdoms under foreign rule. It was not “national” resentment against Persia’s domination which led to the Cypriot Revolt and later the Cypriot War, but rather colliding conflicts between self-confident petty kings pursuing their own interests and a superior master who had to decide how to deal with his subordinates. Nevertheless, for many decades the relations between the Cypriot kings and their masters seem to have been untroubled. The Cypriot Revolt, the Cypriot War and the uprising in the middle of the fourth century (which I did not discuss here) cannot be considered the normal case in the relations between the Cypriot rulers and their Persian superiors.

The tensions resulting from the often vaguely defined relationship of suzerainty developed their own momentum in the fourth century, when the Near Eastern Mediterranean zone, from Asia Minor to Egypt, became the focus of the manifold and diverging interests of all political powers. With this development, Cyprus began to lose its peripheral status which had until then guaranteed the status and autonomy of the petty kings. Rulers like Evagoras I of Salamis intensified these tendencies by following their own agendas in the wider scope of the Near Eastern Mediterranean. This inversion of centre and periphery had its consequences in the times of the diadochs. The centres of the new

powers were no longer in distant Mesopotamia and mainland Persia, but on the Egyptian and Levantine coasts.

In the light of the concepts of suzerainty and centre-periphery, it is also possible to explain the long persistence of the Cypriot kingdoms in spite of the existence of larger empires in the Near East, as well as their abolishment when Cyprus came into the focus of attention under the diadochs. It is also easier to understand the alternation of long phases of relative calm and the outbreak of tensions leading even to military conflicts between the superior monarch and his subordinates.

## ABBREVIATIONS

ICS – Masson, O. (ed.), *Les inscriptions chypriotes syllabiques. Recueil critique et commenté*, (Études chypriotes, Vol. 1), Paris 1961 ; Addenda nova, Paris 1983.

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