Pitfalls and challenges in studies on the effectiveness of computerized cognitive training

In recent years, in both science and business, we observe an increased interest in using of various types of software and computer games to improve human cognitive abilities. Paradoxically, together with an increasing number of studies proving the effectiveness of this type of computerized cognitive training, is also growing number of reports about the lack of its beneficial effects. In this situation many doubts are raised by methodology used in training studies, especially poorly matched control groups, and inadequate monitoring of the placebo effect. In this article I will present the most important issues and challenges facing today’s research on computerized cognitive training.

Describing consciousness on scale from zero to one. Perturbational Complexity Index as a scientific attempt on measuring consciousness on an individual level

Scientific study of consciousness entered a new era with research focused on finding its neural correlates. The article depicts reasoning underlying this paradigm and controversies it arises using a novel tool designed to measure one’s level of consciousness by means of analyzing EEG signal. Perturbational Complexity Index, created by team led by Guilio Tononi, is used to present theoretical debate concerning the possibility of creating an objective consciousness measure. Stemming from reflections on mechanisms of loss of consciousness, authors of the index infer the informational nature of the phenomena, which is said to be demonstrated by experiments with participants under anesthesia, in deep sleep or suffering from disorders of consciousness. The extraordinary capability of the index to measure the level of consciousness on an individual level and its practical applications are discussed in context of possibility of experimental access to subjective experience.

Why representations don't stick with dynamic models?

In this paper I investigate thesis, embraced by proponents of dynamicism in cognitive science, that mind is not representational and explanation of cognition can go without representations. This claim has received serious criticism from cognitive scientists and philosophers of mind, who accuse dynamical explanation of being satisfying only for a narrow class of simple cognitive phenomena. Thus, genuine, representation-free explanation of cognition will always be incomplete. I espouse another strategy and present two arguments saying that the language of pure dynamical systems theory is not rich enough to define any nontrivial notion of representation. If I am right, then at least these phenomena dynamical explanation deals well with are not representational and representation talk can in no way help us understand them

During out-of-body experience (OBE) visual perspective and bodily awareness are altered. The phenomenon has been investigated in studies with brain-damaged patients, people exposed to gravitational overloads, as well as victims of traumatic events. Recently, virtual reality technology enabled evoking transient OBE in healthy people. Studies using full-body illusion (FBI) protocol point to incorrect visuo-vestibular integration as a potential mechanism evoking OBE. This conclusion is strengthened by neuroimaging and lesion studies suggesting important role of temporo-pariental junction (TPJ; multisensory associative cortical area damaged in patients suffering from OBE) for proper visuo-vestibular integration. Finally, potential mechanisms of individual differences in susceptibility to OBE ranging from simple perceptual to higher cognitive processes are discussed.

Independence or cooperation? On the issue of interaction between alerting and executive attention systems

According to Posner and colleagues, mechanism of attention consists of three systems: alerting, orienting and executive. Here, we focus on relationship between two of them, namely,  on the interactions between alerting and executive attention in tasks involving cognitive or motor conflicts. Previous studies suggest that the impact of alerting on the efficiency of conflict resolution may depend on various factors, including the presence of established stimulus-response associations, speed of the reaction selection process, characteristics of the allocation of spatial attention, and a stage of processing at which conflict occurs i.e., either perceptual analysis or response selection.  However, the available results are to some extent contradictory and no single hypothesis is sufficient to explain all cases of the interactions between alerting and executive attention observed so far. The present paper provides a comprehensive review of these results and hypothetical mechanisms underlying the relationship between alerting and executive attention