%0 Journal Article
%T O nieprzydatności testu Ástráðsson wobec prezydenckiej prerogatywy – glosa do wyroku Naczelnego Sądu Administracyjnego z dnia 4 listopada 2021 r. (III FSK 3626/21)
%A Sułkowski, Jarosław
%J Przegląd Konstytucyjny
%V 2022
%R 10.4467/25442031PKO.22.032.16997
%N Numer 4 (2022)
%P 163-178
%K Judicial power, the President of the Republic of Poland, judge appointment, judicial independence
%@ 2544-2031
%D 2022
%U https://ejournals.eu/czasopismo/przeglad-konstytucyjny/artykul/o-nieprzydatnosci-testu-astradsson-wobec-prezydenckiej-prerogatywy-glosa-do-wyroku-naczelnego-sadu-administracyjnego-z-dnia-4-listopada-2021-r-iii-fsk-3626-21
%X 
	On the Inappropriateness of the Ástráðsson Test against the Presidential Prerogative: A Gloss to the Judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of November 4, 2021 (III FSK 3626/21) 

	The Supreme Administrative Court in the commented judgment unfortunately made an unsuccessful attempt to carry out the Ástráðsson test with regard to a person appointed by the President at the request of a politically subordinate (in violation of the Constitution) National Council of the Judiciary. Failure to do so is a kind of paradox of the commented judgment. A significant part of it relates to supranational and international law. „Europeanness” is ubiquitous in the judgment and was additionally included in its thesis. According to its content, assessors and judges are European judges. However, this otherwise catchy statement is not confirmed by the application of the judgment of the ECtHR to the assessment of an judge.

	On the constitutional level, the judgment also deserves criticism. The court considered it justified to refer to the judicature of the Supreme Administrative Court, the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Tribunal, referring to some extent to the presidential prerogative of appointing judges at the request of the National Council of the Judiciary, in order to reach a conclusion about the almost „magically healing” effect of the presidential act of appointment to the office of judge. The NSA also did not comment on the total deprivation of any real influence of the judiciary on the nomination procedure. Therefore, one should ask what is the balancing of the legislative and executive powers with the judiciary power absent from the National Council of the Judiciary?