The Use of Maps in the Planning of Operational Activities of Polish and Lithuanian Armies until the Beginning of the Rule of Stephen Báthory

As per the 16th and 17th centuries, operational activities should be understood as military activities conducted by independent groups (usually regiments). They may also be termed the art of manoeuvre. One may place them between strategic decisions and specific tactic actions related to fi ghting a battle or conducting a siege. The first mid-16th-century theoreticians to have observed the importance of this art were Albrecht Hohenzollern and Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski. Some 16th-cenutry authors (e.g. Jan Tarnowski, Albrecht Hohenzollern, Marcin Bielski) concordantly postulated the introduction of a preceding manoeuvre action that would last one day. This assumption survived until  the early 18th century.

As early as in 1551, Modrzewski proposed to follow the Turkish example and make special maps for the purposes of the moving army. Apart from the Turks, caesarean experiences were also mentioned. Bartosz Paprocki and Andrzej Gostyński quoted mainly the example of Charles V (1500–1558). Bartosz Paprocki and Stanisław Sarnicki, in turn, writers active at the beginning of the rule of Stephen Báthory, opted for the necessity of having a cartographer in the army who would make march route maps au courant. The cartographic turn in manoeuvre activities took place in 1567–1577, during the war fought against the rebellious Gdańsk. According to our knowledge, five different maps and plans were made in this period. The production of march route maps required measuring distances with steps, which greatly facilitated reconnoitring. Uniform march step enabled even the determination of the distance covered on the basis of the time lapsed. Engineers could have used an aid in the form of pedometers that counted the number of steps of a man or a horse. T ese assumptions were disseminated in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth by Marcin Bielski who quoted an ancient Roman concept of a double step (passus – 148 cm).  

As per the 16th and 17th centuries, operational activities should be understood as military activities conducted by independent groups (usually regiments). They may also be termed the art of manoeuvre. One may place them between strategic decisions and specific tactic actions related to fi ghting a battle or conducting a siege. The first mid-16th-century theoreticians to have observed the importance of this art were Albrecht Hohenzollern and Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski. Some 16th-cenutry authors (e.g. Jan Tarnowski, Albrecht Hohenzollern, Marcin Bielski) concordantly postulated the introduction of a preceding manoeuvre action that would last one day. This assumption survived until  the early 18th century.

As early as in 1551, Modrzewski proposed to follow the Turkish example and make special maps for the purposes of the moving army. Apart from the Turks, caesarean experiences were also mentioned. Bartosz Paprocki and Andrzej Gostyński quoted mainly the example of Charles V (1500–1558). Bartosz Paprocki and Stanisław Sarnicki, in turn, writers active at the beginning of the rule of Stephen Báthory, opted for the necessity of having a cartographer in the army who would make march route maps au courant. The cartographic turn in manoeuvre activities took place in 1567–1577, during the war fought against the rebellious Gdańsk. According to our knowledge, five different maps and plans were made in this period. The production of march route maps required measuring distances with steps, which greatly facilitated reconnoitring. Uniform march step enabled even the determination of the distance covered on the basis of the time lapsed. Engineers could have used an aid in the form of pedometers that counted the number of steps of a man or a horse. T ese assumptions were disseminated in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth by Marcin Bielski who quoted an ancient Roman concept of a double step (passus – 148 cm).