TY - JOUR
TI - Krytyka natywizmu jawnego i ukrytego w badaniach nad dziecięcymi teoriami umysłu
AU - Mirski, Robert
TI - Krytyka natywizmu jawnego i ukrytego w badaniach nad dziecięcymi teoriami umysłu
AB - 
	A Critique of Explicit and Implicit Nativism in Research on Children’s Theories of Mind

	The traditional theories of theory-of-mind development – modularist nativism, theory theory, and the two-systems theory – share a common model of mental representation. According to that model, the normative content of representation is encoded in its physical vehicle. In the present article, I point out that this claim entails the view that representation cannot emerge out of non-representational phenomena. This leads to the need of positing foundational mental content – foundationalism – and viewing cognitive development only as a reconfi guration of the innately given representations. As a result, all three models are forced to claim innate mental content, although only the modular nativists explicitly acknowledge it. Further, the idea that mental content is innate faces its own challenges: nativism does not seem to be a tenable position in either the “biological” or “psychological” sense of the term. I argue that nativism is a symptom of theoretical limitations, not a legitimate division of labor between psychology and other sciences.
VL - 2019
IS - Tom 24, Numer 2
PY - 2019
SN - 1895-6297
C1 - 2084-3879
SP - 15
EP - 28
DO - 10.4467/20843879PR.19.007.10890
UR - https://ejournals.eu/czasopismo/psychologia-rozwojowa/artykul/krytyka-natywizmu-jawnego-i-ukrytego-w-badaniach-nad-dzieciecymi-teoriami-umyslu
KW - theory of mind
KW - mindreading
KW - mental representation
KW - nativism
KW - foundationalism
KW - emergence
KW - teoria umysłu
KW - natywizm
KW - emergencja
KW - reprezentacje mentalne
KW - fundacjonizm