%0 Journal Article
%T Interpretacja wzorców konstytucyjnych z perspektywy filozofii prawa
%A Gizbert-Studnicki, Tomasz
%J Przegląd Konstytucyjny
%V 2017
%N Numer 3 (2017)
%P 33-49
%K constitution, interpretation, constitutional standards, essentially contested concepts
%@ 2544-2031
%D 2017
%U https://ejournals.eu/czasopismo/przeglad-konstytucyjny/artykul/interpretation-of-constitutional-standards-from-the-perspective-of-legal-philosophy
%X 
	Interpretation of constitutional standards from the perspective of legal philosophy 

	The provisions contained in the constitution have different characteristics. Specific problems arise in connection with interpretation of those provisions which contain standards. Traditional canons of interpretation (linguistic, systematic and purposive interpretation) fail, since constitutional standards refer to essentially contested concepts. The understanding of such concepts as equality, human dignity or social market economy depends on the accepted political philosophy. A deficit of legitimacy of decisions arises, since decisions based on a particular political philosophy are challenged by adherents of competing political philosophies. Such a deficit may be reduced by reference to the conception of “incompletely theorized agreements”. It may be demonstrated that a dispute relating to an abstract principle or value does not preclude the possibility of reaching a consensus with respect to a particular decision. Such a decision may be differently justified on the basis of different political philosophies.