@article{6f982faa-dff5-4faf-be11-9584995ca3c2,
author = {Robert Mirski},
title = {Krytyka natywizmu jawnego i ukrytego w badaniach nad dziecięcymi teoriami umysłu},
journal = {Psychologia Rozwojowa},
volume = {2019},
number = {Tom 24, Numer 2},
year = {2019},
issn = {1895-6297},
pages = {15-28},keywords = {theory of mind; mindreading; mental representation; nativism; foundationalism; emergence; teoria umysłu; natywizm; emergencja; reprezentacje mentalne; fundacjonizm},
abstract = {A Critique of Explicit and Implicit Nativism in Research on Children’s Theories of Mind

	The traditional theories of theory-of-mind development – modularist nativism, theory theory, and the two-systems theory – share a common model of mental representation. According to that model, the normative content of representation is encoded in its physical vehicle. In the present article, I point out that this claim entails the view that representation cannot emerge out of non-representational phenomena. This leads to the need of positing foundational mental content – foundationalism – and viewing cognitive development only as a reconfi guration of the innately given representations. As a result, all three models are forced to claim innate mental content, although only the modular nativists explicitly acknowledge it. Further, the idea that mental content is innate faces its own challenges: nativism does not seem to be a tenable position in either the “biological” or “psychological” sense of the term. I argue that nativism is a symptom of theoretical limitations, not a legitimate division of labor between psychology and other sciences.},
doi = {10.4467/20843879PR.19.007.10890},
url = {https://ejournals.eu/czasopismo/psychologia-rozwojowa/artykul/krytyka-natywizmu-jawnego-i-ukrytego-w-badaniach-nad-dzieciecymi-teoriami-umyslu}
}