In the years 1946 to 1948 Jan Patočka dealt, among other things, with the then current wave of existentialism and its criticism. In addition to an essay „Doubts on Existencialism”, published in 1947, this is evidenced by numerous reflections from this period found in Patočka’s estate, such as the recently published Philosophical Diaries. Unpublished notes from the years 1946–1950, as well as by the previously published book manuscript Eternity and Historicity, which comes from another part of his estate. These are the main sources the paper explores in order to show an impact of Eugen Fink’s critical stance on phenomenology, which in the 1930s was linked, among other things, to the idea of the “Me‑on.”The article does not go into this idea itself, as Fink conceived it, but it only follow its traces in Patočka’s debates on existentialism, where the negativity of being, insofar as it is reduced to “pure objectivity” in transcendental phenomenology, leads to the concept of a “dialectic of negative affection.”

The aim of this article is to critically analyze the implications of Husserl and Patočka’s model of phenomenological method for their philosophical conception of space. First, the question of the status of spatiality is reconstructed within the context of Husserl’s ontology. I demonstrate that his understanding of transcendental reduction presupposes an ontological premise about the difference between the transcendental and the worldly‑real, which justifies the supposed reducibility of the world – including its elementary dimension of spatiality – to the phenomenon of pure consciousness. This reconstructed context serves as a point of reference for the systematic presentation of Patočka’s critique of Husserl’s subjectivism. However, I demonstrate that the Czech thinker’s understanding of the phenomenological method (including his strong distinction between the moment of epoché and reduction) remains insufficient, as it reiterates certain Husserlian premises, generating significant inconsistencies in redefining the status of the field of phenomena. I argue that because the subject itself is irreducibly corporeal, any attempt at epoché itself takes place in the space of the world and must therefore remain constantly unfulfilled.

The article elaborates the interpretation of homelessness, which appears in Patočka’s Heretical Essays, from wider perspective of his philosophy. In the first part the author outlines the problem of homelessness on the background of tension between the natural world and modern scientistic account of reality. Patočka presents modern homelessness as multilayered phenomenon, which affects not only our private and intimate spaces, but also our relations to the world, Earth and even Being itself, what leads to question whether such multilayered understanding can be grounded in his philosophy. For this reason, the second part of the article is dedicated to elaboration of Patočka’s concept of home with its ties to the world in the context of his theory of three movements of existence. Such approach reveals that home and the world permeate each other. The concluding part points to specific thematic contexts of homelessness in its various layers and highlights how they atest to crisis of modern humanity and problematicity of its situation.

This article begins by distinguishing between perceptual consciousness and imaginative consciousness, outlining their main characteristics as a foundation for examining the role of imagination in human experience as conceived by Sartre. In order to clarify this role, I compare imagination, hallucination, and dreaming, using these phenomena to illustrate the function and significance of imaginative variation. The analysis aims to highlight the philosophical relevance of dreams, hallucinations, and oneiric consciousness not only within Sartre’s theoretical writings but also through his literary works, particularly the short stories The Room and Herostratus. The central questions concern whether the creation of images–especially in the form of imaginative variations–can be regarded as a cognitive method, and if so, what kind of insight it provides. Finally, I consider the epistemological and existential dimensions of imaginative variation, as well as the interpretative challenges that arise from Sartre’s conception of imagination.